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9. EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE RESURGENCE OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM DURING THE 1970S

DAVID N. GIBBS

The 1970s brought a major ideological shift in the United States, moving the political agenda decisively to the right. At the domestic level, economic policy became increasingly market-based, eschewing the Keynesian proclivities of an earlier period, while at the international level, there was renewed emphasis on confrontation with the Soviet Union. The conservative shift was evident in both political parties. This chapter assesses how the rise of evangelical Protestantism influenced the political shift of this period. The term *evangelical* will be used as denoting variants of Christianity that emphasize literal interpretations of the Old and New Testaments; the importance of personalized and emotional relationships between individual Christians and Jesus Christ; hostility toward secularist political tendencies; and the salience of life-transforming “born again” experiences.

The overall conservative shift was led by business elites, who sought free-market economic policies and military expansion. In seeking these objectives, they established common cause with evangelical Christians, and the resulting business-Christian alliance offered advantages to both groups: From the

standpoint of the evangelicals, business support enhanced their power and better enabled them to lobby for the “traditional values” that the evangelicals favored. From the standpoint of business elites, the coalition with evangelicals offered a mass base, which included millions of conservative voters. The glue that held together this disparate alliance was funding, supplied by business figures and expended by church clergy. The combination of money, votes, and religious fervor, which resulted from this alliance, was a significant factor in producing the rightward shift of the era. At an affective level, the new Christian conservative identity created a strong sense of “belonging” among its adherents, in a culturally unstable era, which helped make this identity an especially potent force for the political right. The public role of Christian conservatism has remained a distinctive feature of U.S. politics, one that endures to the present day.

The Crisis of the 1970s

During the post-World War II era, a “class compromise” emerged in the United States, which entailed government regulation of the macro-economy, a federal welfare state of moderate size, and mass labor unions—a state of affairs that came to be accepted by most business interests.¹ After 1970, however, the class compromise was undermined, as business gradually withdrew support from the project. This withdrawal of support was based on changed circumstances: During the 1970s, profit rates declined in multiple sectors and reached historically low levels, a process that has been well documented by economic historian Robert Brenner.² This decline in profitability was a matter of grave concern for corporate executives and was probably the most important factor undercutting the class compromise. Second, sizable elements of U.S. youth were becoming politically radicalized and associated with a New Left that first emerged on college campuses during the 1960s and remained a potent force into the early 1970s; this too was a source of apprehension among business elites. Third, the 1975 defeat in Vietnam generated reluctance on the part of the U.S. public to countenance new overseas interventions, which left multinational companies concerned that their investments in unstable regions, such as the Persian Gulf, lacked military protection.³

The rise of business anxiety during this period was most clearly explicated by a memorandum written by Lewis Powell, a Virginia corporate attorney who would later serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. Originally written as a confidential strategy paper for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in 1971, the document was leaked to the press and published in the *Washington Post*. In this memoran-

dum, Powell emphasized the danger of growing antibusiness attitudes among the general public. He focused especially on the influence of political activist Ralph Nader, whose criticism of U.S. corporate power was considered especially threatening. Powell also noted criticisms of business emanating from academia, mainstream clergy, and the mass media. Overall, the Powell memorandum advanced the notion that the American business class faced an unprecedented attack on its practices and the free-market ideology that undergirded it. In response, the Powell memorandum advocated an extended campaign by business to counter this perceived attack and laid out a proposed program of corporate lobbying, aimed not only at policy makers but also at the general public. The lobbying effort was to be backed by “generous financial support from American corporations.”⁴ In retrospect, its wording may seem shrill and overstated, but there is no doubt that Powell expressed a widespread sentiment among U.S. business figures, and this sentiment deepened over time.

The memorandum coincided with a massive lobbying campaign by business interests that also began during the early 1970s and continued throughout the decade, and aimed at curtailing the New Deal legacy of regulated capitalism. While there was a substantial augmentation in the scale of business involvement in politics, the *character* of the involvement also changed: During the 1970s, business increasingly sought not merely to influence specific legislation—as it had done in the past—but also to engineer a fundamental shift in the political climate, in a *laissez-faire* direction.⁵ New business lobbies were founded, such as the Business Roundtable, while preexisting lobbies, such as the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, were reinvigorated with increased financial support.⁶ The business mobilization would in time generate a sea change in U.S. politics that culminated in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. This business mobilization also funded a growing network of highly talented conservative intellectuals, associated with such corporate-funded think tanks as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Hoover Institution.⁷ Among the most important of these rising conservative intellectuals was Paul Weyrich of Heritage, who would play a key role in planning and orchestrating the mass mobilization of conservatives among the general public.

The 1970s also was a decade of mass religious mobilization, which some authorities have termed America’s “fourth great awakening.”⁸ The most distinctive feature of this awakening was a rapid growth in fundamentalist sects, outside the more established Protestant churches. By 1976, one-third of the U.S. adult population reported that they had experienced being “born again” with Jesus Christ.⁹ At the same time, more mainstream congregations, such as

the Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists, and the United Church of Christ (as well as the Catholic Church), all saw significant declines in membership, consistent with a more generalized loss of public confidence in established institutions that was one of the hallmarks of public opinion at this time. Just as people were losing confidence in established political institutions due to military failures in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, the public was also losing confidence in established religion.¹⁰ Among the more mainstream churches, the only one that registered major growth during this period was the Southern Baptist Convention; and fittingly, the Baptists were among the most evangelical of all the purportedly mainstream Protestant groups.¹¹ The burgeoning movement of fundamentalist churches had thus emerged as a powerful and potentially decisive electoral force.

The Evangelical Mobilization Begins

While political conservatives in the Republican Party did not create this evangelical awakening, they were clearly prepared to mobilize the evangelicals and fortify their efforts, beginning during the presidency of Richard Nixon. The president himself was irreligious, and “church worship bored him,” according to one study.¹² Yet he clearly understood the potential of Christianity to rally large numbers of voters against the antiwar movement, the “hippie” counterculture,” and the Democratic Party, which was increasingly viewed as embracing these heretical tendencies. Nixon made a special effort to mobilize not only Christian voters but also Christian businessmen. At one point, Nixon directed an aide to “develop a list of rich people with strong religious interest to be invited to the White House church services.”¹³

The most important element in Nixon’s religious strategy was his alliance with charismatic Baptist pastor Billy Graham, who held mass rallies that were widely televised. These rallies combined emotional commitment to Jesus with support for President Nixon and his political agenda; they also showcased mass contempt for Nixon’s secularist enemies. Graham played a prominent role in Nixon’s first inauguration ceremony in 1969. His religious invocation was considered by *Time* magazine to be a “mini-inaugural address,” in which Graham condemned the “materialistic and permissive society,” as well as “crime, division, and rebellion”—a thinly veiled criticism of the counterculture.¹⁴ Nixon’s own inaugural address was filled with religious references.¹⁵ In response to mass student demonstrations against the Vietnam War in 1970, Graham helped sponsor an “Honor America Day,” with a mass rally of conservatives in Washington, DC, to support the president’s war effort.¹⁶

From Nixon's standpoint, the affiliation with the Baptist preacher was a stroke of genius, as it added a populist and even anti-elitist character to his administration. It also generated political support for Nixon from among Graham's numerous admirers, many of whom were working-class southerners, who had traditionally voted Democratic. In encouraging a social backlash, Nixon was subtly appealing to racist sentiment, since much of the backlash was against racial integration. Graham himself generally opposed segregation and racism, but this was not necessarily true of his overwhelmingly white followers.¹⁷ Overall, the whole operation fit in well with the Nixon administration's "southern strategy," which sought to forge a new Republican majority in this traditionally Democratic region.

Despite his populist image, Graham also had impressive connections to conservative businessmen, which no doubt increased his value to the Republican Party. Throughout his career, Graham had combined his religious proselytizing with strident anticommunism, as well as free-market and anti-union ideas. As early as 1952, Graham stated that in the Garden of Eden there were "no union dues, no labor leaders, no snakes, no disease," and similar themes were reiterated throughout his long career.¹⁸ He attracted considerable corporate support. According to one biography, "Graham enjoyed numerous long-standing relationships with men of great wealth," including such prominent figures as J. W. Marriott, H. L. Hunt, Clint Murchison, Sid Richardson, and J. Howard Pew.¹⁹ Oilman Pew seems to have been an especially important figure in supporting Graham; Pew also supported *Christianity Today*, a Graham-affiliated publication that became one of the leading voices of evangelical Christianity. In 1971, the executive editor of *Christianity Today* wrote to a colleague that Pew was a "great benefactor" of the publication as well as "one of the most wonderful men I have ever known."²⁰ By affiliating his presidency with Graham, Nixon could further cement his ties to corporate America while at the same time broadening his electoral appeal among social conservatives.

Nixon's association with religion paid rich dividends, especially in light of the Democratic Party's shift toward a more secular direction. The rise of the women's movement, with its associated ideas of gender equality and abortion rights, was embraced by the Democrats, at least at the national level. The 1972 Democratic convention was widely viewed as a "secularist putsch," a point that Nixon did not fail to emphasize in his reelection campaign.²¹ The Republicans' strategy produced a large swing of religious Protestant voters away from the Democrats and toward Nixon, contributing to Nixon's landslide victory over George McGovern in the November election. Nixon's support among white

southerners who regularly attended church reached 86 percent—in a constituency that traditionally had voted Democratic.²²

In the long run, the Nixon presidency would end in disgrace, with the Watergate scandal and Nixon's humiliating resignation in 1974. On the other hand, the Nixon administration's mobilization of religion would prove useful as a model to rising New Right activists in private industry and also in industry-funded think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation. Building on Nixon's approach, the New Right would use religion to drive a conservative realignment in U.S. politics, one that was to go far beyond the tepid conservatism of the Nixon administration itself. And if Graham was no longer available to lead this movement, there existed a coterie of ambitious preachers who would eagerly replace him while building on the idea of the corporate-friendly religious figure that Graham helped pioneer. And finally, the Nixon-Graham concept of combining the mobilization of religion with the simultaneous mobilization of business interests, and fusing the two sets of interest groups, would prove instructive for New Right strategists such as Weyrich, who would avidly adopt this strategy as well.

Evangelical Politics after the Nixon Presidency

A remobilization of evangelicals began almost immediately after Nixon's demise. Spearheading this remobilization was Bill Bright, who in 1975 founded the Christian Embassy in Washington, which sought to "evangelize members of Congress, the military, the judiciary, and the diplomatic service," as well as the Here's Life, America organization, to evangelize the general public.²³ Bright's endeavors combined religious and economic conservatism, and they attracted financial support from the Coors (of Coors Brewing), the Hunts (of Hunt Oil), and the DeVos family (Amway Corporation) as well as Mobil Oil, PepsiCo, and Coca-Cola. Bright also founded a Christian publishing company, Third Century Publishers, which distributed copies of conservative tracts that combined religious piety with economic conservatism and praise of the free market. Third Century's editor in chief, Rus Walton, also served as a director at the National Association of Manufacturers.²⁴ Meanwhile, the evangelical Fellowship Foundation "tapped wealthy businessmen" and with these funds organized prayer groups among members of Congress and other high-ranking government officials.²⁵ In Texas, pastor James Robison gained a large following for his sermons against both "demonism and liberalism." He was funded by the Hunts, the owner of the Texas Rangers baseball team, and a prominent Houston banker.²⁶ In southern California, fundamentalist leader Demos Shakarian

“continued to recruit the Sunbelt’s merchants and financiers” into his church while he advanced “pro-capitalist politics.”²⁷ The wealthy DeVos family helped underwrite the Christian Freedom Foundation, which sought to “further religious right organizing efforts.”²⁸

Perhaps the most important evangelical leader of the 1970s was Jerry Falwell, who led a congregation in Lynchburg, Virginia, and whose radio and television show *The Old Time Gospel Hour* had a national audience. Falwell also established the fundamentalist Liberty Baptist College (later Liberty University), which offered a Christian college experience to the faithful. A strong believer in capitalism, Falwell affirmed that “the free enterprise system is clearly outlined in the Book of Proverbs.”²⁹ He also preached anti-union views. One researcher dryly observed that Falwell’s position “coincides with the interest of local business owners and managers far better than it does with those of most people in his own congregation.”³⁰ With his fervently probusiness position, Falwell attracted many wealthy benefactors.³¹

At least some of the business funders were acting on the basis of cynical realpolitik rather than religious commitment. One of the major supporters of the evangelicals was Hunt Oil patriarch H. L. Hunt, who was merely a “nominal believer, who had a regular mistress and a healthy gambling habit.”³² For some, religion was simply a useful vehicle for advancing the conservative ideology that many businessmen supported instinctively, as a matter of self-interest. But this was not always the case. There also emerged during the 1970s a group of Christian business interests, whose executives combined an authentic religious fervor with entrepreneurial activity, including the Amway Corporation, Days Inn, Chick-Fil-A, and Mary Kay Cosmetics. The burgeoning market for Christian music produced several highly profitable companies. All these interests became ready sources of support for Christian causes.³³

The Christian conservatives engaged the culture wars that were sweeping through the United States during the mid-1970s. One of the first major flare-ups occurred during 1974–75 in Kanawha County, West Virginia, where evangelicals protested against public school textbooks that contained excerpts from works by Mark Twain, Bernard Malamud, Eldridge Cleaver, and James Baldwin. The protests continued over a period of months and entailed repeated acts of violence, bombings, and shootings. The Ku Klux Klan mobilized to bolster the protesters—thus giving the overall movement a racist tinge—while coal miners staged a supportive strike. Local ministers led the protests and insisted that they were upholding “the infallible word of God.”³⁴ The Heritage Foundation immediately saw an opportunity for using this dispute to curry favor with evangelicals. Accordingly, Heritage offered support to the Kanawha

County protesters, including free legal assistance as well as help presenting their cases to the national media.³⁵

The culture wars continued throughout the decade with gathering intensity, and they would play out around issues of school curriculum, homosexuality, feminism, and abortion rights, often led by right-wing female activists, such as Anita Bryant and Phyllis Schlafly.³⁶ The ubiquitous Coors family helped fund Schlafly's activism, notably her crusade against the pending Equal Rights Amendment to the constitution, which proposed equality of the sexes.³⁷ Throughout the decade, these populist movements were integrated into the larger conservative movement, with its probusiness agenda, all of which formed a broad coalition. And these mobilization efforts produced a basic shift in the political orientation of evangelicals, who became far more engaged in politics than previously. This shift began around the middle of the decade, as described by political scientist Robert Putnam: "Prior to 1974 . . . most studies found evangelicals less disposed to political participation than other Americans—less likely to vote, to join political groups, to write to public officials, and to favor religious movements in politics. After 1974, by contrast, most studies have found them *more* involved politically than other Americans."³⁸ Evangelicals were indeed forming into a mass movement, one that would influence the U.S. political system well into the twenty-first century.

The Presidency of Jimmy Carter

The 1976 election constituted yet another setback for the New Right. The favored conservative candidate, Reagan narrowly failed to gain the Republican nomination, and the Democrats ultimately won the presidency while retaining their overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress. Though the conservative defeat would prove only temporary, it seemed devastating at the time. And the new president, Jimmy Carter, threatened to co-opt culturally conservative issues, being both a southerner and an evangelical Christian himself, one who regularly taught Bible classes and embraced the mantle of having been born again. During and after the election, Carter had gained support from prominent evangelical ministers while winning nearly all the southern states; it briefly appeared that Carter could reintegrate these key constituencies back into the Democratic Party while holding the support of the party's more secular, northern wing.³⁹ Among his cohorts, the new president seemed the ultimate centrist, who would reconcile the divide between the religious and the secular and thus overcome or at least attenuate the culture wars. Carter would surely find some middle ground, or so it was hoped.

In reality, the middle ground did not exist. Carter's alliance with the evangelicals did not last long, and the failure of this alliance helped undermine his presidency. Some of Carter's problems resulted from questionable judgment: After his inauguration, Carter distanced himself somewhat from the ministers who had helped him win the election and generally held the evangelical movement at arm's length. He evaded several requests to speak before evangelical organizations or attend their public functions. It appears that the president felt secure in the knowledge that he himself was an evangelical. Carter believed he had no need to make special efforts with these groups—a strategy that had the predictable effect of alienating the evangelicals over time.⁴⁰ The president made more strenuous efforts to cultivate secularists, especially those in the burgeoning women's movement, who had always distrusted him to some degree. Key figures in the women's movement were appointed to the administration. Several of these appointments, notably the former Congresswomen Bella Abzug, were undiplomatic in their manner; they clashed repeatedly with the Christians, especially with regard to abortion rights and the still-pending Equal Rights Amendment. Particularly damaging to Carter's standing among evangelicals was a 1978 ruling by the Internal Revenue Service that threatened to strip the tax-exempt status from many Christian schools, which were considered racially discriminatory.⁴¹ After 1979 Carter made feeble efforts to appease the evangelicals and repair the damage, but it was clearly too late.⁴²

Amid the deterioration of Carter's relationship with evangelicals, New Right activists recognized an organizing opportunity. In 1979, they helped create the Moral Majority, an overtly political Christian group headed by Virginia pastor Jerry Falwell. The Moral Majority and its affiliated organizations held mass rallies and also coordinated networks of local Christian activists, virtually acting as a religious wing of the Republican Party. Perhaps the most important function of the Moral Majority was a mass voter registration campaign, which is believed to have successfully registered some two million voters for the 1980 election.⁴³ The new organization gained substantial business support. According to one account: "Falwell's high-flying profile with Republican leaders and the Moral Majority attracted a new kind of contributor: the superdonor. Texas oil billionaire Nelson Bunker Hunt had given millions to the Moral Majority. [Other contributors included] life insurance moguls Arthur Williams and Art DeMoss, cotton magnate Bo Adams, and a wealthy Pennsylvania poultry farmer, Don Hershey."⁴⁴ The Coors family also provided funds.⁴⁵ And the corporate-backed Heritage Foundation was instrumental in founding the organization, with Weyrich playing an especially central role.⁴⁶

Consistent with the New Right philosophy of “fusionism,” evangelical Protestants began forming alliances with diverse religious groups, including conservative Catholics and Orthodox Jews.⁴⁷ Despite his segregationist past, Falwell’s Moral Majority was open to all races and gained some limited support among socially conservative black people.⁴⁸ A particularly striking feature of this period was the rise of “Christian Zionism,” which became influential among evangelicals. The Christian Zionists were staunch supporters of the State of Israel, based on a biblical prophecy that the Jewish state anticipated the Second Coming of Jesus. Jewish groups responded with some trepidation to the evangelical support—considering the long history of antisemitism that had been associated with Christian awakenings in the past—but ultimately welcomed the prospect of forging new alliances for the pro-Israel project.⁴⁹ And finally, the evangelicals established common cause with corporate lobbyists seeking an expansion of the U.S. military: The president of the American Security Council, a trade group of weapons manufacturers, developed close ties to one of the Moral Majority’s affiliated organizations, the Religious Roundtable.⁵⁰ Accordingly, many Christian conservatives advocated for an aggressive U.S. military stance and justified this advocacy in theological terms. According to Falwell, “Jesus was not a pacifist. He was not a sissy.”⁵¹

During the 1980 election campaign, the evangelicals played prominent public roles, overwhelmingly in favor of the Republican candidate, Reagan. In the end, the evangelical mobilization was not decisive in Reagan’s election, given his substantial, ten-point margin of victory over Carter. While the Moral Majority brought new voters to the Republican Party, especially among the vast numbers that the organization registered, it also probably alienated a sizable number as well. Overall, the net electoral benefit of the evangelicals to the Republican Party in 1980 was actually less than it had been in the earlier 1972 election.⁵² However, the religious mobilization helped create a new and enduring force in U.S. politics for the long term whose strength grew over time. Pollster George Gallup would later remark that “religious affiliation remains one of the most accurate and least appreciated political indicators available.”⁵³ Christian conservatism has proven an enduring and essentially permanent feature of the U.S. political landscape.

Conclusion

Superficially, the right-wing shift at the end of the 1970s resulted from massive investments by business interests that had turned against the postwar class compromise and sought more business-friendly policies. And indeed,

we have seen that there is a good deal of truth in this explanation. The turn of evangelicals toward conservative politics and the Republican Party was surely influenced by sustained business funding. But there is another factor that should not be overlooked: the New Right developed a highly effective political strategy, which entailed the formation of broad coalitions integrating disparate groups, including socially conservative Christians and economically conservative business executives. The idea of blending together these groups was advocated by Ronald Reagan in 1977: “The time has come to see if it is possible to present a program of action . . . that can attract those interested in the so-called ‘social’ issues and those interested in ‘economic’ issues. In short, isn’t it possible to combine the two major segments of contemporary American conservatism into one politically effective whole?”⁵⁴ The willingness to engage in such coalition building—and to do so as part of an overarching political strategy—accounts for much of the conservative success in this era, just as much as the massive infusion of money that undergirded that success.

The political left consistently avoided coalition building, and this avoidance points to a broader political failure. In some respects, the left’s inability to check the rightward shift seems surprising, since labor unions remained large and powerful during the late 1970s, still accounting for a major share of the work force. In addition, the new social movements of the era held considerable sway among America’s youth, and these included environmental, antinuclear, gay, and women’s organizations. There also were African American, Chicano, and Native American political organizations, with substantial followings. While the left may have lacked corporate money, it could have compensated with broad popular support. The problem is that the progressive groups had little capacity to work together; the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and other major unions were viewed with suspicion, because of their earlier support for the Vietnam War. And the social movements each had a single-issue focus, which prevented them from even considering significant cooperation with groups emphasizing different issues. There was also a profusion of small Marxist groups that sought revolutionary change, and they attracted some of the best and brightest among politically engaged young people. But these groups produced no realistic programs.

During the 1970s, the left seemed to reject the very idea of coalition building or majoritarian politics, almost as a matter of principle, a political stance that dovetailed with postmodernist theories that were just becoming popular in academia at the time. According to Marshall Berman, postmodernists “generally pushed their movements in the separatist and sectarian directions, away from broad civil rights coalitions and from human bonds that could transcend group

boundaries.”⁵⁵ Such attitudes go a long way toward explaining the New Right’s success. Indeed, one of the most striking features of the New Right is the way it followed a political script of forming mass movements that had been pioneered by the *left*, from an earlier period. By the 1970s, however, the left had abandoned the idea of broad mass movements and strategic thinking more generally.

Stated simply, the right had a strategy for political success, whereas the left had none. It should come as no surprise that the conservative alliance of religion and money was so successful. When looking back at the story of religious mobilization during the 1970s, it appears that the outcome was not predetermined but was the result of specific political decisions that, for better or worse, ended with a victory by ultraconservatives in 1980. This victory has resonated in American politics ever since.

NOTES

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- 12 Williams, *God's Own Party*, 94.
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- 16 Kruse, *One Nation under God*, 263–73.
- 17 Regarding Graham's attitudes toward racial segregation and his complicated relationship with Martin Luther King Jr., see Steven P. Miller, *Billy Graham and the Rise of the Republican South* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 90–92.
- 18 Kruse, *One Nation under God*, 37–38.
- 19 Grant Wacker, *America's Pastor: Billy Graham and the Shaping of a Nation* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 154. See also Jane Wolfe, *The Murchisons* (New York: St. Martin's, 1989), 233.
- 20 Lemuel Nelson Bell to Frank P. Stelling, December 18, 1971, Lemuel Nelson Bell Collection, Box 41, Folder 19, Billy Graham Center, Wheaton College. See also Darren E. Grem, “Christianity Today, J. Howard Pew, and the Business of Conservative Evangelicalism,” *Enterprise and Society* 15, no. 2 (2014): 337–79.
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- 25 Lichtman, *White Protestant Nation*, 342.
- 26 Darren Elliott Grem, “The Blessings of Business: Corporate America and Conservative Evangelicalism in the Sunbelt Age, 1945–2000” (PhD diss., University of Georgia, 2010), 199.
- 27 Darren Dochuk, *From Bible Belt to Sun Belt: Plain Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism* (New York: Norton, 2011), 386. These activities were also undertaken by Bill Bright, according to Dochuk.

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- 29 Lichtman, *White Protestant Nation*, 347. Regarding the history of Falwell's relationship with the local business community, see Daniel K. Williams, "Jerry Falwell's Sunbelt Politics: The Regional Origins of the Moral Majority," *Journal of Policy History* 22, no. 2 (2010): 125-47.
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- 32 Grem, "Blessings of Business," 199.
- 33 Grem, "Blessings of Business," 159, 161, 187, 191, 203, 210-11. Additional information on business funding can be found in Deborah Huntington and Ruth Kaplan, "Corporate Ties to the Evangelical Christian Groups: A Report to the World Student Christian Federation," August 28, 1980, unpublished report in Group Research Inc. Papers, Box 125, Folder 8, Columbia University, New York.
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- 35 Lichtman, *White Protestant Nation*, 314.
- 36 Regarding Bryant's and Schlafly's activism, see Anita Bryant, *The Anita Bryant Story: The Survival of our Nation's Families and the Threat of Militant Homosexuality* (Grand Rapids, MI: Revell, 1977); and Donald T. Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman's Crusade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
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- 39 J. Brooks Flippin, *Jimmy Carter, the Politics of Family, and the Rise of the Religious Right* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 108-11, 210-11, 321.
- 40 Flippin, *Jimmy Carter*, 161, 250.
- 41 See Robert Freedman, "The Religious Right and the Carter Administration," *Historical Journal* 48, no. 1 (2005): 238-39; and Joseph Crespino, "Civil Rights and the Religious Right," in *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s*, ed. Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 97-105.
- 42 Flippin, *Jimmy Carter*, 157, 166-67, 250.
- 43 Liebman, "Mobilizing the Moral Majority," 54. The two million registered voters included those registered by the Moral Majority as well as its affiliated organizations Christian Voice and Religious Roundtable.
- 44 Smillie, *Falwell Inc.*, 105. Note that the time frame for these contributions is not specified.
- 45 Bellant, *Coors Connection*, 50.
- 46 Jerome L. Himmelstein, "The New Right," in *The New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation*, ed. Robert C. Liebman and Robert Wuthnow (New York: Aldine, 1983), 26.

- 47 Himmelstein, "New Right," 19; Laura Kalman, *Right Star Rising: A New Politics, 1974-1980* (New York: Norton, 2010), 273-74.
- 48 Clyde Wilcox, "Blacks and the New Christian Right: Support for the Moral Majority and Pat Robertson among Washington, DC Blacks," *Review of Religious Research* 32, no. 1 (1990): 43-55.
- 49 On Christian Zionism, see Joe. L. Kincheloe and George Staley, "The Menachem Begin-Jerry Falwell Connection: A Revolution in Fundamentalism," *Journal of Thought* 17, no. 2 (1982): 35-39. See also "For AJC," memorandum from Irving Kristol, undated, probably 1981, Box 9, Folder 28, Irving Kristol Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison.
- 50 John Fisher, president of the American Security Council, was "one of the political members of the [Religious] Roundtable's 'Council of 56,'" according to Saloma, *Ominous Politics*, 61. For more information on Fisher and the Roundtable, see "A Third Religious Force Is Organized by the Right Wing," *Group Research Reports*, November 28, 1979; and Bellant, *Coors Connections*, 50. Regarding the close connections between the Religious Roundtable and the Moral Majority, see Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since World War II* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 205.
- 51 Quoted in Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983), 116.
- 52 Phillips, *American Theocracy*, 192.
- 53 Quoted in Phillips, *American Theocracy*, 124.
- 54 Ronald Reagan, "The New Republican Party" (speech at the 4th annual CPAC Convention, February 6, 1977), <https://patriotpost.us/pages/430-ronald-reagan-the-new-republican-party>.
- 55 Marshall Berman, "Postmodernism," in *Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, ed. Joel Krieger (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 686.

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