THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THIRD WORLD INTERVENTION



Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis

David N. Gibbs

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The Political Economy of Third World Intervention

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DAVID N. GIBBS is assistant professor of political science at the University of Arizona.

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To Bernard and Sybil Gibbs

So I had it after all the months. For nothing is lost, nothing is ever lost. There is always the clue, the canceled check, the smear of lipstick, the footprint on the canna bed . . .

That is what all of us historical researchers believe. And we love truth.

From Robert Penn Warren
All the King's Men

Contents

Acknowledgments

I owe an important intellectual debt to Thomas Ferguson. I have learned a great deal from my association with Tom; above all, I learned that political science need not be boring. Tom has always been able to shake up a discussion, and in the current intellectual climate—so empty and so hostile toward critical thought—his insights should be welcomed. Readers familiar with Thomas Ferguson's work will recognize his influence on the present study.

Willard Johnson and Richard Samuels, my other dissertation advisors at MIT, were most helpful in sharpening my arguments. The following persons made important comments on various chapters: Jerri-Lynn Scofield, Jan Vansina, James Nolt, Jerry Theodorou, Aleki Mukendi, Robert Vitalis, Catherine Boone, Gregory Nowell, and Marion Smiley. Nzongola-Ntalaja gave generously of his time and his specialized knowledge of the Congo. Michael Schatzberg, one of the referees, gave extended and excellent comments on two manuscript drafts. My sister, Merryl Gibbs, was an important source of ideas. Documentary materials and other research help were provided by David Palmeter, Bruce Lehman, Mathew Borman, W. Weigert, Janice Pottker, Jonathan Kwitny, William Minter, and Stephen Weissman. Cynthia McClintock, who originally encouraged me to undertake graduate study and has long been helpful to me, deserves special thanks. It was a pleasure to work with John Tryneski, my editor at Chicago. The Mudd Library of Princeton University allowed me to quote from documents in its collection, while reprint permissions were granted by Simon and Schuster, Dartmouth Publishing, St. Martin's Press, and *Fortune* magazine. Financial support was generously provided by the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation. The political science departments at the University of Wisconsin (Madison) and the University of Arizona offered congenial environments for revising my work.

This book is dedicated to my parents, Bernard and Sybil Gibbs, who both understand, from their own experinces, that politics is not an abstract thing and that, moreover, it is not always pretty.

I, of course, am solely responsible for the contents of this book.

Introduction

> All nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of the means of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests.
>
> Hans Morgenthau[1]

> Often the phrase "national interest" is used when what is meant is that a certain bank wants the State Department to do something.
>
> Harold Lasswell[2]

In the field of international conflict, intervention remains one of the most important, yet underresearched, areas. Foreign intervention—the manipulation of the internal politics of one country by another country—has been a feature of international politics from the earliest times, dating back at least to Ancient Greece.[3] Intervention has been particularly important during the post–World War II era. With the advent of nuclear weapons, it is often noted, the great powers were no longer able to confront each other directly. Instead the Cold War was often fought indirectly, in Third World countries; the superpowers would use foreign intervention, often covert, to project their influence into these conflicts. Some writers suggest that intervention had become the dominant form of international conflict, and by 1963 Hannah Arendt implies that there had been a "profound change of international relations" marked by this increased interventionism.[4] Foreign intervention shows no sign of abating, despite the recent collapse of communism and the decline of Cold War tensions. The invasion of Panama suggests that the USA will still continue its interventionist activities. Other Western countries, such as France (and perhaps in the future Japan), are also likely to play interventionist roles during the post–Cold War era. It is even possible that the Soviet Union will engage in intervention, though less often than previously.

Foreign intervention violates numerous international laws and conventions. A United Nations resolution, for example, declares that "no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state" and specifically forbids any state from supporting "the violent overthrow of another state."[5] The practice is widely condemned. Nevertheless, intervention remains one of the most important modes of contemporary global conflict.

The present study will attempt to explain foreign intervention. It will analyze the factors that motivate countries to intervene, and how such interventions influence international politics. The study will develop an explanatory model of intervention, termed the "Business Conflict" model. This model will be defined at length in chapter 1. Now the model's main features will be noted: First, private business interests affect all aspects of policy, including foreign intervention. Second, private interests are typically divided with regard to intervention, and these divisions significantly influence world politics.

We will explore a case study of foreign intervention in the Congo (now Zaire), focusing on the years 1960–70. The Congo was selected because foreign powers extensively intervened in that country. The Congo gained independence from Belgium in 1960, but it was immediately beset by several secessions and rebellions, some of which were supported by Belgian companies. The United States also played a role in these events. It is now known that the American government helped undermine, and possibly assassinated, the Congo's first prime minister during 1960–61. The USA strongly supported a United Nations military mission which ended the secession of Katanga province in 1963. The United States aided a Belgian intervention in 1964. The current leader of the Congo, General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, came to power in 1965 with American support.[6]

How can U.S. policy be explained? Most studies suggest that anticommunist sentiments and fear of Soviet and Chinese influence account for America's Congo policy,[7] but this explanation is inadequate. It ignores the fact that the USA could have followed many different policies in order to preclude communist influence in the Congo. The anticommunism argument, moreover, does not explain why the USA opposed several anticommunist factions in the Congo. Finally, this view fails to account for changes in policy. Eisenhower, for example, supported the Belgian interests in the conflict, whereas Kennedy tended to oppose the Belgians.

The author accepts that anticommunism was one factor motivating U.S. foreign policy. However, the specific policies that the government followed to preclude communist influence were conditioned by business conflict. The international business community was seriously divided with regard to the Congo Crisis, and these divisions, it is argued, affected U.S. policy. The Eisenhower administration was close to investors who were linked to Belgian companies, and Eisenhower was thus predisposed to favor the Belgian interests. Kennedy, on the other hand, was linked to investors who sought to replace the Belgians, which predisposed Kennedy to oppose the Belgian position. Business conflict, we shall see, was a crucial factor in the Congo Crisis.

In general, this study demonstrates that private interests *do* affect international conflict. These interests can act in two ways. First, they can influence foreign policies of specific states, sometimes (in extreme cases) reducing the states to mere instruments of specific pressure groups. Second, the private interests can bypass the states and conduct their own foreign policies, intervening directly in specific Third World crises. As its title suggests, this study will emphasize the importance of private interests in international relations, and the emphasis will reappear throughout.

The focus on private interests is inconsistent with the familiar Realist approach. Realism, still probably the dominant perspective in international relations,[8] has always focused on state policy and has eschewed private, nonstate, actors. In the Realist view, sovereignty is the essential prerequisite for participation in international relations. States are thus the only actors of consequence in the international arena, and private actors, lacking sovereignty, are virtually excluded. In short, Realism holds that private interests do not play an independent role. The present study will challenge these points and will stress the independent role of private interests. The author's Business Conflict model thus differs sharply from Realism.

Of course the present study is hardly the first to challenge Realism. Dissenters in the field of international relations have often turned to Dependency analysis, which emphasizes economic conflict between the industrialized core countries and the Third World periphery.[9] Relying heavily on Marxist concepts, the *Dependistas* view international relations as a global class conflict between the core and the periphery. Some writers even refer to "bourgeois" and "proletarian" countries and their struggle for the world's resources.[10] This conflict constitutes the principal issue of international relations, and foreign intervention is one of its manifestations.

The Business Conflict model, employed in the present study, should be distinguished from Dependency theory. The author does not deny the importance of core-periphery conflict, but he will also emphasize conflicts between different core powers. Core countries, influenced by their respective private interests, will compete for investment opportunities in the periphery. The following chapters on the Congo will note examples of such competition among the USA, Belgium, and France. The conclusion will suggest that other interventions in other countries may have been influenced by similar rivalries. The Business Conflict model can be generalized.

The approach of this study thus differs from both Realism and Dependency. Whereas Realists emphasize state power and neglect the role of private interests, the present study will emphasize private interests and will regard state policy as a reflection, to some extent, of private power. While *Dependistas* stress the importance of core-periphery conflict, this study emphasizes conflict among the core countries and among the corporate interests within these countries. The author's perspective thus differs from much of the existing international relations literature.

This study will also contribute to the analysis of comparative politics. Typically, the fields of international relations and comparative politics are carefully distinguished from one another. Accordingly, comparative studies often disregard international factors and how they influence the internal politics of specific countries. Serious misinterpretations can occur, and the Congo provides good examples. Crawford Young's *Politics in the Congo* remains one of the most widely cited, and still one of the best, studies of the Congo Crisis.[11] The Young book covers Congolese politics in the most minute detail; it virtually ignores, however, the role of foreign intervention and the way intervention influenced Congolese politics. In later chapters we shall see that foreign intervention played a decisive, often determining, role in the Congo. The present study suggests that comparative analysis may be enriched by attention to international factors, including intervention.

Methodology

This book, in short, proposes a theoretical model of intervention, the Business Conflict model, and tests it in a case study of U.S. policy in the Congo. The Business Conflict model will also be compared with other, more conventional, approaches. One of the most difficult methodological issues is that of causality. In order to properly evaluate these theories, we must gain an understanding of what caused U.S. policy; the study must show that certain factors were crucial in making U.S. policy what it was. Moreover, we must consider the counterfactual question: What would have occurred if certain variables—specific business influences, for example—had not been present? It is very difficult to answer this question definitively. We cannot repeat history, leaving out certain business influences while holding other factors constant, and then analyze the result. This limitation can be partially but not completely overcome if we examine several different cases of intervention. Such studies can measure to some extent the relative importance of specific causal factors.

However, the latter approach presents another problem: Comparative studies with multiple cases sacrifice, and necessarily must sacrifice, a great deal of empirical depth. It is not practically possible to examine several cases in detail. Multiple case studies must rely predominantly or exclusively on public sources, yet these are totally inadequate. Government officials do not usually advertise their business connections, and businesses do not advertise their lobbying activities. Comparative studies gain some methodological rigor, but the rigor is achieved at the expense of essential data.

Another possibility is to examine only one case in great depth. Such a study would entail careful analysis of available materials and a reconstruction of the case history. From this historical reconstruction, we can consider the importance of business influence on the policy process. The current study uses the historical approach.

This approach presents some obvious difficulties. First, historical analyses entail subjective judgments and do not permit quantitative measurements. How do we measure, for example, the power exercised by particular business interests or their importance in the policy process? No answer presents itself. One possibility is to drop the entire question of business influence, because it cannot be analyzed with complete precision. The present author will reject this option and will agree with economist Paul A. Baran: "Yet it would certainly seem desirable to break with the time-honored tradition of academic economics of sacrificing the relevance of subject matter to the elegance of analytical method; it is better to deal imperfectly with what is important than to attain virtuoso skill in the treatment of what does not matter."[12] In this study, we must content ourselves with verbal rather than quantitative analysis.

A second problem concerns motivation. Studying the motivations of policymakers is difficult, and the following judgment of John F. Kennedy may be only a slight overstatement: "The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often indeed to the decider himself."[13] The Business Conflict model, for example, assumes that policymakers are motivated by financial gain. Yet it is very difficult to prove this definitively. One can ask policymakers about their motivations, but their answers will reveal little. Government officials usually deny economic motivations, since these would reflect badly on the officials' integrity. Where an official does admit an economic motivation, such a confession would count as reliable evidence, since it would constitute a declaration against interest. By the same token, researchers rarely, if ever, obtain such admissions. In most cases we can only infer motivation from circumstantial evidence.

The third problem is that historical records are incomplete. The present author, for example, could not obtain much of the necessary information. Numerous government documents remain classified, and the Central Intelligence Agency, which played a major role in the Congo, has released little of substance. Many declassified documents contain "sanitized" sections, from which information has been deleted. None of the relevant business archives are open to public scrutiny. Furthermore, the author is confident that much information was lost or destroyed, and that many important events were simply not recorded at all. And it is always possible that some of the documents contain false or deliberately misleading information. Historical figures do from time to time attempt to tamper with the historical record.[14] The paucity of documents can be compensated for by direct interviews, but this technique presents other difficulties. Some of the most important figures in this study refused to submit to interviews, while others, who were interviewed, revealed little.

The author does not pretend that his is a complete or definitive account. Such an account, in all probability, will never be written. Nevertheless, the author was able to obtain substantial documentation from numerous sources, including the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries; the National Archives; the Council on Foreign Relations Archives; the United Nations Archives; the World Bank Archives; and special collections at Stanford University, Princeton University, the Indiana Historical Society, and the Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives. Additional information was gathered from numerous European, American, and African periodicals, including legislative journals, the general press, the business press, and specialized trade publications. Some two thousand pages of U.S. government documents were obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, and over thirty on-the-record interviews were conducted. Memoirs of former officials, as well as secondary sources, were also consulted.

Substantial materials clearly are available, and in this author's opinion these data are sufficient to draw some conclusions. The methodological approach will be straightforward. The study will factually recount the history of the Congo Crisis and will compare the historical record against several theories of U.S. intervention, including the Business Conflict model. The theories will be evaluated according to the following criterion: An acceptable theory must account for the facts of the Congo case. We cannot expect any theory to account for all of the facts—that is impossible in the social sciences—but an adequate theory should account for at least most of the facts. In general, the greater the range of information explained by the theory, the greater the validity of that theory.[15]

This book comprises eight chapters, including the present Introduction. Chapter 1 defines intervention and surveys the literature pertaining to the issue. This chapter analyzes six existing explanations of foreign intervention and advances the author's Business Conflict model as an alternative approach. Chapter 2 provides the historical background to the Congo Crisis, with a discussion of Belgian colonialism and the factors that ultimately led to independence. This chapter is based largely on secondary sources and is intended to familiarize the general reader. Congo-Zaire specialists may wish to skip this chapter (although one section, "The International Context of Belgian Colonialism," does contain much new information). The next chapter, chapter 3, discusses the Congo Crisis itself during 1960–61, and how the Eisenhower administration responded to the crisis. Chapter 4 analyzes the Congo Crisis during the Kennedy era in the years 1961–63. Chapter 5 discusses U.S. policy after the Congo Crisis, during the period 1963–65. Chapter 6 brings the discussion through 1970 and emphasizes how long-term U.S. policy was determined by the events of the Congo Crisis. The conclusion, chapter 7, reconsiders the theories of foreign intervention in light of the Congo case.

Reader's Note

Most names of persons and places in the Congo were changed during the late 1960s and early 1970s, in accord with General Mobutu's policy of "Africanization." The country name itself was changed in 1971 from the Congo to Zaire. To avoid confusion, the text uses the names that were in existence at the time of independence in 1960. The same names will be used consistently throughout the study.

Translations from French-language sources are the author's.

1 Explaining Foreign Intervention: Toward a Business Conflict Model

> The latent causes of faction are thus sown in with the nature of man . . . The most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property . . . Those who are creditors and those who are debtors . . . A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, and many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views.
>
> James Madison[1]

This chapter will explore the literature pertaining to foreign intervention. Before beginning the analysis, it will be necessary to define intervention. A country will be viewed as interventionist when it deliberately manipulates the internal politics of another country.[2] The most obvious form of intervention is, of course, an invasion. The invading power can establish a puppet government in the target country, a government which will be subservient to the interests of the invader.

Interventionism can also be accomplished through subtler means. An interventionist power can gain influence within a foreign government (usually by bribing government officials), and the interventionist may use this influence to change or modify that government's policies. A country engages in intervention if it helps a foreign government to repress an insurrection, or alternatively if it helps the insurrectionists to overthrow the government. Interventionists may also promote political disorder in a foreign country, through financing opposition newspapers, disseminating propaganda, bribing union leaders to engage in strikes, coercing legislators to vote against the government, supplying information to opposition parties, or supporting a coup d'état against the government.[3]

The above definition is far from exhaustive. A country can intervene indirectly, by providing foreign aid to a "friendly" country. Such aid may bolster the government in power, and thus it will influence the internal politics of the recipient country.[4] Foreign intervention is not limited to states; the International Monetary Fund has intervened extensively in Third World countries. Nor is foreign intervention only practiced by industrialized countries against Third World countries. Industrialized countries frequently intervene in the internal affairs of other industrialized countries. Japanese efforts to lobby the U.S. Congress against protectionist legislation constitute foreign intervention. Sometimes Third World countries attempt to influence the politics of industrialized countries. The "Koreagate" scandal in the USA provided one example. In other cases, Third World countries intervene in the affairs of other Third World countries, as when Tanzania overthrew the Idi Amin regime in Uganda. Thus, an extensive array of international activities fall within the category of foreign intervention. To circumscribe this study, U.S. intervention in the Third World will be emphasized.

We will now analyze six major theoretical perspectives on foreign intervention: National Character, Pluralism, Instrumental Marxism, Structural Marxism, Statism, and Bureaucratic Politics. The essay will then critique each of these approaches and will advance a Business Conflict model as an alternative approach. Later chapters will test these models in a discussion of foreign intervention in the Congo.

The National Character Model

The National Character model emphasizes the anticolonial aspects of American policy and attributes this orientation to the American national character. The National Character approach argues that the United States—because of its heritage as a former colony, its successful revolt against British domination, its democratic traditions, and its tendency to identify with the downtrodden—is inherently anticolonial. No other country, it is held, has pursued such disinterested and selfless foreign policies as the United States. Chester Bowles provides a sample of the National Character perspective:

> We are unquestionably in the midst of a world revolution. Has any nation of great wealth and material advantages ever . . . become an active, contributing partner in such a revolution? My reading of history discloses none.
>
> Can America, then, become history's first exception? . . . In Africa, Asia, and Latin America impatient millions are straining against the old established order . . . against the old social order of master and servant, against the old political order of the rulers and the ruled . . . We [Americans] approach the challenge with certain advantages. The first of these is our own American revolutionary tradition . . . Wilson's Fourteen Points in 1917, with their advocacy of the rights of self-determination for subject peoples everywhere, were deeply rooted in the American tradition.[5]

American officials frequently express such views in public speeches, as well as in classified documents.[6]

Some academics have subscribed to the National Character interpretation as well. One recent exponent of this view is Tony Smith, who focuses on U.S. foreign policy toward China. Smith notes that the USA opposed European spheres of influence in China; American officials favored Chinese nationalism and an open door for foreign trade. Smith suggests that the China experience typifies U.S. policy in general. He concludes that "the cultural, social, and especially political structures of the American Republic thus conspired to favor sovereign self-government for other peoples."[7]

The National Character perspective does not systematically examine U.S. intervention in the Third World. Indeed, it implies that the USA is inherently noninterventionist. Advocates of the National Character position generally avoid the issue entirely, and if they discuss it at all, they regard U.S. intervention as an aberration, contrary to the overall thrust of American policy in the Third World.[8]

The National Character approach often leaves many issues unaddressed. The approach is never really developed as a theory. The role of business interests in the policy process, the relation between the state apparatus and interest groups, and the significance of bureaucratic cleavages are usually not examined. The National Character approach does not really need to address such issues, since the United States is viewed in rather monolithic terms. Nearly all Americans are influenced by the American national character, and political conflict therefore disappears as an issue.

The National Character model makes specific predictions and is easily testable. The model predicts that U.S. foreign policy consistently will favor national self-determination. The USA, concomitantly, will oppose colonialism and neocolonialism in the Third World. If the model is correct, then American foreign policy should be consistently anticolonial over long periods. If the model is incorrect, we should find that the USA often pursues procolonial policies, or alternatively we should find no consistency over time with regard to U.S. policy toward the Third World.

Pluralism

The Pluralist model of politics has long been the dominant tradition in American political science. Its basic logic runs as follows: American society is extraordinarily heterogeneous and contains a large number of ethnic, economic, regional, professional, ideological, and other groups. These groups all have distinct political interests, and each forms its own lobbying organization through which it pressures the government. Politicians are naturally receptive to interest group pressures, since interest groups represent potentially large voting blocs. A pressure group rewards (i.e., gives political support to) politicians who favor that group's position, and it punishes politicians who oppose the group's position. The bureaucracy is also affected by interest group lobbying. State bureaucrats are controlled by politicians, and the politicians, in turn, are controlled by the interest groups. Few competent bureaucrats completely ignore interest groups, and bureaucrats who do so will probably find their budgets cut.

The Pluralist methodology has been extensively applied to the study of domestic politics, especially in Congress and in local governments. Some studies, however, also apply Pluralism to U.S. foreign economic policy.[9] In addition, F. Chidozie Ogene applies Pluralist analysis to the study of U.S. policy in Africa.[10] Ogene finds that Africa policy is influenced by a diverse range of groups, including ethnic or racial organizations (such as the NAACP), liberal groups (American Committee on Africa), right-wingers (John Birch Society), humanitarian groups (Red Cross), religious groups (World Council of Churches), agents of foreign governments (South African Embassy), and a variety of business interests (especially mining companies). Each group lobbies the government or, through media campaigns, the general public and advocates policies that favor the particular group. These pressure groups, Ogene concludes, influence U.S. policy.

A key assumption of Pluralism is political equality. All persons are legally permitted to organize, and all individuals, if they have an interest in politics and are rational, form pressure groups and lobby the government. All groups enjoy access to power, and the political system does not systematically favor any one group. Two authorities on Pluralism state: "Probably the most powerful factor preventing one group from upsetting the balance of power is the existence of other groups. Organization invites counter-organization. The increased influence of one group forces competing groups to strengthen themselves."[11] Of course, some interest groups win political battles, while others lose, depending upon each group's level of organization, the skill with which the groups employ their respective resources, and their overall tenacity. However, all groups at least initially have equal access to power.

Pluralist studies downplay the role of business. The major Pluralist statement on business lobbying, that of Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, argues that business is a weak interest group, and that its lobbying efforts are often incompetent and ineffectual.[12] One recent defender of Pluralism claims that business is "an interest group, actively competing with a plurality of other political constituencies . . . *Business is not regarded as enjoying any particular advantages* that cannot be matched by other interest groups [emphasis added] . . . [Pluralist writers] argued that the American political system was both fluid and accessible. They documented the inability of any one interest group, including business, to dominate it."[13] This is a slight exaggeration. If one searches the literature one can find (very rarely) Pluralists who acknowledge that business may be more effective than other interest groups. Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom write that "in our discussion of pluralism we . . . [regarded] business and business groups as playing the same interest-group role as other groups . . . though more powerfully."[14] Such qualifications are exceptional, and they suggest that at most, business possesses marginal advantages. Business influence is a minor imperfection in an essentially egalitarian political system.

If the Pluralist explanation were correct, we would expect the following: diverse interests from several social classes and status groups would organize and pressure government officials. No sector would dominate the process, and business groups would not wield significantly more power than nonbusiness groups. If Pluralism were incorrect, we would find little evidence of interest group activity, or we would find that the political system systematically favored certain interest groups, while it excluded others.

Instrumental Marxism

The Instrumentalist view of political power is completely at odds with that of Pluralism. While the Pluralists regard the political system as egalitarian, the Instrumentalists regard it as highly inegalitarian. Above all, the Marxists claim that business interests dominate the political system and point out that most state officials are themselves capitalists or representatives of the capitalist class. The extensive links between business and government are stressed. Ralph Miliband, a prominent exponent of this view, writes: "It has remained a basic fact of life in advanced capitalist countries that the vast majority of men and women in these countries has been governed, represented, administered, judged, and commanded in war by people drawn from other, economically and socially superior and relatively distant classes."[15] In a capitalist society, wealth, income, and economic power are all distributed unequally, and political power, accordingly, is also distributed unequally. The political system strongly favors the dominant economic groups (i.e., business interests), while it disfavors, or completely excludes, workers.

Instrumental Marxism is often employed in studies on U.S. foreign policy. (The Dependency school is generally based on Instrumentalist concepts.) These studies note that the foreign policy apparatus, just like all other areas of government, is dominated by men, rarely women, from elite social backgrounds and very close ties to business interests. Richard Barnet, a former advisor to the Kennedy administration who later adopted radical views, provides this description:

> Between 1940 and 1967, when I stopped counting, all of the first- and second-level posts in a huge national security bureaucracy were held by fewer than four hundred individuals . . . [The government officials] were so like one another in occupation, religion, style, and social status that, apart from a few Washington lawyers, Texans, and mavericks, it was possible to locate the offices of all of them within fifteen city blocks in New York, Boston, and Detroit. Most of their biographies in *Who's Who* read like minor variations on a single theme . . . Seventy of the ninety-one people who have held the very top [foreign policy] jobs . . . have all been businessmen, lawyers for businessmen, and investment bankers.[16]

Several other writers also emphasize the connections between business interests and the foreign policy bureaucracy.[17]

Other studies analyze business connections with certain private "research" institutions, which in turn influence foreign policy. Shoup and Minter analyze the Council on Foreign Relations from a Marxist perspective and emphasize the ties between the council and the "New York Financial Oligarchy."[18] They note that about half of the council's members, and the large majority of its officers, are representatives of the capitalist class. Shoup and Minter also ar-

gue that the council has decisively influenced American foreign policy. Edward Berman similarly analyzes the Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie foundations.[19]

The implications of business dominance are straightforward. American foreign policy directly serves business interests and manipulates Third World governments in order to serve these interests. The USA supports conservative, probusiness political groups in Third World countries, while it opposes radicals. Any Third World government that is "unfriendly" toward American business interests risks overthrow by the CIA.

Inevitably these interventions are rationalized in Cold War terms. Instrumentalists challenge the establishment history of the Cold War and argue that the United States has used the Soviet "threat" as a pretext for crushing indigenous revolutionary movements in the Third World. Alexander Cockburn asserts, for example, that "the United States seeks to establish hegemony in the Third World and has used anticommunism and anti-Sovietism as the propaganda equivalents of the older 'white man's burden.'"[20] In an earlier era, but in a similar vein, Charles Beard described the way economic interests motivated policy, while policymakers and businessmen cynically justified these adventures in terms of "the national interest."[21]

Following Lenin's and Hobson's studies of imperialism, the Instrumentalists argue that U.S. foreign policy is motivated by economic factors. The famous study of William Appleman Williams argues that the USA has, since the beginning of the century, sought to impose an open door on the rest of the world, which permits unlimited economic expansion.[22] Baran and Sweezy claim that foreign intervention serves both multinational corporations and armaments manufacturers.[23] Noam Chomsky claims that American interventions in Central America protect American companies from nationalization.[24] The state thus acts as an instrument of the capitalist class in all areas, including foreign policy.

In general the Instrumentalist perspective assumes a cohesive capitalist class. The Instrumentalists avoid discussion of politics within the business community; they tend to view the business community as a monolith, united against challenges to capitalism. None of the Instrumentalist studies systematically addresses the question of intercapitalist conflicts. Instrumentalist Marxism is ill-equipped, therefore, to explain cases where the business community is divided. If the Instrumentalist approach were correct, we would expect the following: Intercapitalist conflicts would rarely occur, or alternatively, such conflicts would not significantly affect government policy.

Structural Marxism

Structural Marxists also acknowledge that government policy favors business interests and that, more specifically, the structure of capitalism influences state policy. Structuralism, however, differs in some key respects from the Instrumentalist approach. Whereas Instrumentalists stress direct government-business ties, the Structuralists deemphasize such ties. Nicos Poulantzas, for example, states that "the *direct* participation of members of the capitalist class in the state apparatus and in the government, even where it exists, is not the important side of the matter."[25]

The Structuralists therefore perceive some independent role for the state. The independence is in fact essential for the survival of capitalism. Business is frequently divided, and each firm advances its own interests. Such individualism may prevent the capitalists from advancing their general interests as a class. Businesspersons, moreover, perceive their interests in the short-term and are incapable, in general, of pursuing their long-term interests. Social welfare programs, for example, ensure long-term stability, but businesspersons, ever shortsighted, oppose such reformist measures. The capitalist class requires a state apparatus to consider the long-term needs of the system and to ensure its continuation. In order to properly discharge its function, the state must have some autonomy from specific business interests.

However, the state is never completely autonomous, according to Poulantzas. The state, to use the jargon, is "relatively autonomous" from the capitalist class. The state may pursue a range of policies, but it will not directly challenge capital. In the short run the state may oppose specific companies, but in the long run it must serve the capitalist class.

Why does the state serve capital? What are the mechanisms through which the state remains wedded to the capitalist system? Poulantzas unfortunately does not seem to answer these questions. Other writers discuss the points with greater clarity. Charles Lindblom, late in life, abandoned his earlier Pluralist views and adopted views that may be classified in the Structuralist category.[26] Lindblom notes that business occupies a privileged position in society, since it has the ability to cease investing, which would wreck the economy and bring down the government. A "capital strike," as it is sometimes termed, could work like this: A leftist government comes to power and legislates measures—greatly increased corporate taxes for example—which are considered antibusiness. Business interests retaliate by ceasing to invest new capital within the country and shifting to overseas investment. The lack of investment reduces the level of economic growth, undermines the leftist government, and ultimately causes a change in policy. In addition to capital strikes, other measures may also be employed: Business interests can speculate against the national currency and drive down its value. They can reduce their exports and therefore undermine their host country's balance-of-payments position.[27] Through strategies such as these, companies can sabotage an unfriendly government.

All governments in a market economy will have to court business interests. Lindblom puts the matter this way:

> Thus politics in market-oriented systems takes a peculiar turn, one largely ignored in conventional political science [and especially in Pluralism!]. To understand the peculiar character of politics in market-oriented systems requires, however, no conspiracy theory of politics, no theory of common social origins uniting government and business officials, no crude allegation of a power elite established by clandestine forces. Business simply needs inducements, hence a privileged position in government and politics, if it is to do its job.[28]

If business interests disapprove of government policy, they may cease to invest. Few governments are able to survive such action. No group in society, Lindblom argues, enjoys these privileges. Workers must work in order to make a living, "without special inducements from the government." It is far easier for business to organize a capital strike than it is for workers to call a labor strike.

A lively literature in the Structuralist tradition has grown around the issue of business privilege.[29] Several studies focus on the British experience and note that successive Labor governments were forced, against their will, to implement economic austerity. One study cites the memoirs of Harold Wilson. Wilson recounts the following conversation with the governor of the Bank of England, which took place shortly after Wilson's inauguration as prime minister:

> I said that we had now reached the situation where a newly elected government with a mandate from the people was being told, not so much by the Bank of England but by international speculators, that the policies on which we had fought the election could not be implemented; that this government was to be forced into the adoption of Tory policies to which it was fundamentally opposed. The Governor confirmed that this was, in fact, the case.

> I asked him [the Governor] if this meant that it was impossible for any Government whatever its party label, whatever its manifesto, or the policies on which it fought an election, to continue, unless it immediately reverted to full-scale Tory policies. He had to admit that this was what his argument meant.[30]

Even a leftist government must appease business.

Harry Magdoff applies Structuralist methodology to the question of U.S. intervention in the Third World. Magdoff argues that foreign policy will serve business interests, but it will only do so in the long run:

> The search for unadulterated economic motives of foreign policy decisions will serve as a useful hypothesis . . . But it will fail if one expects to find such for *each and every* [emphasis in original] act of political and military policy . . . Attempts to explain isolated actions [of U.S. intervention] in "bookkeeping" terms make no sense. Small Latin American countries that produce relatively little profit are important in United States policy-making because control over all Latin America is important . . . [Their votes] in the UN or the OAS . . . [are] important to the general U.S. scheme of domination.[31]

Foreign intervention helps to create an international environment that is conducive to investment. Interventions do not always aid specific companies, but they serve business interests in general. Thus, the American foreign policy apparatus is relatively autonomous from business interests.

Paul Joseph uses Structuralist methodology for his study of U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War. Joseph states that the Vietnam War cannot be explained in purely economic terms, since there was no significant U.S. investment in the country. The war was intended, nevertheless, to serve long-term capitalist interests. U.S. officials, Joseph argues, sought to discourage revolutionary movements throughout the Third World—including areas which *did* contain American investments. Joseph cites a Chase Manhattan executive who in 1965 opined that "U.S. actions in Vietnam . . . have considerably reassured both Asian and Western investors."[32] Business interests did not formulate the policies that led to the war, but they did support the war in general.

In Joseph's model, the capitalist class does not direct policy-making, but it sets the parameters around which policies are formulated. Within these parameters, state bureaucrats possess some autonomy. Bureaucrats may not, however, advance proposals that go beyond the established parameters and that threaten capitalism. In the Vietnam case, unilateral withdrawal was regarded as an anticapitalist measure. According to Joseph: "If the U.S. turned tail and ran [from Vietnam], other national liberation movements would be encouraged . . . Indeed, unilateral withdrawal would weaken the very structure of international capitalist power."[33] Unilateral withdrawal accordingly was never considered in the Vietnam case, because it was regarded as anticapitalist. The state is relatively autonomous from capitalism but never completely autonomous. The relative autonomy affects all areas of policy-making, including intervention in the Third World.

The essential feature of Structuralism (at least for the present discussion) is its assumption of "relative autonomy" and its concomitant assumption that business interests do not direct government policy. Fortunately it is easy to test this proposition. If the Structuralist view were correct, we would find little evidence of direct business-government ties, or we would find that such ties, where they exist, do not influence policy.

Statism

The Statist paradigm focuses primarily or exclusively on the internal dynamics of state institutions, on how these institutions formulate policies, and on how the resulting policies influence the society and the political system. Statist theorists, of which Theda Skocpol is probably the leading proponent,[34] severely criticize both Marxism and Pluralism for being "reductionist" and for ignoring or underestimating the importance of state activities.[35] Statist methodology has been applied to a range of empirical issues, especially with regard to domestic politics in the USA.[36]

Statism has also been applied to the study of international conflict. Indeed, the Statist perspective is closely related to the "Realist" school of international relations previously discussed. Stephen Krasner's *Defending the National Interest* is probably the most influential study of intervention from a Statist perspective. Krasner regards the state bureaucracy as the independent variable and the focus of analysis. The state is considered internally cohesive and autonomous from societal pressures. Policymakers collectively establish their own conception of the national interest, and this conception largely determines American foreign policy. In Krasner's words, "the objectives sought by the state cannot be reduced to some summation of private desires. These objectives can be called appropriately the national interest."[37]

Krasner attempts to generalize his approach. He notes a fundamental difference between "hegemonic" superpowers, on the one hand, and smaller nonhegemonic countries, on the other hand. The nonhegemons, he argues, have rather mundane foreign policy objectives, such as security against foreign invasion and assured supplies of natural resources. The foreign policies of hegemonic powers, in contrast, reflect complicated ideological interests. The United States illustrates this point. After World War II, the USA achieved hegemonic status, and at that time its foreign policy reflected American ideology. According to Krasner, "after the Second World War, Lockean liberalism was the key to American foreign policy; it was the desire to create a world order in America's image."[38]

Practically speaking, anticommunism is held to be the essence of American foreign policy, at least in the post–World War II era. Krasner states that all armed interventions since 1950 were motivated by anti-Soviet and/or anti-Chinese sentiments. As evidence Krasner usually points out that American officials publicly claimed that they were motivated by anticommunism. Krasner acknowledges that the anticommunism is often irrational and that the communist "threat" is exaggerated. Nevertheless American officials perceive such threats, and anticommunist ideology is thus the main cause of U.S. intervention in the Third World.

Most importantly, Krasner argues that the state is autonomous from business influences, at least in the area of foreign policy. This, he argues, is because foreign policy is formulated mostly by the president and the State Department, which are insulated from business pressures. Krasner writes that "of all the executive departments, State is least subject to pressure-group tactics."[39] He acknowledges that many federal departments, such as Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture, are subject to interest group pressures, but these departments play only a secondary role in the area of foreign policy. In Krasner's numerous case studies, he documents (or claims to document) that American foreign policymakers consistently ignore business pressures. On occasions the government works with certain businesses in foreign countries; even in these cases, however, the government manipulates business more than business manipulates the government. In very few cases does Krasner find that business determined, or even significantly influenced, governmental policy.

Krasner's approach differs markedly from the Pluralist and Instrumentalist Marxist approaches. The latter approaches suggest that foreign policy is molded by nongovernmental actors. Various social groups—"interest groups" according to Pluralism, or "the capitalist class" in the Instrumentalist model—essentially determine foreign policy. The Statist approach, in contrast, suggests that nongovernmental actors play little role. The Statist approach also differs from Structural Marxism. The Structural Marxists argue that the state is relatively autonomous from business pressures; Statists hold that the state is *completely* autonomous.

Krasner's study is the most rigorously developed variant of the Statist model. However, there is a wide range of foreign policy literature that implicitly accepts Krasner's analysis. Numerous diplomatic histories suggest that a fear of communism is the root cause of American intervention in the Third World.[40] All of these studies imply that the American state is autonomous, and that policymakers are motivated by Cold War considerations rather than economic interests. Researchers from a surprisingly wide range of political perspectives accept the Cold War explanation. Some more traditional researchers condone American intervention in the Third World and emphasize that such intervention was a legitimate response to the communist threat,[41] while others imply that the Soviet threat was overstated or illusory.[42] In any case, it is clear that there is a broad consensus, among both defenders of U.S. intervention and some of its critics, that the Cold War is the main cause of U.S. intervention. The Statist view has thus gained wide acceptance among analysts of U.S. intervention.

The Statist approach, in sum, predicts that policymakers favor security interests over business interests. If the Statist approach were correct, then national security considerations would dominate the policy-making process, and business pressures would play no significant role. Government documents would show little evidence of business pressure, or they would show that government officials generally disregard such pressures.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model

The previous three approaches all assume that the foreign policy process is rational. High-level policymakers (president, cabinet-level advisors, subcabinet-level advisors) all agree on certain long-range objectives, and in specific cases they formulate policies that are consistent with these guiding objectives. The policies are implemented by military officers, diplomats, CIA operatives, and other assorted bureaucrats. These approaches all view the state apparatus as a singular entity, with no significant internal conflicts, or it is assumed that such conflicts are secondary matters. The Statist, Instrumentalist, and Structuralist approaches generally imply that the policy-making process functions smoothly. The Bureaucratic approach[43] challenges these assumptions.

The Bureaucratic perspective has much in common with Pluralism; both approaches assume that policy is the result of conflict. The two approaches differ, however, in their conception of conflict. Pluralists stress the importance of interest groups and tend to deemphasize the role of state actors. Bureaucratic Politics reverses this emphasis and draws attention to internal conflicts within the state.

The Bureaucratic Politics perspective regards policy-making as essentially idiosyncratic. Foreign policy bureaucracies are "lumbering, rule-ridden, mechanisms incapable of decisive, coherent action,"[44] and they tend to act in particular ways because they have always acted in such ways. The Central Intelligence Agency, for example, engages in covert action because that is what the agency was created to do. Each CIA officer has a direct interest in engineering covert actions, since such actions will advance that officer's career.[45] Covert action may serve no useful purpose, but the CIA does it anyway. Thus, bureaucratic inertia favors intervention.

The Bureaucratic Politics perspective emphasizes interbureaucratic cleavages and the way the cleavages influence intervention. Government agencies constantly feud with one another. The Agency for International Development advocates increased foreign aid, while the Office of Management and Budget and the Treasury Department oppose increased expenditures. The State Department supports diplomatic solutions to crises, while the CIA favors covert action, and the military advocates military action. Within the military, the Air Force and Navy clash over whether to use carrier-based aircraft or land-based aircraft, while the Army and the Marines argue over which units to deploy in an amphibious assault. Some accounts emphasize, in addition, personality conflicts among specific policymakers, and how such personal conflicts can magnify interagency and intraagency rivalries.[46] The seemingly petty and minor feuds within the state apparatus can profoundly influence policy.

The Bureaucratic perspective thus emphasizes the irrational factors in foreign policy. American intervention in the Third World does not necessarily serve the interests of pressure groups or the capitalist class, and it may have nothing to do with national security. Intervention results instead from the irrationality of the bureaucratic process.

Numerous studies analyze bureaucratic conflicts and how they influence policy-making. Such studies neglect cases where bureaucratic conflict does not exist or is not significant. If the Bureaucratic approach were valid, we would find evidence of bureaucratic conflict, and would find that such conflicts influence the substance of policy. If the approach were invalid, then we would find little evidence of such conflicts, or we would find that bureaucratic conflicts, where they occur, do not influence policy.

Discussion

Of the six approaches, the National Character perspective—the view that the United States has always championed national self-determination and opposed colonialism—is the most obviously flawed. It is based on a highly tendentious reading of American history. Certainly the United States in certain cases has opposed colonialism in the Third World, but there are many other cases when the USA has favored it. The Eisenhower administration, for example, strongly supported European colonialism in Africa.[47] Sometimes the United States itself has engaged in colonialism. In 1898 the United States colonized the Philippines, and it has long maintained colonial-style domination in Central America and the Caribbean. And it should not be forgotten that much of the continental USA was conquered from Mexicans and American Indians. These instances cannot be dismissed as mere aberrations, and they clearly refute the National Character paradigm.

The Pluralist paradigm provides a sounder explanation for interventionism, and unlike the National Character approach, it can explain sudden policy changes. Pluralism assumes that policies change frequently, depending on which interest groups happen to be dominant at a particular time. Pluralism can also account for conflicts within the government. Conflicts inevitably emerge among various interest groups, and the conflicts tend to generate conflicts within the government. Clearly Pluralism can account for a wide range of empirical information.

However, the Pluralist view of politics has one fundamental flaw: it assumes that all groups have equal access to power, that no single group can dominate the political system. This view is incorrect. There is abundant evidence that business is far more powerful than other social groups, and that it essentially dominates the political system. In a well-known critique of Pluralism, E. E. Schattschneider states:

> When the lists of these [political lobby] organizations are examined, the fact that strikes students most forcibly is that *the*

> *system is very small* [emphasis in original]. The range of organized, identifiable, known groups is amazingly narrow; there is nothing remotely universal about it. There is a tendency on the part of publishers of directories of associations to place an undue emphasis on business . . . Nevertheless, the dominance of business groups in the pressure system is so marked that it probably cannot be explained away as an accident.[48]

These findings are generally confirmed by other studies.[49]

Schattschneider's analysis suggests that business is the best-organized group in the United States, and that the political system is biased in favor of business. There are several reasons for this bias. Corporations possess substantial financial resources—individual companies are certainly better endowed than individual workers—which they can use to publicize their views and thereby influence policymakers. Furthermore, corporations can organize more easily than other groups. The work of Mancur Olson, for example, shows that small groups are inherently easier to organize than large ones.[50] A small number of corporations can unite for political action much more easily than millions of workers, consumers, or taxpayers can. A single large corporation can act on its own, avoiding the inconveniences of collective action, and it will exercise incomparably more political power than a single worker, consumer, or taxpayer. The "collective action problem" constrains the political activity of all social groups, but it presents fewer problems for business than it does for other groups.

Randall Bartlett illustrates the collective action problem as follows: "We might see a large producer of missile systems engaged in influence production [i.e., lobbying] favoring the systems; we would not, on the basis of Olson's work, expect to see consumers, who must pay for the systems, organized to counter this influence."[51] Similarly, certain multinationals may urge the government to invade a Third World country in order to protect investments from nationalization. Taxpayers would not necessarily oppose the invasion, even if it is clearly against their interests. The general public probably would play no role whatsoever in the decision. Large, amorphous groups, whether workers, consumers, or taxpayers, are at a permanent disadvantage.

The Pluralist paradigm also makes some questionable assumptions. Pluralism focuses overwhelmingly on the role of lobby groups in shaping government policy.[52] In order to influence policy, an interest group must establish registered, public lobbyists in Washington and use the lobbyists to pressure

the government. Pluralism implies that such lobbies are the only effective methods of exerting political influence, and if a group does not establish an official lobby organization, then it is not exerting any influence. Our discussion so far has accepted this assumption. Now we will raise the following questions: Are there other methods, ignored by Pluralism, through which interest groups can influence the government? Do these other methods, if they exist, favor business?

The answer to both questions is clearly yes. There is a wide range of "nonlobbyist" strategies, systematically disregarded by Pluralism, through which business can influence policy. First, there are many informal links between business and government. Most government officials, as the Instrumentalist Marxists show, have extensive connections in the business world. A businessperson can exert influence simply by contacting an old associate who now happens to work in the government. Organized labor also has such political connections, but labor's ties are generally far weaker than those of business. Many policymakers have backgrounds in business or corporate law, but very few have working-class backgrounds. Data on campaign contributions further illustrate this class disparity. One study, cited by Lindblom, showed that corporations outspent labor unions by a margin of fifty-eight to one.[53]

If all else fails, business can collectively engage in a capital strike and refuse to invest. Such actions, as Lindblom and others have demonstrated, can damage the economy and cause the government to pursue a more probusiness policy. A general strike by labor is harder to organize, because of the much larger size of the working class, and it is harder to sustain, because of the limited financial resources of unions. Clearly nonlobbying methods of influence do exist, and they further increase the power of business. The existence of the nonlobbying strategies weakens the Pluralist argument.

By now it should be clear that the Pluralist paradigm is seriously flawed. Groups do compete for political power, but contrary to Pluralist theory, they do not compete on equal terms. Both lobbying and nonlobbying channels of influence favor business. Pluralism ignores many channels of influence through which business can influence policy, and it is thus an inadequate methodology for our study of foreign intervention.

The Instrumental Marxist perspective, on the whole, presents none of the problems that arise with the Pluralist paradigm. The Instrumentalist view also has considerable explanatory power. It recognizes the nonlobbying channels of political influence, and it correctly predicts that the USA will often intervene in the Third World.

The Instrumentalist perspective also has its limitations. The approach assumes that the capitalist class is monolithic and that capitalists have nearly identical interests. This assumption is intuitively implausible, and it ignores evidence that in many instances capitalists are divided. Instrumentalists imply, moreover, that the state is a monolith, and that all state officials have essentially the same (procapitalist) views. This assumption is also incorrect. State officials may agree on the general desirability of capitalism; however, they constantly feud over which policies to pursue, over how to further capitalism. As we shall see, the U.S. government was seriously divided with regard to policy in the Congo.[54] The Instrumentalists tend to ignore or gloss over such disagreements. Finally, the Instrumentalists cannot explain changes in foreign policy. The Instrumentalist approach to intervention is not adequate.

The Structuralist approach overcomes some of these limitations. It acknowledges divisions within the capitalist class and notes that government policies often conflict with certain business interests. Moreover, the Structuralists recognize that commercial interests are often intertwined with political and military issues. In many ways the Structuralist perspective provides a subtler and more nuanced analysis than Instrumental Marxism.

Still, the Structuralist approach has serious drawbacks. It asserts that government officials have substantial autonomy from business interests. This proposition is doubtful. If the concept of state autonomy has any meaning at all—if it is not merely a tautology—then we must be able to distinguish the state bureaucrats from the capitalists. Yet, it is very difficult to make such a distinction. In the USA, state bureaucrats usually are capitalists. Empirical studies show that government officials have extensive business ties, and in many cases the officials are businesspersons themselves. These facts do not settle the matter. Defenders of Structuralism may object that business-government connections have no effect on policy and that therefore the connections are insignificant. In order to disprove the Structuralist paradigm, we must show that such connections actually do affect policy. At the outset, however, the Structuralist argument is weakened by the existence of such strong links between government and business.

The Statist paradigm, despite its apparent popularity, suffers from serious theoretical and empirical problems. To begin with, the Statists overemphasize the role of anticommunist ideology as an explanation for foreign intervention. Such an explanation may work in cases where communist forces are active. However, the USA has intervened in conflicts where *both* sides were anticom-

munist. As always, such interventions were justified by government officials in anticommunist terms, but such justifications make little sense. Anticommunism is not always a reliable predictor of governmental action.

United States intervention in Iran illustrates these problems quite well. In 1953, the CIA overthrew the parliamentary regime of Mohammed Mossadegh. Krasner claims anticommunism motivated the intervention, but this explanation is unconvincing, since Mossadegh himself was anticommunist, and crucially, his anticommunism was *recognized* in establishment circles. Dean Acheson had characterized Mossadegh as "rich, reactionary, feudal minded"—hardly the description of a communist. Mossadegh, according to a former *New York Times* correspondent, "had been anticommunist throughout his career."[55] The U.S. government could just as easily have supported Mossadegh and still justified the policy in anticommunist terms. Anticommunism may help explain some interventions, but it clearly does not explain all of them.

Krasner's study is also marred by some tendentious reasoning[56] and by insufficient empirical research. Krasner failed to discover some important information. For example, Krasner claims that the major oil companies did not influence U.S. government policy during the 1953 Iranian coup. He neglects to mention that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had previously been "the senior member of Sullivan and Cromwell, the major law firm for the Jersey Standard empire"—a major beneficiary of the Iranian coup.[57] CIA Director Allen Dulles had also worked for Sullivan and Cromwell. This information does not necessarily disprove Krasner's case, but it certainly should have been mentioned. Similar problems also crop up in Krasner's Guatemala case study.[58] In general, Krasner is too eager to accept official explanations of policy. Whenever government officials declare that anticommunism motivated policy, Krasner invariably accepts the statements as true. He never considers the possibility that the officials prevaricated. Both the Statist and Structuralist approaches beg the question of policy-making. Krasner claims that state bureaucrats consistently act in the national interest, and he provides empirical evidence which he claims supports this view. Structuralists, on the other hand, provide evidence that the state favors the general interests of capitalism. Neither theory, however, explains why state officials act in this way. What causes officials to favor general interests rather than the interests of pressure groups or indeed of the officials themselves? No answer is provided. The Statist and Structuralist approaches do not adequately explain the behavior of policymakers.[59]

The Bureaucratic Politics perspective offers other explanatory advantages. It can easily account for divisions among state bureaucrats, and in fact assumes such divisions. Memoirs from government officials provide many examples of internal rivalries.[60] It may be theoretically untidy to consider interagency rivalries and personality conflicts, yet there is no doubt that they are important. Foreign policy is thus affected by a large number of idiosyncratic and essentially irrational factors.

As a general explanation, however, the Bureaucratic Politics perspective is flawed, and if taken literally, it amounts to a "slippery slope" argument. The Bureaucratic theory points out that policy is sometimes inconsistent and irrational; this does not prove, however, that policy is always inconsistent and irrational. There are cases where the government can formulate and implement long-range policies with relatively little bureaucratic bickering. For example, American foreign policy has been consistently anticommunist since 1946, and few officials have seriously dissented from this policy. Bureaucratic Politics cannot account for the consistency of American anticommunism.

Moreover, Bureaucratic Politics completely ignores nongovernmental actors such as lobby groups, even though such actors clearly do influence policy-making. Many federal agencies have close ties to interest groups,[61] and conflicts among different agencies (or even among individual policymakers) sometimes result from conflicts among different interest groups. The Bureaucratic Politics approach fails to analyze the role of interest groups.

It is clear that none of the six approaches can adequately explain U.S. intervention in the Third World. In order to construct a theoretically adequate model, we must account for long-term tendencies in policy-making, policy changes, and when they occur, conflicts among different parts of the government. Our theory must be able to explain a broad range of empirical observations without being so comprehensive that it becomes a tautology. To overcome the inadequacies of the other theories, we will develop a new approach.

The Business Conflict Model

The Business Conflict approach begins with the assumption that the business community is fundamentally divided with respect to most policy issues. While Instrumentalists assume that the capitalist class is essentially united, the Business Conflict approach, in contrast, makes no such assumption. Business cleavages clearly do exist, and they significantly influence politics.

We will illustrate the importance of business conflict with regard to monetary policy. Debtor companies generally favor inflationary policies, since inflation reduces the effective value of their debts, while creditors (specifically banks) oppose inflation.[62] Trade policy provides another example. Internationally oriented businesses favor free trade, while domestically oriented businesses favor protection.[63] Business cleavages emerge on a wide range of other issues, including social welfare expenditures, fiscal policy, antitrust policy, tax policy, environmental policy, regulation of stock trading, sales of federal bonds, awards of government contracts, subsidies for scientific research, and military planning.

The business community is also divided with respect to its international activities. Multinational corporations, mostly from the industrialized core countries, compete for highly profitable investments in the Third World periphery. Some analysts suggest that these Third World investments are crucial to the economic well-being of the core countries, and that without such investment opportunities, the core economies would collapse. Pierre Jalée notes that the core seeks Third World investments "because of vital necessity, because it [the core economy] could not survive otherwise."[64] There is little evidence to support such views, and Jalée is probably incorrect.[65]

The Business Conflict model takes a different approach from that of Jalée. The model assumes that Third World investments are not essential for the core economies as a whole, but that they are essential, or at least very desirable, for individual companies. These companies seek ever-increasing investments in the periphery, and interbusiness feuds often result. The multinational corporations are thus continually vying for investment opportunities in the periphery.

The multinationals often seek support from their home governments, and each core government tends to favor its own nationals. The U.S. government promotes American commercial interests, often at the expense of British, French, or Belgian interests. The British, French, and Belgian governments, reasonably enough, seek the same advantages for their companies. Various countries thus compete for commercial access to the periphery. Sometimes core countries annex huge areas of the Third World. This, of course, occurred on a large scale during the late nineteenth century, when much of Asia and virtually all of Africa were divided among the core powers. At other times, however, international competition creates spheres of influence, where specific core powers dominate peripheral regions through informal means.[66] Thus, conflicts among businesses lead to conflicts among countries, and these feuds influence the general character of international relations.

Business conflicts also affect the domestic politics of Third World countries. Specific political factions within countries often receive outside support. The United States tends to favor pro-American elements in Third World countries and seeks to impose pro-American governments, while the French support pro-French elements in the same countries, and the British support pro-British elements. Within Third World countries, the foreign manipulation causes political instability, coups d'état, and in extreme cases civil wars. International commercial competition leads to foreign intervention and political turmoil in the periphery.

Thus, nationality represents a major cleavage within the business community, but it is clearly not the only cleavage. Business is divided internationally, but it is also divided within specific countries. American companies not only compete with French and British companies; they also compete with other American companies. The Business Conflict approach must consider *intra*national business competition. The analysis is further complicated by corporations with multinational stock ownership. Such corporations do not have fixed national identities and may seek support from several core governments. The Business Conflict approach thus assumes many cleavages within the business community—divisions among corporations of different nationalities, among corporations of the same nationality, and among internationally owned corporations—and these cleavages often lead to intervention in the Third World.

So far we have only assumed that the core governments assist the multinational corporations. We will now consider how the business interests influence governments. One method of influence, quite simply, is bribery. A company can pay a government official in cash for services rendered. It is well established that many Third World political systems routinely operate with high levels of bribery.[67] Old-fashioned corruption is not confined to the Third World. Of the USA, Max Weber once wrote: "A corruption and wastefulness second to none could be tolerated only in a country with as yet unlimited economic opportunities."[68] Some sectors of American government, especially at the local level, still function in this way. Direct bribery has its drawbacks, however, since it entails risk of prosecution and scandal. In present-day America, bribery is probably the exception rather than the norm.[69]

There are other methods of influencing the government which, unlike bribery, are legal. As we have seen, most public officials have close connections with business. Corporations use these connections to affect policy-making. The basic process is straightforward: A corporate executive can contact a government official, one who used to work for the company, and in this way attempt to influence policy. If a U.S. company favors foreign intervention, for example, its CEO can telephone the secretary of state—who had once worked, perhaps, as the company counsel—and advocate the intervention. Government officials are quite naturally receptive to entreaties from former employers. Moreover, the prospect of *future* employment with a company, whether or not the company has employed the official in the past, acts as an additional incentive. These "revolving door" career patterns continually reinforce business-government ties. Officials may deny that business connections affect policy-making, and some researchers uncritically accept these denials. The Business Conflict approach, in contrast, argues that such ties often do influence government officials.

Business interests thus influence policy; concomitantly, conflicts within the business community generate conflicts in the government. Different, often competing, corporations may gain influence within the same presidential administration. Specific policymakers, or even entire agencies, support the views of specific investors, and these in turn come into conflict with other officials and other agencies which represent opposing investment groups. The State Department, for example, may advocate the views of one corporation, while the CIA champions the position of a competing company.

But bureaucratic conflicts do not always occur. In general we would predict the following: If several business factions gain influence within the same presidential administration, then we would anticipate considerable bureaucratic conflict. If only one business faction gains influence in an administration, then we should find little or no conflict.

Businesses can also pressure the government through more conventional means, by forming pressure groups with registered lobbyists. Lobbies of this sort are particularly effective with Congress and with certain executive departments, such as Agriculture and Commerce. However, the most important federal agencies, including the CIA, the State Department, the Treasury Department, and the National Security Council, are not very responsive to overt lobbying. Also the lobbyists will be tainted as "special interests." A traditional lobbying strategy holds limited value. Thus, the Business Conflict model predicts that, in general, the most powerful businesses will eschew public lobbying and will discreetly pressure the key executive agencies.

Some business interests may lack connections to the executive. Investors do not possess equal power, and such inequalities affect the nature of policy-making. The weaker interests, lacking clout, may seek other ways to influence the government. They can establish registered lobbying groups, curry favor with Congress, and publicly denounce the administration's policies. Congressional lobbying is not an ideal tactic, as we have seen, but politically weak investors sometimes use this strategy as a last resort.

Such diverse strategies complicate still further our analysis of policy-making. One business faction may dominate the Congress, while another may control the executive. Business conflict would then generate conflict between the legislative and executive branches. Thus, many political feuds—among individual policymakers, among various executive agencies, between the president and Congress—result from divisions among investors. The outcome of such conflicts is contingent and varies from case to case. As a general rule, however, we would expect that the corporations with the best prior connections to government officials and which expend the most time, money, skill, and effort in the influence process will prevail.

The Business Conflict approach acknowledges that the international business community, despite its cleavages, can act as a unified bloc. All investors oppose anticapitalist political movements. Moreover, certain ideologies, especially communism and socialism, threaten the whole international business community. Such complications do not occur frequently. Third World politicians often employ antibusiness rhetoric, but few leaders seriously wish to drive out all foreign investment. When such extremist governments do emerge, however, international investors and core governments all act in concert to oppose and destabilize the radicals.

Thus, governmental politics often parallel business politics. When the business community is divided, we would find divisions within the state, and when the business community is united (in response, perhaps, to a revolutionary upheaval in the Third World), the state would also be united. Business interests determine both the substance and the process of policy-making.

Certainly business is not the only interest group. Nonbusiness lobbies may pressure the government on certain foreign policy issues. Nonbusiness groups sometimes form along ethnic or racial lines, for example, Jewish organizations in favor of Israel, African-Americans against South Africa, and (to a small extent) Greeks with regard to the Cyprus conflict. Very rarely, diffuse public sentiment, not associated with a specific group, may protest foreign policy. Popular opposition to the Vietnam War is an example. Thus nonbusiness lobby groups can be influential.

However, nonbusiness lobbies face formidable obstacles; they tend to be popularly based and are accordingly very difficult to organize. Most African-Americans presumably oppose apartheid, but only a small number have become politically involved. Popular movements must be large in order to wield influence, and they encounter serious collective action problems. A small number of companies, in contrast, is much easier to organize. Collective action problems do not absolutely preclude nonbusiness lobbies, and such lobbies occasionally influence the government. In most instances, however, they prove ineffective and play no significant role. Foreign policy is usually dominated by business-oriented groups.[70]

For all its details, the Business Conflict model is actually quite simple. It is based on three premises: First, capitalist societies are composed of diverse and competing economic groups. Second, these groups come into conflict with one another, and the resulting controversies, in turn, generate political conflict. Third, politicians and business people act rationally to further their respective self-interests, and such rational behavior influences the conduct of foreign policy.[71]

It should be noted that the Business Conflict model is not virginally new. The model builds on previous studies in the fields of political science and diplomatic history which emphasize the interaction between domestic and international politics. Research in this tradition has generally been conducted on an ad hoc basis, without a theoretical framework.[72] The Business Conflict model supplies such a framework and therefore fills a gap in the literature.

The Seven Perspectives Compared

The Business Conflict model differs from the other theoretical perspectives that we have examined in this chapter. (For convenience, the Business Conflict model and the six other approaches are all compared in summary form on table 1.) The National Character approach assumes that American foreign policy has been consistently anticolonial. The Business Conflict model assumes no such consistency. The Business Conflict model also differs from the Instrumental Marxist model. The Instrumentalists predict a high level of unity among government decision makers and among investors, while the Business Conflict model predicts conflict among these actors. The Statist and Structuralist models assert that the state is somewhat insulated from corporate pressures, while according to the Business Conflict approach, corporations determine foreign policy.

The Business Conflict approach is somewhat closer to the Bureaucratic Politics and Pluralist models, since these approaches emphasize conflicts in the policy-making process. Unlike Pluralism, however, the Business Conflict model assumes that the large corporations are by far the most important pressure

TABLE 1. Seven Theoretical Perspectives on Foreign Intervention

Issues	National Character Model	Pluralism	Instrumental Marxism	Structural Marxism	Statism	Bureaucratic Politics Model	Business Conflict Model
Primary causal factor in international relations	Political cultures of various countries	Internal politics of various countries	Capitalist interests	Structure of capitalist system	Inequality of power among different states	Interagency feuding among foreign policy bureaucracies of specific states	Cleavages among business interests
Main objective of U.S. foreign policy	Promotion of American values overseas	Promotion of interests of most powerful pressure groups	Protection and promotion of interests of corporations	Promotion of long-term capitalist interests	Protection and promotion of American power	No guiding objective except to promote diverse bureaucratic interests	Promotion of specific factions of business community
Normative view of foreign intervention	Negative, contrary to American values	Not specified	Strongly negative	Strongly negative	Varies; some adopt positive view	Not specified	Not specified
Interpretation of intervention	Result of political/ national characters of specific countries	Result of pressure from pro-interven- tion interest groups	Result of capitalist domination of foreign policy	Result of structural capitalist needs, specifically need for a global environment conducive to foreign investment	Result of national security considerations; since 1945, U.S. intervention is motivated by anti-commu- nism	Result of irrationality of bureaucratic process	Result of interests of specific business factions
Role of bureaucratic conflict	Not specified; implies that process should function smoothly, with little internal dissent	Bureaucratic conflicts significant to extent that they interact with pressure groups	Not seen as significant	Bureaucratic conflicts significant within constraints imposed by capitalism	Not significant	Bureaucratic conflicts decisive	Bureaucratic conflicts significant; determined by business conflicts
Role of business	Not a significant factor in policy	One interest group among many others	Decisively important	Decisive; but power is exercised indirectly, through structure of capitalism	Not important as a causal factor; in some cases government may use business as a tool	Not significant	Decisively important
Degree of state autonomy	None; state policy is a product of societal values	Generally low or nonexistent	Generally low or nonexistent	State "relatively" autonomous, within capitalist framework	Complete state autonomy assumed	Not specified; some autonomy implied	No significant state autonomy

Note: This table borrows from the approach in Thomas Biersteker, *Multinationals, the State, and Control of the Nigerian Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 46-47.

groups. Unlike Bureaucratic Politics, the Business Conflict approach assumes that intergovernmental conflicts result from cleavages within the business community rather than from petty squabbles within the bureaucracy. The Business Conflict model thus offers a distinct perspective on U.S. policy toward the Third World. Now that we have examined these theoretical models, we will turn our attention to the Congo case study. In the course of the empirical discussion, we will continually reevaluate the seven theories.

2 Historical Background to the Congo Crisis

> To open to civilization the only area of our globe to which it has not yet penetrated, to pierce the gloom which hangs over entire races, constitutes, if I may dare to put it in this way, a Crusade worthy of this century of progress.
>
> Leopold II, King of the Belgians[1]

> Listen to the yell of Leopold's ghost
> Burning in Hell for his hand-maimed host,
> Hear how the demons chuckle and yell
> Cutting his hands off, down in Hell.
>
> Vachel Lindsay, "The Congo"[2]

> The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those who have a different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing.
>
> Joseph Conrad, "Heart of Darkness"[3]

The question of neocolonialism is a central theme in this study, and it will reappear throughout. During our discussion of the Congo Crisis, we shall see that the Belgians sought a classic neocolonial relationship with their former colony, but these Belgian designs were opposed by Congolese nationalists, the United Nations, and the Kennedy administration. Before we can analyze these conflicts, however, we must first understand their historical roots. This chapter will accomplish two tasks. First, it will describe the colonial and precolonial history of the Congo and how this history led to the conflicts of the 1960s. These sections are intended to familiarize the nonspecialist reader with the history, and they rely primarily on secondary sources. Second, the chapter will analyze how the international business community interacted with Belgian colonialism. In subsequent chapters we will see how these issues played out during the turmoil of independence.

The Origins of Colonialism

The region that constitutes present-day Congo (now Zaire) comprises an exceptionally wide range of cultural and linguistic groups. The precolonial histories of these groups were also quite diverse, and their political systems were influenced to a significant degree by geography. In the heavily forested regions of northern Congo, large-scale social organization was difficult to achieve. Many groups in the northern half of the country, such as the various Pygmy peoples, developed fairly decentralized, mostly village- or district-based political systems. However, certain forest peoples, such as the Mangbetu, were able to achieve some degree of intervillage coordination, covering fairly large geographic areas, for such things as military defense, justice, and to a very limited degree, administration. In the southern part of modern-day Congo, in the savanna regions where geography was less of an impediment, more sophisticated systems developed. In the south, full-fledged kingdoms emerged among the Kuba, Lunda, and Yaka peoples.[4] Perhaps the most important state in the region was the Kingdom of the Kongo, which flourished during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries along the Atlantic coast regions of what is now the Congo and Angola. The Kongo kingdom developed a national currency (consisting of special seashells), a unified court system, centrally controlled provincial governments, written administrative records, and at the center of the system, a monarch.[5]

European involvement in the region did not begin with the colonialism of the nineteenth century, but began much earlier, with the "discovery" of Central Africa by the Portuguese in 1483. The contact with Portugal brought a substantial influx of European influence into the Kongo kingdom. One effect of the foreign contact was the gradual Christianization of the Kongo. The Kongo monarch, King Affonso, was a major promoter of Christianity, and a large segment of the general population converted at least nominally to Roman Catholicism. The Christian influence reached a high point in 1518, when the king's son, Henrique, was appointed a bishop in the church.

Another result of the European arrival was the slave trade.[6] The sixteenth century saw a general worldwide expansion in the demand for slaves, especially for the growing plantations of the New World colonies. Slaves were procured from several regions of sub-Saharan Africa, including the Kongo kingdom and surrounding areas. Portuguese and later Dutch and English traders exported huge numbers of slaves. Slave trading was often associated with

the Christian influx, and indeed many of the Portuguese missionaries themselves participated in the trade. According to one source, "It was not the principle of the selling of men that was called into doubt," by the Catholic missionaries. The missionaries only objected when slaves were sold to competing Protestant traders from Great Britain or the Netherlands.[7]

Slavery had always been a feature of life in Central Africa, long before the arrival of the Europeans, but the transatlantic trade tremendously increased the quantity of slaves, and slave trading became one of the principal economic activities in the region. The demographic effects of the slave trade have been extensively debated. Some studies claim that slavery removed some thirteen million persons from the Congo basin region, although recent research implies substantially lower totals.[8]

Probably the most pronounced effect of the slave trade was an increase in violence and war. For Africans in the region, slave raiding was the most profitable form of commerce, because of the international demand, and various African groups would raid one another to procure captives for sale. Escalating rounds of warfare were thus triggered among various groups.[9] The violence profoundly disrupted the African societies in the Congo basin region.

Throughout most of the slave trade, the European traders did not attempt to administer the Congo as a colony; the Europeans worked almost entirely through African intermediaries. This practice changed in the nineteenth century during the "scramble for Africa," in which European powers all vied for influence on the African continent. In the context of the competition, Central Africa was also colonized. In 1885, the Congo Independent State was officially created by King Leopold II of Belgium. During the entire history of the Independent State, from 1885 to 1908, the Belgian government held no authority whatsoever in the Congo. The Independent State was not officially governed by a European nation but by a private company, and for all practical purposes the colony was ruled by a single man: King Leopold.[10]

The Congo Independent State was the culmination of a long effort by Leopold to establish an empire. Even before his coronation in 1865, Leopold began investigating schemes in the Far East, especially in China. By the 1870s he focused his attention on Central Africa and began building international support for his ambitions. Leopold organized a number of public conferences, where he elaborated plans to colonize Central Africa under international auspices. The conferences attracted prestigious delegations from all over Europe and provided publicity for Leopold's colonization activities. Through such forums, Leopold promoted himself as a benevolent statesman dedicated to the disinterested development of Africa, the promotion of free trade, the abolition of slave raiding, and the furtherance of Christian civilization.

Leopold raised funds for his Congo adventures mostly through speculation in Suez Canal stock and embarked on his efforts to establish a colony. In 1878 Leopold hired the famous explorer Henry Morton Stanley to establish trading posts in the Congo area, to forge alliances with local chieftains, and overall to create a sphere of influence. By the early 1880s, the Stanley expedition established a de facto administration in the Congo. In 1882 Leopold formed the Association Internationale du Congo (AIC), which was responsible for administering the colony. It was widely believed at the time that the AIC was a truly international organization, but this was a misperception; the AIC "was not international at all, but was entirely an instrument of Leopold II."[11]

Leopold's colonial schemes did not, however, go unchallenged. By the 1870s, numerous European trading companies had established themselves at the mouth of the Congo River, near the Atlantic coast, and the great powers of Europe all coveted the valuable territory. The main threat came from France, which was also exploring opportunities in Central Africa and which, in 1879, dispatched an expedition headed by Savorgnan de Brazza to organize a French sphere in Central Africa. The de Brazza mission established control of territory east of the Congo River in what was later part of French Equatorial Africa. From this base of operations, the French threatened to overrun the whole of the Congo basin.[12]

The British, not to be outdone, had their own plans. Britain could not attempt outright annexation at that time—the British empire was already overextended—so indirect methods of control were considered. Specifically, the British chose to promote Portuguese interests in the Congo, hoping that these would act as a check on French activities.[13] Great Britain offered support for Portuguese claims in the Congo (provided that the Portuguese agreed to maintain free trade). British objectives were stated as follows:

> An important field of commerce has clearly been opened up [in the Congo]. The attention of traders in all parts of the world is being attracted to it. Her Majesty's Government considered that an arrangement between Great Britain and Portugal, based upon principles of freedom and equal advantages to all countries, would greatly contribute to prevent rivalries and jealousies, so likely to be injurious to a rising trade.[14]

Thus allied, the Portuguese sought to establish a colony. The alliance was widely regarded as a British bid to establish a sphere of influence in the Congo, using Portugal as a proxy.[15] The alliance immediately encountered strong opposition all over Europe, and the various powers, especially France, Germany, and the Netherlands, objected.[16] As a result of the rivalries, the Portuguese-British plan collapsed. The European powers were thus unable to resolve their differences on the Congo issue.

King Leopold cleverly exploited the divisions, while in public he extolled his own humanitarianism. Leopold emphasized that his AIC organization deserved the "congratulations of those who take an interest in the moral and material progress of the African races." He also promised to keep the Congo committed to free trade.[17] Leopold's maneuvering was marked by shrewdness and subtlety. His publicity campaign was, according to a contemporary observer, "a masterpiece of diplomatic strategy; its execution [was] a work of artistic statecraft."[18] Appearing high-minded and disinterested, Leopold gained considerable support for his own colonial ambitions.

An international consensus gradually emerged with regard to the Congo question: none of the powers would govern the Congo, and as a compromise, Leopold would retain it.[19] In 1884, Germany and the United States recognized Leopold's colony, with the AIC organization as the sovereign power. During the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, the great powers all generally agreed to recognize Leopold's claims in the Congo. Leopold also received permission from the Belgian parliament to become sovereign in both Belgium and the newly created Congo Independent State.

The Congo state officially came into existence at the time of its international recognition, on February 26, 1885. Its political system was relatively simple. The government consisted of a governor-general, as well as ministries of interior, foreign affairs, and finance, each headed by an administrator-general. A rudimentary bureaucracy gradually developed. By 1904 a total of 1,424 administrative officials worked in the colony.[20] The administration was predominantly Belgian in nationality, although a substantial contingent of non-Belgians was represented, especially from Italy, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries.

In fact the administration barely existed, and much of the day-to-day rule was undertaken by the colonial military.[21] In the first years, the military was itself an informal apparatus, not really established as a separate institution. The colonial military was professionalized to some extent with the creation, in 1886, of the Force Publique. The Force had a formal officer corps, and by

1898, a total strength of nineteen thousand men.[22] A judiciary supposedly acted as a check on the military and the civil administration, but in reality the court system barely functioned. In 1906 there was only one judge in the entire colony for civil or commercial cases.[23] Power was effectively monopolized by Leopold himself, who had "complete legislative and executive authority."[24]

The tasks in administering the colony—one of the largest and most sparsely populated in the world—were immense. In many cases Leopold had to settle for forms of "indirect rule," by establishing alliances with indigenous authorities. In other cases simple conquest was the answer. Perhaps the most sustained opposition emanated from Swahili-speaking ("Arab") slave traders, who ruled a large segment of the east and northeast Congo under the leader Tippu Tib. Initially Leopold established an alliance with Tib and appointed him a state official with responsibility for the entire eastern region. However, the alliance broke down, because of a variety of commercial disputes; Arab forces rebelled against the state authorities, leading to an extended war with the Force Publique.[25] By 1894, Tib and several other Arab armies were defeated and their territories occupied. Other revolts continued inconclusively. In the northeast, the Zande people repeatedly rose in revolt, and those revolts, along with others in the Kivu region, were never fully suppressed. Certain territories thus remained insecure during the entire period of Leopoldian rule.[26] In other regions, however, the Force Publique ruthlessly and effectively crushed all opposition.

The colony's most pressing problem was finances. The state after all had to pay its administrators and the Force Publique officers. Moreover, Leopold established mercenary armies, which were used (with mixed success) to expand the boundaries of the Independent State. The mercenaries also had to be paid. Leopold was unable to raise revenue through the imposition of tariffs, since he had already committed himself by treaty to free trade.[27] The Belgian parliament had made it clear at the outset that it would not support Leopold's private adventures, and so the Congo Independent State could not depend on support from the metropole.[28] Leopold had to develop other sources of revenue.

Thus, the Congo state was administered to yield the very highest level of revenues for the state treasury, as well as profits for Leopold. The entire colony was opened for commercial activity. The colonial administration established trading monopsonies for ivory and rubber, and the companies operated throughout most of the Congo. The peasants were forced to deal with the state-run companies rather than independent traders. State officials justified the monopsonies on the grounds that by law, all vacant lands in the Congo

were under direct state control. Gradually, "vacant" lands came to include virtually the whole country. A 1891 decree formally "granted to the State a right of absolute and exclusive property over nearly the whole of the land."[29] The state also imposed a labor tax on the inhabitants of the Congo, which forced them to spend most, or nearly all, of their time working directly for the state (or for one of the officially sanctioned private concessions) usually collecting rubber and ivory. Enforcement of the labor tax was quite harsh. State officials received premiums for the amounts of ivory and rubber collected, and the officials thus had an incentive to overwork the inhabitants. Through such measures, the state-run companies generated considerable profits.

The state developed further means of raising money, by leasing enormous parcels of land to private companies. The largest of the concessions were owned by persons who had helped finance King Leopold. The Anglo-Belgian-Indian Rubber Company (ABIR) was permitted to exploit a huge tract in the northwest region; ABIR's president was Arthur Constant van der Nest, "a keen supporter of Leopold's project." Another rubber concession company, the Anversoise tract, had as its main shareholder another one of Leopold's financial backers.[30] The Congo state contracted with various companies to construct railroads, and the railroad companies also received land grants.[31] King Leopold also sought advantages for himself. In 1896 Leopold established the Domaine de la Couronne, which was the largest concession of all and which directly generated profits for the Belgian royal family. While other commercial enterprises produced at least some revenues for the colonial treasury, the Domaine de la Couronne, which covered an area almost the size of Poland, existed only to enrich the king.[32]

The various land concessions generated enormous profits by forcing the inhabitants to collect commodities, especially rubber. The private concessions functioned almost as independent countries, and the colonial administration seldom interfered with their activities.[33] The concessions operated at a rather basic level of exploitation. A study of the ABIR concession reads as follows: ABIR "created no self-perpetuating structural relationships. It introduced no new technology, no new market relations, no new indigenous elite . . . Abir was a plundering and tribute collecting empire of the crudest sort. It [left] . . . a legacy of death, disease, and destruction."[34] The same evaluation could probably be made about the other concession areas as well.

The colony was also rich in minerals, most of which were unexploited and located in the southern region of Katanga. The Congo Independent State, still lacking funds, was unable to establish full control of this distant province.

Leopold needed to occupy the region quickly, because of its potential wealth and also because the British threatened to annex it. So Leopold contracted with private companies to explore the region on behalf of the Congo Independent State. The principal company was the Société Générale de Belgique—a financial institution with "very close links to the Belgian royal family."[35] In 1891 the Compagnie du Katanga, a Société Générale subsidiary, sent an expedition to Katanga, negotiated treaties with African leaders, and established a rudimentary administration in the region, all under the titular authority of the Congo state.

In return for these services, Leopold granted the Compagnie du Katanga extensive rights in Katanga province. Specifically, it was agreed that the province would be run by both the Independent State and the Compagnie du Katanga through a new joint stock company called Comité Spécial du Katanga (CSK). The CSK was owned two-thirds by the Congo state and one-third by the Compagnie du Katanga. The CSK had responsibility for administrating the province,[36] and Katanga was thus ruled in part by a private company.

During 1905–6 several new companies were established. The most important of these companies was the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, which mined copper, while a second company, La Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo (FORMINIERE), was created to exploit the diamond mines of the Kasai region. Finally, the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas Congo au Katanga (BCK) was established to construct and maintain the rail system in the region.[37] These companies had one feature in common: the Société Générale de Belgique held shares in all of them. Some of the companies were to play a major role in the colony throughout its history and, as we shall see in later chapters, after decolonization as well.

The Independent State began to export substantial quantities of goods. Initially ivory exports were the mainstay of the colony, but beginning in the 1890s, the ivory harvest began to decline, and rubber production became the main economic activity.[38] The Congo also produced palm oil, palm kernel, and copal.[39] In addition, the Congo began to export minerals, although they did not become a major factor until World War I. With the boom in commodities, the Independent State managed to balance its budget, for the first time, in 1896, and produced huge financial surpluses thereafter. The Congo also generated profits for the various private companies and for Leopold himself. Finally, Belgium benefited, since Leopold used some of his Congo profits to finance public works and buildings in Brussels and elsewhere.[40]

For the indigenous population, however, Leopold's rule proved highly destructive. One problem was the Force Publique, which played a major role in "administering" the colony. For the African troops, who comprised the vast bulk of the Force, conditions were quite harsh. Conscripts were usually coerced into joining the military; rarely did they volunteer. The Force functioned virtually as a slave army, and basic training was so difficult that a large percentage of the black recruits failed to survive. According to Gann and Duigan, the "trainees' mortality rate approached that of troops in battle."[41] In order to save money, the Force comprised relatively few officers, and the ratio of officers to men was generally one to one hundred. The white officers, working in a difficult and unfamiliar environment, became seriously demoralized. Weakly led and eager for revenge, the Force Publique troops gained a reputation for brutality.

Indiscipline and administrative incompetence thus accounted for a substantial number of atrocities. There is evidence that a much larger quantity of atrocities resulted from state policy; colonial officials perpetrated appalling abuses. The Congolese were forced to work under exceptionally difficult conditions, and if they did not work quickly enough, they were killed or mutilated. In 1899, an American missionary described work conditions in the Domaine de la Couronne:

> Each time the corporal goes out to get rubber, cartridges are given to him. He must bring back all not used; and for every one used, he must bring back a right hand! . . . [A State official] informed me that in six months they, the State, on the Momboyo River had used some 6,000 cartridges, which means that 6,000 people are killed or mutilated. It means more than 6,000, for the people have told me repeatedly that soldiers kill children with the butt[s] of their guns.[42]

Numerous accounts, from a wide variety of sources, provide similar (and equally grisly) depictions. Such atrocities and mutilations came to symbolize Leopold's rule in the Congo.

The European colonization was also marked by severe epidemics, including smallpox, sleeping sickness, tuberculosis, venereal disease, yellow fever, and (in 1918) Spanish influenza. All of these maladies spread rapidly through the population, partly because the Congolese had already been weakened by hard labor and were therefore more susceptible to disease. Forced migrations, widely practiced in the Congo, helped spread the diseases. There is evidence that some of the maladies were introduced by the European colonization, and the epidemics, whatever their origin, ravaged the population.[43]

Most sources note a remarkable decline in population during the era of Leopold. Raymond Leslie Buell mentions the "widespread opinion among the Europeans in the Congo that the native population has greatly decreased since the European occupation."[44] According to a Belgian government report in 1919, the Congolese population had declined by half during colonial rule.[45] It is unclear whether epidemics or deliberate killings were more important in causing the population decline. However, Roger Anstey notes that the Congolese have a "strong strand of local, oral tradition [which] holds the rubber policy to have been a greater cause of death and depopulation than either the scourge of sleeping sickness or the periodic ravages of smallpox."[46] Jean Stengers, who presents the most favorable view of the Congo state and implies that other accounts exaggerated the atrocities, concedes that certain regions of the Congo were "veritable hells on earth."[47] There is general agreement that Leopold's rule devastated the Congo.

International protests were voiced almost from the beginning of the Independent State. In 1890, certain British missionaries began to publicize Leopold's atrocities, and missionaries from other countries, especially Sweden and the USA, soon joined in the denunciations. In 1895 the *London Times* published an extensive exposé of the Congo, and this was followed by further reports in the Belgian press.[48]

In 1904 the Congo Reform Association was founded in Great Britain. Similar groups were formed in France, Germany, and the United States, and the various human rights groups campaigned against Leopold. E. D. Morel, who headed the reform group in Great Britain, wrote prolifically of the Congo atrocities, and his books, especially *Red Rubber,* heightened public interest in the issue.[49] Protestant churches all over the world organized, and "Congo Sundays" were held regularly in Britain.[50] Because of all the public agitation, the British government dispatched Roger Casement, a foreign service officer, to investigate conditions in the Congo Independent State. Casement performed the investigation during a period of several months of travel through the interior of the colony. He confirmed that extensive atrocities were taking place in the Congo and that, because of the severe conditions, entire regions of the colony were being depopulated. The Casement report, issued in 1904, received international attention.[51] The report greatly increased support for the Congo Reform Movement, as well as opposition to Leopold.

Idealism was undoubtedly a major factor in the campaign against Leopold. The atrocity reports were generally accurate, and the suffering was real. Critics may note, however, that the campaign contained some inconsistency. The

anti-Leopold campaign was, after all, based in Great Britain, yet British colonialism was not always gentle, and it too entailed atrocities in Africa and elsewhere.[52] Several observers noted that Britain had an unsavory record in its rule of Ireland.[53] There was some hypocrisy in the anti-Leopold movement, a point which the Belgians did not fail to note.

Leopold's defenders criticized the Congo Reform Movement on other grounds as well. They often claimed that the Congo reform campaign was orchestrated by British business interests which opposed Leopold for commercial reasons. Leopold himself denounced the "accusations of jealous Liverpool merchants."[54] There is some evidence in favor of this view. British trading firms had extensive interests in the Congo basin, and from the very beginning, they opposed Leopold's plans. A contemporary account noted that trading interests generally "have viewed the development of the Free State [Congo Independent State] with hostile eyes . . . If they could have had their way, the coast and interior would have remained a no-man's land," independent of Leopold.[55] Once established, the Congo state used its power to exclude many private traders and to drive them out of the region;[56] British trade declined substantially.[57] Leopold's policies were thus ruining British traders.

The trading interests became a major source of opposition to the Independent State, and they played a prominent role in the Congo Reform Movement. Anti-Leopold sentiment was especially strong in Liverpool. John Holt, one of the leaders of the movement, was vice president of the African section of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce. Holt apparently had an incentive for opposing King Leopold. Specifically, Holt feared that the Congo concession system would be emulated by French colonies in Central Africa, where Holt himself had interests, and that such a system would reduce his own trading opportunities. Holt also had close connections with the British Foreign Office, and the connections proved useful for the Reform Movement.[58] Opposition to Leopold surfaced throughout Great Britain. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce and the Newcastle Chamber of Commerce, both free-trade bastions, opposed Leopold's scheming in the Congo, while William Cadbury, a Birmingham cocoa merchant, participated in the anti-Leopold campaign.[59] One study noted that British interest in Congo reform represented "the fusion of commercial and humanitarian forces."[60]

Leopold thus faced formidable opposition. The opposition extensively publicized Leopold's atrocities and demanded an end to the Congo Independent State. Numerous plans were presented, including Belgian or even British annexation of the Congo. Leopold launched a publicity campaign—financed with revenues from the Congo—to counter the atrocity reports, and he founded a press bureau, which planted stories in newspapers throughout the world. Leopold's press bureau issued "a stream of public statements of approval from Impartial Travelers, Eminent Economists, and Lawyers of Repute."[61]

This publicity failed to discredit the Congo Reform Movement, and the protests continued. The outcry became so strong that Leopold appointed a commission to investigate allegations about the Independent State, especially the assertions in the Casement report. Leopold's Commission of Inquiry comprised distinguished lawyers from Belgium, the Congo Independent State, and Switzerland. The commission conducted its investigation and produced a report—which Leopold promptly attempted to suppress. Despite his efforts, the report was released, though only in part, in November 1905. (The full report was not made public until 1985, some eighty years later.) The report included some praise for the regime, but it also documented substantial abuses.[62]

With the publication of the commission's report, Leopold was totally discredited. In response, Leopold introduced a number of reforms in 1906. The Independent State announced that the indigenous population would receive a larger proportion of the lands, that taxes would be reduced, and that the court system would be improved.[63] The announced reforms did not placate the critics; moreover, the "reforms" were wholly cosmetic and were never seriously implemented.[64]

Leopold also made an effort to buy off the opposition. In 1906, American investors Thomas F. Ryan and Daniel Guggenheim purchased shares in the diamond mines of FORMINIERE, a Société Générale affiliate. The famous banker J. P. Morgan served as "Leopold's fiscal agent in America."[65] French capital was also brought into the Congo. In 1906, the Banque de l'Union Parisienne purchased shares in the (also Société Générale affiliated) BCK railroads.[66]

These financial transactions were politically motivated. According to one source, Leopold sought international investment in the Congo "partly because he hoped that financial involvement would lead to political support and approbation from his backers' governments."[67] Joye and Lewin note: "The sovereign king [Leopold] hoped that by thus associating American capital in the development of the Congo it would quiet the violent criticisms."[68]

Leopold made a special effort to placate business interests in Great Britain, the dominant world power at that time. In fact Leopold had prudently courted British interests long before the controversies had begun. As early as 1891, British investors participated in the Compagnie du Katanga, which administered the mineral-rich Katanga region. Conor Cruise O'Brien offers the following interpretation: "It seemed as if Belgium and Britain might come into sharp contention [over Katanga] . . . Leopold II, however, being a practical man, as well as a good biter and chewer, saw the desirability of including British capital in a chartered company."[69] Other British interests were brought in as well. In 1900 the Independent State granted mineral prospecting rights to the British firm Tanganyika Concessions (TANKS). In 1905, TANKS purchased shares in the newly created (and Société Générale affiliated) Union Minière, the principal mining company in Katanga.[70]

Leopold thus sought to propitiate foreign capital, but the strategy had its limitations. There were formidable interests, especially in Great Britain, which were hostile toward the Congo state. Leopold certainly could not placate all of them.[71] Also, the Congo Reform Movement's campaign had already publicized the Congo atrocities, which had fully discredited Leopold. Leopold's various strategies thus failed, but the incidents demonstrate that the international environment—especially the international business environment—influenced events in the Congo Independent State. We will see later in the chapter that commercial factors would influence policy even after the demise of the Independent State.

In any case, Leopold's image problems were compounded by economic pressures. The colony's profitability began to decline during the years 1906–8 as the wild rubber became depleted. Rubber exports peaked in value in 1906, but declined precipitously thereafter, losing over a quarter of their value over the next two years. New plantations in India and Southeast Asia began competing with the Congo's produce, further depressing profits. The ABIR and Anversoise concessions ceased operation completely in 1906.[72] Rubber had been the economic mainstay of the colony, and its decline undermined the whole colonial system. Facing political pressures and declining profits, Leopold relinquished his colony. The Congo Independent State was thus terminated. The Belgian government reluctantly agreed to administer the Congo, and in 1908 the Belgian Congo was officially created.

The Belgian Congo

The Belgian Congo (see map 1) began its existence amid great international suspicion. The colony still retained a sinister reputation, and the reputation lingered for a long period after the Belgian government had annexed the colony. E. D. Morel and his Congo Reform Association continued to agitate

MAP 1. Central Africa, 1949

against Belgian rule, arguing that the Belgians were tainted by the past practices of King Leopold.[73] Several countries delayed recognition of the Belgian Congo. In 1911, three years after the end of King Leopold's rule, Morel still wrote of Leopold's "moral hideousness" and his "violation of the moral law on the Congo."[74] The Belgians were under great pressure to implement reforms.

In fact, some reforms were forthcoming. The system of rubber collection was ended, and forced labor declined generally (although it was never abolished). The Force Publique was retained, but it apparently behaved with less brutality than previously. International investigations, undertaken during the first years of Belgian rule, generally confirmed an improved state of affairs.[75]

There is no doubt that living conditions did improve somewhat after the termination of the Congo Independent State.

One important change was in the area of civil administration. Leopold's rule, as we saw, had no real bureaucracy and was little more than an exploitive enterprise. Some of Leopold's most noxious abuses flourished in the atmosphere of "informality." Under Belgian rule, for the first time, a colonial bureaucracy was established. In 1911 a Colonial School was founded for training administrators. The number of administrators gradually increased until, prior to World War I, the Congo had more administrators per capita than any other African colony except Dahomey and Mauritania. The court system was strengthened.[76] The new government operated from the old capital of Boma, near the coast, although a new capital was established in 1923. (The new capital, somewhat ironically, was named "Leopoldville.")

The Belgian administration also developed the colony's economic potential. The transport system grew steadily. During the period 1911–59, the length of the railroad network increased almost five fold, while the road system expanded more than twenty fold. Great improvements were also made in river transport.[77] The improved infrastructure laid the basis for a general development of the economy, and new sectors, especially in the area of mining, were opened. Copper exports increased rapidly. By the 1920s, copper was an important colonial export, and the Congo had become one of the world's leading copper producers.[78] New diamond deposits were discovered in Kasai province,[79] and gold production at the state-run Kilo-Moto mines expanded as well.[80] The Belgian administration also developed the Congo's agricultural potential. Plantation economies, often on a massive scale, produced palm oil and other commodities. The new products gradually replaced rubber and ivory as the colony's main exports.

The economic development led to improvements for the Congolese population. The atrocious Red Rubber economy associated with Leopold became a thing of the past. New social services were gradually created by the colonial state or, more often, by the private companies and the Catholic church.[81] Education and health care saw major advances. The number of government-employed doctors increased from 30 in 1908 to 132 in 1926, and additional doctors were supported by the companies or church missions. Long-standing medical problems, especially sleeping sickness, were gradually brought under control, and by the late 1930s, five million Congolese were being regularly examined for sleeping sickness. The rate of sleeping sickness infections declined by more than two-thirds between 1927 and 1939.[82] Primary schools, mostly Catholic, expanded considerably, and a large percentage of the population achieved basic literacy.[83]

However, Belgian rule was not always benevolent. The tax system, for example, was essentially an instrument of coercion. Beginning in 1910 the Congolese were obliged to pay a regular money tax to the government; Congolese were often forced to work for the Belgian companies in order to raise enough money to pay the taxes. The tax system thus helped to augment the supply of labor, and there is no doubt that the tax was intended to have this effect. According to Belgian industrialists, the goal of the tax system "is not only to reimburse the government . . . for the cost of occupying all the territories . . . Taxes also have a higher purpose, which is to accustom the Negroes for work . . . The tax system will continue to provide for a long time the main incentive to work. The trader can of course steer the native in the right direction, but in the long run he had to be helped by the state."[84] The tax burden was often quite onerous. An American missionary said that the peasant often "puts his family in the field" in order to pay the tax.[85] The money tax had essentially the same function as Leopold's notorious labor tax, which was nominally abolished in the Belgian Congo.[86]

The Belgian Congo contained other odious features, sometimes reminiscent of the Leopoldian system. Forced labor was widely practiced, and indeed it was mandated by law. The Congolese were required to provide up to sixty days of labor per year constructing roads, bridges, and other infrastructure projects. Sometimes the Congolese were conscripted for additional labor beyond the required sixty days.[87]

Despite these measures, the supply of labor remained insufficient. Leopold's rule had severely depleted the Congo's population, and a labor shortage existed in some regions.[88] To compensate, the administration arranged mass labor migrations, which transferred workers to areas, such as Katanga, where labor was in short supply. The migrations, euphemistically termed labor "recruitment," were organized by private agencies called bourses du travail or by the state itself. Officially, the bourses only encouraged migration, but a governor-general of the Congo acknowledged that "recruiting for the mines is sometimes carried on by force."[89] The resulting journeys were hazardous. One 1918 survey reported that 11 percent of the workers recruited from the Kasai region died en route to the mines.[90]

After forced migrations, workers were brought to large work camps, where hard labor and unhealthy conditions prevailed. Contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis, pneumonia, and venereal disease, spread rapidly in the camps, causing high death rates. Workers, understandably enough, did not always volunteer to migrate to the camps. Coercion was thus essential to the colonial system. The labor recruitment practices were highly effective, and they depopulated entire areas.[91]

Coercion was also employed in agricultural policy. Peasant lands were usurped on a significant scale, often by Belgian farmers. Though the Congo never became a "settler colony" in the style of Kenya, there was some settlement by individual Belgians, and these were displacing Congolese peasants and seizing their lands.[92] In other cases the colonial administration usurped peasant lands and leased them to concessionary companies. According to law, Belgians could not arbitrarily seize land; in practice peasant lands were seized on a large scale. One study noted that "in many cases [Congolese] chiefs do not understand the transaction which is carried on in French and that in other cases they have no authority under native law to enter into such transactions." At other times, "chiefs have been virtually obliged to sign contracts granting land."[93]

The peasants also suffered from low prices for agricultural produce. The colonial government, continuing the Leopoldian policy, forced peasants to sell their cash crops to state-run agencies, which purchased the crops at artificially low prices and then resold them at the higher market prices.[94] It appears that peasants avoided cash crops, because the prices were low, and instead cultivated subsistence crops. Subsistence crops enabled the peasants to evade the state monopsonies and their exploitive practices. The colonial administration responded by *compelling* the peasants to produce cash crops. In 1917 the colonial government issued a series of ordinances requiring peasants in several regions to cultivate cotton, manioc, yams, rice, and corn. Such requirements were extended after World War I.[95] Usually mandatory cultivation was enforced by the state; in some regions (Kasai province, for example), the state collaborated with concessionary companies to force cultivation of cash crops.[96] The peasants' standard of living was thus systematically reduced.

Conditions worsened during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The depression of course caused severe hardship throughout the world, and the Congo was not spared. An agricultural crisis hit the Congo and there were rapid declines in world prices for palm oil, copal, and cotton. Peasant incomes fell precipitously. The Belgian companies were also affected by the depression, and stock values for the Congo-based companies, which had increased in value during the 1920s, now crashed. By 1931 colonial stocks were at only 15 percent of their predepression (1928) levels.[97]

Bogumil Jewsiewicki has shown how Belgian companies passed some of the losses on to their workers. Mining companies increased their use of work camps, where African workers could be easily monitored and where work productivity accordingly was augmented. Repressive work practices thus increased. Movement of population was strictly controlled to a greater degree than before, and Africans were not permitted to leave their villages or work camps without permission. In rural areas, the forced cultivation system was intensified, providing cheap sources of food for urban workers. The measures reduced the operating costs of the companies and helped maintain their sagging profits. According to Jewsiewicki, a truly "totalitarian" level of political control was established during the 1930s.[98]

Gradually, toward the end of the decade, the depression began to ease. International mineral prices gradually recovered, and by 1937 copper had reached thirteen U.S. cents per pound—higher in real terms than the 1928 price level.[99] The international arms buildup prior to World War II contributed to the price rise. Profits began to recover. Wages rose for mine workers in the Katanga region,[100] and probably elsewhere as well.

The onset of the World War II marked further increases in world demand for raw materials, but working conditions failed to improve. On the contrary, the mineral boom caused increased regimentation. The Belgian companies, assisted by the administration, forced the Africans to produce as much as possible, and to an increasing degree they used compulsion. Forced labor of all kinds increased during the war, while leisure time was reduced. Salaries rose during the war, but the higher wages were more than offset by substantial inflation, especially in food prices. In Katanga province during the period 1940–43, wages increased by 10 percent, while food prices increased by 63 percent. Overall the standard of living decreased during the war.[101] We will see that the war also marked a high point in Congolese labor agitation.

The postwar era, especially the 1950s, brought a substantial improvement in economic conditions. This period, worldwide, was one of the most prosperous in history, and the Congo benefited from the prosperity. Moreover, there were some specific factors which aided the Congolese economy. The Korean War, in 1950–53 helped increase world prices for basic metals, including many of those exported from the Belgian Congo. During the war, real world prices for copper increased some 26 percent.[102] The Congolese mining industry expanded accordingly, and new mineral exports were established, including zinc, cobalt, manganese, and uranium.[103] Even after the end of the Korean War, in 1953, the Cold War helped maintain demand for these strategic commodities.

The mineral exports raised local incomes; the enlarged consumer market, which resulted, stimulated the development of import-substituting industrialization. The Congo began to establish small-scale manufacturing. By the late 1950s, manufacturing accounted for 12 percent of the colony's gross domestic product.[104] Local producers were supplying such items as "cigarettes, oleomargarine, beverages and soft drinks, plastics, soap." The economic boom also created a demand for locally produced cement, paint, and various construction materials. Local factories began, to a limited degree, to refine mineral and agricultural products.[105]

The Congolese benefited from the economic expansion. Some of the prosperity was apparently passed on in the form of higher salaries or improved social services. After 1949 minimum wage laws were established, and although they were not always enforced, they apparently did increase wages for certain categories of workers.[106] The new prosperity was generally noted in contemporary accounts. An American journalist writing during the 1950s described Leopoldville: "The African quarter is well built, and has commendable amenities. It does not remotely resemble the slums around Cape Town. Sound, handsome housing projects are in process of construction and Africans have their own cinemas, restaurants and so on—not many but more than in any city in southern Africa."[107] The Congolese saw new career paths open, and they were employed as skilled or semiskilled laborers in many of the new industrial and transport projects. In 1954 a British journalist commented: "I do not know of any other territory in Africa where unskilled workers are being transformed so deliberately and conscientiously into semiskilled and skilled workers."[108] Services continued to improve, especially in the area of primary education. By 1959, some 70 percent of the African population had received some primary education—one of the highest levels in Africa.[109]

Living conditions were thus rising during the 1950s, but these improvements were not matched by any political changes. The colonial administration remained dictatorial and highly centralized. The leading colonial figure was the minister of colonies, who was part of the government in Brussels. The minister appointed the governor-general of the Congo, and for the most part the governor-general was subservient to the minister.[110] No representative institutions existed, and the Congolese had no deputies in the Belgian parliament. Congo residents, white or black, had no voting rights of any kind (until the very last years of colonial rule). Authoritarianism was reflected in all areas of colonial administration, including primary education. Teacher training colleges directed future teachers to stress "love of work . . . and respect for the authorities."[111]

Theoretically Belgian rule was not entirely coercive, and on paper the Congolese population participated in government. The indigenous chiefs legally held authority within their jurisdictions, and the administration was expected to rule with "respect for native customs."[112] In practice the administration continually manipulated the chiefs. Beginning in 1917, chiefs became adjuncts of the administration, and they were required to help implement colonial policy, including such unpopular measures as tax collection and mandatory crop cultivation.[113] Local chiefs were directly employed by the state, and they received salaries. The chiefs were used as instruments of colonial rule.

However, the chiefs were not always subservient toward the administration. Belgian administrators complained about the "incompetence" of Congolese chiefs, because the chiefs did not always cooperate with colonial directives.[114] The administration had a range of strategies for dealing with such recalcitrance. Edouard Bustin shows how the Belgians sought to mold indigenous political institutions, especially in the Lunda areas of Katanga. In some cases the Belgians created new "indigenous" authorities without any real legitimacy or precedent in order to bypass the chiefs. In other cases uncooperative chiefs were simply removed. In one area, during the 1930s, all four resident chiefs were replaced.[115] Overall the chiefs were not a very effective check on colonial policy.

Other potential channels of influence were closed to the Congolese. Independence was ruled out, and no effort was made to train Congolese administrators. The colonial civil service was dominated by whites. According to one study: "Admission to the higher grades [in the service] was reserved for persons of Belgian or Luxembourg nationality. Since Africans were not legally regarded as Belgian nationals . . . they did not qualify."[116] During the entire history of the Belgian Congo, no Congolese ever reached the top ranks of administration, while only a minuscule number, in the final years of colonial rule, even reached the middle ranks.[117]

The dearth of African civil servants was a product of the educational system. The colony had a relatively good record in the area of primary education, but secondary and higher education lagged. The first Congolese-based university, that of Lovanium, opened in 1954. The university was nominally biracial, but the number of African students was minute. Congolese students were

also permitted to study at Belgian universities but only to a very small extent. It is probable that until the 1950s not a single Congolese held a university degree, and by 1960 the total number of university graduates was no more than thirty.[118]

The Catholic church was one institution that was by and large open to Congolese participation. Congolese males were permitted to study at Catholic seminaries, as a preparation for the priesthood. By 1960 some five hundred Congolese had completed seminary education, which was equivalent in years of schooling to a university degree.[119] The church seminaries were thus avenues for advanced study. The lack of regular university training, however, remained a serious problem and constituted a constraint on Congolese political participation. Such politically important studies as law and journalism were virtually closed off. By 1960 only one Congolese had a law degree.[120] The educational system limited the possibilities for African political leadership and helped maintain the colonial system.

With such apparent control, the Belgians effected few reforms. Through the middle 1950s the Congolese still had no voting rights or legislative institutions, and none were seriously contemplated. The colonial government rigidly suppressed most opposition, and in 1954 there were some four thousand political prisoners.[121] Authoritarianism was also expressed in economic policy. Many of the early abuses, including forced labor and forced cultivation of crops, continued. In 1952, *Fortune* magazine provided this account:

> If the Congo was to be developed under white tutelage—the only way it would be developed in any foreseeable time—it would, nevertheless, have to be developed by Bantu labor power. Consequently, the sum of Bantu productivity would have to be increased . . . Belgian "native policy" is a consequence of these conditions and this line of thinking. In agriculture the problem was to get beyond subsistence goals . . . In cotton, the reform has involved compulsion. The government sets aside certain areas for cotton growing and assigns quotas to the "peasants." These they must meet—or risk a prison term.[122]

Privately, state officials often commented on the exploitive features of their administration.[123] Foreign diplomats stationed in the Congo were also quite candid. An American diplomat described the general atmosphere as follows: "For the great preoccupation here is the making of money, to make it fast and to make it for yourself, at no matter what cost to others. One feels that here every day."[124]

The administration therefore had enormous power over the Congolese. Despite the high levels of coercion, the Congolese continually resisted the domination. Even during Leopold's rule there was opposition, and state officials were killed, often in large numbers, by the indigenous population.[125] Portions of the Katanga region were in open revolt throughout the history of the Congo Independent State and were not fully pacified until the 1920s.[126] Units of the colonial military force rebelled in 1895 and 1898.[127]

Periodic revolts continued during the period of Belgian rule. Perhaps the most potent of these were led by a series of millenarian religious cults, such as the Kitwala and Kimbangu movements. The cults had a clearly political cast. They were strongly hostile to colonial rule and especially to the racial dominance of the Europeans. The Kitwala ideology has been described as follows: "God was black, and therefore there was nothing innate about racial segregation; on the contrary, racial segregation was specifically a result of men's actions. The antiracial message of Kitwala was the clearest and the most radical of all . . . Much more directly than Kimbanguism, Kitwala directly confronted all forms of colonial authority, which itself was seen as the work of Satan."[128] These religious movements triggered revolts throughout the history of the Belgian Congo.

The religious movements were particularly influential during the depression of the 1930s and also during World War II. We have seen that living conditions deteriorated during those periods; political agitation against colonial rule increased accordingly. The depression conditions of the 1930s brought sporadic violence, which later developed into full-scale revolts. The period 1941–45 saw uprisings throughout the colony, from the Atlantic port of Matadi in the west to Kivu province in the east.[129]

Political agitation was especially serious in Katanga province, where Union Minière mine workers staged repeated strikes, some of which assumed political overtones. The labor unrest culminated in a general strike in November 1941. In some areas the religious influence of Kitwala "transformed the call for a general strike into a millennial wake." The Force Publique was called in, leading to a massacre of over seventy workers.[130] The massacre, followed by a wage increase, eventually ended the strike, but general discontent remained. Disaffection spread through the ranks of the Force Publique troops, many of whom had sympathized with the strikers and were disquieted by their role in suppressing the strike action. In 1944 the disaffection led to a

mutiny within the Force Publique itself, in the city of Luluabourg. Mutinous troops briefly seized control of the town before being crushed by loyal military units.[131]

None of these incidents seriously threatened Belgian rule, since the Congolese resistance movements faced formidable and effectively insurmountable obstacles, which ultimately undermined the movements. The first obstacle was simply geography. The colony was exceptionally large and therefore difficult to organize on a national scale. Secondly, the Congo was divided—to a greater extent than most other African colonies—into numerous ethnolinguistic groupings. The diverse groups were seldom able to achieve unity even within given geographic regions, and the various uprisings never achieved national support. Political agitation was accordingly limited to specific regions and specific ethnic groups. Such regionally based movements were relatively easy to suppress.[132]

It should also be noted that active revolts of the type just described were exceptional events. More frequently the Congolese employed passive forms of resistance. Passive tactics included "Boiling cotton seeds before sowing them . . . choosing infertile soil in which to plant the crops forced on them by compulsory cultivation . . . fleeing into the forest to avoid the census, or a medical team."[133] Overall the Congolese political activity was less effective than popular movements elsewhere in Africa.

In any case the outside world viewed the Congolese as politically inactive. During the 1950s, when nationalist agitation was affecting much of sub-Saharan Africa, the Congo was regarded as placid. In 1952 *Fortune* magazine reported: "The big news in the Belgian Congo is that, unlike what comes out of Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, the Gold Coast, Kenya, or almost anywhere else on the Dark continent, the news right now is good . . . Disaffection is slight, the security force is small and has little to do. White men are in no danger from Bantus in the remotest bush by day or night."[134] In 1958 a U.S. Government document noted that "there is nothing to indicate that the Belgians will be forced out soon."[135] Belgian colonialism, it seemed, was secure.

Before closing this analysis of the Belgian Congo, we will consider one further aspect of colonial rule: the political role of private companies. Throughout the history of Belgian colonialism, private companies played a major role. The companies' political potency was augmented by their large size and high level of industrial concentration. Colonial policy helped increase the concentration, and the promonopoly policies are well documented.[136] The administration eliminated much small-scale trade, and several large companies were able to dominate the economy.

Of the large companies, the most important was the Société Générale de Belgique (SG), which traditionally had close ties to the Belgian royal family and indeed had been very close to King Leopold. Other companies, including the huge FORMINIERE and Union Minière, were directly controlled by SG. By 1932, SG or one of its numerous affiliates accounted for over half of the total capital in the colony. The combined capital of SG and three other financial groups accounted for over 75 percent of Congo investments.[137]

These companies, especially SG, wielded political power through ties to the colonial bureaucracy. A U.S. foreign service officer commented that "the powerful companies . . . run the Congo and dictate policy to a large extent."[138] This influence was reinforced by the career patterns of colonial officials. Many officials would retire at age forty or fifty and then begin to work with one of the companies.[139] In some cases the corporate ties were established even before retirement. According to one study, "By 1937 a mere twenty-eight people held 400 board seats in colonial companies . . . The same names repeatedly appeared in ministerial cabinets and on company boards . . . These linkages existed also at the lowest levels of administration."[140] SG wielded exceptional power in Katanga province, which was by far the richest region of the Congo. The government of Katanga, it should be recalled, was really a joint stock company, partly owned by the Compagnie du Katanga, an SG affiliate. A U.S. consulate report noted that "governors of the Katanga have tended to be 'yes men,' the strong power being the Union Minière du Haut Katanga"[141]—which was another SG affiliate. A Belgian politician aptly termed the Congo a "portfolio state."[142]

Overall the Belgian companies benefited considerably from their investments in the Congo. The colonial investments were exceptionally profitable (see table 2). Profit rates were consistently higher in the Congo than in metropolitan Belgium. The Congo investments generated a large proportion of Société Générale's profits.[143] In 1952, *Fortune* magazine described the Congo as an investor's paradise, providing rich natural resources and apparent political stability.[144]

Belgium also gained major benefits from its colony. Nearly eighty times the size of Belgium, the Congo was a source of national pride. Most of the purchasers in the Congo were Belgian, and they provided Belgian exporters with preferential access. The colony functioned as a protected market for Belgian industry.[145] The colony was also an asset from the balance-of-

TABLE 2. Average Profits of Firms Principally Active in Belgium and Firms Principally Active in the Congo

Year	Profit rate (%) for Belgium	Profit Rate (%) for Congo
Average 1936–39	7.0	10.10
Average 1947–50	6.88	15.07
Average 1951–54	8.20	21.48
1955	8.19	18.47
1956	9.40	20.16
1957	9.49	21.00
1958	7.85	15.10

Source: Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York: Universal Library, 1966), p. 173. The table is slightly adapted from the original and is reprinted with permission.

payments standpoint. According to *Fortune:* "the soundness of the little Belgian franc, 'the dollar of Europe,' is partly due to [the exports of] the colony."[146] The Belgians clearly did not wish to lose this valuable asset.

The International Context of Belgian Colonialism

Colonial rule in the Belgian Congo throughout its history was influenced by the international environment. The Belgians were continually suspicious that other powers, especially Great Britain, coveted their colony. It seemed that foreign intrusion was an ever-present threat. Belgium was after all a relatively small country, certainly never a major power, and yet it controlled one of the largest and richest colonies in Africa. In retrospect it is quite surprising that Belgium prevented more powerful countries from seizing the Congo. How did the Belgians do it?

Essentially, Belgium adopted a policy of co-opting foreign powers. This strategy had begun with Leopold. It should be recalled that Leopold had brought foreign, especially British, interests into the Congo in order to give them a stake in his colonial project and thus to defuse potential opposition. After the demise of Leopold's rule in 1908, the Belgian Congo continued to co-opt foreign capital. In 1911 the Belgian Congo granted a huge agricultural concession to the Unilever Group of Great Britain,[147] while Tanganyika Concessions, also British, continued its participation in the Katanga copper mines.

British influence increased considerably during World War I, and it threatened to eclipse Belgian influence. By 1917 Belgians comprised only 22.5 percent of the total European work force in the Katanga copper industry. There are no data on the percentage of British employees, but it appears that they constituted a growing number. Katanga province gradually was becoming a sphere of influence of Great Britain. The Belgians became resentful of creeping British domination, and during the period 1917–20 the Congo administration sought to reduce the foreign role in Katanga. In fact British influence was reduced. According to Bruce Fetter, "British investments . . . constituted a decreasing proportion of the Union Minière's capital" by the early 1920s.[148] Nevertheless, some British investments remained, especially in Katanga, and in later chapters we will see that these investments would hold political significance. Great Britain thus retained a financial stake in the Belgian Congo.

During the interwar years, British power was in decline in the Belgian Congo and throughout the world. The USA was clearly beginning to supplant Great Britain as the preeminent global power. Concomitant with its new world status, the USA began to involve itself in the politics of the African continent, including the Congo.

The American interest is crucially important for this study and will require some discussion. Until the 1930s, the United States had shown relatively little concern with sub-Saharan Africa. Occasionally there were upsurges of interest—the USA had participated in the campaign against Leopold for example—but such activism was only intermittent. For the most part the U.S. government ignored Africa and considered it a European sphere of influence. This indifference continued through the early years of the Great Depression.

American interest in Africa increased during the New Deal. In 1938 the State Department established a desk for monitoring African developments full-time.[149] During World War II American involvement increased still further, and according to a 1942 study: "American penetration in Africa has grown by leaps and bounds during the past year."[150] Several U.S. government agencies showed an interest in the Belgian Congo. Officials from the State Department advised the Belgians on economic planning for the Allied war effort, while the Army's Office of Strategic Services dispatched officers to the Congo, presumably to gather intelligence on the colony's strategic raw materials.[151] Congolese uranium was eventually used to manufacture the world's first atomic bombs.[152]

Private U.S. companies, especially traders in agricultural commodities, also began to show new interest in the continent. The Belgians feared and resented the American interest. In 1944 an American missionary analyzed the

situation this way: "There has been a great awakening [among Americans] to the tremendous industrial possibilities of the Congo . . . There is a growing realization that the Congo will be the locale of a struggle between conflicting economic interests . . . [and] there are various interests now active in that territory which would be glad to see no development of American interests in that area."[153] The Europeans erected barriers against American influence. In the Congo, for example, American traders had numerous grievances against colonial authorities, including restrictive allocation of foreign currency, a tax on "transient" (presumably non-Belgian) businessmen, and other acts of discrimination.[154]

It appears that the Congo was thus an arena for international competition among various economic interests.[155] It is interesting to note that such competition existed throughout the African continent, in both British and French colonial spheres. During the late 1930s and 1940s, U.S. officials complained of discrimination in several colonies, including Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Kenya, Tanganyika, and French Equatorial Africa.[156] The USA thus challenged European commercial dominance, provoking incidents throughout Africa.

European political dominance was also challenged. It is generally recognized that President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to end colonial rule in Africa, as well as in Asia and the Middle East. American policy had a strongly anticolonial quality, and the anticolonialism led to international disputes. One dispute focused on the 1941 Atlantic Charter. Great Britain and the United States jointly proclaimed the charter, which called for national self-determination for all countries; to the consternation of the British, the USA asserted that the charter applied to the colonial areas as well as to areas liberated from the Axis powers.[157] In addition, a State Department official emphasized "the economic objectives of the Atlantic Charter, i.e. equal access and equal opportunity," and sought "the fullest possible application . . . of the economic principles of the Atlantic Charter to the African colonies."[158]

Anticolonialism was evident at all levels of the foreign policy establishment. President Roosevelt himself suggested that the colonies should be placed under international trusteeship, presumably as a prelude to independence.[159] The State Department insisted that the Europeans should establish specific timetables, according to which the colonies would be granted independence.[160] Some foreign service officers had negative views of colonial institutions. A 1945 diplomatic cable harshly criticized the "widespread exploitation of the Belgian Congo by Belgian cartels," while another cable noted reports of "brutality inflicted upon natives in the Congo."[161]

African nationalists were apparently enthusiastic over Roosevelt's anticolonialism.[162] The United States encouraged such enthusiasm, as indicated by the following intelligence report on American military activities in Africa: "The United States should justify its actions by promising the organization of a new, independent Africa . . . Africa for the Africans! . . . An African Bolivar is needed . . . Undoubtedly this idea would meet with strong objections from the British and the metropolitan French."[163] Anticolonial views were also expressed in nongovernmental circles. A series of reports by the Council on Foreign Relations advocated anticolonial policies.[164] Even *Life* magazine denounced colonialism.[165]

The Europeans were alarmed by the American views. Both British and French officials objected to Roosevelt's anticolonialism.[166] The Belgians also objected. In 1945 and 1946, the U.S. consulate in Leopoldville reported extensively on the problem of "anti-Americanism" among the white population.[167] One diplomat stated: "Every American with whom I have talked . . . remarked with amazement and disappointment that they find anti-American feeling [in the Congo] so widespread, so bitter."[168] A Belgian businessman opined that "the United States will embark upon a period of economic imperialism after the war, due to the fact that its industry will be able to produce more than can be consumed at home."[169] The governor-general of the Belgian Congo, in a somewhat conciliatory manner, stated: "We must understand the anxiety of Americans, their concern in knowing what they will do with their demobilized workers and the interest which they take in the development of markets such as China, India and Africa."[170] The Belgians suspected that commercial interests motivated American anticolonialism.

The Belgian suspicions were probably justified. There is evidence that economic interest did influence American anticolonialism. A Council on Foreign Relations study, for example, stated that "preferential trade relations . . . is a significant factor in explaining American hostility to colonial ties."[171] A State Department report on the U.S. interest in Africa provided a particularly detailed analysis:

> Our traditional policy in the past with regard to Africa, as well as the Far East, has been that of the "Open Door" . . . Overseas trade will be more important than ever before to this nation in maintaining our vaunted standard of living . . . Our country will not be able to maintain our heretofore standard of living or even to approximate it unless we can produce more, export more, and help by our overseas trade to all lands to raise the standard of living of backward peoples so that they may absorb more and more of the products of American agriculture and industry . . . We have therefore the most vital national interest in this matter. In my opinion it is not sufficient that there be a condition of joint world leadership by Great Britain and the United States . . . [The United States should not tolerate] agreements which would relegate *in any area of the world* [emphasis added] American influence . . . to a secondary position.[172]

A military intelligence report advocated anticolonial policies in Africa, partly because such policies would establish another "territory of free economic enterprise for United States business."[173]

It thus appears that the colonial issue was, at least in part, a dispute over trade and investment. On the one hand, the United States sought to establish a free-trade regime.[174] American business—as the world's preeminent economic power—stood to gain the most from free trade. Concomitantly, the USA wished to end colonialism and to open the underdeveloped regions to American exporters and investors. On the other hand, the Europeans were not eager to lose the markets to formidable American competitors. Overall, U.S. policy was influenced by both ideological and economic motivations. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of U.S. anticolonialism;[175] however, this ideology was also influenced by economic factors. American anticolonialism was a source of friction in the Belgian Congo and throughout Africa.

With the death of Roosevelt in 1945 and the conclusion of the Second World War, the USA changed its position on Africa. The Cold War came to dominate Africa policy during the Truman presidency, while anticolonialism, which had previously characterized U.S. policy, diminished or disappeared entirely. Declassified documents confirm that the United States pursued procolonial policies during the late 1940s and 1950s.[176] The Belgian Congo in particular was now regarded favorably, as an anticommunist bastion and as a supplier of strategic raw materials. American officials opposed independence, fearing that it would threaten the security of the minerals.[177] Indeed, the United States offered financial support for colonialism. The USA provided aid through the Economic Cooperation Administration, which administered the Marshall Plan, while the Export-Import Bank and the (U.S.-dominated) World Bank issued loans.[178] These pro-Belgian policies continued during the Eisenhower administration. Documents from the Eisenhower presidential library indicate a continued, and even intensified, procolonial policy.[179]

During the postwar period the Belgians still feared that the United States was encouraging independence. These fears were no longer justified, as we have seen, but they persisted all the same. The Belgians were also antagonistic toward the United Nations, which they regarded as an anticolonial forum. Congo Vice Governor-General Leon Petillon denounced the UN as an "institution whose atmosphere is, naturally, almost fatally hostile to us."[180] The U.S. consulate in the Congo in 1958 observed, "the Belgians . . . are resentful and suspicious of Communism, of Islam, of the United Nations, and of the United States . . . The Belgians are particularly suspicious of the United States."[181]

During the 1950s Belgian colonial investors developed a strong, though apprehensive, interest in American politics. The official *Bulletin* of the Belgian business interests in the Congo frequently discussed American views of colonialism.[182] The *Bulletin* analyzed statements made by Richard Nixon and John Foster Dulles, as well as articles and editorials from the *New York Herald-Tribune*, *New York Times*, *U.S. News and World Report*, *Minneapolis Tribune*, *Look*, and *Chicago Tribune*.

The Belgians not only monitored U.S. public opinion but they also attempted to influence it. In a 1956 speech before a business group in the Congo, Pierre Ryckmans, the former governor-general, advocated improved public relations in the USA. The governor-general's views were reported as follows:

> After having analyzed the causes of the anticolonialist sentiment of the United States, inspired above all by the preamble of the Declaration of Independence . . . M. Ryckmans concludes that it would be impossible to change this sentiment. "But [states Ryckmans] what we can do is to better inform the United States about the real situation in the Congo . . . Americans are very badly informed . . . We can rectify these misunderstandings by better informing the American public."[183]

The Belgians organized a publicity campaign in the United States which presented a highly favorable view of Belgian rule in Africa. The Belgian Information Center in New York "presented, to American circles, the civilizing work being undertaken in the Congo."[184] In 1954 the center began to produce regular English-language publications on the Belgian Congo.[185]

Belgians toured the United States to drum up support for their rule in the Congo. In 1952 the legislator Pierre Wigny made some twenty speeches in the United States and Canada, including appearances before the National Republican Club, the National Press Club, the Foreign Policy Association, and the Council on Foreign Relations.[186] E. van der Streaten, an executive with the SG holding company, made a similar tour of the United States, where he spoke at a conference organized by the Belgo-American Chamber of Commerce in New York.[187] All of these speaking tours and conferences emphasized that Belgian colonialism was benevolent, economically productive, and a bulwark against communist influence in Africa.

The Belgians also encouraged American businesses to invest, on a small scale, in the Congo. In 1954, the Belgian embassy in Washington established an attaché for Belgian Congo affairs, who was charged with attracting U.S. investment.[188] In 1955 an American trade mission traveled to the Congo at the invitation of the Belgian government to investigate investment possibilities.[189] Sabena airlines sponsored a tour of the Congo for members of the Detroit Chamber of Commerce.[190]

These efforts were apparently successful, since several American firms obtained portfolio interests in the Congo. In 1950 the following American interests purchased stock in an SG affiliate: Ladenburg, Thalman and Company, an investment bank; Lazard Frères, also an investment bank; David Rockefeller; and the (Rockefeller-owned) International Basic Economy Corporation.[191] In 1951 Lazard Frères helped fund the Crédit Congolais, a financial institution in the Belgian Congo.[192] In 1958 the Rockefeller-associated firm Dillon, Read and Company floated a fifteen-million-dollar bond issue for the colonial government. Morgan Guaranty Trust—"the American bank which showed the most interest in the Congo"—led consortia which provided forty million dollars in loans to the colony during 1959 and 1960.[193] The Bank of America helped finance the Société Congolaise de Banque.[194] SG created the Belgian-American Banking Corporation, which was based in New York and had an American on its board of directors. SG also funded the Belgo-American Development Corporation.[195]

American firms made direct investments in the Congo. The Rockefeller family acquired, in full or in part, a textile plant, an automobile distributor operation, a pineapple processor, a metal can producer, and a mineral prospecting firm. The Socony-Vacuum Oil Company (also Rockefeller-controlled) owned service stations and gasoline storage terminals worth a total of twelve million dollars. Other investors included Texaco and Gulf Oil.[196]

The Belgians were clearly opening the Congo, somewhat, for American investors. Given the prevailing suspicion of foreigners (and especially Americans), why did the Belgians permit these investments? One reason is that Belgian companies lacked the resources to develop the Congo,[197] and so they sought American capital. It is also possible that the investments had a political significance. It is worth noting that several of the American businesses in the Congo, especially those associated with the Rockefeller family, were politically well connected. An account in *Le Monde Diplomatique* offered this assessment: "The Belgian financial circles had sold off large blocks of stock . . . in the Congo-oriented companies, especially Union Minière du Haut Katanga. This transfer had, in their view . . . interested American finance—and accordingly American policy—in the future of their enterprises."[198] It thus appears that the Belgians were co-opting U.S. companies in order to prevent a resurgence of anticolonialism. The Belgians sought to appease the Americans just as half a century earlier Leopold had appeased the British. American investors thus gained a direct stake in Belgian colonialism.

It should be noted that, even during the 1950s, the Belgian Congo never established an open door for foreign investors. In 1955 Belgian capital still accounted for about 90 percent of total investments in the Congo.[199] The Belgians continued to exclude many foreign investors. In 1952, *Fortune* magazine reported:

> The Congo business climate being that of a tropical gentlemen's club, the word competition causes smiles . . . And the big corporations are Belgian-controlled, closely interconnected, and devoid of antitrust sentiment. One U.S. corporation recently abandoned the possibility of a Congo venture largely because the only available transport system and electric power are tied to a Belgian-controlled miner of the metal in question.[200]

During the middle 1950s, there was a "lively controversy" regarding American participation in a proposed hydroelectric project on the Congo's Inga River. It was generally acknowledged that the project was so massive that it required American financial support.[201] However, many Belgian companies resolutely opposed American penetration on such a large scale. According to *Le Monde:*

> [Opponents of the Inga project] did not want to have to invite American capital, which would permit, they believe, the United States to exert an anticolonial influence in what they regard as a sort of [Belgian] "game reserve" . . . [According to one account] Société Générale and Union Minière are systematically blocking the development of the Inga project . . . [Belgian businesses in the Congo] oppose the penetration, not only of American capital, but also of American influences, methods, and ideas.[202]

Belgian officials who favored the Inga project and the American participation were attacked in the press.[203]

Probably because of the controversy, the Belgians never brought the Inga dam project beyond the planning stage. There was clearly a limit to the amount of foreign investment that the Belgians would permit in the Congo. The Belgians tolerated some American investment if it did not threaten established colonial interests, but they would not permit a large-scale influx of American capital.

American commercial interest in the Congo was thus quite complicated. Several American companies were able to invest in the high-profit and low-risk environment of the Congo. Some of these companies were apparently content with their investments and ardently supported Belgian colonialism. But other American companies had an interest in opposing the Belgians. The latter group comprised investors who wished to increase their investments in the Congo but were blocked from doing so, and others who were unable to invest in the Congo at all. The American business community thus had conflicting interests in the Congo. These business cleavages would influence U.S. policy during the Congo Crisis of the 1960s.

Background to Independence

We have seen that the Congolese, despite all of their grievances and dissatisfactions, were not able to mount an effective resistance to colonial rule. The Congolese lacked institutions through which they could challenge the colonial system. Periodic rebellions occurred, but they were only regional in character and were therefore no real threat to the administration. Moreover, the sheer size of the colony helped prevent effective political organizing. The colonial status quo was gradually undermined during the post–World War II period. The economic boom of the 1950s, in particular, brought major social changes. New social groups were created during this period, leading to intensified nationalist agitation and ultimately independence. In this section we will briefly consider the circumstances which led to independence.

Of the social changes during the postwar period, the most important was rapid urbanization. The capital city of Leopoldville grew from 47,000 in 1940 to 340,000 in 1955, and Stanleyville and Elisabethville registered substantial growth as well. For the Congo as a whole, the population was 22 percent urban by 1955.[204] The independence movement, we shall see, was primarily urban based.

Urbanization enlarged politically important groups. The first such group comprised unemployed urban youths who lived by begging, odd jobs, and petty crime.[205] There is no specific estimate of their number, but this lumpenproletariat constituted a significant, growing percentage of the urban population. Later, the unemployed would function as a "reserve army" of demonstrators and rioters. Urban mobs would play an important role in Congolese politics by the end of the 1950s.

Urbanization also helped to create another social group: that of the *évolué,* an African who had evolved, shed traditional ways, and become westernized. For the most part the *évolué* was also the product of the postwar economic boom, which had generated a large number of jobs for clerks, nurses, and skilled laborers. Typically Africans filled these positions, and the *évolués* emerged from this group.[206] There was no universally accepted criterium for becoming an *évolué,* but it usually required a good knowledge of French, adherence to Christianity, and some postprimary education. The *évolués* enjoyed some privileges, such as relatively high incomes and limited social status. In essence the *évolués* constituted an African elite.

In reality, however, the privileges were quite limited; the *évolués* were rarely able to achieve university training or rise to the really responsible jobs in the administration, and pretenses aside, the white community regarded them (at best) with condescension. The *évolués* were subjected to the humiliations of racial discrimination, which was widely practiced in the Congo. In 1955 John Gunther described the discriminatory practices:

> The Belgians like to say that color bar does not exist in the Congo, but this is of course not true . . . Leopoldville and Elisabethville are double cities, with one compartment for blacks, one for whites. All manner of minor discriminations still exist. Africans cannot travel without a permit, cannot (in theory) drink anything stronger than beer, and cannot possess firearms. They are permitted vocational education, but only up to a point . . . There are thousands of Negro lawyers in British and French Africa, but not one in the Congo.[207]

White settlers in the Congo[208] enjoyed major advantages over all Africans, including the supposedly privileged *évolués*. The best lands, the most profitable areas of trade, and the highest-paying jobs were reserved for the whites.[209] Racial discrimination was not as severe as in South Africa, but it clearly did exist.

Unable to achieve recognition in "respectable" society, the *évolués* had little choice but to opt for nationalism. Modern nationalism had its origins in the late 1940s, when *évolués* created a series of cultural and social groups termed *évolué* clubs. By 1956 the Congo had 317 separate *évolué* clubs, with a total membership of over fifteen thousand.[210] *Evolués* also organized African-oriented publications. In 1951, *Conscience Africain* became the first black publication in the Congo. Although it initially published writings that were considered "high-minded, unexciting, and safe,"[211] the publication did in time assume political overtones.

Most *évolué* clubs were quite small, but Congolese gradually formed more substantial organizations covering whole regions and ethnic groups. Some of them moved into political action. The most important of these was the organization of the Bakongo peoples, eventually known as the Alliance des Bakongos (ABAKO). This organization, led by Joseph Kasavubu, was particularly influential in the vicinity of Leopoldville.[212] Thus strategically located, ABAKO would play a major role in nationalist agitation.

Gradually the *évolués* became politically assertive, and some expressed support for proposals from within the European community. In 1955 A. van Bilsen, a Belgian academic, proposed that the Congo be granted independence within thirty years. The van Bilsen plan was regarded as radical at the time, and the white settlers overwhelmingly opposed it. Congolese nationalists supported van Bilsen.[213] In 1956 *Conscience Africain* wrote an editorial calling for an end to racial discrimination and for political "emancipation," presumably meaning independence, within thirty years. This editorial was apparently inspired by van Bilsen, and it evoked considerable controversy. The ABAKO party, in stronger language, demanded immediate independence.[214]

Nationalist ideology was thus concentrated in the growing cities, especially in *évolué* circles. Discontent was also rising within the rural areas. The Congolese peasantry, still a large majority of the population, had a clear set of grievances. The postwar economic boom was primarily confined to the urban areas, and it had bypassed the countryside. Government monopsonies continued to hold crop prices at artificially low levels, reducing income.[215] Peasant living standards were depressed, and indeed the rapid urbanization of the period reflected the rural stagnation. A colonial magistrate, provided the following description of rural life:

> What makes life in the Bush unhappy is above all the *corvées* . . . the innumerable prescribed obligations and prohibitions, with a severe penalty always attached, which wear . . . [the peasants] out, the bullying, the pestering by every kind of authority, European as well as traditional . . . the excessive punishments inflicted without discernment by the European *agent*, the *juge de police*, and also by the *tribunal indigène*. These improper annoyances, which in large measure have their origin in our policy of production, inevitably result in the discouragement of the native.[216]

Tensions were thus increasing in the rural areas.

With stagnating incomes and with the best lands reserved for the whites, black peasants competed with each other for the remaining lands. These tensions had existed throughout the history of colonialism, but they were apparently increasing during the postwar era. Frequently the economic conflicts accentuated the numerous ethnic and regional rivalries in the Congo. Amid increasing inequality, petty jealousies were naturally augmented. The problem was especially acute in the Katanga region, where the land shortage was causing increasingly violent confrontation between Lunda and Baluba ethnic groups. According to one account: "By 1959, the whole district was rife with animosities; under the circumstances, very little was needed to ignite the smoldering tinder."[217] The growing tensions would in time draw the masses, both rural and urban, into active politics. They also ensured that nationalist politics, when it fully developed, would be complicated by feuding among different segments of the African community attempting to settle old scores.

Perhaps the most important influence on Congolese nationalism was the international context. During the postwar period, anticolonial movements were gaining force in Africa and throughout the Third World. By 1956 the Sudan had been granted independence, while Ghana achieved independence the following year. In Kenya, Mau Mau nationalists were waging war against British rule. Developments in the French-speaking areas were influential. The 1954 battle of Dien Bien Phu, in which Vietnamese nationalists defeated the French, inspired anticolonialists throughout the world. Franz Fanon would later write of "the great victory of the Vietnamese people at Dien Bien Phu," and added: "Since July 1954, the question which the colonised peoples have asked themselves has been 'What must be done to bring about another Dien Bien Phu? How can we manage it?'"[218]

Nationalism was also gaining in France's African empire. Both Morocco and Tunisia became independent in 1956, while in Algeria, guerrillas were fighting colonial rule. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle announced that the remaining colonies, in sub-Saharan Africa, could choose between immediate independence or continued association with France. De Gaulle's proposal caused some sensation in the Congo, and Congolese nationalists began to press for similar concessions from Belgium.[219]

The Congolese activists began to establish direct contacts with nationalist figures elsewhere in Africa. In 1958 several Congolese attended the All African Peoples Congress in Accra, Ghana, where they encountered prominent political leaders from all over the continent.[220] A series of factors, both international and internal, thus fostered anticolonial sentiment in the Congo.

One additional factor entered the equation: a major economic downturn. During 1957–58, world copper prices declined; copper lost 30 percent of value in 1957 and an additional 14 percent the following year.[221] The entire Congolese economy experienced a general recession, and living standards dropped throughout the colony, while unemployment increased. In Leopoldville, 25 percent of the population was unemployed by early 1959.[222] As popular discontent grew, the indigenous political organizations became increasingly strident in their demands.

In this context, the Belgians made the first moves toward political liberalization. In December 1957 the administration permitted Leopoldville and two other cities to establish popularly elected municipal governments. In 1958 voting rights were extended to four other cities.[223] These concessions were quite timid in comparison with the political rights extended in many British and French colonies; but by the standards of Belgian colonialism, they were major advances. For the first time the Congolese were permitted to vote, albeit only in a few selected areas.

The Belgian concessions proved inadequate, and new political parties continued to form. The number of African publications, in French and various African languages, increased significantly, reaching a total of 250 by the beginning of 1959. As the pace of political activity quickened, nationalist ideology spread. Large urban crowds, not really controlled by any of the organizations, formed spontaneously, and mass demonstrations, generally anti-Belgian in tone, occurred in several regions toward the end of 1958.[224]

In January 1959, severe riots erupted in Leopoldville. The Leopoldville riots began as a response to a police crackdown on the ABAKO party (although the party does not appear to have planned the riots).[225] Several Belgians were injured. The Force Publique was called in, and it employed brutal tactics to suppress the Congolese. The official death toll was forty-nine, although some sources claimed hundreds of deaths.[226] The total number of deaths—all of which were Congolese—has never been firmly established. The Force commander, Lieutenant-General Emile Janssens, commented that the massacre "must serve as a lesson to those who were lucky enough to escape our bullets."[227]

The Leopoldville riots marked a decisive turning point. The brutality of the repression seriously embarrassed the Belgians and put them on the defensive. Shortly after the January riots, Belgian King Baudouin announced major changes in colonial policy. The most immediate change was the termination of racial discrimination. The king also announced that independence would be granted in the future, although the date was left unspecified.[228] The royal announcement was the first time that a Belgian official had alluded to the possibility of independence.

Within the colonial administration, there was a lively debate regarding the causes of the riot. The Belgian parliament appointed a commission to study the issue, and the findings were quite critical of colonial policy. The commission's report stressed the pervasiveness of racial discrimination, as well as the haughty attitude of white colonials, and how these factors had led to African discontent.[229] At the same time, in the manner of a "carrot and stick" strategy, the administration used selective repression, arresting some three hundred Congolese political activists. Some prisoners were released, but by the spring of 1959, colonial police were still "grimly combing out 'undesirables.'"[230]

Despite the repression, the pace of political activity intensified. In the newly charged atmosphere, activism spread far beyond the *évolué* circles. In the western regions, the rural areas "underwent a blitz-politicization in the course of which the administration lost virtually all control."[231] During 1959, changes were taking place within the Congolese nationalist movement, giving the movement a more radical content. Specifically, the ABAKO party, previously at the forefront of the agitation, was being eclipsed. ABAKO was weakened by its exclusive identification with the Bakongo peoples of the western region and by its failure to build support in non-Bakongo areas. The non-Bakongo, a substantial majority of the population, began to resent ABAKO's exclusiveness. The popularity of Joseph Kasavubu, ABAKO's leader, also began to suffer. By September 1959, *Africa Special Report* noted that "Kasavubu's star as a national figure has waned since he came out on June 23 with a plan to set up a secessionist Bakongo tribal state."[232] Other parties, especially the newly formed Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), moved into the limelight. The MNC eschewed regional appeals and ultimately proved far more formidable and more menacing to the Belgians than the parochial ABAKO.

The Belgian administration eventually unveiled a detailed plan for reforming the colony. The Belgian plan, promulgated during the summer and fall of 1959, called for gradual African self-government, with the option of full independence in 1964. The first step in this plan entailed general municipal elections, which were to be held in December 1959.[233]

Several of the Congolese parties, including the MNC and ABAKO, opposed the Belgian plan, regarding it as excessively slow paced. The nationalist parties proclaimed a boycott of the elections and demanded immediate independence. In December the Belgian-sponsored elections took place, but they proved a failure. The nationalist boycott was generally effective, and election turnout was light. In Leopoldville, less than a third of eligible voters actually participated, despite the very high level of political interest.[234] The fall of 1959 had also been marked by fresh rioting in several cities, and though not as severe as the January riots, the new disorders had the effect of "turning on the heat."[235] Certainly the prospect of further rioting tempered Belgian policy.

The riots, combined with the successful boycott of the December elections, indicated that the plan for gradual independence had failed. Some accommodation with the nationalist forces was obviously necessary. The Belgian government agreed to an immediate Round Table conference with representatives of the Congolese parties, to be held in Brussels in January and February 1960, to discuss the future of the colony. The conference took place as scheduled, and it produced "a radically different decolonization plan," one much more in line with the most radical demands.[236] The plan included a new interim constitution, the *Loi Fondamentale*. The constitution provided for a bicameral legislature, a prime minister, a ceremonial president, and semi-autonomous local institutions. General legislative elections were scheduled for May 1960, and full independence was to be granted on June 30, 1960.

The most striking feature of the Congolese independence struggle was the speed of its success. Throughout the crisis, the period for decolonization was persistently shortened. Until January 1959, no real plans for decolonization existed. After the January riots, eventual decolonization was promised, but without any date specified. By the end of 1959, Belgian plans called for decolonization over a five-year period, and finally, at the Round Table conference, it was decided that independence would come in less than half a year. Thus, the Congo became independent with extremely little preparation.

Conclusion

In the colonial history of the Congo, several factors are particularly noteworthy. First, the Belgians were among the most exploitive colonial rulers in Africa. Leopold's rule was especially atrocious, but many abuses continued even after direct Belgian rule began in 1908. The Congolese must have deeply resented this treatment and felt antagonism toward Belgium. Second, the Congo had no tradition of national unity. The country was huge and culturally diverse. The African population was divided by geography and ethnolinguistic differences, and colonialism, by introducing new inequalities, greatly intensified the divisions. Third, the colonial system did not prepare the Congolese for independence. The number of university graduates was small, and the overall level of university education was one of the lowest in Africa. Trained indigenous leadership was thus lacking, and few leaders had postsecondary education. Congo politicians often had feeble organizational support. The Congolese did establish a great number of political groups—estimated at 120 by 1960[237]—but for the most part these were weakly organized and unable to cooperate with each other. With such conditions, postindependence politics was marked by chaos and random violence. The new Congolese state was extremely weak and therefore vulnerable to foreign intervention. We will see the effects of such intervention in chapter 3.

Colonial rule also enabled Belgian financial interests, especially the Société Générale group, to establish profitable investments in the Congo. Société Générale and other companies clearly sought to preserve their investments. The business groups were to play important roles during the postindependence politics of the Congo. Finally, this chapter showed how Belgian colonialism was affected by the international environment. We saw that established Belgian interests were continuously apprehensive about their stake in the Congo and that they felt threatened by foreign competitors from Great Britain and, after the 1930s, the United States. These fears significantly affected Belgian colonial policy. Subsequent chapters will further analyze the international commercial competition and how the competition influenced the events of the Congo Crisis.

3 The Congo Crisis

> In this, as in any other unsolved crime, it is useful to begin by determining who benefitted.
>
> I. F. Stone[1]

On June 30, 1960, the Belgian Congo became independent. The new political system almost immediately degenerated into chaos. Several days after independence, the military mutinied and went on a rampage. Over the next three years, the Congo faced regional secessions, intervention by several foreign countries, and extended domestic turmoil. The Congo Crisis, as these events were later termed, was one of the seminal events of recent African history. It constituted the first time that the Cold War was brought to sub-Saharan Africa. The Congo Crisis entailed one of the most important covert operations in the history of the Central Intelligence Agency. The crisis is also interesting from a methodological standpoint. The conflict, which lasted from 1960 until 1963, involved two presidential administrations: those of Eisenhower and Kennedy. The two administrations were from different parties and had very different approaches to Africa policy. The Congo Crisis therefore provides an excellent case study for examining changes in U.S. foreign policy.

This chapter will analyze the Congo Crisis during the period of the Eisenhower administration, from June 1960 to January 1961. We will consider the circumstances of Congolese independence, the postindependence turmoil, the Belgian role in the crisis, and finally how the Eisenhower administration reacted to the crisis. The conclusion will analyze the motivations for U.S. policy.

Belgium and Congolese Independence

It is difficult to draw conclusions about Belgian intentions at the time of independence, since the Belgian archives are still closed. The most interesting issue, still unresolved, is why the Belgians ended colonial rule so quickly.[2] In any case, the available evidence shows that the Belgians were prepared to dominate the Congo in a neocolonial manner even after independence.[3] The colonial military force, the Force Publique, was entirely officered by Belgians. The Belgians, especially the Force Publique officers, resisted Africanization of their respective services.[4] Force commander Lieutenant General Emile Janssens held "right-wing political opinions."[5] On independence day the Force Publique was renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise, but the change was "largely an exercise in nomenclature because no significant changes in the functions or command structure of the Force were planned or anticipated."[6]

Whites also continued to dominate most top- and mid-level positions in civil administration.[7] Richard Mahoney sums up Belgian intentions this way: "The Belgian gamble—*le pari Belge*—was to transfer the trappings of power to the Congo while maintaining de facto control over the new state."[8] The Belgians evidently did not intend to leave.

Belgium had strong incentives to remain in the Congo. Thousands of whites worked in the colony, and Belgian companies held major investments. We have seen that the investments were exceptionally profitable, and that they provided benefits for the Belgian economy as a whole. According to a 1960 State Department report: "The loss of the Congo will subject the Belgian economy to unprecedented strains . . . Possession of the Congo has brought the Belgian economy numerous benefits in recent years."[9] Belgian policy toward the Congo was influenced by these economic interests.

The Belgians thus had reason to fear independence. The new country could, after all, take measures, such as nationalization or regulation, that would be disadvantageous to investors. Four months before independence, stock prices fell on the Brussels Bourse, reportedly because of fears about decolonization.[10] In May 1960 the Belgians reinforced their military bases in the Congo. The Belgians also dispatched Ganshof van der Meersch as the new government minister with responsibility for the Congo. Van der Meersch "was pictured in the Belgian press as a strong man going out to protect the Europeans in the Congo." These actions were regarded as acts of intimidation on the eve of independence.[11] General Janssens summed up the Belgian attitude when he wrote, "After independence = Before independence."[12] The Belgians intended to retain control of the new state.

African Nationalism

While the Belgians were planning only a nominal independence, they had to confront the rising power of nationalist ideology in the Congo. The potency of the ideology had been dramatically demonstrated during the riots of January 1959, which led directly to decolonization. Any discussion of the nationalist perspective must focus on its principal exponent in the Congo: Patrice Lumumba.[13] Lumumba, a former postal clerk, began his political career during the late 1950s, when the Belgians first began to permit political organization. He helped found the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) and quickly became the party leader.

Lumumba infused the MNC with a strong ideological content, generally a blend of African nationalist views with liberal Western ideas. His speeches during the 1950s stridently denounced colonialism but also paid homage to liberal concepts. During 1958 and 1959, Lumumba traveled extensively in Africa and Europe and participated in a debate on the colonial question with academics at the Free University of Brussels.[14] Lumumba was especially influenced by his attendance, in 1958, at the All African Peoples Conference in Accra. At this conference Lumumba met with some of the leading figures of African nationalism, including Kwame Nkrumah, president of Ghana.

With Lumumba as its leader, the MNC quickly built up a substantial popular following. Historical accounts all note that Lumumba's personal charisma, powers of speech, and ideological sophistication contributed to the party's success. One authority writes that "the MNC's rise to national prominence must be essentially credited to Lumumba's skill at maneuvering."[15] The MNC thus became the dominant force in Congolese politics.

The MNC was clearly not the only political party during this period. We have noted that numerous parties formed in the Congo, but most of them had only regional influence, and they drew their support from specific ethnic groups.[16] Ethnically based parties have been a feature of postindependence politics throughout the continent, but even in this context, the ethnic orientation of Congolese parties stood out. Crawford Young notes "the striking fact that Congolese parties are the only significant ones in Africa to adopt specifically ethnic names."[17] Lumumba's MNC, in contrast, generally eschewed regional appeals and sought support throughout the country. The party was strongest in the region of Stanleyville, but it also gained adherents in the provinces of Kasai, Katanga, and Kivu.[18]

The MNC accepted money from Belgian sources, like virtually all Congolese political movements. One source notes that "there was scarcely any party, including Lumumba's MNC . . . which did not benefit to some extent from official or private Belgian support."[19] However, because of his large popular base, Lumumba was less dependent on the Belgians than any other Congolese politician. As a result of this autonomy, the MNC's campaign propaganda contained a "populist and anti-Belgian tone."[20]

The party program, though somewhat vague, had a strongly nationalist tone. The party called for gradual Africanization of administration, state-led economic development, and neutralism in foreign policy. The party sought a generalized loosening of ties with Belgium and presumably a diversification of the Congo's sources of foreign aid, investment, and trade. The MNC proposals do not seem particularly radical by contemporary standards. The MNC did not call for nationalization of industry and never advocated a complete expulsion of Belgian influence. Lumumba was undoubtedly aware that Belgian aid would be essential for the first several years, since there were so few technically trained Congolese.[21]

Nevertheless, the MNC program threatened Belgium's neocolonial designs. While the Belgians sought to dominate the Congo even after independence, the MNC intended to distance the country from Belgium; while the Belgians wished to continue their tutelage, the MNC sought to indigenize the new country's administration and to reduce white tutelage; while the Belgian companies sought autonomy from state control, the MNC intended to increase business regulation. The Belgians and the MNC each had conflicting, and mutually antagonistic, plans.

In accordance with the interim constitution, parliamentary elections were held in May 1960. The Belgians supported a series of regionally based parties which, in contrast with the MNC, favored a federal system and weak central government. Such a federalized system would have been presumably more susceptible to Belgian control. According to Smith Hempstone, "the federal form of government . . . appealed to most whites."[22] Hedging their risks, the Belgians also supported a party with some limited national appeal, the Parti National du Progrès (PNP). This party was considered conservative, weakly organized, and favorably disposed toward Belgian interests.[23] Catherine Hoskyns describes the Belgian attitude: "Up to the moment of the elections most Belgians counted on a PNP victory . . . and expected that a moderate government would be formed which, if not teleguided from Brussels, would at least be heavily dependent upon Belgian advice and support."[24] Above all the Belgians appeared quite hostile toward Lumumba's MNC. Lumumba, in

turn, denounced Belgium for its "discreditable and manifest efforts to sabotage the elections."[25]

The Belgian strategy failed. The MNC won a plurality, gaining 40 seats out of a total of the 137 seats in the Chamber of Representatives. Twenty-three other parties gained seats in the Chamber, but none of them held more than 13 seats.[26] The MNC, as the largest single party, was selected to lead a broad coalition government. Lumumba became the first prime minister. Joseph Kasavubu, of the Alliance des Bakongos, one of the ethnically based parties, gained the post of president.[27]

Initially the Belgians acquiesced in the prospect of an MNC government. They hoped that Kasavubu would act as a restraint on Lumumba.[28] This optimism was shattered by the Independence Day ceremonies of June 30, 1960. During the ceremonies, which were attended by Belgian King Baudouin and Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens, Lumumba delivered a strongly nationalistic speech. His speech reads in part:

> Our lot was eighty years of colonial rule . . . We have known tiring labor exacted in exchange for salary which did not allow us to satisfy our hunger . . . We have known ironies, insults, blows which we had to endure morning, noon, and night because we were "Negroes" . . . We have known that our lands were despoiled . . . We have known that the law was never the same depending on whether it concerned a white or a Negro . . . We have known the atrocious sufferings of those banished for political opinions or religious beliefs . . . We have known that there were magnificent houses for the whites in the cities and tumble-down straw huts for the Negroes.[29]

The speech also contained some conciliatory passages, but these escaped notice. Western writers reported, often in highly exaggerated form,[30] the stridency of Lumumba's address. According to one account, a "consensus quickly crystallized that Lumumba was unreliable, anti-Belgian, antiwhite, perhaps a Communist, and probably crazy."[31] The Belgians thereafter regarded Lumumba as an implacable adversary.

The Belgians also had to contend with diffuse popular hostility—widespread in the Congo—toward European tutelage. The hostility was particularly marked in the military. Congolese enlisted men resented the Belgian dominance and demanded changes, but on July 5, General Janssens summarily dismissed such demands and asserted, "the Force Publique continues as before."[32] That evening the military mutinied, and black soldiers refused to obey their officers. The rebellion rapidly spread throughout the country. The soldiers proceeded to go on a rampage, looting, rioting, and harassing whites. Numerous rapes were reported. Lumumba, desperately seeking to quell the revolt, dismissed General Janssens and later all Belgian officers. Congolese soldiers were promoted in rank. However, the rebellion continued, killing up to two dozen whites, and caused a generalized panic. Thousands of Belgians fled the country within a few days of the uprising.[33]

On July 10, Belgian paratroopers, who had been based in the Congo under treaty,[34] acted to crush the mutiny. The paratroopers intervened in several locations throughout the Congo. Lumumba, unable to assert control, initially countenanced the intervention, provided that the troops were "restricted to the protection of persons and property."[35] The Belgians quickly exceeded this restriction. The Belgian navy bombarded the port of Matadi, killing nineteen Congolese, even though no Belgians were threatened in that city.[36] The U.S. ambassador reported that some Belgian troops "have become completely irrational and in many instances have behaved worse than the worst Congolese."[37]

At first, many Congolese had expressed regret at the atrocities committed against the Europeans. Young describes the situation: "Much of the Congolese leadership was inclined to agree that the Belgians were the aggrieved party. The parliamentary debates are instructive on this point . . . The deputies observed a minute of silence for the [European] victims, and a feeling of shame was expressed by numerous members."[38] The Belgian intervention, rather than restoring order, greatly intensified the military rebellion. According to another account, the "mutiny was comparatively restricted up to the time the Belgian paratroopers arrived."[39] The paratroopers exacerbated the turmoil.

The situation deteriorated still further on July 11, when the province of Katanga announced that it was seceding and forming an independent state. Lumumba sought to negotiate an end to the Katanga secession, and he flew to Elisabethville, Katanga's capital city. Katangese authorities prevented his plane from landing, and the secession continued.[40] Belgian troops, we shall soon see, directly supported the Katanga secession. Undoubtedly the Belgian intervention went well beyond the protection of persons and property.

After the incidents in Matadi and Katanga, Lumumba demanded that the Belgian troops leave. When the troops did not depart, the Congo severed diplomatic relations with Belgium. Lumumba appealed for international support to end the intervention—which led to rapid escalation of the conflict. A United Nations military force entered the country and remained for the next four years. The great powers, including the USA and the USSR, became deeply involved. We will focus on this internationalization shortly; at this point we will take a closer look at the Belgian role.

"We Belgians are Back in Power"

Throughout the first months of the crisis, Lumumba accused the Belgians of "external aggression" and "colonialist machinations."[41] Western journalists and diplomats generally dismissed these claims as simpleminded rhetoric. The memoirs of former U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake, for example, state that Lumumba "found it politically convenient to identify Belgium as the villain in every scene . . . Lumumba would list one Belgian 'plot' after another."[42]

Historical research shows that Lumumba's statements were essentially correct. The Belgians did indeed intend to reestablish control in the Congo. A United Nations intelligence report from October 1960 described Belgian activities:

> During the latest phase, and in contrast with the precipitate mass departure of last July, the Belgian influx to the Congo is progressing at a steady pace and there is evidence of centralized planning behind this infiltration . . . The Belgians have achieved some success in reestablishing their political, or, at any rate, administrative, influence in Leopoldville . . . The most striking occurrence, in recent weeks . . . was the taking of office by Mr. M. Tshibamba in the Ministry of Health, who following his appointment on 20 September, as *Commissaire general,* arrived with half a dozen Belgian advisers . . . One of the latter told ONUC [United Nations] staff member that there was no longer any need for their [*sic*] Advisory team, "since we, Belgians, are back in power."[43]

The Belgians endeavored to reduce the Congolese to figureheads, leaving real power to the white advisors.

Belgian neocolonialism was not entirely successful,[44] since UN civilian officials already occupied many of the administrative positions. As a result, the Belgians attempted to divide the Congo into a series of small, relatively malleable, states. They then attempted to establish governments that would accept Belgian dominance. We will now consider these issues in detail.

The Katanga Secession

The most important Belgian activity was in Katanga province. Katanga was by far the most valuable region of the country, containing substantial reserves of copper, cobalt (60 percent of the Western world's supply), uranium, zinc, manganese, coal, iron ore, gold, silver, germanium, and radium.[45] Most of the Belgian investments were located in this province.

The secession had its origins in the preindependence politics of Katanga. In 1958 the CONAKAT (Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga), a political party based on the Lunda and Bayeke groups, was founded. The CONAKAT, led by Moise Tshombe, developed a strongly regional perspective, one hostile toward the central government in Leopoldville.[46] The CONAKAT was opposed by a rival party, the BALUBAKAT (Association des Balubas du Katanga). The latter party, based on the Baluba group, apparently eschewed regionalism and favored a strong central government. The long-standing feud between the Balubas and the Lundas, described previously, thus influenced postindependence politics.

The provincial elections of May 1960 produced mixed results. The BALUBAKAT gained a plurality of the popular vote, but because of an electoral technicality, the CONAKAT won a plurality of seats in the provincial legislature.[47] CONAKAT thus managed to dominate the provincial government, with Tshombe as provincial leader. The BALUBAKAT leadership, angered by the outcome, chose to boycott the provincial legislature, leaving CONAKAT in complete control. Under Tshombe Katanga seceded from the Congo and formed an independent state in July 1960.

The most interesting aspect of the secession was the role of the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), a Belgian mining company and an affiliate of the Société Générale de Belgique. Some studies, such as that of Crawford Young, claim that the UMHK was only a minor factor in the Congo Crisis. Young clearly acknowledges Union Minière's support of the Katanga secession; he nevertheless downplays the issue and confines his discussion of UMHK's role in the secession to a footnote, which reads, in part:

> The role of the large corporations, especially Union Minière and the Société Générale, is much more complex than is generally believed by the world at large. One must carefully distinguish between . . . the Brussels and Elisabethville [Katanga] offices. There is every reason to believe . . . that the companies were willing to use the secession threat as leverage, but did not want to have their bluff called . . . In my opinion, the most reasonable interpretation of the behavior of colonial corporations is that they were simply bewildered by the pace of events, had had little experience in other countries to provide perspective in survival techniques for periods of political effervescence, and pursued simultaneously several contradictory policies in order to hedge as many bets as possible.[48]

Young implies that Union Minière was only a marginal factor.

Newly available evidence, however, suggests that Young is incorrect, and that the Belgian company played a crucial role in the Katanga secession. It should be noted at the outset that UMHK had historically dominated Katangese politics. We have seen that Union Minière personnel were extensively intertwined with the provincial administration. Katanga was generally regarded as a "company province." Moreover, UMHK influenced the Congolese political parties of the late 1950s. The white community (which in Katanga meant Union Minière[49]) dominated Tshombe's CONAKAT Party. In the United States a Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee report noted: "The CONAKAT . . . [is] under very strong white influence . . . [It] was transformed into a political party in no small measure as a result of intervention by white colons with the assistance of many officials of Union Minière and some of the administration."[50] Pierre Davistar, a Belgian journalist and a supporter of Katanga, made the following observation about CONAKAT: "Who cemented this Union? We do not hesitate to say it: the European." Davistar also referred to the CONAKAT as "an African party which the Europeans had intelligently sponsored at baptism, and whose strings they clearly pulled in the wings."[51] The Belgians thus created the political basis of the Katangese secession.

When the secession actually occurred, the Belgians provided crucial assistance. Union Minière executives—in the local Katanga office and in the Brussels headquarters—supported Tshombe. As late as 1962, both American and UN intelligence reported that UMHK continued to support the secession.[52] The company provided approximately 80 percent of Katanga's revenues.[53] It is doubtful that the secession could have continued without this subsidy. A U.S. foreign service officer later commented that "volumes could and probably will be written on UMHK's real role in the Katanga secession attempt."[54]

The Belgian government never officially recognized Tshombe's regime, and on paper the government opposed the secession.[55] Despite these diplomatic niceties, the Belgian government, working closely with the corporate interests, supported Katanga.[56] Belgian officials, including Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny, praised the Tshombe regime. Belgian legislators (especially from the ruling Liberal and Christian Social parties) also favored the secession, as did much of the press. Belgian troops organized the Katangese military and police forces.[57] On July 20, the Belgian Technical Mission was established. This agency, authorized directly by the Belgian Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens, "constituted the real command post for Katanga."[58]

Facing intense international criticism, Belgium modified its policies and gradually withdrew most of its troops from Katanga during the month of August. Despite the withdrawal, Katanga remained firmly under white control. A UN report from October noted that "in Katanga, all key civilian and security posts are either held directly by Belgian officials or controlled by advisers to recently appointed and often inexperienced Congolese officials."[59] Some thirteen hundred Belgians were employed in educational, technical, and administrative positions in Katanga,[60] while Belgian academics, especially from the University of Liège, advised Tshombe. Many of the advisors achieved considerable power. A Belgian professor, René Clemens, was the "principal author of the 'Constitution'" of Katanga. Clemens reportedly had been recruited by Union Minière.[61] Another Union Minière employee advised Katangese Foreign Minister Evariste Kimba.[62]

Whites also dominated the Katangese gendarmerie. Some of the Belgian troops never actually left the Congo; many officers simply began to wear the insignia of the now-dissolved colonial militia instead of Belgian military uniforms.[63] In addition, mercenaries were recruited from South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and several European countries. By early 1961 several hundred white mercenaries (including former SS soldiers and Italian Fascists) served in the Katangese gendarmerie.[64] Military equipment was airlifted from Belgium. A United Nations document indicated that Union Minière helped organize the buildup. The Belgian corporate interests,

> have backed Tshombe actively. It is significant that apart from the Rhodesian border areas such as Kipushi, the main centers of Katangese par [?] are now Jadotville and Kolwezi, the main Union Minière centers. It is reported from numerous sources . . . that bombs and other weapons for the Katangan forces are made in the Union Minière workshops and that civilian vehicles are armored there for military use. Mercenaries are recruited by Union Minière . . . and are lodged, looked after and probably paid by Union Minière on arrival.[65]

The UN secretary-general publicly accused Union Minière of providing military assistance to Tshombe.[66]

The mercenaries were useful in several ways. Their presence helped deter attacks by the Congolese National Army against Katanga. Later, in 1961, they would be used against the UN force. The mercenaries also helped crush resistance within Katanga. Specifically, the Balubas, who constituted roughly half the population of Katanga, resented the Belgian influence in the province. The leadership of the Balubas, noting that "this government is run by the Belgians under the pretext of Tshombe," sought UN aid.[67] The Balubas thus constituted an embarrassment to Tshombe and his corporate sponsors. The Baluba hostility also threatened the safety of European missionaries. Conor Cruise O'Brien, an Irish diplomat who headed the UN mission in Katanga, would later recall that "Christian missionaries could not survive in much, perhaps most, of Katanga without the protection of European gunmen."[68] To counter the threat, the Katangese gendarmerie, led by the white mercenaries, terrorized Baluba regions. By December 1960, the campaign killed up to seventy thousand Balubas. The white-led forces used "'strong means' to clean out certain rebel nests. Entire villages were razed and automatic weapons literally mowed down entire ranks of 'youths.'"[69]

Despite the Baluba opposition, Tshombe did enjoy some indigenous support. The Lundas, it should be recalled, had voted overwhelmingly for Tshombe's CONAKAT Party, because of the CONAKAT's association with the traditional Lunda aristocracy.[70] There is no evidence, however, that popular sentiment influenced Katangese government policies. Tshombe relied primarily on his white advisors. According to a UN intelligence report, "the idea that Katangan resistance is a native and African affair is a myth put out for foreign consumption and is scoffed at in private by the Europeans here."[71] Tshombe so distrusted the local population that he employed white officers for his personal protection, noting, "in these matters I trust only whites."[72]

In short, Katanga functioned as a neocolonial puppet state. The Belgian companies and to some extent their government played a crucial role in the

Katanga secession. The Belgians helped create the secessionist party, CONAKAT, they staffed most of the major military and administrative jobs in the province, and they supplied Katanga with most of its finances. Mercenaries, recruited and probably funded by UMHK, crushed Tshombe's opposition.

The Belgian interests gained major advantages from the secession. Union Minière clearly benefited, since it was insulated from the possible disturbances of African nationalism. The company's operations continued throughout the Congo Crisis, virtually without disruption.[73] The roughly twenty thousand Belgian residents in the province, many of whom worked for Union Minière, also benefited.[74] A Belgian newspaper provided this account of Katanga:

> They [the white residents] can feather their nests, for they are quite handsomely paid, and Katanga is extremely generous in respect to financial transfers to Belgium . . . Personal currency transfers total one hundred million Belgian francs a month, and those of the companies two and a half thousand million a year. That makes a total of more than three and a half thousand million a year leaving Katanga without . . . being balanced in any way by investments from the outside.[75]

Katanga was a colonialist's paradise. Former UN official O'Brien sums it up this way: "The State apparatus of Katanga was designed mainly for the protection of European lives and property," and it was widely considered "nothing but a mask for continuing European rule."[76]

The Belgians tried to arrange other regional secessions on the model of Katanga throughout the Congo. Stephen Weissman writes that Belgian agents "had instructions to encourage 'any rallying of other provinces of the Congo to Katanga . . . of course with discretion.'"[77] The Belgians thus proceeded to dismember the Congo.

Secessionist attempts in Equateur and Kivu provinces failed.[78] However, the South Kasai region seceded in August 1960. South Kasai, under the nominal leadership of Albert Kalonji, a local politician, cooperated closely with Katanga. The region was also commercially valuable. Though not as rich as Katanga, South Kasai produced much of the Western world's industrial diamond supplies. The Belgian companies, especially the FORMINIERE diamond company (another affiliate of the Société Générale), had substantial interests in the region.

Probably because of these interests, FORMINIERE helped finance the secessionist state.[79] In addition, the Guggenheim family of the United States,

which owned stock in FORMINIERE, reportedly aided the secession.[80] The Belgian military also provided support. On paper South Kasai functioned as an African state, headed by an indigenous government; in fact, the Belgians dominated South Kasai. A United Nations intelligence report stated that in South Kasai,

> there is also a considerable Belgian presence . . . The current emphasis there is on war-like preparations directed by Colonel Crevecoueur, serving in Belgian uniform, and assisted by another Belgian, Colonel Levaux. With a view to increasing Kalonji's forces from 2,000 to 3,500 or 4,000, the Chief Medical Officer of Forminière has been instructed to examine young . . . recruits. There is no apparent shortage of rifles. Moreover, arms from Katanga are being brought in . . . reportedly with the help of a Belgian businessman . . . Col. Crevecoueur's military activities seem to be matched by his political power; at a recent conference attended by South Kasai leaders . . . he was the dominating figure, according to an eye witness.[81]

Even Timberlake's memoirs mention (rather casually) that "the South Kasai government of Albert Kalonji was clearly built on the resources of the Forminière industrial diamond mines and that of Katanga on the great copper works of Union Minière."[82] South Kasai, like Katanga, appears to have been a puppet state of the European interests.

The secessions were decisively important. South Kasai and Katanga, especially the latter, had historically been the economic mainstays of the entire colony. Katanga's mineral exports generated at least half of the Congo's revenues.[83] Without these regions, the Congo would have been economically crippled. The secessions attracted considerable international interest.

The United States and Belgian Neocolonialism

We have noted an extended conflict between the Belgians, who sought to dominate the Congo, and Patrice Lumumba, who opposed the Belgian efforts. In this conflict the United States supported Belgium. The Eisenhower administration had encouraged Belgium to form a neocolonial relationship with the Congo. Weissman writes that, "at the time of independence, American officials still considered the Congo a 'Belgian bailiwick' . . . Belgium . . . would take care of whatever problems developed; America's role would be largely that of an understanding friend."[84] Dwight D. Eisenhower himself disdained African nationalism, which he termed "a torrent overrunning everything in its path."[85]

Given these attitudes, it should not be surprising that the United States favored Belgian intervention in the Congo. When the Belgian paratroopers intervened, the USA welcomed the action. Indeed, the American embassy had previously requested such intervention.[86] The United States did not protest against Belgian excesses, even after the Matadi massacre and the Katanga secession.

The Belgian intervention, however, turned into a public relations disaster, and it was denounced harshly by the Soviet Union. On July 13, Moscow radio broadcasted that, "Belgium is grossly violating, not only the territorial integrity, but also the political independence of the Congo."[87] The Soviet views were also shared by many countries from the Afro-Asian bloc. The denunciations embarrassed the United States, and American officials soon faced a dilemma. It was clear that the Belgian troops, discredited by their violence, had to be withdrawn; however, the Congo needed some outside force to restore order. Which country would provide the necessary troops? Congolese Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko initially suggested that the USA send a military force.[88] The U.S. government considered sending troops, and an aircraft carrier task force was dispatched to the Congolese coast.[89] But the option was considered too risky and was rejected. President Eisenhower was reluctant to commit U.S. forces outside traditional spheres of influence.

Instead it was agreed that Belgian troops would be replaced by a multinational force under United Nations command.[90] On July 14, 1960, the UN Security Council officially authorized the removal of Belgian troops from the Congo and their prompt replacement with a UN military force. The resolution was quickly implemented. UN troops were airlifted to the Congo and soon reached a strength of fourteen thousand men. A civilian aid program was also established, with UN officials staffing key positions in the Congolese government.[91]

The USA strongly supported the UN force, and indeed American officials largely organized the action. The Belgians were angered by the UN resolutions, since they required the removal of Belgian troops. U.S. and Belgian policies momentarily diverged.[92] The divergence was slight, however, and the U.S. delegation continued to defend Belgium during the United Nations debates. A State Department official claimed that "Belgians obviously have not committed aggression and U.S. could not support any UN force on this basis . . . Belgian actions to protect lives and property . . . are clearly justified."[93] Weissman summed up the U.S. position as follows: "It was considered too dangerous to let the Belgians solve the Congo problems alone; but every effort would be made to protect Belgian interests."[94] The USA thus continued, on balance, a pro-Belgian policy in the Congo.

Most importantly, the Eisenhower administration favored the Katanga secession, which, as we have seen, was a bulwark for the Belgian interests. Mahoney writes:

> American officials regarded pro-Western Katanga as their ace-in-the-hole. Washington decided that it could not risk alienating virtually all Black Africa by recognizing Katanga officially, however much it would have liked to. The State Department, nonetheless, advised several posts: ". . . should other states recognize Katanga, it is possible the U.S. might reconsider its position." Under Secretary [of State C. Douglas] Dillon's attitude was: "Don't close the door on Katanga." Ambassador Timberlake urged at one point that Katanga be permitted political independence. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant looked on the secession, according to one Foreign Service Officer in the Africa Bureau, "with all the objectivity of a large stockholder in Union Minière."[95]

The U.S. embassy in Leopoldville openly supported the secession. In November Timberlake became "the first foreign ambassador to visit Katanga."[96] The Central Intelligence Agency assisted Katanga and delivered Fouga Magisters, French-built jet fighters, to the Katangese military. The delivery was undertaken by Seven Seas Airways, an agency contract company.[97]

The pro-Belgian policy did not go completely unchallenged. Criticism emanated from the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs and (to a very small extent) from the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, but the criticisms had no significant impact. These two bureaus both were quite weak during the Eisenhower administration, and they had little influence. Also, their opposition to Katanga was feeble and halfhearted. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs J. Satterthwaite was willing to consider eventual U.S. recognition of Katanga "in view of the possibility that the Katanga is all that can be salvaged for the West."[98] Overall, the relative *absence* of bureaucratic rivalries during the Eisenhower administration was notable. Officials in the Eisenhower administration with rare exceptions assented to the dominant pro-Belgian, pro-Katanga policy.

Let us consider the significance of these facts. In chapter 1 we saw that policy processes are usually studied within the Bureaucratic Politics model. The model assumes the existence of feuding within the bureaucracy; yet in the Congo case there was virtually no feuding. We will return to the issue of policy-making in chapter 4, where we will discuss it at greater length. Now we will simply note that the Bureaucratic Politics model is unable to account for the absence of interagency conflict during the first months of the Congo Crisis.

The United States and Lumumba

Whatever its theoretical significance, it is clear that the Eisenhower administration was nearly unanimous in its support of Katanga. Lumumba ignored the bias and sought American support. He refrained from criticizing the USA, and at one point he even praised American policy in the Congo. In a radio broadcast he stated: "We know that the U.S. understands us . . . and we are pleased to see the U.S. position in bringing about international peace." Lumumba also commented that the USA "is a great friend."[99] In late July 1960, in his first state visit, Lumumba traveled to New York and Washington. Lumumba was quite solicitous toward American officials. The *New York Times* described Lumumba's visit as follows:

> There was nothing in the restrained remarks . . . to suggest the impassioned leader who had been jailed by Belgium for inflammatory speechmaking . . . Only occasionally during his news conference did the premier's voice betray emotion and urgency. One came when he complained bitterly [with regard to the Belgian role] . . . For the rest, his manner was restrained and his case presented legalistically.[100]

Lumumba also urged American officials to support the Congo in its conflict with Belgium.[101]

The Eisenhower administration had no intention of supporting Lumumba. U.S. officials, on the contrary, had extremely negative views of the prime minister. Robert Murphy, who represented the USA at the Congo's independence ceremonies, called Lumumba "a new demagogue."[102] Ambassador Timberlake considered Lumumba "unscrupulous and untrustworthy. He did not hesitate to arouse antiwhite sentiment."[103] To Under Secretary of State Dillon, Lumumba "was just not a rational being."[104] Eisenhower's memoirs describe Lumumba as "radical and unstable."[105] Many policymakers were convinced that Lumumba was a communist.[106] American views on the Congolese prime minister corresponded to the views held by Belgian officials.[107] It was clear that the USA would not help Lumumba end the Katanga secession.

Lumumba also sought support from the United Nations force, but these efforts were unavailing, since UN policy was nearly identical to American policy. UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld closely collaborated with American officials. The American delegate to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, even helped the secretary write one of his speeches for the Congo debate. Hammarskjöld, moreover, was quite hostile toward Lumumba.[108] Other UN officials held conservative views on the Congo. The commander of the UN force, Major General Carl van Horn of Sweden, was "ready to sympathize with the Belgian plight and accept the Belgian position at face value." The UN's civilian director in the Congo was Ralph Bunche. Bunche was an American and a former State Department official who "worked closely with the U.S. ambassador" to the Congo and believed that Lumumba was "emotionally unbalanced."[109] Bunche was replaced in late August 1960 by Andrew Cordier, another American national who had worked in the State Department. During his tenure, Cordier secretly collaborated with the U.S. government and shared that government's hostility toward Lumumba. Madeleine Kalb notes that at one point, "Cordier sent an 'urgent recommendation' to the U.S. government, *via Hammarskjöld,* suggesting that it send an official to Leopoldville—'not too high-level, not too junior'—who could observe the local scene, see what the Russians were up to, and make a firsthand report to Washington [emphasis added]."[110] Evidently Cordier was still loyal to the State Department, even though he was a UN official. The communist bloc was excluded from the operation. O'Brien notes that "care was taken to see that no member of the [UN] Secretariat, who was a citizen of a Communist State, saw the Congo telegrams."[111] An American foreign service officer believed that for the most part, "the UN acted as an agent of the U.S."[112]

Moreover, the UN command refused to become involved in the Katanga controversy, insisting that it was an internal matter. When the UN troops arrived in the Congo in July, they failed even to enter Katanga province. On August 14, UN troops finally entered the province and replaced the Belgian troops, but they made no effort to end the secession. Ambassador Timberlake believed that the "entry of UN troops into Katanga 'in no way constitutes interference . . . in the internal affairs of the Republic or of a province, and this obviously applies to Katanga.' This position infuriated Lumumba."[113]

UN avoidance of the Katanga issue is surprising. The United Nations force was sent to restore order in the Congo, and there is no doubt that the regional secessions fomented disorder. The UN's lethargy was apparently caused at least in part by the United States. According to one account, the UN "Secretariat was limited by the fact that America was carrying nearly half the financial burden of ONUC [the United Nations Congo force]. Hammarskjöld was frequently reminded of this by the American government."[114] The Americans thus constrained UN policy. Obviously Lumumba could not count on UN support.

The Cold War and the Congo Crisis

Lumumba's only source of active support came from the communist bloc. At the end of August, Soviet Ilyushin transport aircraft arrived in Leopoldville, unloading trucks and other equipment.[115] The trucks were used to transport Lumumba's troops, as well as three Czechoslovak military advisors, for an assault against the secessionist government in South Kasai. For the first time the Soviets directly intervened in the conflict. Lumumba later explained that he "had turned to the Russians for planes only when the Belgians supplied planes to Tshombe and after the UN and the U.S. had abandoned him by failing to furnish transportation."[116] Lumumba certainly would have accepted aid from the United States or the UN force, but those powers had refused such aid.

Lumumba's offensive against South Kasai failed. Mercenary-led forces defended South Kasai, and they routed Lumumba's troops. Lumumba was thus unable to reunite the country. Moreover, the defeated troops went on a rampage, killing hundreds of civilians,[117] and the mounting atrocities embarrassed both the Congolese government and the USSR. The Soviet airlift alarmed the United States. Ambassador Timberlake cabled Washington that "Congo [is] experiencing classic Communist effort [to] takeover government."[118]

The military failure in South Kasai also generated new political turmoil. On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as prime minister. Kasavubu named Joseph Ileo, a legislator, as the new premier. Lumumba still had a majority in parliament, and the constitutional grounds for his dismissal were dubious at best; this mattered little in a country with only one lawyer.[119] What, then, caused the change in government? It was clear that President Kasavubu, a politician of far lower caliber than Lumumba, was not acting on his own. Ambassador Timberlake described the president: "We are now satisfied Kasavubu will continue to be a political zero as long as

Lumumba is active; in my opinion he is naive, not very bright, lazy, enjoying his new found plush living and content to appear occasionally in his new general's uniform."[120] Some outside power—probably the U.S. embassy and the UN—directed Kasavubu.[121] Hammarskjöld publicly endorsed the dismissal before the Security Council: "The president [Kasavubu] has the right to revoke the mandate of the prime minister."[122]

Lumumba immediately sought reinstatement. He attempted to broadcast his case to the country, but the UN forces quickly closed the radio station. Moreover, the UN controlled the airports,[123] so Lumumba could not airlift loyal troops. Instead he appeared before the legislature, where employing his formidable powers of speech, Lumumba attacked his opponents. The U.S. ambassador described the debate: "At his very best Lumumba then devastated the points raised by the opposition . . . [He] made Kasavubu look ridiculous."[124] Both houses of parliament overwhelmingly voted to reaffirm Lumumba's mandate.[125] Lumumba thus remained in power.

These events disturbed American officials. A CIA officer lamented that "Lumumba talents and dynamism appear overriding factor . . . Each time Lumumba has opportunity have last word he can sway events to his advantage."[126] Ambassador Timberlake commented that "Kasavubu acts more like a vegetable every day while Lumumba continues [to] display brilliant broken field running. In spite number of constructive suggestions given Kasavubu and Ileo, they seem incapable of any action even when they have situation literally in hand."[127] The U.S. Navy reinforced the carrier task force that had been off the Congolese coast since July. Amphibious landing craft with five hundred marines also joined the force.[128] It was obvious that the USA could not rely on Kasavubu to remove Lumumba. Other strategies would be required.

The Central Intelligence Agency, now determined to overthrow Lumumba, intensified its activities. The *New York Times* provided the assessment: "After . . . independence from Belgium, a modest little CIA office in Leopoldville mushroomed overnight into a virtual embassy and miniature war department . . . Starting almost from scratch . . . the CIA dispersed its agents to learn Congolese politics from the bush on up, to recruit likely leaders and to finance their bids for power."[129] The agency also began plotting the assassination of Lumumba. These CIA intrigues, which employed Lumumba's internal enemies as well as some regular agency officers, were documented during Senate investigations.[130] The USA now planned to use all means to remove Lumumba from power.

The CIA role requires some further discussion. Available evidence suggests that the agency was financing the Congolese National Army and funneling the payments through Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, a young and politically connected army officer. A former UN official provides the following account:

> [United Nations] liaison officers attached to Mobutu used frequently to report on the constant comings and goings of some Western military attachés who visited Mobutu with bulging brief-cases containing thick brown paper packets which they obligingly deposited on the table. We could not tell what they contained, but could not help making guesses.[131]

Kalb, more bluntly, reports that it was "money supplied by the CIA and by the Western embassies in Leopoldville that kept him [Mobutu] in business."[132] With the money Mobutu's men became "by far the most affluent soldiers in Africa."[133] These highly paid soldiers probably did not number more than a few hundred, but they constituted virtually the only functioning units in the Congolese National Army.[134] With such a political base, Mobutu was able to play a decisive role. The CIA used Mobutu and his soldiers as a free-lance strike force.

On September 14, Colonel (later General) Mobutu staged a coup d'état. He suspended the parliament and the constitution and established a council, comprising Congolese university students, to advise him. Lumumba's removal as prime minister was reconfirmed. President Kasavubu eventually signed a decree which "legalized" Mobutu's dictatorship.[135] The Mobutu government lasted until February 1961, when the country reverted (at least on paper) to civilian rule.

The United States was involved in the coup. Former CIA officer Victor Marchetti confirmed that the agency helped bring Colonel Mobutu to power.[136] One of Mobutu's first actions was to expel the Soviet and Czechoslovak aid missions from the country. Mobutu's coup thus strengthened the U.S. position. At the same time, American officials faced a new complication: The UN force, previously obedient, was becoming increasingly autonomous.

A Reevaluation by Hammarskjöld

During July and August, the United Nations policy in the Congo was almost exactly the same as that of the United States. The UN failed to take any action against the regional secessions, while it undermined Prime Minister Lumumba. However, these actions were beginning to tarnish the reputation of

both Hammarskjöld and the UN itself. In the General Assembly, the Afro-Asian bloc, supported by the USSR and its allies, harshly criticized Hammarskjöld's conduct during the Congo Crisis. The United Arab Republic (Egypt) pointedly withdrew its troops from the UN force in September; Guinea threatened to do the same.[137] Hammarskjöld began to appear as a puppet of the United States—an image that the secretary-general could not have appreciated.

The United Nations was pressured to modify its position, and modifications were indeed forthcoming. On September 8, Rejashwar Dayal was appointed Hammarskjöld's special representative in the Congo. Dayal, an Indian national, held strongly anticolonial views and was critical of past UN actions.[138] Dayal favored a role for Lumumba, and Hammarskjöld "gradually swung around to the position that his special representative, Dayal, had been advocating from the start."[139]

With all of these factors, UN policy shifted during the month of September and began to show some independence from the United States and Belgium. On September 20, Colonel Mobutu ordered the arrest of Lumumba, but UN troops guarded Lumumba's residence and blocked Mobutu's efforts.[140] For the next several weeks, the UN protected Lumumba from arrest. The UN also began to challenge Belgian policy during the period. In November Dayal issued a report which "charged that the Belgians were trying to dominate the Congo Government."[141] Hammarskjöld requested that Belgium "withdraw all military, paramilitary, or civilian personnel which it had placed at the disposal of the authorities in the Congo"—a reference to Belgian involvement in Katanga and South Kasai.[142]

The UN measures were largely ineffectual. The Belgians did withdraw some troops from Katanga, but they were replaced with mercenaries. The secessionists were well entrenched at the point, and they would plague the UN force for another two years. Nevertheless, UN policy, however timid, did diverge significantly from that of the USA.

Hammarskjöld's independence evoked strong opposition from the Eisenhower administration. During the fall of 1960, American officials were incensed by Dayal's criticisms of Belgium. The State Department retorted, "we have every confidence in the good faith of Belgium . . . We therefore are unable to accept the implication to the contrary contained in various parts of the [UN] report."[143] The USA also objected when UN troops protected Lumumba from arrest. Kalb writes: "American officials still felt that Hammarskjöld was yielding too much to Soviet pressure."[144]

From September through November, American policy was stalemated. Mobutu's troops, with U.S. support, sought to arrest Lumumba. UN troops continued to guard Lumumba's residence, and they refused to permit the arrest. The U.S. government demanded the dismissal of Dayal, but Hammarskjöld firmly refused to dismiss him.[145] The United Nations thus impeded American policy. The USA could at any time have terminated financial support for the UN operation, or it could have even demanded Hammarskjöld's dismissal.[146] These actions were never taken, presumably because they would have been an embarrassment.

Lumumba, now trapped in his residence, remained a threat to the USA. One State Department official noted that Lumumba "had this tremendous ability to stir up a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and started to talk to a battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes."[147] The impasse ended on November 27, when Lumumba left his residence and escaped Mobutu's troops. He then headed toward the city of Stanleyville, long the center of nationalist sentiment in the country, where he intended to rally his supporters. Several days later the Congolese army arrested Lumumba and imprisoned him at the Thysville army base, near Leopoldville. The arrest undoubtedly elated American officials.

In the Congo, however, Lumumba's arrest brought new turmoil. Antoine Gizenga, a supporter of Lumumba, immediately seized control of Stanleyville. There he set up an independent state with a vaguely leftist orientation. Gizenga proclaimed that his was the only legitimate government, and that he would take full control of the Congo. The Stanleyville regime received some support from the Soviet Union and several African countries, but the support was very limited. Timberlake's memoirs note the "merest trickle" of foreign aid to Gizenga.[148] In any case, Gizenga's new government, combined with the Soviet aid, intensified American anxieties.

The concerns increased as the year drew to a close. Gizenga's regime began to expand its influence and soon controlled a large portion of the country.[149] There were signs that Lumumba, still imprisoned at Thysville, planned a return to power. Specifically, Lumumba was befriending his military captors. Lumumba, now only nominally a prisoner, had Christmas dinner with the Thysville officers. There were signs of disaffection among soldiers throughout the country, with mutinies at several bases, including Thysville. The mutinies were all contained, but they unnerved American officials. The CIA station warned that the "present government may fall within few days. Result would almost certainly be chaos and return [of Lumumba] to power."[150]

Finally, on January 17, 1961, Lumumba was assassinated. The details of his assassination are complex, and they will not be recounted here.[151] Suffice it to say that the CIA, working with Mobutu and Tshombe, probably played a role in the murder. With the removal of Lumumba, the Eisenhower administration accomplished its principal objective in the Congo.

Conclusion

The most distinctive feature of U.S. policy was the deep hostility toward Patrice Lumumba. An explanation of U.S. foreign policy must account for the hostility. In their memoirs, Eisenhower-era officials justify the policies in anticommunist terms.[152] The Soviet Union, they argue, seriously intended to take over the Congo and its valuable mineral resources. The United States had to remove Lumumba from power, since he was serving Soviet interests. Proponents of the view stress Lumumba's communist ties and especially his acceptance of Soviet military and technical assistance. The Congolese prime minister was, in the view of CIA Director Allen Dulles, "a Castro or worse."[153] The United States was acting essentially to preclude Soviet expansionism and to protect Western security.

The interpretation is not well supported. There is no evidence that the Soviets actually sought to take control of the Congo. Even if the Soviets did intend to seize power, it is very doubtful that they could have done so. At its height the communist intervention in the Congo comprised no more than 380 Soviets and Czechoslovaks—against 14,000 UN troops and many thousands of Belgian military officers, mercenaries, and technical aides.[154] There is little evidence that Lumumba was a communist, and this point was recognized by American officials. A former U.S. official notes that "Lumumba's knowledge of communism was extremely vague."[155] Lumumba's MNC did receive financial aid from the Belgian communist party, but it was also funded by the right-wing Liberal Party of Belgium and by colonial business interests.[156] Lumumba's actions as prime minister did not suggest a predilection for communism. On the contrary, Lumumba sought American and UN aid several weeks before he accepted Soviet aid. The "Western security" explanation greatly exaggerates the Soviet role.

The Western security argument, moreover, fails to explain U.S. support for the Katanga secession. The secession was highly destabilizing, and it threatened to destroy the national unity of the Congo. The United States—by refusing to act against Katanga and by imposing a like-minded policy on the United Nations—virtually ensured that Lumumba would seek aid from the USSR.

Soviet intervention was thus connected to Western support for Katanga, and American officials were aware of the connection. In memoirs, former Ambassador Timberlake writes: "The failure of the UN to dislodge Tshombe and the Belgians as quickly as Lumumba wished led the Congo premier to call on the Soviet Bloc for assistance and thus to provide the entering wedge for Soviet penetration."[157] U.S. support for Katanga helped *cause* the Soviet involvement. Why then did the USA support Katanga? The Western security approach provides no answer.

It may be argued that the United States favored Katanga simply out of deference to Belgium.[158] There is undoubtedly some truth to the argument. Certainly the United States did not wish to alienate a NATO ally. As a complete explanation, however, this is not adequate, since it begs the question of why the USA supported Belgium. The USA does not invariably support its allies. Indeed the Kennedy administration, as we shall see, actively opposed the Katanga secession and its Belgian supporters. Sympathy for Belgium cannot fully explain American policy.

We will now consider an economic interpretation of American policy. The interpretation argues that the Eisenhower administration supported Katanga because it had a financial interest in doing so. Several administration officials had investments in Central Africa. William Burden, the ambassador to Belgium, was a director of American Metal Climax (AMAX), a mining company with extensive African holdings and a favorable view of the Katanga secession. CIA Director Dulles also had connections to AMAX. Robert Murphy, a retired foreign service officer, "led the U.S. delegation to Independence Day ceremonies in Leopoldville and was an influential advisor on Congo policy during 1960." Murphy was also a director of Morgan Guaranty Trust, which had managed two twenty-million-dollar loans to the Belgian Congo. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., the secretary of defense, "was closely tied in with Morgan interests." Secretary of State Christian A. Herter had "married into one of the original Standard Oil families, and his son became a Mobil Oil . . . executive in 1961." Mobil Oil had direct investments in the Congo, especially in Katanga. Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon had family ties to Dillon, Read and Company, which had managed the Belgian Congo's bond issues.[159]

The secondary literature acknowledges the importance of business connec-

tions. Weissman states that "a tender regard for corporate profit-making," as well as an "inclination to look at the Congo as an international business proposition," did influence the administration policy.[160] Mahoney[161] and Minter[162] also note the importance of U.S. investments.

In sum, American interests were synonymous with Belgian interests, and the USA accordingly supported Belgian policy. Let us consider further the economic interpretation. It assumes that the Eisenhower administration would support the Belgians and would oppose any nationalist challenges against them. In fact, there is a good fit between the explanation and the facts. Belgian interests organized the Katanga secession, and the United States, in turn, supported the secession. Patrice Lumumba opposed the Belgians, and the USA sought to overthrow him. Officials justified these policies in terms of national security because American foreign policy is always justified that way. The economic perspective explains the Eisenhower policy quite well.

The analysis is not yet complete. It should be recalled that the Business Conflict model predicts contention among several *different* factions of the business community. In this chapter we have only discussed one faction—those companies favoring Belgian neocolonialism and the Katanga secession. We may now ask: Was there a second business faction, one hostile toward the Belgian position and Katanga? Was there conflict among various business factions? Finally, did business conflict, if it existed, influence U.S. foreign policy? Chapter 4 will explore these issues in detail.