4 The Anticolonial Bloc and the Congo

> Yesterday, an Ethiopian soldier shot a Swiss banker in Elisabethville . . . No one knows why and no one cares. But even Swiss bankers ought to have some rights.
>
> Harold Macmillan[1]

> But it would be asking too much to expect—human nature being what it is—that anybody is going to overlook the fact that the immense mineral riches of Haut-Katanga represent a really "glittering prize."
>
> London *Metal Bulletin*[2]

> The Congo is no petty cash matter.
>
> Advertisement in *American Metal Markets*[3]

Africa policy was a major priority for the newly inaugurated Kennedy administration. The State Department's Africa bureau, previously a backwater, gained a highly visible staff and considerable prestige. Its new head, Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams, had been a four-term governor of Michigan. Although not an Africa specialist, Williams sympathized with nationalist causes in Africa and had urged a more activist U.S. policy in that region. Other pronationalist figures, including Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles, also gained appointments in the new administration.

By June 1961, Kennedy dismissed Clare Timberlake, the ambassador to the Congo, who was closely identified with the Eisenhower policy and with the Belgians. Timberlake was then "put to pasture" as a State Department liaison to Maxwell Air Force Base, a considerable demotion.[4] Edmund Gullion, a personal friend of the president and a longtime critic of European colonialism, replaced Timberlake as ambassador.[5] The administration apparently favored personnel with an anticolonial bent.

John F. Kennedy fundamentally changed U.S. policy toward the Congo. The Eisenhower administration had been staunchly procolonialist, supporting the Belgian interests and secretly aiding the Belgian-organized Katanga secession. The Kennedy administration, in contrast, tended to oppose the Belgian interests, and in early 1963, Kennedy was instrumental in crushing the Katanga secession. Moreover, the decision-making process differed. The Eisenhower policy entailed very little interbureaucratic feuding. During the Eisenhower presidency, the executive acted more or less as a single unit, without much internal conflict. Under Kennedy, there was extensive interbureaucratic conflict; the policy process was marked by a general instability, with numerous tergiversations and long periods of indecision. During the Eisenhower presidency, the Congress played no role in the Congo Crisis. Under Kennedy, the Congress played a major role and often acted as a constraint on the executive. Finally, the Eisenhower administration worked in close cooperation with its European allies. Kennedy's policies, in contrast, were marked by continual, and often acrimonious, discord with the Europeans. Both the substance and the process of decision making changed during the Kennedy presidency.

This chapter will attempt to explain the differences between the two administrations with respect to Congo policy. It will examine, first, the "anticolonial bloc" of policymakers in the Kennedy administration, which opposed Katanga, and contrast it with the (less influential) "procolonial bloc," which favored Katanga. We will note the ties between these policymakers and investors with an interest in the Congo question. We will also discuss how the public lobbies, the Congress, and the NATO governments approached the Congo, and how they influenced administration policy. Then we will examine how the various factors interacted and produced policy. We will analyze why Kennedy adopted an anticolonial stance in the Congo.

The Anticolonial Bloc

Chapter 3 argued that the Eisenhower administration was influenced by pro-Katanga business interests. Katanga had a reputation of being very favorably disposed toward corporate interests in general; Tshombe's government was perceived to be probusiness. However, the American business community was not unified with regard to the Congo. On the contrary, a powerful bloc of interests opposed the Belgian role in the Congo and the Belgian-supported Katanga secession. These interests sought to replace the Belgian investors, and accordingly, they favored an anti-Belgian policy. One executive put the matter this way: "The U.S. business community is by no means monolithic in its outlook . . . Political upheavals, such as those which occurred in the Congo, often open business opportunities which otherwise might have remained closed."[6] We will now consider these business interests at length.

One of the most interesting of the anticolonial interests was a series of companies associated with the Liberian-American Swedish Minerals Company (LAMCO). Despite its name, LAMCO was a predominantly Swedish syndicate, comprising six separate mining companies, which exploited the huge iron ore resources of Liberia. Though involved primarily in iron ore, LAMCO had an interlocking directorate with Bolidens Gruv, a Swedish copper company.[7]

The Swedish mining interests had close ties to the United Nations force in the Congo. Bo Gustav Hammarskjöld was a director of Grangesburg, the largest of LAMCO's constituent companies, and was also the brother of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.[8] The Hammarskjöld family interests appear to have influenced UN policy in the Congo, at least with regard to personnel selection. To head the UN technical assistance program in the Congo, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld selected Sture Linner, a managing director of LAMCO.[9] The UN force hired two other Swedes as consultants to the Congo program. Both consultants had LAMCO connections. The first was Sven Gustaf Schwartz, who had been director of a firm which was, in turn, part of the LAMCO syndicate. Schwartz also had been chairman of the Bolidens board of directors. The second Swedish consultant was Börje Hjortzberg-Nordlund, who had been an alternate director of LAMCO.[10]

Supporters of Union Minière later claimed that the UN was acting to advance the Swedish corporate interests. Specifically, they charged that the Swedes sought to shut down the Katanga mines, to reduce the amount of copper on the international market, and thereby to raise copper prices. The Swedes, it was believed, sought to disrupt Katangese production and to profit from the disruption.[11]

Such claims led to many bitter accusations. We will discuss the public controversy later; at this point, we will note that there was some evidence for the accusations. In fact the Swedes did have an incentive to shut down the Katangese mines, since the world copper market was overstocked during the early 1960s. The *London Times* noted in 1960 that "world copper output has recently been running at something approaching 10 percent in excess of current demand."[12] The Katanga mines produced roughly 8–10 percent of the world's output, and its removal probably would have raised world copper prices, and would thereby have benefited Union Minière's rivals—including the LAMCO/Bolidens group. *American Metal Markets,* a trade publication, asked rhetorically whether metal prices would "be increased sharply . . . by the menacing pattern of events in mineral rich Katanga?"[13]

Mr. Hjortzberg-Nordlund, previously with the LAMCO syndicate, authored a UN report in 1960 on the Congo's copper industry. The report, written for the UN technical assistance mission, provided suggestions for mineral developments in the Congo. The report's conclusion reads, in part:

> The predominance of the Belgians in industry and science will decrease rapidly. Mining legislation should be revised to correspond with the new conceptions of ownership . . . Negotiations should be opened with a view to defining the status of former concessionaires and lessees. This applies also to Katanga and UMHK, which may then choose between a reasonable agreement based on universally accepted principles *and nationalization* [emphasis added] or other steps taken by the National Government.[14]

The report was carefully worded. It was widely interpreted in any case as a call for nationalization. According to the *Washington Post* Africa correspondent, a UN consultant had "recommended nationalization"; the *Richmond News Leader* reported that the UN had "suggested that Union Minière should be nationalized."[15] With the Congo's dearth of trained personnel, nationalization probably would have reduced copper output. It thus appeared that Swedish interests were using their connections to the UN to put one of their competitors out of business.

The Swedes made several other (sometimes contradictory) efforts to profit from the Congo Crisis. At one point they apparently sought direct investments in the Congo. Specifically, a man named L. Edgar Detwiler signed a major economic development contract with the Congolese government in July 1960, almost immediately after independence. Mr. Detwiler, an American national, had been president of a LAMCO affiliate. The Detwiler contract was eventually canceled, but the fact that it was made suggests that the Swedes were trying to gain access to the rich copper mines of the Congo.[16]

The Swedes thus had an interest in opposing the Belgian position in the Congo and accordingly the pro-Belgian Katanga secession. Hammarskjöld himself reportedly held anticolonial views and regarded "the Belgians as the arch villains" in the Congo.[17] We shall see later in the chapter that the UN, under the direction of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld, strongly opposed the Katanga secession through a variety of diplomatic, economic, and, ultimately, military means. The United Nations policy was thus consistent with the anticolonial interests of the Swedish mining companies and also of the prominent Hammarskjöld family.

The Swedes gained important connections in the United States. LAMCO retained the services of several American law firms, including the famous New York firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. The Sullivan firm was politically prominent, and one of its former partners, Allen Dulles, headed the CIA during the Eisenhower administration and also during the beginning of the Kennedy administration. However, Allen Dulles had conflicting interests; he had connections to the anti-Katanga LAMCO group, but he had even closer ties to pro-Katanga business interests, specifically the AMAX mining company. The latter company had direct ties to Dulles. AMAX President Harold Hochschild had long collaborated with the Central Intelligence Agency, especially in Africa, and was well known to CIA Director Dulles. In addition, the Sullivan firm rendered legal services for AMAX. It appears that Dulles favored the pro-Katanga AMAX company, and that LAMCO had little or no influence with him. During Dulles's tenure, the CIA directly aided Katanga.[18] Fortunately for the Swedes, Dulles did not last long. His reputation was tarnished by the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961, and he retired from the agency the following September.

Apparently the Swedes did not find Dulles very useful, but they had other contacts. They had connections to the Democratic law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen, and Hamilton, which also served as legal counsel for LAMCO. Some Cleary partners had additional ties to the Swedes. Fowler Hamilton, one partner in the law firm, was a director of the International African American Corporation, a LAMCO affiliate, while a second partner, Melvin Steen, sat on the board of a LAMCO affiliate registered in Canada.[19]

The Cleary law firm was well connected in any case, and two of its partners were involved in the Congo Crisis. Hamilton became the director of Kennedy's foreign aid program—of which the Congo was a major beneficiary.[20] Hamilton also appears to have had close connections to the Central Intelligence Agency,[21] which was, of course, deeply involved in the Congo. George Ball, another partner in the Cleary firm, held several positions in the State Department, including under secretary of state, and became a central figure in Congo policy. Ball was a forceful advocate for the anti-Katanga viewpoint. The LAMCO group was thus well placed to influence both U.S. and UN policy.

A second anticolonial business figure was Maurice Tempelsman. Mr.

Tempelsman was the owner of Leon Tempelsman and Son, a diamond trading firm named after his father. A full discussion of Mr. Tempelsman's role would be difficult, since little is known about him. He is not listed in *Who's Who in America*. His principal firm is 100 percent family owned, and it provides no information to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Tempelsman is seldom covered in the press (apart from the society pages), and he declined to be interviewed for this study. He is known to have very close ties to the Central Intelligence Agency—but that institution has been uncooperative with the author's Freedom of Information Act requests.[22]

The little information available suggests that Mr. Tempelsman did have political connections. The first of them was to Adlai Stevenson. Tempelsman had long-standing ties to Stevenson's law firm, later (after a 1957 merger) known as Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison. He was one of Stevenson's largest clients. In 1955, Stevenson's firm received twenty-five thousand dollars from Tempelsman, which was almost 20 percent of the firm's total revenues. In 1956, when Stevenson was distracted by his presidential campaign, Tempelsman's legal business was even more substantial. In that year, Tempelsman paid forty thousand dollars, or 45 percent of the firm's revenues. In 1958, the only other year for which there are figures, Tempelsman paid $50,000 to Stevenson's law firm.[23] There is little information on the nature of Stevenson's work for Tempelsman, but it apparently included negotiations with the Oppenheimer diamond cartel, a trip to the Soviet Union (a major diamond exporter), and deals with the government of Ghana.[24]

Stevenson's two trips to Africa during the 1950s involved work for his clients, including Tempelsman. Stevenson's 1955 trip included "legal business for Tempelsman."[25] Stevenson wrote of his 1957 trip: "The principal reason (perhaps excuse would be more accurate!) for my journey to Africa this year is to transact some legal business for some American clients in the Union of South Africa." The "American clients" very likely included Tempelsman.[26]

Tempelsman clearly benefited from his association with Stevenson. *Fortune* magazine provides this account: "In a bold move for such a young man, Tempelsman . . . began showing up—with Stevenson in tow—in emerging African nations. Stevenson at that time was enormously popular in Africa. That, plus the timing—so many nations were on the brink of independence—gave Tempelsman unmatched entree."[27] A friendly biography of Stevenson, while denying any impropriety, conceded that Stevenson "did use his political reputation to advance his clients' interests."[28] Tempelsman thus developed

close ties to nationalist circles in Africa. Those ties would greatly facilitate Tempelsman's activities during the 1960s and 1970s, when he expanded his influence, often at the expense of the old colonial business interests, throughout the continent.[29] Stevenson, meanwhile, advocated strongly anticolonial policies. In 1957 Stevenson wrote an article entitled "The Support of Nationalism Helps Combat Communist Imperialism."[30] Stevenson's anticolonialism coincided with the interests of his client.

Stevenson also helped Tempelsman gain access to the Congo. In 1957 "Stevenson discussed some of the activities of Leon Tempelsman and Son . . . with officials in charge of the Belgian Congo."[31] Following independence in 1960, Stevenson helped Tempelsman to curry favor with the UN force in the Congo. In September 1960, Stevenson wrote to Sture Linner, the director of the UN aid program in the Congo, introducing a Tempelsman representative named George Wittman. Stevenson's letter reads:

> Mr. Wittman is going to the Congo as a representative of Mr. Tempelsman's firm . . . [and] would be very glad to place at the disposal of the United Nations authorities and the Congo government whatever technical assistance in the field of mineral development they may desire . . . I understand what pressures you must be under, and the only purpose of this letter is to assure you that Mr. Wittman would be glad to be of whatever help he can should his services be required.[32]

UN official Linner replied, "I shall be happy to cooperate with Mr. Wittman in any way that would seem useful to all parties concerned."[33] Stevenson also met with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld "about the Congo on behalf of his client, Maurice Tempelsman."[34]

In January 1961, Stevenson became President Kennedy's ambassador to the United Nations. Tempelsman, understandably enough, was gratified by the appointment. One of Tempelsman's associates commented that "the appointment of Governor Stevenson to the UN was, of course, of great pleasure to us all."[35] Stevenson remained a useful contact for Tempelsman.

Beginning in 1961, Tempelsman urged the Kennedy administration to purchase industrial diamonds from the Congolese. The plan called for the following: The U.S. government was to purchase Congolese diamonds, to be used in the government's strategic stockpile, and the Congolese, in exchange, were to receive American agricultural commodities. Tempelsman apparently hoped to act as middleman and make a substantial profit. At times Tempelsman defended the plan in anticommunist terms, and he warned of the "opportunity of the Soviet Union to entrench itself" in the Congo.[36] But Tempelsman was aware of his own interest in the matter. At one point he wrote to Stevenson on the barter deal and stated: "I think that one can take some pride in . . . a project which is of benefit to everybody (including Tempelsman—I hope!)."[37]

The scheme was of dubious value to the U.S. government. The strategic stockpile was amply stocked with industrial diamonds, and the State Department noted, "we have a very large surplus of industrial diamonds in the stockpile already . . . The diamonds we would obtain from the barter deal would be of no use to us at all." Moreover, the barter arrangement offended the free trade bias of many in the administration.[38]

Nevertheless Stevenson—while a government official—lobbied for Tempelsman's scheme and communicated his progress to Tempelsman. In 1961 Tempelsman contacted Stevenson, with regard to the barter project and wrote, "I just want you to know that I appreciate your help with George Ball."[39] When the project was finally approved in 1965, Tempelsman wrote to Stevenson describing the arrangement and stating "Thanks for all your help."[40]

When questioned with regard to his relationship to Tempelsman in 1963, Stevenson became evasive. Stevenson acknowledged that his law firm had represented Tempelsman, but "never in connection with anything in the Belgian or indep[endent] Congo."[41] The statement is inaccurate, but it does indicate the political sensitivity of the issue. The full details of the Stevenson-Tempelsman relationship may never be known, since in at least one instance Tempelsman helped finance the editing of Stevenson's personal papers.[42] In any case, it is clear that the relationship was close.

Tempelsman enjoyed other contacts in the government. During the Congo Crisis, Tempelsman reportedly worked "hand in glove with the CIA Station,"[43] and he developed close ties to CIA Chief of Station Lawrence Devlin. Devlin retired from the agency in 1974 and then worked as Tempelsman's personal representative in the Congo for the next thirteen years.[44] Theodore Sorensen, after he retired as White House aide, became Tempelsman's lawyer for at least fifteen years. Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense, and Sheldon Vance, director of the State Department's Office of Central African Affairs, appear to have lobbied for Tempelsman during the late 1960s.[45] President Kennedy also had connections. Tempelsman supported Kennedy during the 1960 election and arranged a meeting between Kennedy and Harry Oppenheimer, the famous South African investor.[46] Tempelsman had a long-standing friendship with the Kennedy family, which has continued to this day. Indeed, the late president's son, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Jr., spent a summer working for Tempelsman in Africa.[47]

Moreover, Tempelsman had excellent ties to the Democratic party, reflected in Federal Election Commission (FEC) statistics. During 1979–80, Tempelsman contributed over thirty thousand dollars to various national campaigns, virtually all of which went to Democrats, including such liberal figures as George McGovern, Elizabeth Holtzman, Stephen Solarz, and Frank Church. The only Republican contribution was to the Senate campaign of Jacob Javits—one of the most liberal figures in his party.[48] Complete figures are not available for the 1960s, but Tempelsman was apparently a major figure during that period as well. A 1964 National Security Council document referred to Tempelsman as "a heavy contributor in Democratic politics."[49] Stephen Weissman writes that "the Tempelsmans had long been active in New York Democratic politics, particularly in the Eleanor Roosevelt-Herbert Lehman reform group. A close associate described Maurice Tempelsman as 'among the kingpins' of state politics."[50] Also Tempelsman helped raise money for the party from other business figures and wealthy individuals.[51]

What specifically was Tempelsman's interest in the Congo? Again, a full account is not possible, since there is so little information on the man. Available information suggests that Tempelsman's interests extended to all areas of the Congolese economy. We will see in later chapters that Tempelsman eventually became involved in sectors as diverse as copper mining and hydroelectric power. As a potential interloper and competitor, Tempelsman evoked considerable hostility among the Belgian investors.[52] George Wittman, Tempelsman's representative in the Congo, encountered "hostility from the Belgian companies," and this produced an "anti-Belgian reaction" from Wittman.[53] Tempelsman thus had an essentially anti-Belgian orientation. Accordingly, Tempelsman opposed the Katanga secession—the bulwark of the Belgian interests—and advocated UN economic sanctions against the secessionist regime.[54] Tempelsman was clearly one of the major figures in the anticolonial bloc of interests.

Tempelsman's political contacts were important during the Congo Crisis. Adlai Stevenson was one of the major anticolonial figures in the administration, and he was one of the strongest opponents of the Katanga secession.[55] Theodore Sorensen also played a prominent role in the crisis, although he is rarely mentioned in the documentary sources on the Congo. Nevertheless, one former official was "sure that he [Sorensen] was following it [the Congo] closely" and that he generally supported the administration policy.[56] It is also possible that Sorensen—who was later a nominee for Director of Central Intelligence in 1976—was involved in the covert activities in the Congo. Sheldon Vance, the State Department's Central Africa specialist, was "fanatical" in his support of UN policy.[57] McNamara does not appear to have played a central role in the crisis, but he was one of the most influential figures in the Kennedy cabinet, where the Congo was a frequent topic of discussion, and McNamara's agency, the Defense Department, directly supported the UN military force in the campaign against Katanga. CIA officer Devlin, although initially pro-Katanga, eventually proved sufficiently anticolonial to incur the wrath of the Belgians. Devlin himself claimed that the Belgians attempted to bribe him (unsuccessfully) and then plotted his assassination (also unsuccessfully).[58] Thus, most of Tempelsman's political contacts were active in Congo policy and generally opposed the Belgians.

A third element in the anticolonial bloc was a series of interests associated with the Rockefeller family. The Rockefeller involvement is quite complicated and will require some discussion. The Rockefellers had cooperated closely with the Belgians during the 1950s, and they even held stock in an affiliate of Société Générale.[59] Shortly after independence they apparently sold their stock, although, possibly hedging their risks, they retained holdings in a Katangese textile factory. The Rockefellers also held shares in Mobil Oil, which supported the secession.[60] The Rockefeller family thus had reasons to favor the Belgian interests and the Katanga secession. On the other hand, the Rockefellers had an interest in removing the Belgian companies and increasing their own investments. In later chapters, we will see that the Rockefellers did in fact displace the Belgians during the late 1960s. The Chase Manhattan Bank, of which David Rockefeller was president, eventually became one of the largest investors in the Congo. The Rockefellers thus had complicated and conflicting interests in the Congo. It was not immediately clear whether they would join the procolonial bloc or the anticolonial bloc.

During the Eisenhower administration the Rockefellers played a passive role. There is no evidence that they attempted to influence policy at that time, and in at least one instance they deferred to the State Department. In late July 1960, the Congolese central government had requested a loan from Chase Manhattan. David Rockefeller called Secretary of State Christian A. Herter and stated that he would not become involved in the Congo imbroglio "unless this is something that the Secretary would favor."[61]

Why were the Rockefellers so passive? A complete answer is not possible, since David Rockefeller has not responded to the author's request for an interview. The most likely explanation is that the Rockefellers faced conflicting economic pressures, and for the first few months they simply could not make up their minds. They had good reasons to favor the Katanga secession, but they had equally good reasons to oppose it. Facing such complications, the Rockefellers vacillated for several months.

Their indecision did not last long, however, and David Rockefeller supported Kennedy's policy in the Congo. There are several indications of this support. Weissman states: "It seems that the Rockefellers gave some quiet support to the embattled African Bureau," during the Katanga controversy. One member of the Africa bureau opined that "the Rockefellers were, I think more logically concerned with the *whole* Congo."[62] Executives of the Chase Manhattan Bank, traditionally Rockefeller controlled, were also supportive. A Chase Manhattan vice president later stated, "I, as one officer in the Bank having to do with African affairs, felt all along, and continue to do so, that the U.S. and UN policy towards the Congo [under Kennedy] was the right one and that that policy has been successful."[63] Chase Manhattan director John McCloy defended the UN operation during a congressional hearing.[64] The Rockefellers thus became part of the anticolonial coalition.[65]

The Rockefellers had good connections to the Kennedy foreign policy apparatus. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had been president of the Rockefeller Foundation. Rusk, however, was constrained by the views of George McGhee, another State Department official and a close personal friend, who supported Katanga.[66] Facing conflicting pressures—the Rockefellers on the one hand and McGhee on the other—Rusk failed to play a decisive role in policy-making. One source termed Rusk "supportive but not energetic" with regard to the Congo.[67] Another noted that Rusk "thought about it [the Congo] as little as possible."[68] Chester Bowles, the administration's first undersecretary of state, was probably a more important figure. Bowles had advocated U.S. support for African nationalism in his 1956 book *Africa's Challenge to America*,[69] and during the Congo Crisis he was a persistent foe of Katanga. Bowles had been a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation.[70]

The Rockefellers apparently had access to the Africa bureau of the State Department. The bureau's leading specialist, Deputy Assistant Secretary J. Wayne Fredericks (reportedly "an old CIA man") was a major architect of the policy that eventually crushed Katanga.[71] Fredericks later became a vice president and director of international relations for Chase Manhattan, where he probably helped arrange the Congo's commercial loans.[72] Harlan Cleveland, assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, had been "an analyst for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund." Cleveland also played a key role in Congo policy and was anti-Katanga.[73] In addition the Rockefellers may have had connections to the UN force. Victor Hermann Umbricht, who managed the Congo's central bank under UN auspices, later became a director of the Swiss branch of Chase Manhattan.[74]

Overall, this chapter has identified three separate corporate supporters of the Kennedy policy in Katanga: the LAMCO/Bolidens group, Tempelsman, and the Rockefeller family.[75] The three groups all shared an interest in diminishing the Belgians' commercial and political dominance in the Congo. All of them opposed, and had good reasons to oppose, the Katanga secession. All appear to have supported (and sometimes formulated) the policies of the U.S. government and the UN. The Kennedy policy in the Congo thus had a base within the international business community.

The Procolonial Bloc in Europe and Africa

The anticolonial business interests faced formidable opposition from a range of corporate interests which favored Katanga. The most important of these interests remained of course the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), which controlled the Katanga mines, and its parent company, Société Générale de Belgique (SG). We saw in chapter 3 that these companies provided most of the funds for Katanga and also helped organize mercenary forces to bolster it. It should be recalled also that during 1960 and early 1961, the Belgian government strongly supported SG interests.

However, the role of the Belgian government changed during the Kennedy administration. In a national election in March 1961, the center-right government was replaced by a new center-left coalition, which assumed power in April. The new foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, was according to all accounts less sympathetic to both Union Minière and the Katanga cause. According to one source, "especially after the change of government in Brussels, the beginning of military disengagement on the part of Belgium in Katanga could be noted."[76] The Belgian government gradually ended its active support for the secession.

There are several reasons for the change in policy. Spaak's domestic political backing within Belgium did not favor Katanga. According to the London *Metal Bulletin,* Spaak's Socialist party had "been traditionally enemies of the big financial combine of which Union Minière forms a part."[77] Apparently,

Spaak was associated with business interests, specifically the Lambert banking group,[78] which had relatively few investments in Katanga.[79] The Lambert group was also an old rival of SG. The U.S. embassy in Brussels noted a "long history of hostility" between the two financial groups.[80]

Moreover, Spaak was very susceptible to pressures from the United States and the United Nations, where anti-Katanga sentiment was strong. Spaak's supporters in Lambert had investment and trading interests with American concerns.[81] Further, Spaak had dedicated much of his own career to furthering the United Nations and the Atlantic Alliance. Spaak had served as Belgian delegate to the UN, president of the UN General Assembly, president of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (which administered the Marshall Plan), and secretary-general of NATO. Finally, Spaak had close ties to U.S. business, and upon retirement from politics, he became an executive with International Telephone and Telegraph.[82] Spaak was somewhat less inclined to favor the SG interests, which had engineered the Katanga secession, and more inclined to support U.S. and UN policy, which opposed the secession. Spaak was far less supportive of Katanga than the previous conservative foreign minister, Pierre Wigny.

On the other hand, Spaak was susceptible to counterpressures. Spaak's policies were continually opposed by the Union Minière/SG interests, which remained, after all, the largest and most powerful business group in Belgium. Moreover, Belgian public opinion tended to favor the colonial cause in the Congo. Clearly Spaak could not completely ignore these pressures. According to George Ball, "Spaak was doing his best, [but] Union Minière was actively working to sabotage the effort."[83] As a result, Spaak urged the Kennedy administration to avoid military action against Katanga. The Belgian government thus continued, though to a lesser extent than previously, to constrain U.S. policy in the Congo.

By all accounts, the British government played a prominent role in defending Katanga. Rhodesia, a British colony, supplied Katanga with arms and was one of the chief props of the Tshombe regime.[84] According to a former UN official, "The British position was . . . formal refusal to recognize the secession, combined with active local support for it."[85] In London the Foreign Office supported Tshombe even more strongly than the Belgian government. A U.S. official noted the difference between British and Belgian policy: "I was impressed by mobility and helpfulness [with regard to the Congo], within limits of Belgian position as compared with that of British . . . Equally, British assessment . . . is markedly tepid and different from that of Belgians which much resembles our own."[86] Great Britain was as active in the Congo diplomacy as the former metropolitan power, Belgium.

Why were the British so concerned with the Congo? The reason is clear: British investors were closely interlinked with the Belgian colonial interests. Specifically, the British company Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. held a large bloc of stock in SG and had an interlocking directorate with Union Minière. Tanganyika's annual report discussed the UMHK at considerable length, and the two companies effectively functioned as a unit. Moreover, British interests controlled the Benguela railway, which transported much of Union Minière's copper, through Angola, to the sea.[87]

These interests, moreover, enjoyed good political ties. The Tanganyika board of directors contained several socially prominent individuals, and the chairman of the board, Charles Waterhouse, had been a member of parliament for over twenty years.[88] The Benguela railway interests had representatives in the House of Lords.[89] The colonial investors all had special access to the Conservative party, which was in power at the time of the Congo Crisis, and it was generally believed that those interests influenced Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. The *London Times* noted, "there is also suspicion here that the British Government [officials] are dragging their feet on behalf of British investors in Union Minière."[90] Even Prime Minister Macmillan conceded that "there was strong pressure in Britain, partly from business interests and partly from the right wing of the Conservative party, to support Tshombe."[91] The financial ties became quite embarrassing, and one Conservative legislator, when delivering a defense of Tshombe, felt compelled to state, "I have no personal interest in the matter . . . I have no shares in Tanganyika Concessions."[92]

France also played a role in the Katanga affair. The French government strongly opposed the UN force in the Congo and provided direct aid to Tshombe. Roger Trinquier—a French colonel who had gained some fame in Indochina for his counterinsurgency expertise and for his involvement in the opium trade—advised the Katangese military.[93] Colonel Trinquier almost assumed command of the Katangese gendarmerie at one point. A French company, probably with government encouragement, sold jet aircraft to Katanga.[94]

The French had several interests in Katanga. During the early 1960s, President Charles de Gaulle was organizing a permanent French sphere of influence among the former colonies in Africa. Katanga offered the possibility of expanding French influence even further.[95] A Belgian source stated, moreover, that de Gaulle's Congo policy "was in part a symbol of his anti-American policy . . . His Congo policy was purely anti-American."[96] Finally, some 25 percent of Union Minière's stock was held by French nationals, and their government probably wished to protect those investments.[97]

The Tshombe regime also obtained aid from South Africa and Portugal.[98] South Africa provided aircraft and pilots to the secessionists; Portuguese colonial authorities in Angola permitted Katangese copper to pass through their territory for export. These countries probably supported Katanga for geostrategic reasons. Undoubtedly they felt that Tshombe's "prowhite" regime would be friendly toward the existing order in southern Africa.

Moreover, the NATO countries in general appear to have rallied to the Katanga cause. At one point, in 1961, the *Baltimore Sun* wrote that "the United States appeared to be isolated from all 14 of its NATO allies tonight in its support for the United Nations military action in the Congo."[99] The United States could not completely alienate its most important allies. The NATO countries, led by Britain, France, and (somewhat less enthusiastically) Belgium, continuously restrained the anticolonialism of the Kennedy administration.

The Procolonial Bloc in the Kennedy Administration

The Kennedy administration was not of one opinion on the Congo Crisis. An influential group of policymakers within the administration sympathized with Tshombe, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Some of these policymakers had ties to Belgian business interests.

The most obvious procolonial element was the Europe bureau of the State Department. It was influenced by the European nations which, as just discussed, favored Katanga. The bureau was also influenced by European business interests. In his memoirs, Chester Bowles states: "The European Bureau . . . was itself influenced by the British, French, and Belgian financiers who owned the copper mines in Katanga."[100]

A second element in the procolonial lobby was Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon. It should be recalled that Dillon served in the State Department under Eisenhower, where he was deeply involved in the Congo policy. Also, Dillon's family firm, Dillon, Read and Company, had extended loans to the colonial government in the Congo and had excellent relations with the Belgian colonial establishment. Finally, Dillon had good reasons to oppose the Congolese central government, since it had defaulted on all of its foreign debts, including the one to Dillon, Read.[101] Thus, Dillon had every reason to favor the Belgian position, as well as its Katanga puppet state, and to oppose the central government.

Remarkably, Dillon played no major role in Congo policy under Kennedy. Given his economic interests, as well as his previous Congo experience, Dillon's inactivity seems surprising. On further inspection, however, Dillon's role seems fully comprehensible. Specifically, the Congolese government reversed its initial default decision, and in 1961 it agreed to repay a single foreign creditor: Dillon, Read. A State Department official later commented that "the only exception to the general default was the continued payment . . . on the $15 million Dillon, Read bond issue, this exception being due clearly to *political reasons,* i.e. gratitude to the United States [emphasis in original]."[102] Such gratitude would probably have extended to Treasury Secretary Dillon and to his family investment bank. (It is also possible that the U.S. embassy and/or CIA station "advised" the repayment.) In any case, Dillon ceased to have a serious financial interest in the Congo question, and he did not actively participate in Congo policy. However, he privately continued to favor the Belgian interests, which had been so friendly toward his firm during the 1950s, and to oppose, though rather passively, the Kennedy policy in the Congo.[103] Dillon remained an additional, though only marginally important, constraint on the Kennedy policy.

Lewis Hoffacker, who directed the U.S. consulate in Katanga, was another procolonial figure. Upon Hoffacker's retirement from the foreign service, he became an international affairs consultant for Shell Oil, which was a part of the Belgian colonial establishment. Shell was the second-largest oil distributor in the Congo and had participated in an oil pipeline project, in partnership with Socopetrol, which in turn was "part of the Petrofina group and thus linked to the Société Générale."[104] Although Hoffacker was only a middle-level official, he sided with the pro-Katanga elements in the administration.

Another restraining influence was the U.S. ambassador to Belgium, Douglas MacArthur II, nephew of the famous general. Undoubtedly Ambassador MacArthur was influenced by the strongly pro-Katanga atmosphere that prevailed in Belgium. MacArthur frankly admitted this bias in a 1962 cable to the State Department: "Without wishing to appear to be suffering from 'localitis' or the emotional (sometimes near hysterical) atmosphere of Brussels, we would like [to] point out what from our admittedly limited vantage point [would] appear to be certain very grave implications for United States should we be called upon again to support UN military operations in Katanga."[105]

It is perfectly understandable, for purely bureaucratic reasons, that MacArthur had a pro-Belgian viewpoint. He was, after all, ambassador to Belgium, and it is not unusual for ambassadors to develop "localitis." Ambassador MacArthur, moreover, was influenced by Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, whom the ambassador admired.[106] Finally, MacArthur may have been influenced by Belgian business interests. After his retirement from government service, he became a "business consultant and dir[ector] of several Belgian and American companies." He also joined the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium.[107] MacArthur never became an advocate for Tshombe, and he cooperated to some extent with the administration policy. The ambassador did, however, oppose using military force to end the secession.[108]

President Kennedy himself had some pro-Katanga connections. Alan Kirk, a former admiral who had helped arrange Kennedy's commission as a naval officer during World War II,[109] had close ties to the Belgian interests. Kirk, who had also served as ambassador to Belgium, was president of the Belgo-American Development Corporation during the Kennedy administration. The Belgo-American firm was described as the "center of information between Société Générale, Union Minière and such American financial interests as may in due course be interested in participating in appropriate investments."[110] Thus Admiral Kirk acted as a front for the Belgian interests. Kirk did indeed use his influence with Kennedy, and he criticized the UN military actions against Katanga.[111] In short, Kirk had ties to the president, and he used those ties to bolster the Belgian position. Admiral Kirk had other connections in government. McGeorge Bundy, the national security advisor, had worked as an aide to the admiral during the Second World War.[112]

However, Kirk had only a limited effect on policy. Bundy, for example, was not very active in the Congo decision-making, and to the extent that Bundy was involved, he did not generally side with the pro-Katanga group.[113] Moreover, Kirk himself was only a lukewarm advocate for Katanga. We shall see that the Société Générale interests became internally divided with regard to the Congo issue. Kirk appears to have associated with a relatively moderate faction, one favoring some form of rapprochement between Katanga and the central government. Admiral Kirk, moreover, did cooperate with the Kennedy administration. The administration directly used Kirk as a channel of communications with the Belgian business interests.[114] Kirk nevertheless was another advocate of a relatively cautious policy toward Katanga.

Charles Engelhard, a basic metals trader and a prominent figure in the New

Jersey Democratic party, reportedly lobbied for Katanga, although few details are available. Mr. Engelhard had no investments in the Congo, but he had close ties to South Africa, where there was strong support for Katanga.[115] Engelhard apparently supported Katanga in order to flatter his South African associates. Overall there is no evidence that Engelhard influenced policy to any great extent.

We have seen that American Metal Climax (AMAX) strongly supported the Katanga secession. The company had extensive investments in Rhodesia, across the border from Katanga, as well as historical connections to the Belgian colonial interests.[116] AMAX President Hochschild was a personal friend of Adlai Stevenson and a prominent Democratic contributor. Hochschild was in frequent contact with Stevenson and attempted to influence him in favor of Katanga.[117] However, Maurice Tempelsman, an opponent of Katanga, apparently counterbalanced AMAX's influence. Tempelsman was one of Stevenson's most important clients, while AMAX, in contrast, had not made use of Stevenson's legal talents and instead had retained the Republican law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell.[118] It is true that AMAX President Hochschild helped finance Stevenson's 1956 presidential campaign, but his contribution was only a small fraction of Tempelsman's legal payments.[119] Tempelsman thus had much closer ties to the UN ambassador than did the AMAX firm. Throughout the crisis, Stevenson remained anti-Katanga, and AMAX's efforts had little influence.[120]

George McGhee, the assistant secretary of state for political affairs, was also associated with procolonial interests. McGhee, an independent Texas oilman, later joined the board of Mobil Oil—a major investor in Katanga and a supporter of the secessionist regime.[121] McGhee was "definitely unenthusiastic" with regard to UN attempts to end the secession,[122] although, like the other figures, he reluctantly cooperated with the official, anti-Katanga policy.

Perhaps the most important pro-Katanga element in the administration was Averell Harriman, elder statesman of the Democratic party and a prominent State Department official. Harriman was, according to all accounts, an admirer of Tshombe. Harriman later recounted that "I took rather a shine to Tshombe."[123] Harriman's views on Katanga represented an aberration; previously he had advocated liberal policies on the colonial question. In 1956 a Belgian colonial publication noted with some alarm that "several Democratic leaders, such as Governor Harriman, attacked the 'procolonial' attitude of Secretary of State Foster Dulles."[124] During the 1960 election, "Harriman advised Kennedy to use, in speeches, the theme of Republican neglect of Africa."[125]

Harriman had long associated himself with the anticolonial perspective on the Third World. Why did Harriman identify so strongly with the neocolonialist enterprise in Katanga? One possible answer concerns Harriman's business associations. Specifically, the Harriman family investment bank, Brown Brothers, Harriman and Company, had close ties to the Belgian interests, and the bank accordingly viewed the Congo Crisis with a pro-Belgian bias. An executive with Brown Brothers wrote, "we have enjoyed long standing correspondent relations with the Belgian banks and, thereby, with their affiliates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo."[126]

Overall, the pro-Katanga lobby within the administration was weaker than the anti-Katanga lobby. Only one figure, Harriman, was actively pro-Tshombe; the remainder only opposed, to some extent, the use of force to end Tshombe's secession. Many of the procolonial interests noted here had only a weak interest in the Katanga question. Both Ambassador MacArthur and Admiral Kirk were associated with Belgian interests, but they held relatively moderate views on Katanga and favored some form of conciliation with the Congolese central government. Dillon had the loan repaid to his investment bank and quickly lost interest in the Congo. Engelhard and AMAX made feeble and largely ineffectual lobbying efforts. And if the Europe bureau favored the European interests, it was strongly opposed by the Africa bureau, which held exceptional power under Kennedy. Taken as a whole, the pro-Katanga interests were neither cohesive nor very powerful. They did, however, constitute a constraint, and they help account for the vacillation and bureaucratic feuding that characterized the Kennedy policy.

The Katanga Lobby and the Congress

Lacking access to the executive, the pro-Katanga forces attempted to influence public opinion with a noisy political campaign. The campaign was directed by an organization called Katanga Information Services (KIS), which was based in New York. The KIS director, Michel Struelens, was a Belgian national and a former colonial administrator in the Congo.[127] Officially, KIS was an agent of the government of Katanga. In fact it was probably an instrument of Union Minière. George Ball writes that the KIS "campaign [was] financed by Belgian financial interests."[128] The KIS was well funded in any case, spending almost one hundred thousand dollars in 1961 according to its own estimate, and several hundred thousand according to independent sources.[129]

The KIS public relations campaign attracted support within the American right wing. In December 1961, KIS helped organize an activist organization, the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters.[130] The committee was directed by Max Yergan, a black educator and a former leftist. Yergan was already acquainted with the Congo; during the 1950s he had traveled there and provided a generally positive view of colonial rule.[131] The American Committee gained the support of William F. Buckley, John Dos Passos, Barry Goldwater, and numerous other luminaries. The John Birch Society and the Young Americans for Freedom were also involved.[132] The Katanga cause became one of the leading foreign policy issues of the far right in America. The American Committee grew in strength, and aided by the KIS lobby group, it attacked UN policy in the Congo. It also disseminated highly partial accounts of Katanga, portraying it as racially tolerant, anticommunist, and in contrast with the rest of the Congo, orderly.[133]

The lobbying produced results. The propaganda campaign apparently influenced reporting in the Western news media. Conor Cruise O'Brien, who headed the UN mission in Katanga, provides this account: "Back in New York, I did see on television a 'school in Katanga' with white and black children playing happily together. The impression created was that of a multiracial Paradise. These things may happen in Katanga. I can only say that I have not seen them except on television."[134] The Katanga lobby gradually broadened its support. The mainstream of the Republican party, including such prominent figures as Herbert Hoover and Richard Nixon, endorsed the Katanga cause. The official publication of the Republican National Committee ran several pro-Katanga articles. Southern Democrats, pleased by Tshombe's "prowhite" image, also expressed support.[135] Why did the Katanga issue attract such broad support? One reason was that the Republicans, especially right-wingers, simply needed a foreign policy issue with which they could mobilize their followers. The Katanga campaign dovetailed nicely with anti-UN sentiment, which has long characterized the American far right.[136] Tshombe was personally agreeable and, at least on a verbal level, strongly anticommunist. Tshombe's alliance with white mercenaries and South Africa appealed to racist sentiments. Finally, the campaign did not cost much, since Union Minière revenues, channeled through KIS, defrayed much of the expense.

In Congress, the Katanga cause primarily appealed to Republicans (including even Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen) and southern Democrats. There were some exceptions. The leader of the pro-Tshombe forces in Congress was Thomas Dodd, a liberal Democratic senator from Connecticut. Senator Dodd's involvement probably resulted from financial interest. Tshombe claimed he "was paying Dodd a large monthly stipend," according to Brian Urquhart, a former UN official.[137] There is also circumstantial evidence that Dodd had direct ties to the Belgian interests, although there is no firm proof of this. Frederick G. Dutton, the State Department's congressional liaison, felt that Dodd "was definitely representing Belgian interests at the time" and that Dodd's involvement in Katanga was "strictly business."[138] Thomas Hughes, a former staffer at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, held similar opinions. Hughes had "reports coming in all the time" that Dodd was meeting with Belgian business figures.[139] The author is unable to confirm these views, since unfortunately the Dodd family will not permit him to examine the late senator's personal papers. The National Security Agency, which reportedly investigated the senator, refused to release any information, since release might "cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security."[140] The author might add that he doubts the validity of the latter point. In any case, Dodd was a personal friend of Vice President Lyndon Johnson, who, though he played no role in decision making on the Congo, shielded Dodd from criticism. State Department officials were circumspect in their dealings with the senator.[141] Dodd was thus a powerful spokesman for the Katanga cause, and he advanced views that were virtually indistinguishable from those of Union Minière.

Katanga supporters, though weak in the executive branch, were well represented in Congress. We shall see that the congressional opponents intimidated the president. The legislative branch thus emerged as a bastion of support for the Union Minière position in the Congo.

Let us now return to some of the theoretical issues discussed in chapter 1. The Statist perspective, it should be recalled, predicts that state agencies, especially those connected with foreign policy, are insulated from business interests. The state is considered autonomous from outside pressures. These predictions are contradicted by the case study of the Congo. We have seen that the U.S. government was not at all autonomous, and that contrary to the predictions of Statism, business and government were thoroughly intertwined. Business-government connections were also evident in Great Britain and Belgium, disconfirming still further the Statist predictions. The findings also disconfirm the Instrumental Marxist perspective. The latter implies a monolithic capitalist class, united in its foreign investment activities. During the Congo Crisis, there was no such unity, and the "capitalist class" was divided into factions. The facts of the Congo case contradict a significant portion of the existing political science literature.

The Congo Crisis under Kennedy

Now that we have analyzed the groups with interests in the Congo Crisis, we will see how these groups interacted with each other and influenced the Kennedy administration. The administration's task may be summarized as follows: First, it sought to improve the public image of the Congolese central government by ending Mobutu's dictatorship and reestablishing at least the appearance of parliamentary rule. Second, it had to terminate the vaguely leftist regime of Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville. Gizenga's regime, which received limited aid from Eastern bloc countries, threatened to topple the central government and to turn the Congo in an anti-Western direction. Third, Kennedy had to end the secessionist regimes of Albert Kalonji in South Kasai and Moise Tshombe in Katanga. (The various regional secessions are displayed on map 2.) Of all these objectives, the last was by far the most important and the most difficult. Katanga was not only the richest province in the country, but it was also supported by the powerful Belgian interests and an army of white mercenaries. In achieving all of these goals, the administration often used the United Nations force as its instrument.

Shortly after Kennedy's inauguration as president, an interagency Congo task force studied possible changes in U.S. and UN policy toward the Congo. The task force report was issued on February 1, 1961. Reflecting the views of the Africa bureau, the report recommended that the UN be allowed to use force against Katanga. The State Department's Europe bureau, reflecting the European interests, opposed this task force recommendation. The Africa bureau prevailed, however, and Kennedy approved the task force recommendation.[142]

During mid-February, the UN Security Council debated the Congo question. The United Arab Republic (Egypt), Liberia, and Ceylon jointly introduced a resolution for a new UN charter which called for, among other things, the use of force against Katanga. The European powers were hostile toward this proposal. Belgium could not participate in the debate, not being a member of the Security Council at the time, but the Belgian foreign minister, in a public speech before the Royal Academy of International Affairs in Britain, strongly denounced the UAR-Liberia-Ceylon proposal. In the Security Coun-



MAP 2. Rebellions in the Congo, 1960–63

cil the French and British delegations actively defended the Belgian position. U.S. delegate Adlai Stevenson attempted unsuccessfully to weaken some of the language of the resolution in order to mollify the Europeans. Stevenson suggested, for example, that the resolution should instruct the UN to exhaust all peaceful measures before resorting to violence. Stevenson was unable to alter the resolution, but he agreed to support it anyway.[143]

The resolution as adopted urged "that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the UN command, and mercenaries." Moreover, the resolution authorized the "use of force, if necessary, in the last resort."[144] The resolution passed the Security Council by a vote of 9-0, with two abstentions. France, privately supporting Tshombe but publicly opposing him, abstained. The Soviets abstained on account of their general opposition to the UN presence in the Congo. The British actually voted for the resolution, although with strong reservations. According to a former UN official, "The British position appeared to be that after having voted for the resolution they did not want to see its implementation."[145] The UN force, despite the British reservation, was prepared to subdue Tshombe.

The UN resolution also called for reorganization of the central government in Leopoldville. Specifically, the resolution urged the termination of Mobutu's dictatorship, the establishment of civilian government, and the recalling of parliament. The United States, partly for public relations purposes, supported such changes. Mobutu and his aides quietly resigned, reportedly under "pressure from the Kennedy administration." Joseph Ileo, who had been a legislator before the military coup, formed the new civilian government in February 1961.[146] The Ileo government was regarded as provisional, pending the recalling of parliament at a later date. The government was hardly constitutional or parliamentary, but at least it was governed by civilians and was therefore more acceptable to its American benefactors.

The new Security Council resolution, and the UN's Congo activities in general, were deeply resented by many Congolese politicians in Katanga and even in Leopoldville. Premier Ileo claimed (incorrectly) that the United Nations planned to disarm the national army and to place the Congo under trusteeship. Anti-UN articles appeared in the Leopoldville press. It is also likely that Ileo feared Antoine Gizenga's leftist appeal.[147] With all of these apprehensions, Ileo was willing to ally himself with Tshombe.

Tshombe shrewdly manipulated the situation. The Katangese leader had every reason to encourage Ileo's hostility toward the UN, which threatened to end his secessionist regime. Tshombe proposed an alliance with the central government, to be directed against both the UN and Gizenga. On February 28, Ileo and Tshombe, as well as Albert Kalonji of South Kasai, agreed to "pooling of military resources" for use against "communist tyranny."

In early March the three leaders met in Tananarive, on the island of Madagascar, to work out the details of their alliance. Tshombe used all of his persuasive skills and dominated the conference. The three participants agreed in principle to reunification of the Congo and to the establishment of a very loosely organized confederal system. The agreement called for the eventual dismantling of the central government, leaving all administrative tasks except for foreign affairs to the regional authorities. The Tananarive agreement constituted a virtual capitulation by the central government.[148]

These events probably resulted from foreign intervention, specifically by the French and Belgian interests which were backing Tshombe. The hostility toward the UN, which led to the Tananarive accords, resulted partly from "some deliberate mischief making on the part of European advisers."[149] The Belgians welcomed the Tananarive agreement, since it clearly strengthened Tshombe's position. The Belgian foreign minister praised the agreement, while on the Brussels exchange, prices increased for the Katanga-related stocks.[150] There is also evidence of French intervention. Madagascar, the location of the conference, had recently gained its independence from France and was governed by a conservative, pro-French government, which was "most favorable to the idea of Katanga secession." The UN Secretariat and the USA, in contrast, both opposed the agreement. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld refused to recognize the Tananarive accords, while American officials privately expressed disapproval.[151] The Kennedy administration was temporarily outmaneuvered.

The Tananarive agreement did not last long. Within weeks Ileo and his followers developed doubts about their alliance with Tshombe. Tshombe himself did not hold to the terms of the agreement. The Katangese established an economic agreement with the government of Congo-Brazzaville, a former French colony. This violated the Tananarive accords, which stipulated that the central government alone would conduct foreign relations.[152]

In April, Congolese leaders, including Ileo and Tshombe, met in the city of Coquilhatville, in northern Congo, to discuss further implementation of the Tananarive accords. This conference was very different from the previous one in Tananarive. Central government officials now demanded revision of the accords "not only in matters of detail but also in matters of substance." The conference ended with bitter disputes, between Katangese and central government figures, and the repudiation of the Tananarive agreement. When Tshombe threatened to leave the conference, he was arrested by central government troops. Tshombe was held for the next two months until, in late June, he agreed to end the secession and was released. Tshombe then returned to

Katanga where, reneging, he reaffirmed his commitment to secession.[153] Clearly the alliance between the central government and Tshombe now was over.

The outcome of this conference probably reflected UN intervention. The "United Nations officials played a considerable part in the deliberations of the conference" at Coquilhatville, while the Belgians played no apparent role.[154] The conference coincided with a rapprochement between the central government and the UN force. President Joseph Kasavubu agreed to work with the UN to expel Tshombe's foreign advisors. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld praised the new "spirit of constructive cooperation and mutual confidence," and noted with satisfaction, "we are beginning, more or less, to move away from Tananarive, and . . . to put Mr. Tshombe in his proper place."[155] The United Nations thus regained the initiative.

The Kennedy administration and the UN now acted to restructure the central government. Kennedy stated privately that he was "setting up" a new government in the Congo.[156] Specifically, the USA sought to recall parliament in order to reestablish the central government's credentials as "democratic" and to make it more acceptable to world public opinion. Moreover, the administration wished to replace Prime Minister Ileo, probably because Ileo was "weak and ineffective"[157] and also because he so easily had capitulated to Tshombe at Tananarive. The USA favored Cyrille Adoula, a local politician and union leader, for the position of prime minister. Adoula was widely promoted as a moderate and a neutralist; in fact he had strong American ties. Specifically, Adoula had worked closely with the international affairs division of the AFL-CIO, which, in turn, has long collaborated with the Central Intelligence Agency.[158] Weissman reports, moreover, that the U.S. embassy had bribed Adoula.[159]

In July the Congolese parliament reconvened for the first time since September 1960, in the Congolese town of Lovanium. The United Nations supervised the conference. A battalion of UN troops surrounded Lovanium to prevent interference by any French or Belgian agents. Tshombe, foreseeing that he would be at a disadvantage, did not attend.[160] The Lovanium conference thus proceeded without the domineering influence of Tshombe or his European supporters. During the next two weeks Congolese politicians debated the composition of a new government.

The UN force itself was not above intervening, however, nor was it above collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency. During the course of the Lovanium meeting, leftist leader Gizenga gained strength and threatened to

eclipse Adoula. The CIA and the UN worked feverishly to undermine Gizenga's position. According to Richard Mahoney, the State Department issued an "emergency directive to the field to stop a Gizenga victory at all costs . . . [CIA Station Chief] Devlin and his colleagues had meanwhile located an underground sewage tunnel leading into the sequestered conclave and began passing money destined for key legislators. On the inside, [UN official Mahmoud] Khiary and his Swiss *homme de main* used the money to bribe parliamentarians."[161] The *New York Times* commented that "money and shiny American automobiles, furnished through the logistic wizardry of Langley [CIA headquarters], are said to have been the deciding factors in the vote that brought Mr. Adoula to power."[162] The effort was successful, and Adoula was overwhelmingly elected prime minister, with Gizenga as deputy prime minister. In the following months Gizenga attempted to dominate parliament, but the CIA managed to keep Adoula in power.[163] According to Mahoney, "the CIA began spending large sums of money to organize popular support for Adoula." The agency also furnished pilots for the government's air force.[164]

American officials considered the Lovanium conference a success, especially from a propaganda standpoint. A State Department official publicly praised the conference and called the results "an act of faith in the democratic process."[165] Now Gizenga was in the government, and his independent leftist regime was ended. Tshombe's secession continued, but at least he and his corporate supporters were unable to dominate this conference as they had dominated conferences in the past. The new Adoula government was on paper supported by parliament and thus had a certain public legitimacy.

The United Nations now turned its attention to Katanga. Consistent with its February charter, the UN force spent several months attempting through diplomatic means to remove the white mercenaries. The UN Secretariat sought assistance from Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak. The foreign minister cooperated to some extent and urged mercenaries of Belgian nationality to leave Katanga. These efforts had only a marginal effect, since Spaak had little influence over the corporate interests that dominated Katanga. A former UN official writes that "it was plain that whoever the masters of Katanga might be, they were not M. Spaak and his colleagues." By August 1961, only forty mercenaries had left Katanga, while five hundred remained.[166]

During August and September, the United Nations used force in an effort to expel the mercenaries and to end the Katanga secession. These operations were directed by Conor Cruise O'Brien, the UN director in the Katanga region. The operations failed.[167] Many additional mercenaries were expelled, but the remainder, supported by the Katangese gendarmerie, fought back. A single Katangese fighter plane ("the lone ranger") strafed UN forces.[168] The United Nations, lacking air support, attempted to procure several Ethiopian jets, but the British government impeded their delivery.[169] The UN force was thus outgunned. An Irish infantry company was surrounded and by mid-September was forced to surrender to the Katangese. The UN was militarily defeated.

European newspapers immediately denounced the United Nations. The Belgian daily *La Dernière Heure* compared the UN actions to Nazi atrocities, while *La Libre Belgique* summed up the operation as a "premeditated crime."[170] In Paris, *Le Figaro* condemned the UN for acting "brutally—and illegally."[171] O'Brien was singled out for criticism. He became "an international figure and entered into the demonology of the right, not least of the English Tory papers, leading his 'Red Army in blue berets' through Katanga."[172] From the British and Belgian governments there was "bitter criticism."[173]

Within the USA, the Katanga lobby, under Michel Struelens, was activated. Struelens sent anti-UN mailings to congressmen, and these quickly had an effect.[174] During a September 16 Senate debate, pro-Katanga speakers denounced the United Nations and defended Tshombe. Senator Dodd, the leading speaker, also attacked the central government, claiming it was "pro-communist . . . [and] several small steps removed from complete and total Communist domination." Dodd warned, "the whole of Africa will be lost to communism."[175]

The Kennedy administration reacted ambiguously. On the one hand, American diplomats within Katanga supported the UN. In his memoirs, O'Brien states:

> The only Consul of a major interested power who was on the United Nations side without reservations was the American Consul . . . All the other Consuls in Elisabethville [Katanga] represented Western European countries and the general feeling among them . . . was one of resentment at the American Government's 'pro-Congolese' and 'pro-UN' attitude. The American Consul was *ex officio* somewhat unpopular—and became more so.[176]

The State Department publicly defended UN conduct.[177] On the other hand, the congressional denunciations intimidated the Kennedy administration. The

State Department privately sent Hammarskjöld "a thinly veiled warning" against any additional UN violence.[178]

Faced with overwhelming military and diplomatic pressure, Hammarskjöld decided to yield. He officially reprimanded O'Brien for employing force[179] and flew to the Congo to negotiate with the Katangese. On September 17, while en route to meet Tshombe in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia, Hammarskjöld's plane crashed and the secretary-general was killed.

The cause of the crash has never been firmly established. There was widespread speculation that Tshombe's fighters had shot down Hammarskjöld's plane. Some writers, however, dismiss this possibility. O'Brien, for example, states that "Tshombe had no more reason to murder Hammarskjöld on the way to Ndola than Hitler had to murder Chamberlain on the way to Munich."[180] In other words, Hammarskjöld had already called off the UN offensive, and Tshombe, therefore, had no reason to murder him. The present author disagrees with this analysis. Hammarskjöld's cease-fire was only a temporary measure, not a capitulation. The United Nations did not withdraw from the Congo. The possibility of a new UN offensive remained an ever-present threat, and Tshombe, in this author's opinion, did have an incentive to kill the secretary-general. Speculation aside, the cause of the crash has never been resolved. A UN investigation was inconclusive; the report cited no proof that the plane was shot down, but it did not rule out the possibility either.[181]

The first effect of Hammarskjöld's death was a formal cease-fire, signed on September 20, between the UN and the Katangese military. In the long run the secretary-general's death was probably a setback for the Katanga cause, at least from a propaganda standpoint. There remained a lingering suspicion (whether justified or not) that Tshombe and his European supporters had committed murder. The Africa bureau of the State Department, a center of anti-Katanga sentiment, was emboldened.

Several factors strengthened still further the Africa bureau's position. Specifically, the Katanga issue was undermining confidence in the Adoula government. Leftists elements, led by Deputy Premier Gizenga, pressed Adoula to confront Tshombe and end the secession. In October 1961, Gizenga effectively quit the government and returned to Stanleyville, where he reestablished his independent regime. In fact, the "Gizenga threat" was overstated. Gizenga himself was generally regarded as a weak and ineffectual leader, much less capable than Lumumba. The amount of Soviet aid to his regime was always minuscule, and according to one historian, the Soviets "had more or less written Gizenga off as a potential leader."[182] And Gizenga did not last long. In January 1962, central government forces, encouraged by the UN, easily defeated the Stanleyville regime. Gizenga was then imprisoned.[183]

In the fall of 1961, however, Gizenga's strength was his most obvious feature. Prime Minister Adoula was vulnerable to leftist criticisms, especially the complaint that he had not confronted Tshombe. The Adoula government was so desperate that it even threatened to accept Soviet aid in order to reunify the country.[184] Tshombe's recalcitrance thus was undermining the Western position in the Congo and inviting Soviet influence.

These developments alarmed cold warriors in the administration and accordingly helped strengthen the anti-Katanga bloc. George Ball, now the "commander in chief" of Congo affairs, strongly urged action against Tshombe in a report to President Kennedy. Ball's report stated: "Tshombe is the basic problem . . . Our policy must therefore be directed most immediately to destroying Tshombe's assurance in his own military supremacy, and to removing, or at least greatly weakening, the influence of his Belgian advisers . . . We must immediately build up UN fighting power."[185] UN Ambassador Stevenson "urged that the UN forces be permitted to push forward."[186] Assistant Secretary Williams wrote, "we continue to believe that UN military strength must be augmented in the Congo."[187] Other State Department liberals, including Harlan Cleveland and Edmund Gullion, advocated renewed action against Tshombe.[188]

A UN military buildup quickly ensued. The United States sent several Globemaster transport aircraft to ferry UN troops to Katanga and encouraged other countries to send aircraft as well. Fighter-bombers were gradually acquired from Ethiopia, Sweden, and India.[189] Moreover, the UN Security Council—supported by the American delegation—agreed to strengthen the UN charter in the Congo. The new resolution, approved on November 24,

> *Strongly deprecates* [emphasis in original] the secessionist activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by foreign mercenaries . . . [and] *Authorizes* the secretary-general to take vigorous action, including the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate . . . [removal of the European mercenaries and political advisors in Katanga].[190]

The United States voted for the new resolution, while both Britain and France abstained.[191] The United States, already supplying the largest share of the UN force's funds, now became the only major Western country supporting the operation.

The UN-Katanga cease-fire, established after the September fighting, began to break down as Katangese units attacked the UN force. U Thant, the new secretary-general, publicly threatened to use "force to restore peace in Katanga."[192] The fighting rapidly escalated. United Nations jets raided airfields and other installations in Katanga, and by December 15, the UN infantry began a full-scale offensive. The Katangese continued to receive military aid from Rhodesia and Union Minière, while white mercenaries once again led the defense. The UN force was well equipped, however, and it was overcoming the mercenary-led opposition. The anticolonial bloc was apparently delighted with the new offensive. Stevenson met with UN officials and expressed "appreciation and approval for rapid and decisive manner UN had proceeded in dealing with Katanga problem."[193] Had the offensive continued, the Katanga secession might have ended. However, the Katanga lobby renewed its campaign. The UN offensive and its aftermath "caused the biggest display of anti–United Nations feeling in the West since the time of Suez."[194] The European countries, especially Britain, protested. David Ormsby-Gore, the British ambassador to the U.S. and a personal friend of Kennedy, urged restraint.[195] Within the administration the Europe bureau once again favored the European position.[196] The Katanga Information Services and a variety of right-wing organizations denounced the UN.[197] *National Review* editorials declared the Katangese "the freedom fighters of 1961" and expressed hope that the Katangese would "lick the daylights out the forces of the so-called United Nations."[198] Senator Dodd spoke out in Tshombe's defense.[199] The UN Secretariat and the State Department publicly defended the military action,[200] but the Katanga lobby proved too powerful. Tshombe, moreover, promised to negotiate with the central government. Under pressure, the UN finally ended the offensive, and on December 19, it declared a cease-fire.

Tshombe then met representatives of the Adoula government and the UN in the town of Kitona, where he agreed to recognize the central government. With the Kitona agreement, Tshombe officially ended the secession.[201] Tshombe then returned to Katanga—where he essentially repudiated the Kitona agreement. The secession thus continued.

Some feeble efforts were made to implement the Kitona accord, but these were unavailing. Tshombe traveled to Leopoldville and conferred with Premier Adoula repeatedly during the spring of 1961. In May Tshombe affirmed once again that he would end the secession, and he agreed to merge the Katangese gendarmerie with the Congolese National Army. By July, however, negotiations between the central government and Katanga broke down, and Katangese civilians, presumably with official encouragement, began harassing the UN forces.[202] Tshombe was no longer threatened with military action, and he did not need to make any concessions.

Still suffering from the Katanga lobby's attacks, President Kennedy did not even consider another military offensive against Tshombe. Instead Kennedy used diplomatic pressure. The administration sent Admiral Alan Kirk, an old acquaintance of the president and the head of Société Générale's American affiliate, on a mission to Belgium in December 1961. Kirk urged the Belgians to cease aiding Katanga.[203] Ambassador MacArthur, the U.S. envoy to Brussels, also lobbied the Belgians,[204] while the U.S. embassy in London prevailed upon Tanganyika Concessions, SG's British affiliate.[205] George McGhee, himself a former oilman, conferred with Mobil Oil.[206] Investors were urged to cooperate with the administration's policy and to cease their payments to Tshombe.

The efforts had some effect. During 1962, fissures began to appear within the Belgian business community. Many Belgian interests indicated weariness with the Katanga secession and with the unending turmoil that it entailed. This weariness was repeatedly demonstrated on the Brussels stock exchange. When Tshombe showed signs of reconciliation with the central government, Congolese stock values increased.[207] Clearly many investors sought an end to the secession. Within the SG group, moreover, one faction specifically advocated cooperation with the central government and with the Kennedy administration. This faction included Max Nokin, who became president of SG in December 1961.[208]

However, the pragmatic faction, including President Nokin, failed to change company policy. Second-level executives, strongly pro-Tshombe, blocked any conciliation with the central government. In August 1962, Ambassador MacArthur reported that the "dominant group in UMHK and SG remain[s] unreconstructed insofar as giving positive support to Leopoldville Government and are also unwilling to put effective pressure on Tshombe."[209]

A UN intelligence report provided a similar evaluation.[210] Moreover, the Belgian business community as a whole still sympathized with Tshombe. Even the most conciliatory elements, those which favored an end to secession, adopted this position only with great reluctance. Those interests still wanted to preserve the Tshombe regime in some form. At most a very loose federation, or a confederation on the model of Switzerland, was advocated, on the assumption that this would permit a continuation of Tshombe's neocolonial regime.[211]

During 1962, the Belgian press remained overwhelmingly pro-Tshombe and anti-UN. *L'Echo de la Bourse,* the Brussels financial daily, reported "the strong element in the Congo remains Katanga."[212] The Adoula regime in Leopoldville was regarded with contempt. *L'Echo* noted that wherever "the central government pretends to exercise its authority . . . it is a complete mess."[213] Similar views were expressed by other papers.[214] Union Minière never cut off Tshombe's financial support, and the U.S. lobbying proved futile. One State Department official stated, in May 1962, "I must report almost complete failure" with regard to efforts to end SG's support for Tshombe.[215]

Liberals in the State Department began to lose patience with the prevailing caution. Some began to advocate stronger action, including economic sanctions. As early as March 1962, Ball wrote a memorandum discussing possible sanctions, stating, "we recognize that such move [imposition of sanctions] could involve renewed violence in Elisabethville [Katanga] since it would hit Tshombe where it hurts—in the pocketbook."[216] Conservatives in the administration generally opposed such measures, especially if sanctions threatened to provoke new fighting. From Brussels, Ambassador MacArthur continually criticized administration policy and warned that it would harm relations with Belgium.[217]

Facing conflicting pressures, the Kennedy administration promulgated a compromise conciliation plan. Developed during the summer of 1962, the plan entailed an end to the Katanga secession, a new, federalized constitution to ensure a high measure of regional autonomy, and most importantly, a complicated formula for dividing Katanga's lucrative mining revenues. Specifically, 50 percent of the revenues would accrue to the provincial authorities in Katanga and the other 50 percent would accrue to the central government. Sanctions were also recommended, if Tshombe did not cooperate.[218]

The State Department attempted to obtain European support for the plan, but the results were mixed at best. Britain refused to support economic sanctions, while France refused to cooperate in any way at all. Only the Belgian government, especially Foreign Minister Spaak, agreed to support the plan.[219] Even Spaak's support was unenthusiastic; the policy was bitterly criticized by colonial interests. O'Brien reports that "almost all the Belgians . . . of Elisabethville [Katanga] denounced M. Spaak."[220] In Belgium, rightist parliamentarians launched "a campaign of attack against the Belgian government."[221] Thus the only country that strongly backed the plan was its originator, the United States.

The Kennedy administration, seeking to diminish its public involvement with the Congo, presented the plan to the UN Secretariat, which officially unveiled it. The "U Thant Plan," as it then was called, was proposed to both Katanga and the central government. Premier Adoula accepted the plan in August 1962.[222] Tshombe responded ambiguously and only agreed to negotiate. Thant later wrote that Tshombe "constantly shifted from lukewarm cooperation to calculated opposition and vise versa."[223] In all probability Tshombe never intended to accept the Thant Plan in any form and was only trying to stall for time.

Subsequent events tend to confirm this interpretation. In October the central government, assisted by UN aides, promulgated a new federal constitution consistent with the Thant Plan; Tshombe began to stall and failed to ratify the draft.[224] Instead the Katangese proceeded to build up their military capability and acquired, by the end of 1962, at least fifteen aircraft and several hundred mercenary advisors.[225] By the fall of 1962, the Katangese forces were harassing UN personnel.[226]

The Thant Plan was evidently failing and in fact it was never implemented. By negotiating, Tshombe managed to gain time and to augment his military capability. The formidable Katanga lobby used this interval to intensify its propaganda activities against the United Nations force and to weaken the UN politically. The European press began a strident anti-American campaign. We will now turn our attention in detail to the propaganda effort.

Europe Versus the USA

Some studies of the Congo allege that the international politics of the Congo Crisis reflected above all the East-West conflict. One study states, for example, that "the linchpins of Kennedy's Congo policy were precisely those of Eisenhower's. The Soviet threat to central Africa would have to be deterred."[227] This interpretation is partly correct; the Kennedy policy did indeed reflect an anticommunist motivation. The analysis is incomplete, however, since it ignores a highly significant conflict between the USA and Europe. Documentary sources and European newspapers from that era provide abundant evidence of such a conflict.

Belgian papers frequently alleged that the USA sought to displace Belgian influence in the Congo. According to *La Libre Belgique*, the United States "wants to take Katanga and its copper," and added: "The Americans will take . . . the place of the Belgians."[228] The United Nations force was regarded as a tool of the Kennedy administration or, in the words of *La Libre Belgique*, "the striking force of American imperialism."[229] The weekly *Pourquoi Pas* claimed that Kennedy was simply "seizing a market" and seeking "new opportunities in Central Africa."[230] The Flemish language *Het Volk* made similar accusations. Perhaps the harshest diatribe was in *L'Echo de la Bourse*, the financial daily, which implied that the United States was undermining European interests throughout Asia and Africa. The newspaper concluded by asking rhetorically, "Is it now necessary to establish a common European front to end American economic imperialism?"[231]

Many Belgians were convinced that business interests directed U.S. policy in the Congo. The concern was so strong that Société Générale attempted, in desperation, to sell much of its stock to an American group in late 1962. Such a sale presumably would have increased American interest in the Tshombe regime. The Belgians were using their time-honored technique of buying out competing foreign interests. A State Department document observed:

> Charge is repeatedly made in Belgian financial circles and elsewhere that American policy in the Congo is motivated by a desire to displace Belgian business interests and to have American ones take their place . . . The fact that the Belgian management of Société Générale is anxious to sell to an American group indicates that the motivation for the sale is at least in part political and based upon a desire to obtain USG [U.S. government] protection for Société Générale's operations in the Congo.[232]

The State Department, fearing that such a sale would be an embarrassment and would provoke "doubt about the true motivation of U.S. Congo policy," refused to endorse the deal. In fact no such sale was ever made. It is doubtful that many American businessmen could be persuaded to invest in the middle of a civil war. The Belgian effort to build support in the U.S. business community failed.

However, the Belgians continued to publicize American economic interest in the Congo in an effort to discredit U.S. policy. Often the attacks referred vaguely to financial interests. In some cases, however, the accusations were more specific. A Union Minière director claimed that the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies had "provoked the troubles" in the Congo.[233] The director implied that these companies wished to disrupt Union Minière's copper exports and thus to increase the international price of copper. The author should note that although these companies had a motive for supporting the Kennedy policy in the Congo, there is no evidence that they actually did support Kennedy, or that they played any role whatsoever.[234]

There were further controversies. Several Belgian papers publicized the association between Maurice Tempelsman and Adlai Stevenson. *La Dernière Heure* and *Le Soir* reported that Stevenson was "president" of Leon Tempelsman and Son. This accusation was partly false—Stevenson was the company counsel, not the president—but it was true insofar as Stevenson did have close ties to the company. Tempelsman threatened to take legal action, and the papers issued a retraction.[235]

The polemics were not confined to Belgium. Business circles throughout Europe suspected that the USA was usurping a European sphere of influence. According to one executive: "People are beginning to say . . . that this [UN] action was inspired by the USA for the purpose of ousting the Belgians and replacing them with American interests . . . I have learned that they [these interpretations] are very widely accepted in various countries of Europe and I have noticed that in Canada they are also accepted."[236] Articles in the Swiss press implied that U.S. financial interests directed the attack against Katanga.[237] German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer criticized U.S. policy in the Congo and opined that "the U.S. wanted to reduce Europe's role on the dark continent."[238] The British also harbored doubts about American motives in the Congo. The London *Metal Bulletin* denounced Kennedy's policy as another case of "dollar imperialism," and implied, "American interests have been using the UN as a tool to oust the Belgians from Katanga and get a foothold there themselves."[239] Similar views were expressed, often acrimoniously, in the House of Commons. One Tory legislator characterized the U.S. role as "a sinister form of international capitalism," designed to acquire "the rich mines in Northern Rhodesia and Katanga."[240]

It is interesting to reflect on the strident tone of these polemics. Denunciations of "American imperialism" are common enough in leftist circles; during the Congo Crisis, such rhetoric issued from business publications and the political right. During a parliamentary debate on the Congo, Labour MP Harold Wilson alluded to this paradox. Wilson noted that the previous Conservative speaker, who denounced American business interests,

> seemed to be speaking with almost a slightly Marxist tinge. He gave a materialistic interpretation of what has been going on in the Congo, with all these stories about mysterious companies . . . What I am perhaps permitting myself to smile at [Wilson continues, later in the debate] is the extraordinary repetition of this Marxist interpretation of history that we keep getting from hon[orable] Members opposite. This is not their usual approach to these matters.[241]

How do we interpret these "Marxist" outbursts? At a minimum they suggest a very deep split between the USA and Europe. Kennedy's anticolonialism cannot be dismissed as a public relations exercise.

Katanga activists in the USA could not, of course, use this type of anti-American rhetoric; their patriotic constituency would not have tolerated it. Instead American defenders of Katanga drew attention to *Swedish* business interests. In September 1962, Congressman Donald Bruce, an Indiana Republican, delivered a speech entitled "Is Katanga on the Auction Bloc?" Bruce discussed the role of the Swedish LAMCO group and emphasized its association with the UN Secretariat—and also with George Ball's law firm. Bruce implied that the Kennedy administration represented "foreign" interests in the Congo. The present author has checked many of Bruce's sources and has concluded that his charges were, at a factual level, accurate. Bruce demanded a congressional investigation.[242] Senator Strom Thurmond also demanded an investigation of the alleged conflicts of interest.[243] Shortly thereafter, Congress adjourned for the coming congressional elections, to reconvene in January 1963.

The Republican proposal was a serious one, and it threatened to embarrass the Kennedy administration. It was widely accepted that only the pro-Katanga forces had economic interests; Union Minière's support for Tshombe was well known. It was also believed that Tshombe's opponents, specifically the Kennedy administration and the UN Secretariat, had humanitarian, or at any rate noneconomic, motives. Congressman Bruce's allegations threatened to change this perception. An Ohio paper put the matter this way: "Curiously enough, many of the staunch defenders of the UN operations in the Congo have maintained that Americans and West Europeans who opposed the use of force to unify the Congolese nation were acting out of some sinister financial interest. Now there arises the possibility that the shoe could conceivably have been on the other foot."[244] An investigation also threatened to embarrass several officials who were deeply involved in Congo policy.

The End of the Katanga Secession

These right-wing attacks may have influenced policy-making in the Kennedy administration. There is evidence that the polemics intimidated George Ball, who had previously supported UN policy. Facing a possible congressional hearing, Ball reversed his position. He now demanded a complete U.S. disengagement from the Congo. In October 1962, less than a month after Bruce's speech, Ball attempted to purge the State Department of several of its most liberal figures, especially Sheldon Vance of the Office of Central African Affairs.[245] Ball had long been a central figure in the administration's Congo policy and a strong advocate of the anti-Katanga viewpoint. Now he completely changed his perspective and briefly joined the pro-Katanga bloc.

Ball's view was shared by other administration figures, including Ralph Dungan of the White House staff, Carl Kaysen of the National Security Council, and Lewis Hoffacker, the new U.S. consul in Elisabethville. In September, Assistant Secretary McGhee flew to Katanga to meet Tshombe, and he departed with an even more sympathetic impression of the Katangese leader than he had held previously. McGhee gave a highly favorable report on Tshombe.[246] These figures were joined by MacArthur and Harriman, who had always been skeptical of the anti-Katanga policy.[247] Opposing the group were Stevenson, Cleveland, Bowles, Fredericks, Williams, and Gullion, who remained strongly committed to the UN force and to ending the Katanga secession.[248] Without Ball, however, the anti-Katanga group was seriously weakened. In late October, Kennedy stated that there "could not be any consideration at this time of military action in the Congo on the part of the United Nations forces."[249] The anti-Katanga bloc was at a serious disadvantage.

Developments in the Congo intruded on these bureaucratic rivalries. New threats appeared to the Adoula government. Adoula did have some successes, since his troops had defeated the Stanleyville regime in January 1962 and the South Kasai secession the following September.[250] But on the most important issue, Katanga, the Adoula government seemed a complete failure. Leftists once again criticized Adoula's inability to subdue Tshombe, and in November Adoula survived a no confidence vote by only a very narrow margin.[251] These events reaffirmed that the Katanga secession threatened the stability of the entire country. The developments also strengthened the position of the anti-Katanga bloc within the Kennedy administration. George Ball could not force a U.S. disengagement from the Congo.

Ball—unable to end U.S. involvement and facing an investigation when Congress reconvened—changed his position once again in December. He now favored a prompt termination of the Katanga secession.[252] On December 14, the National Security Council discussed the Katanga issue and, encouraged by Ball, resolved to support a new UN military buildup.[253] The Defense Department sent a military team led by a three-star general, to determine what equipment the UN would require.[254] The USA also agreed to provide intelligence aid to the UN force.[255] Even Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak now denounced Tshombe as a "rebel."[256] The UN "peace-keeping" force, meanwhile, prepared a new offensive, code-named Operation Grand Slam. The UN augmented its forces to 18,200 men in the Congo, 70 percent of whom were deployed in Katanga or its environs.[257]

By late December, Tshombe stepped up his harassment of the United Nations force. On December 28, 1962, the United Nations used these provocations as a pretext for implementing Grand Slam. UN jets raided Katangese airfields, while a multinational infantry force seized control of Elisabethville and advanced toward the Union Minière headquarters at Jadotville.[258] Tshombe, now desperate, urged new negotiations. When it was obvious that the UN would not accept his offer, Tshombe threatened to destroy Union Minière facilities.[259] There were "scare reports from London and Brussels."[260] Tshombe's threat was clearly a bluff; the facilities sustained no significant damage, and Tshombe continued his profitable relationship with Union Minière for many years after the incident. In any case, the UN force was not cowed and continued its offensive.[261] The Katanga lobby was activated one last time, and the right-wing publications denounced the operation. The *National Review* declared, "our Congo policy is, in a word, insane."[262] It was to no avail; on January 17, 1963, Tshombe effectively ended the secession and permitted the UN freedom of movement throughout the region.[263] Conveniently, the fighting was almost completed when the U.S. Congress reconvened on January 9. The threatened investigation never took place.

Katanga was thus reintegrated without major concessions to Union Minière. A loose confederation, so often the basis of negotiations, was never established. Tshombe made several feeble efforts at a comeback. In early 1963 he traveled to France, Angola, and Rhodesia, presumably to drum up support among conservative colonial elements. He continued to receive support from

Union Minière and maintained a force of several thousand gendarmes and mercenaries in Angola. Finally, arrested by Congolese police for his seditious activities, he left the country in June 1963 and went into exile in Europe.[264] The Katanga secession was never revived, and Tshombe's political career appeared to be over.

Conclusion

The Business Conflict model predicts that international issues would split the business community into factions, and that each of these factions would attempt to influence policy. The model also predicts that these factions would establish direct ties to specific policymakers, and that the policymakers, in turn, would act in accord with their economic interests. These predictions are generally confirmed by the discussion of the Congo.

We have seen that the business community was divided into pro-Katanga and anti-Katanga factions. Most of the major policymakers in the Kennedy administration—including Stevenson, Bowles, Fredericks, Ball, Sorensen, Devlin, Cleveland, McGhee, Harriman, MacArthur—had ties to one of the interested investment groups at the time that they entered government service, or in the familiar "revolving door" tradition, they established such ties after leaving the government. This prediction was not universally correct. The author has not been able to find any relevant business ties for Kaysen, Dungan, Williams, or Gullion, even though they played important roles in the Congo Crisis. Not *all* policymakers had business ties; but the majority of them did.

Furthermore, the policymakers generally acted in ways that were consistent with their business ties. Specifically, those officials with ties to the pro-Katanga group tended to favor Katanga, or at least to oppose strenuous measures to end the secession, while those affiliated with the anti-Katanga interests strongly opposed the secession. The business influences were not absolutely determining. We have seen that McGeorge Bundy did not support the Katanga cause, despite his friendship with Admiral Kirk, who represented Belgian interests in the USA. George Ball briefly changed his position when threatened with a Congressional investigation. Most policymakers, however, acted in accord with their economic interests. For the most part, the politics of the Kennedy administration conformed to the Business Conflict model.

With regard to bureaucratic behavior, the Business Conflict model proposes the following two hypotheses: First, when the executive is dominated by a single faction of business, there will be few intrabureaucratic rivalries. Second, when several competing factions gain influence in the same presidential administration, then bureaucratic rivalries will result. This prediction is also confirmed. We saw that the Eisenhower administration had ties almost exclusively to the pro-Katanga faction of business, and had no significant ties to the anti-Katanga bloc.[265] The Eisenhower administration showed little evidence of bureaucratic feuding on the Congo question. The Kennedy administration contained representatives of both the pro-Katanga and the anti-Katanga business blocs, and accordingly, the administration experienced protracted bureaucratic feuding. The feuds help explain the vacillation and indecision which characterized much of Kennedy's policy.

The Business Conflict model also suggests that different types of business interests will adopt different methods of influencing public policy. In general, investors prefer to influence policy surreptitiously and to eschew public exposure. There are, however, exceptions. When business interests resort to public lobbying, it is the *weaker* interests that do so. This hypothesis is also confirmed. The anti-Katanga bloc was well connected to the Kennedy administration, and this bloc made little effort to lobby Congress or the public. The pro-Katanga interests, in contrast, had weaker ties to the executive, and they launched a formidable public relations and lobbying effort. They also focused their efforts on the congressional branch.

Finally, we must recognize the limits of the model's explanatory power. The Business Conflict model does not explain why the Kennedy administration helped crush the Katanga secession. It is true that the anti-Katanga forces were probably stronger within the administration itself. However, the pro-Katanga forces held the advantage in the congressional branch. The pro-Katanga bloc also dominated the NATO governments, and those governments continuously pressured the Kennedy administration. There is no compelling evidence that the anti-Katanga business faction was on balance the more powerful. The business interests appear to have been rather evenly matched. Why did the anti-Katanga faction finally prevail?

In order to answer this question, we must consider traditional national security factors, consistent with the Statist approach. There is no doubt that the Katanga secession was the most destabilizing single factor in the Congo Crisis, and it threatened the stability of the entire country. The pro-American Adoula government was consistently weakened, and nearly overthrown, because of its inability to terminate the secession and unify the country. An anti-Katanga policy was simply the most logical method of maintaining a pro-American government in the Congo and precluding Soviet or Chinese influence. These Cold War considerations favored the position of the anti-Katanga bloc during the intrabureaucratic feuds. The liberals in the Africa bureau were able to marshal stronger arguments in favor of their position. Anticommunist objectives therefore contributed to the decision to crush Katanga.

But anticommunism does not provide an adequate explanation, since it fails to account for the differences between the Eisenhower and Kennedy policies. Eisenhower supported the Katanga secession, even though that policy exacerbated the political turmoil and led to Soviet intervention, while Kennedy opposed the secession. The two presidents dealt with the same problem in very different ways, even though both presidents were strongly anticommunist. Anticommunism was certainly a factor, but it does not provide a complete explanation.

How can one account for this mass of factual information? An adequate explanation must consider both economic factors and Cold War ideology. The Eisenhower presidency had business ties that were overwhelmingly pro-Katanga. The economic pressures were so one-sided that they overrode all other considerations and generated a pro-Katanga policy. In the Kennedy administration, however, the pro-Katanga forces were counterbalanced by the powerful anti-Katanga bloc. The economic pressures were no longer overriding, so the administration was able to pursue its national security objectives—which entailed a unified Congo and an end to the Katanga secession. Thus both economic pressures and anticommunist ideology were crucial in the Kennedy policy. The anti-Katanga business interests constituted a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the administration's Congo policy.

5 The Decline of Business Conflict, 1963–65

> Of the covert operations undertaken [since the 1950s] . . . I would say some have been very successful and some have been disasters . . . The Bay of Pigs was certainly a disaster. But consider our program in the Congo.
>
> William Colby, former director, Central Intelligence Agency[1]

Chapter 4 discussed the conflict phase of the Congo Crisis. The chapter argued that American business interests sought expanded influence in the Congo, and that the U.S. government supported such expansion. The USA, in turn, came into conflict with established European concerns. The Congo Crisis thus entailed a feud between the United States and Europe. The defeat of Katanga in January 1963 was a severe blow to European interests.

It appeared that the Congo would move out of the Belgian sphere of influence and into the U.S. sphere. In 1963 European sources widely expected that the Congo would, in fact, become an American sphere of influence. A French publication suggested that the USA could "use the Congo as a platform for [spreading] its influence in Africa," and that "the government in Washington intends to replace Belgium completely."[2] Belgian periodicals expressed similar views.[3] Brookings Institution documents reported "increasing evidence of tension between Belgian and American military personnel in Leopoldville,"[4] and stated that "Belgians are jealous of increasing American influence."[5]

The Belgians were also hostile toward U.S. investors, especially Maurice Tempelsman. According to a State Department memorandum, Belgian right-wingers cited Tempelsman "as evidence that the U.S. was subject to pressures from private firms eager to displace the Belgians and acquire a dominating position in the Congo."[6] Even Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgium's strongly pro-American foreign minister, was suspicious of U.S. business interests.[7]

Indeed, some American officials in the Congo did seek to displace the Belgians. The U.S. ambassador to the Congo, Edmund Gullion, favored expanded American influence. The ambassador was "strongly against the policy of permitting or encouraging Belgians to resume the leading role in Congo affairs. The U.S. and the UN have saved the situation and have rescued the Belgians from an embarrassing position. The U.S. has paid the bill . . . and we want to have some significant say."[8] The CIA station also appears to have favored an increased U.S. role.[9] On the other hand, some officials were more cautious and felt that the USA was already overextended. It was also feared that with the withdrawal of UN forces, Belgian support was necessary to prevent a resurgence of disorder in the Congo.[10]

These debates never proceeded very far beyond the rhetorical stage. Toward the end of 1963, the Congo was once again racked by revolt and disorder. During the period 1963–64, the Western governments and corporate interests all set aside their differences and pursued a common policy in the Congo. Business feuding largely ceased. The period thus constitutes an interregnum of sorts between periods of business conflict. In this chapter we will consider the renewed domestic turmoil in the Congo and how the Western powers responded to those developments.

Conditions in the Congo, 1963–64

Despite the ending of the Katanga secession in early 1963, the Congo's internal problems were very far from over. Many of the problems that had existed at the time of independence—the lack of university-trained personnel, the near absence of stable institutions, the regional fragmentation—continued to plague the Congo. The most destabilizing factor was economic deterioration. Gross domestic product declined by 8 percent from 1959 to 1964, while commercial agricultural output during the same period declined by 36 percent.[11] Foreign currency and gold reserves were reduced to only a fraction of what they had been at the time of independence.[12] Transport networks were disrupted. These conditions, along with rampant inflation and unemployment, lowered living standards. By October 1963, two-thirds of the population of Leopoldville was out of work.[13] In November 1963 the Congolese government implemented an austerity program designed by the International Monetary Fund; the program increased prices and lowered living standards still further.[14]

The burgeoning labor unions, mostly comprising civil servants and teachers, became increasingly active during this period. Unionists typically demanded reduced salaries for politicians and limits on official corruption.[15]

According to one source: "Throughout the year 1963, labor union activity was intense."[16] In October 1963, the country's three unions demanded official participation in the government and threatened a general strike if this demand was not met. The government declared a state of emergency and proceeded to repress the unions.[17]

Amid the growing disorder, the UN military force was being phased out. The Congo operation had proven highly controversial, and UN officials were fatigued by the incessant complications.[18] The force was scheduled for final termination at the end of 1963. The UN Secretariat agreed to extend its mandate for another six months, because of American pressure, with a definitive departure date set for June 1964.[19] The force did depart at that time, and thereafter only a UN technical aid program remained in the Congo.[20]

The United Nations had essentially run the Congo for almost four years, and there was no force capable of taking its place. The Congolese National Army clearly could not supplant the UN. Far from promoting order, the army engaged in looting and "behaved brutally in the rural areas."[21] Military units went on violent rampages in Boma and Jadotville. Thousands of police mutinied in Leopoldville itself during May 1963. Order was restored only when troops personally commanded by General Joseph Mobutu patrolled the streets of the capital.[22]

Moise Tshombe, now in exile in Europe, apparently contributed to the growing chaos. He still controlled an army comprising white mercenaries and Katangese gendarmes based in the Portuguese colony of Angola. "Tshombe has troops, some aircraft, and money . . . and has secretly consulted with Portuguese authorities in Angola," according to one account.[23] A second Katanga secession, led by Tshombe, was an ever-present threat. A UN document from January 1964 stated that "secessionist feelings are strong and widespread among European and Katangese populations."[24] Union Minière du Haut Katanga, the Belgian mining company, as well as its parent company, the Société Générale de Belgique, probably maintained close ties to the Katangese secessionists.[25] Tshombe's army also staged forays through Katanga, causing considerable destruction.[26]

The Congolese government proved incapable of containing the chaos. The government of Cyrille Adoula never gained a significant national base. The central government was largely a creation of the USA, and it continued to serve American interests. The U.S. embassy "advised" Adoula on almost all aspects of policy. Stephen Weissman writes that "the American government not only supported Adoula; it was, in many different ways, part of his government."[27] Certainly Adoula's image as a foreign puppet was not a particularly popular one.

The government increasingly resorted to repressive measures, but these only increased popular opposition. Adoula's base of support was further narrowed as he removed left-leaning ministers, especially those who had previously supported Patrice Lumumba. The purges were probably orchestrated by the U.S. embassy. Weissman states that "American officials expressed a desire to see the extremists 'dealt with effectively.'" The Lumumbist presence in the Adoula government "appeared to be a *temporary, tactical necessity* [emphasis in original] which could be conveniently discarded."[28]

In fact the Lumumbists were discarded. Throughout 1962, the Lumumbists were gradually purged from the government, and Lumumbist legislators were harassed or arrested, sometimes "on trumped up charges." Leftists were also purged at the very lowest levels of the civil administration. By 1963, many leading Lumumbists were forced to flee the country.[29] The Lumumbist activists thus emerged as a potential opposition leadership.

It is difficult to determine the exact state of popular opinion at this time. It may be assumed, however, that the Congolese population generally resented the declining standards of living and growing lawlessness in the countryside. It would also seem likely that the population bore hostility toward the rampant foreign intervention in their country. Supporters of Patrice Lumumba—a significant part of the population—were alienated by Adoula's repressive policies. All of these factors led to an insurrectionary explosion in 1963–64.

During 1963, opposition leaders began to organize in Brazzaville in the former French Congo. In October 1963, the Comité National de Libération (CNL) was founded, which aimed at overthrowing the Adoula government. Its leader initially was Christopher Gbenye, who had been minister of the interior under Lumumba and had also served in Antoine Gizenga's Stanleyville-based government. The CNL program promised an end to foreign domination of the Congo.[30]

The CNL quickly began infiltrating teams into Leopoldville and initiated a campaign of "urban terrorism," aimed at toppling the government. The rebels attempted unsuccessfully to kidnap several government figures, including General Mobutu. In early 1964 the CNL expanded its activities and established new overseas bases in Burundi, along the eastern frontier with the Congo. From its new base of operations, the CNL initiated an insurgency in the eastern Congo, which spread rapidly. The Congolese National Army was



MAP 3. Rebellions, 1963–65

consistently routed, and in many cases it retreated without a fight. The insurgents gained a major victory when they captured the city of Stanleyville in August 1964. By the middle of 1964, most of northern and eastern Congo was controlled by the CNL, and a "People's Republic" was declared.[31]

A separate rebellion began almost simultaneously in Kwilu province in west-central Congo (see map 3). The rebellion was led by Pierre Mulélé, a former minister of education under the Lumumba government, who had traveled to mainland China and was reportedly impressed with the revolutionary doctrines of Mao Ze Dong. According to Crawford Young, the Mulélé insurgency combined Marxist ideas with elements of traditional African religions, and it had a more ideological quality than did the CNL. With a relatively high proportion of organized cadres, Mulélé developed a political and military organization of some depth.[32]

It was frequently claimed that communist subversion was behind the rebellions. This explanation is doubtful. The Chinese provided some aid, particularly to the Mulélé organization, but only in minuscule quantities.[33] A CIA report from August 1964 showed little evidence of Soviet involvement. The report stated that the Soviets had maintained contact with the rebel leaders, but "Moscow does not presently intend to supply the rebels . . . [Since the fall of Lumumba] the USSR has been extremely cautious in committing its prestige or resources in the Congo . . . Soviet representatives regard the various Congolese rebel leaders as venal and unreliable and that the USSR has no expectation that the rebels will further Soviet interests in the Congo."[34] Gradually, especially toward the end of 1964, the USSR, China, and (to a very small extent) Vietnam provided material support, as did several African countries. The famous Cuban guerilla leader Ernesto ("Che") Guevara advised the Congolese rebels for several months.[35] The State Department reported that the communist support remained limited, and that the main cause of the rebellion "essentially are [*sic*] internal discontent with central" government.[36]

Overall, the rebel movements developed large popular followings. It is generally agreed that in areas under rebel control, the population was overwhelmingly supportive. However, the insurgents had their limitations. Mulélé never managed to extend his influence beyond the Bapende-Bumbunda groups of Kwilu province, and his rebellion remained essentially a localized phenomenon.[37] The CNL rebellion and its People's Republic had much greater military success; however, this rebellion had other weaknesses. The CIA reported that many of the CNL's leaders were "at least as corrupt as present [Congolese] government officials."[38] The leaders were, according to Young, "far less educated than the generation [of political leaders] of 1960."[39] In reality, there was no clear leadership structure at all, and "the rebellion dissolved into a series of revolts, strongly influenced by local contingencies, bound together by a shifting coalition of leaders."[40] The CNL was continually plagued by factional disputes and internal feuds among its nominal leaders. The rebellions nevertheless "were far more profound in their effects than the 1960 disorders."[41] The central government was gravely threatened.

The rebellions also threatened the Western powers. The Mulélé movement,

with its vaguely Maoist ideology, was particularly hostile. The CNL was much more pragmatic and, at least in the early stages, did not attack the Belgian investments.[42] The Comité nevertheless had a strongly anti-Western orientation, and its leadership was quite open about this. The CNL Program of Action denounced "armed Belgian aggression," "American-directed imperialism," and "Yankee oppression."[43] Moreover, the CNL, with its loose organizational structure, was considered unpredictable. The rebellions evoked considerable apprehension in the West.

The disorder presented a dilemma for the United States. U.S. officials were committed to the Congolese central government, and they dreaded the prospect of a rebel victory. However, the Americans could not lead the counterinsurgency campaign. The American military was totally unfamiliar with the complexities of the Congo. Few American military officers could speak French, let alone the indigenous African languages. Moreover, the USA was already overcommitted. It should be recalled that 1964 was the year of the Tonkin Gulf incident and the beginning of rapid escalation in Indochina. It was also an election year. President Lyndon Johnson could not risk large-scale commitments in an area outside of the traditional U.S. sphere of influence.

The Johnson administration sought support from other Western countries. Five nations, Canada, Belgium, Israel, Norway, and Italy, agreed to help retrain the Congolese National Army. The multinational aid program was to operate officially under UN auspices. In fact the USA directed the aid program—an American army colonel prepared it—but the appearance of UN involvement made the plan more palatable. Under Afro-Asian pressure, however, UN Secretary-General U Thant rejected the plan. After the UN rejection, Norway and Canada withdrew. Israel, Italy, and Belgium, as well as the United States, all provided some military aid on a bilateral basis.[44]

The limited support proved insufficient, and the rebellion continued to grow. By the middle of 1964, the Congolese National Army was fleeing in disarray, while the rebels controlled approximately half the country. The United States had tried to "save the Congo on the cheap," but this was obviously not succeeding. Clearly larger-scale foreign intervention was needed. However, the USA remained reluctant to intervene unilaterally and sought out other countries. In particular, augmented Belgian assistance was required, since the Belgians were intimately familiar with the Congo. Belgium, however, required certain concessions. We will now discuss these concessions in detail.

The Return of Moise Tshombe

In July 1964, Moise Tshombe returned from his exile in Belgium and became prime minister of the Congo. At the outset, it must be emphasized that Tshombe's accession is an astonishing development. Tshombe had rebelled against the central government, sparked a civil war that lasted two and a half years and almost ended the national unity of the Congo. The Tshombe government was completely anomalous.[45]

Tshombe can be compared, as a historical figure, to Jefferson Davis, the Confederate leader during the American civil war. Both figures led secessionist movements, both caused protracted civil wars, and both were ultimately defeated. Yet Tshombe was rewarded for his secessionist role with the post of national leader. The only parallel in American history would have been the emergence of Jefferson Davis as president of the United States in 1865. In the U.S. case, such an event never occurred and would have seemed preposterous; yet in the Congo, Tshombe became prime minister. How did it happen?

Some researchers allege that the Tshombe government resulted from purely internal factors, and not from foreign manipulation. Ernest W. Lefever, for example, denies any Western involvement in Tshombe's return:

> Tshombe was invited back by Prime Minister Adoula who was convinced that only Tshombe could save the Central Government in its desperate plight . . . If there was a plot it was a Congolese plot. Tshombe's return was feared by some American officials and welcomed by practically none. Though many Belgians wanted Tshombe to return in some capacity, his return was not engineered by the Belgian Government. Both Washington and Brussels played it cool.[46]

This explanation, that Tshombe's return was the product of domestic politics, has some plausibility. Tshombe enjoyed support in Leopoldville and certain other urban areas.[47] The population, desperate after years of disorder, sought a "strong leader," and Tshombe seemed to fit that image. Tshombe's charisma was clearly a potent force, and because of his Belgian ties, he was associated with prosperity. A U.S. embassy official noted a "frequently heard rumor in the townships [is] that if Tshombe came to power he would bring hard cash to everybody."[48] Perhaps Tshombe was appointed prime minister because of his popular appeal.

On further consideration, however, Tshombe's popularity explains little. The manifestations of popular support occurred only *after* Tshombe's return

from Belgium. At the time of his return, Tshombe had no political base outside of his native Katanga. Moreover, his popular support was highly ephemeral. Even a close aide conceded that "Congolese public opinion [is] highly unstable and his [Tshombe's] popularity could be gone tomorrow."[49] None of the documentation suggests that popular sentiment played any role whatsoever in Tshombe's appointment as prime minister.

Officially, Tshombe was appointed prime minister by the president, Joseph Kasavubu. It may be suggested that Tshombe's appointment resulted from Kasavubu's own personal predilections. This also seems doubtful. Kasavubu was a generally passive leader, certainly far less astute than Tshombe, and it is unlikely that he would have undertaken such a momentous action without outside support. Nor could the Congolese parliament, which failed to challenge the appointment, have been a major factor in Tshombe's return, since the parliament was no longer a major factor in national politics. One source noted that the parliament had been "purged, corrupted and intimidated."[50] According to a retired American diplomat, the decision making which led to Tshombe's return "certainly occurred outside of the Congo."[51] Foreign intervention seems the most likely cause of Tshombe's appointment.

There is strong evidence that the Belgian companies, specifically the Société Générale de Belgique and its Union Minière affiliate, engineered Tshombe's return. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, the Belgian financial newspaper, repeatedly expressed support for a Tshombe government. Stock values for Congolese shares rose in response to news of Tshombe's return to the Congo, and then rose again with the announcement that Tshombe had been appointed prime minister.[52]

Declassified U.S. government documents clearly imply a Belgian role. In June 1964, a CIA document predicted that "the Belgians might well require Tshombe's presence in the government, perhaps as premier."[53] When Tshombe returned to the Congo, the U.S. ambassador offered this interpretation:

> There is evidence of at least non-Gov[ernmen]t Belgian involvement in his [Tshombe's] return . . . I fear realities of Belgian domestic situation are such that [Belgian Foreign Minister] Spaak will be pushed hard give early and overt support to Tshombe by those powerful elements in Belgian society not controlled by Foreign Office [almost certainly meaning Société Générale and Union Minière], those same

> groups who *unquestionably* played important role in paving way for his [Tshombe's] triumphant return.[54]

An American diplomat noted the "close association of Belgian businessmen, if not their government, with Tshombe."[55] The evidence strongly suggests that the Belgian investors, especially Union Minière and Société Générale, helped arrange Tshombe's return to power.

The Belgian interests were well represented in the Tshombe government. Tshombe surrounded himself with many of the old Belgian advisors who had supported him during the Katanga episode. Many of these advisors had close ties to the Société Générale complex. A U.S. embassy cable stated, "Tshombe can be expected to rely far more on Belgian advisors than did Adoula and it [is] already clear that old-Katanga hands . . . will play influential behind-scenes roles."[56] Probably the most important of Tshombe's advisors was René Clemens, a Belgian academic and a former aide to Tshombe during the Katanga secession. According to one document, Clemens's "real sponsor was believed to have been the Union Minière."[57] The Belgians continued to control the Congolese military. According to a State Department report: "The Belgian Military Assistance Program . . . is the backbone of the ANC [Congolese army] . . . Belgian officers exert substantial influence at every link in the ANC chain of command."[58]

The Belgian influence extended to all areas of policy. Michel Struelens, the Belgian public relations aide who had run the Katanga Information Services in New York,[59] now became Tshombe's personal representative in Washington. Tshombe sent a letter to McGeorge Bundy, the U.S. national security advisor, stating: "As my special assistant on foreign affairs, Mr. M. STRUELENS is the only person qualified to speak with the U.S. Government as my official adviser to both the Congolese Embassy in Washington and the Congolese delegation to the United Nations."[60] The U.S. ambassador to the Congo commented that Struelens, "to all intent and [purpose] will be acting foreign minister" of the Congo.[61] The official Congolese diplomats in the USA functioned purely as figureheads, while Struelens, a Belgian national and a former colonial official, spoke for the Tshombe government. Senator Thomas Dodd, Katanga's staunchest defender in the USA, wrote pro-Tshombe letters to President Johnson during 1964 and 1965.[62] The same groups that had supported the Katanga secession now enthusiastically backed Tshombe as leader of the central government.

The Tshombe regime clearly aided Belgian interests. Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall, a Mexican national and a UN official in the Congo, was alarmed by the growing Belgian influence. He described the Belgian activities as follows: "Belgian businessmen . . . [are] determined reassert complete control over Congolese gov[ernmen]t and economy to point that there will be in fact classic neocolonialist system in existence." The Belgians systematically blocked UN technical support, and they often arranged policies "in favor of Belgian business interests."[63] The Tshombe government clearly benefited the Belgians.

American officials, in contrast, were quite hostile toward Tshombe, and the hostility was reflected in State Department cable traffic. In June 1964, the Belgians recommended that Tshombe be placed in the government; the American ambassador to the Congo, McMurtie Godley, reacted with astonishment. Godley thought that this would be the "most bizarre way of finding employment for him [Tshombe] on record."[64] After Tshombe's appointment as premier, the United States expressed suspicion of the new government. Godley, for example, advised "that we not associate ourselves too closely with Belgium on [Congo] policy matters until situation clears."[65] Later, Godley again registered his dissatisfaction: "[I] believe it would be mistake [to] allow ourselves be drawn [phrase deleted] into anything but the most tentative 'wait and see' policy formulation re Tshombe and his gov[ernmen]t. We should indicate to Belgians and other friends that until situation clarifies we intend [to] go no further than maintain quiet if correct relations with Tshombe."[66] Another cable reported, "We still have definite reservations re Tshombe . . . We should not embrace him too tightly." The cable also expressed fear that Tshombe "may well . . . revert openly to the role of the outstanding African Uncle Tom."[67] On July 30, 1964, the American embassy reported continued "U.S. 'reserve' toward the Tshombe Government."[68]

The new government constituted a setback for U.S. policy in Africa generally. African leaders throughout the continent strongly opposed Tshombe. In early July 1964, just prior to Tshombe's appointment, a U.S. embassy cable stated that "African Ambassadors [in Leopoldville] . . . were openly expressing their deep concern re Africa reaction Tshombe's leadership."[69] African opposition to Tshombe did not abate after his appointment as prime minister. One month later, an embassy cable noted that even "moderate African states view Tshombe with emotions ranging from reserve to antipathy."[70] The Tshombe government was a serious embarrassment to the USA. Tshombe also favored Belgian, rather than American, interests. A State Department report described a "bias . . . in favor of the Belgians."[71] Despite all of these considerations, the USA did not protest or in any way attempt to block the

Tshombe government. Facing a major insurgency, the American government did not wish to antagonize the Belgians.

Counterinsurgency

The appointment of Moise Tshombe as premier clearly presented some advantages. Tshombe's troops—"large numbers" of white officers and Katangese gendarmes[72]—were now at the disposal of the central government. Moreover, Tshombe's accession to the premiership ensured that Katanga would not secede again. Finally, the Belgians supported the Congolese government with far more enthusiasm than had previously been the case.

Despite these advantages, the Tshombe regime was not an immediate success. Tshombe was not able to contain the rebellion, to improve the performance of the armed forces, or to increase the legitimacy of the central government. The initial euphoria over Tshombe's return seems to have abated fairly rapidly. Government documents once again adopted a pessimistic tone: "Since Tshombe took office three weeks ago, the Congolese internal security situation has markedly deteriorated . . . There is no evidence, moreover, that any regular ANC [Congolese National Army] units have been infused with a new fighting spirit—on the contrary."[73] Another report from August stated that "even here in Leopoldville central gov[ernmen]t's authority could evaporate overnight . . . There is sense of pessimism and defeatism evident."[74] Other reports predicted that most of the Congo, outside of Leopoldville and Southern Katanga, could collapse administratively or fall to the rebels.[75]

In response to the deterioration, the United States increased its intervention in the civil war in August.[76] The Central Intelligence Agency, operating through a front company called Western International Ground Maintenance Operation, had organized an "instant air force" for the central government, consisting of propeller-driven T-28 and B-26 bombers and C-47 transports. To fly the planes, the CIA recruited anticommunist Cubans who had fought at the Bay of Pigs.

Moreover, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia apparently provided assistance. New mercenaries, including pilots, began to arrive from those countries. The famous mercenary Michael ("Mad Mike") Hoare arrived from South Africa to help lead the white forces.[77] A South African brigadier general conferred with Congolese officials.[78] Moreover, Belgian aid increased considerably. At its height, 450 Belgian soldiers, led by a colonel, advised the Congolese. Gradually, the Belgians played operational roles in the counterinsurgency, and in some cases led Congolese troops in battle.[79]

The foreign intervention began to have an effect. Rebel positions began falling to the white-led forces, and the central government's position began to improve. A rebel attack on the city of Bukavu was repulsed by the central government—with the aid of the Cuban-piloted air force. By the end of August the eastern city of Albertville was captured by mercenary units.[80] Finally, in late November 1964, the rebels received the coup de grace. Some 545 Belgian paratroopers, airlifted by U.S. Air Force planes, were dropped on the city of Stanleyville, nominally to rescue American and European civilians who were held hostage by the rebels. After the rescue was completed, the paratroopers withdrew.[81]

This operation, code-named "Dragon Rouge," helped break the morale of the rebels. Central government forces quickly recaptured the city of Stanleyville. The counterinsurgency campaign, which involved South Africans, white mercenaries, and extensive foreign intervention, was embarrassing from a public relations standpoint. The embarrassment was heightened when a mercenary column massacred thousands of Congolese in the town of Kindu.[82] The campaign began to assume an unsavory quality, and it was criticized in the Organization of African Unity. Many individual African governments also protested.[83] From a purely military standpoint, however, the campaign was succeeding. The rebels, or "Simbas," as they were sometimes called, were definitively in retreat by late November. In March 1965, the white mercenaries captured the town of Watsa on the far eastern frontier, and the rebellion was declared defeated.[84]

This statement proved to be an exaggeration. One month after the announcement, remnant bands of rebels killed several Europeans, and in early 1966, other groups attacked a Belgian plantation. In fact, the Simbas continued to operate in isolated regions, without a great deal of central direction, for many years. Embittered by defeat, the rebels committed brutal atrocities against educated Congolese. Journalist Jonathan Kwitny provides this account: "For five years [after the recapture of Stanleyville] the Simbas terrorized the whole northeast quadrant of the Congo. It would be impossible to estimate the number of people they [the rebels] killed . . . In a mad campaign to insure that traitors would never again allow rule by outsiders, the Simbas practiced prophylactic homicide against all educated people."[85] According to Kwitny, the rebellion was completely crushed only in 1970. Other sources suggest that small pockets of Simbas remained active even after 1970.[86] These armed bands continued to prey upon the inhabitants of isolated regions. For the central government and its Western supporters, however, the continued guerilla activity was no more than a nuisance. After the Dragon Rouge parachute operation in November 1964, the rebellion was not a serious threat. The counterinsurgency was a success.

The Politics of Counterinsurgency

Chapter 4 noted that the Congo Crisis generated intense political conflict throughout the West. In the USA, both procolonial and anticolonial business interests feuded with each other and sought to influence government policy. Pro-Katanga congressmen and lobbyists bitterly denounced the Congo policies of both the United Nations and the Kennedy administration. Within the administration, policymakers continually argued over Congo policy, with regard to matters of detail as well as substance. In Belgium, there was friction between the colonial business interests, especially the Société Générale/Union Minière group, and the Socialist foreign minister. Finally, a split emerged between the USA and Europe, with intense anti-American polemics emanating from many European publications and with significant policy differences between the American and European governments. All of the conflicts dissipated, or disappeared entirely, during the year 1964.

Within the USA, bureaucratic feuds declined considerably. The only bureaucratic differences during this period concerned matters of emphasis. The State Department liberals were concerned about African reactions to the campaign. Reflecting these concerns the State Department sought to reduce the involvement of mercenaries and South Africans in the campaign (or at least it sought to make such involvement less public).[87] American officials coached Tshombe to attend a September meeting of the Organization of African Unity and to project a moderate image. One U.S. official noted his "impression that Tshombe fully comprehends the situation and has the right arguments. I had to run through each point and came as close to a rehearsal as possible."[88] In public, U.S. officials downplayed the intervention or simply denied that the USA was intervening at all. Adlai Stevenson stated that "from the beginning we have been opposed—and remain opposed—to foreign intervention" in the Congo.[89]

Relatively conservative figures, such as Averell Harriman, tended to disparage African opinion and to ignore the propaganda aspects of the counterinsurgency.[90] Some bureaucratic differences also emerged with regard to the military campaign itself. The Defense Department, and especially the uniformed military, urged an aggressive campaign, while many State Department figures favored a more cautious use of force.[91]

The differences were relatively minor. There were some disputes with regard to the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign. No one, however, opposed the campaign per se. No one seriously considered an accommodation with the rebels. Even the liberals of the State Department's Africa bureau regarded the insurgents as "'radical,' 'irresponsible,' 'racist.'" The liberals believed that "of course the U.S. shouldn't make deals with such a bunch."[92] The Africanists had little enthusiasm for Tshombe, but they did not attempt to block his appointment as prime minister. Even Assistant Secretary Williams, one of the most liberal figures, acquiesced in the Tshombe government.[93] Policymakers differed with regard to details; on the larger issues, however, there was general agreement.

The business community also opposed the rebels. The *Wall Street Journal* denounced the insurgents for "committing many . . . atrocities against the whites" and for fomenting "racial hatred."[94] There is no evidence that any business interests supported the rebels or attempted to influence Congo policy during the year 1964. The feuds between procolonial and anticolonial interests, which had characterized the 1961–63 period, apparently ceased. The American business community played a passive role in 1964. The only dissent was in the Senate, where Mike Mansfield and John Stennis questioned the expanded U.S. military commitment—especially during an election year.[95] The criticisms were very mild, however, especially when compared with the strident speeches during the Katanga controversy, and they disappeared entirely after the Dragon Rouge rescue operation in November. Congo policy no longer generated a great deal of controversy.

Congo policy also ceased to generate controversy in Belgium. The colonial business interests no longer criticized Foreign Minister Spaak or his left-leaning government. The government, in turn, delegated considerable responsibility to the private interests. The State Department reported that "the Belgian Embassy makes very little attempt to direct or even coordinate the diverse Belgian interests in the Congo."[96] When necessary, the government directly supported the companies. According to the State Department: "It is appreciated that Belgian mining interests . . . exert, at times, decisive influence on GOB [government of Belgium] policy."[97] With regard to military policy, another report noted: "Belgian diplomatic influence on Belgian military advice [to the Congolese army] has not been very important, except when urged on by Belgian business interests."[98] The government and the colonial companies now collaborated in the Congo. In Belgium, as in the USA, Congo policy ceased to be a source of political controversy.

The U.S.–European conflict, so much in evidence previously, now receded. During the year 1964, the Belgian press no longer contained anti-American rhetoric, and the Belgian papers instead praised U.S. policy. *L'Echo de la Bourse,* the financial daily, stated: "The recent American intervention in the Congo . . . has made a good impression. The ugly American is making amends."[99] *L'Echo* also noted: "It took the Americans four years to realize that the Belgians, alone have the experience that the Congolese [need] . . . Better late than never."[100] For the most part, the Belgian business interests strongly supported the counterinsurgency campaign. On the Brussels exchange, stock values rose strongly after the arrival of American military advisors in the Congo.[101]

Finally, the Belgian and American governments worked together harmoniously during the period and closely coordinated their policies. The only major policy difference occurred during August 1964. At that time, the Belgian government showed some reluctance to continue the military campaign and considered a negotiated settlement with the rebels. CNL leader Christopher Gbenye arrived in Brussels for talks.[102] A State Department memorandum from August 7, noted the "apparent Belgian preference to trying to do business with the rebels, even if Communist, rather than [phrase illegible] putting down the rebellion."[103] The reason for the timidity is clear: during this period, the rebels controlled large areas of the Congo, and over four thousand Belgian nationals lived in rebel-controlled areas. The Belgian government was concerned about their safety.[104] The United States, which had few of its nationals in rebel-held areas, urged the Belgians to intensify the antiguerilla campaign. U.S. and Belgian policy briefly diverged.

The differences lasted for only three weeks. The Belgian government was apparently unable to reach an accord with the rebels. By the end of August, the Belgians apparently abandoned the negotiation efforts.[105] They expanded their military commitment and once again coordinated their policies with the USA. Overall the counterinsurgency was very much a Belgian-American enterprise, culminating in the joint Dragon Rouge parachute operation. Great Britain also provided support for Dragon Rouge. The U.S. Air Force planes, which transported the paratroopers, refueled on Ascension island, a British possession.[106] Dragon Rouge was essentially a combined NATO operation, and it marked a high point in Western collaboration on the Congo issue.

Now, let us reconsider one of the explanations advanced in chapter 1. It will be recalled that the National Character theory predicts that the USA will oppose colonialism and neocolonialism in the Third World. Chapter 4, on the

Kennedy policy in the Congo, presented evidence in favor of that theory, since Kennedy pursued an anticolonial policy in the Congo. The National Character approach does not, however, account for the events of 1964–65. During that period, the United States fully backed the Belgian position in the Congo and supported a counterinsurgency campaign which resembled, according to one observer, "a classic colonialist police operation."[107] The National Character approach is contradicted by these events.

The End of the Tshombe Regime

Following Dragon Rouge, the rebellion began to recede in its importance. Western cooperation concomitantly also receded. With the rebellion under control, the Western powers, especially France and Belgium, began vying for influence in the Congo. In December 1964, Tshombe paid a state visit to Paris.[108] By early 1965, the French greatly augmented their aid programs in the Congo, generally at the expense of the Belgians. According to the U.S. embassy: "The threat of French encroachment in the technical assistance field has also encouraged the Belgians to sharpen the focus and raise the level of their own efforts . . . The Belgians, who rightly claim that they bear the burden of 'working level' technical assistance, see a danger of becoming 'the technical assistance of French technical assistance.'"[109] In May 1965 the Congo became a member of the Organisation Commune de l'Afrique et Malgache, a French-dominated group.[110] French business interests also expanded their activity. The Congolese contracted with a French company to build a television network.[111]

The Belgians were intensely jealous of the increased French influence, and a Belgian-French feud rapidly ensued. A State Department document noted a "strong anti-French feeling among Belgian businessmen here and [among] certain groups in Belgium."[112] Belgian newspapers sometimes made sensational charges against the French. One Belgian publication in all seriousness alleged a conspiracy involving Chinese communists, French capitalists, and Charles de Gaulle to undermine Belgian interests in the Congo.[113] A Belgian parliamentarian said, "one has the distinct impression that . . . General de Gaulle . . . would thus like to monopolize Belgian interests in the Congo for the advantage of France."[114] Belgian polemics against the French were remarkably similar to the anti-American polemics of the early 1960s. The French in any case were apparently challenging Belgian dominance.

The Americans, more discreetly, were also planning to expand their influence. U.S. officials now sought to remove Prime Minister Tshombe and to replace him with a more pro-American figure. In March 1965, a (heavily censored) document described U.S. policy toward Tshombe:

> Tshombe is a transitional prime minister. It is imperative therefore that we keep in touch with groups other than the Katangans who dominate the present government . . . The suggestion is made that we plan for a successor to Tshombe . . . An ad hoc group might meet regularly to review lists of possible successors who might be discreetly educated . . . It is appreciated that this approach may seem excessively paternalistic.[115]

It should be recalled that American officials had never been enthusiastic about Tshombe and only reluctantly assented when he became prime minister in 1964. Facing an insurgent threat, the U.S. government could not afford to antagonize Tshombe or his Belgian sponsors. When the insurgents were retreating in 1965, the USA began planning a new government.

On October 13, 1965, Tshombe's political career ended. President Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe and appointed Evariste Kimba, a former ally of Tshombe, to lead the new government. The cause of the change in government is not clear. However, internal factors, once again, do not account for the change in government. Kasavubu was simply too passive a leader to have dismissed Tshombe on his own accord. The U.S. embassy predicted, after the dismissal, Kasavubu "will probably lapse into his usual somnolence."[116] It is unlikely that Kasavubu would have acted without foreign encouragement.

The Belgian interests opposed the removal of Tshombe. In fact the Belgians continued to back Tshombe during this period, despite his associations with the French. On the Brussels exchange, stock values declined in response to the change in government.[117] The conservative paper *La Libre Belgique* was highly critical of Tshombe's dismissal.[118] Moreover, the new Kimba government was unfriendly toward Belgian interests. The U.S. embassy noted that the new government was considered "somewhat more nationalistic, anti-Belgian, and potentially anti-European," than the Tshombe government had been.[119] It is thus unlikely that the Belgians arranged Tshombe's removal.

Was the USA involved in Tshombe's dismissal? Such involvement cannot be ruled out, since American officials had long distrusted Tshombe, and by

1965 they were seeking a replacement. Tshombe, as we have seen, was considered a "transitional" prime minister. However, there is no specific evidence of CIA or other American involvement. A complete explanation for the Kimba government must await further declassification of documents.

Prime Minister Kimba, whether CIA backed or not, lasted less than two months. On November 25, 1965, General Joseph Mobutu staged a coup d'état, overthrew Kimba, and assumed the title of president. The CIA was definitely involved in Mobutu's coup. Stephen Weissman, a congressional investigator, gives the following account: "According to three informed individuals—a U.S. official then in Washington, a Western diplomatic Congo specialist, and an American businessman who talked with the returned CIA man, [former Leopoldville Station Chief Lawrence] Devlin—the CIA was at least 'involved' in the . . . *coup* of November 25, 1965."[120] Weissman's account is also supported by John Stockwell, a former CIA officer with long experience in Africa. According to Stockwell, the United States "installed in power" the Mobutu regime.[121] Another former CIA officer, Victor Marchetti, claims that the CIA had played a role in the coup.[122] The Belgian newspaper *La Libre Belgique* stated, in 1966, "It is no longer a secret, in diplomatic circles, that the CIA helped Mobutu take power."[123] The Congo had a fully pro-American government.

Conclusion

The Business Conflict model predicts that under certain circumstances, business conflict will cease. Specifically, revolutionary, anticapitalist political movements, which threaten the business community in general, tend to unite corporate interests. Rivalries among different capitalist countries, or within the bureaucracies of specific governments, will also cease. The capitalists will set aside their differences and cooperate to defeat the radicals.

These predictions were generally confirmed by the Congo events. The rebellions of 1964, which threatened Western interests generally, transformed the situation. The business interests, and their respective governments, ceased their feuding. No longer did the Europeans attack American policy or American businessmen in the Congo. Instead the Western interests all worked harmoniously to defeat the rebels. Government policymakers, with only minor exceptions, ended their bureaucratic conflicts. In the face of the rebel threat, the intercapitalist differences were no longer so important.

By the end of 1964, the rebels were in retreat. Business conflict, accordingly, began to reappear. Western collaboration gradually declined, and inter-capitalist feuding became apparent. The French government, along with French business interests, sought to displace the Belgians. The USA, for its part, helped engineer Mobutu's coup. In chapter 6 we will see that business conflicts intensified still further during the Mobutu era.

6 The Mobutu Regime and the Recrudescence of Business Conflict

> If you want to steal, steal a little in a nice way.
>
> Joseph-Désiré Mobutu[1]

> Mobutu . . . is reportedly worth $5 billion.
>
> *Fortune* magazine[2]

> If money was to be made on [the] deal, why not [an] American company[?]
>
> An executive with Leon Tempelsman and Son[3]

Almost immediately after his coup d'état, General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu consolidated his power and established a full-scale dictatorship. One of Mobutu's first actions was to declare, "there will be no more political party activity in the country" officially for a period of five years. Mobutu assumed the title of president and greatly limited the powers of parliament, first eliminating the practice of legislative review of presidential actions and then in March 1967, abolishing the parliament altogether.[4]

The United States clearly benefited from the coup. The CIA had supported Mobutu throughout his political career. The agency helped install him as dictator. Moise Tshombe, the leading pro-Belgian politician and a rival of Mobutu, was out of power and went into exile in Spain.

The Mobutu era proved a crucial one in the history of international relations in the Congo. We have seen in previous chapters that the business community was seriously divided with regard to the Congo. A group of American companies, termed the anticolonial bloc, sought to displace the established Belgian companies, while the Belgians sought to retain control. This conflict, in turn, decisively influenced the diplomacy of the Congo Crisis. In chapter 5 we saw that the conflicts subsided temporarily during the rebellion of 1963–64, but that they began to reappear in 1965. This chapter will discuss the resolution of the conflicts, focusing on the period 1966–70. We will see how U.S.

business interests eventually displaced the Belgians and how the Congo became an American sphere of influence.

The Union Minière Controversy

Mobutu adopted anti-Belgian policies several months after seizing power. The policies were aimed against Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), the copper-mining company, resulting in the eventual nationalization of Union Minière's holdings. Michael Schatzberg analyzes Mobutu's policies this way:

> When Mobutu seized power in 1965, he had a number of compelling needs. First, as Tshombe's successor, he wanted to reassert . . . [the Congo's] independence in the eyes of the world. In addition . . . funds would be needed . . . Control of the mining sector's enormous resources would therefore provide a source of remuneration and perquisites which could be distributed to build loyalty and support for the new regime. Finally, there may well have been some ideological commitment to economic nationalism . . . This confluence of interests and desires provides the background against which the "nationalisation" of UMHK should be understood.[5]

Mobutu thus had clear incentives to challenge the Belgian company.

The controversy began in May 1966, when Mobutu began demanding concessions from UMHK. Specifically, Union Minière had to contribute 10 percent of its output to a government stockpile. The Congolese government implied, moreover, that it would begin to market copper independently of the companies.[6] The Congolese press used harsh anti-Belgian rhetoric, while crowds, presumably with official encouragement, marched outside of the Belgian embassy.[7] Mobutu noted that the Belgian-Congolese dispute "threatened to lead to a rupture."[8]

During the June 1966 Independence Day celebrations, Mobutu criticized Belgian colonialism in far stronger terms than he had used previously. He denounced the "money powers" which "insidiously, hypocritically wish to maintain our people in misery and exploit them to the end of time." Mobutu also paid homage to the legend of Patrice Lumumba (despite Mobutu's role in Lumumba's assassination), declaring him to be a "national hero." Mobutu qualified his rhetoric and said that the Congolese should respect foreign property, but Belgian nationals nevertheless feared the radical polemics.[9] Many Belgians criticized Mobutu's "Bantu lawlessness,"[10] and *L'Echo de la Bourse*, the financial daily, denounced the "attitude of deliberate provocation toward Belgium."[11]

On June 7, 1966, Mobutu issued the Bakajika Law, which authorized the confiscation of "real property, mining concessions, and equipment used in exploitation in certain specified cases." Union Minière was given an ultimatum: the company had to establish corporate headquarters in the Congo and to comply with all of the other new requirements or face confiscation of its assets by January 1, 1967. Union Minière firmly refused the demand.[12]

On January 1, 1967, UMHK's assets were officially seized. A crisis immediately ensued. The Congolese officially listed the following grievances against UMHK: refusal to transfer its headquarters to the Congo; refusal to contribute 10 percent of its output to the government stockpile; violation of Congolese tax, foreign exchange, and export laws.[13] The Congolese government formed a new state-owned company, Société Générale Congolaise de Minérais (GECOMIN), to operate the nationalized copper industry.[14]

GECOMIN quickly proved unable to run the copper industry. Very few Congolese had adequate technical training to manage the mines, and the Belgian technicians were departing en masse. UMHK, in revenge for the nationalization, actually encouraged the departures. A U.S. embassy cable noted UMHK's "apparent policy of enticing technicians to depart" from the Congo.[15] UMHK also prevented the Congo from selling its copper on the international market. It threatened to sue any foreign company that attempted to market Congolese copper.[16] Unable to mine or export its copper, the Congo immediately lost its principal source of foreign exchange.[17] By the end of January 1967, the Congo had nearly exhausted its exchange reserves.[18] The Belgians thus helped engineer a financial crisis that threatened to cripple the Mobutu regime.

The Abortive "Third Coming" of Moise Tshombe

In addition to the financial crisis, Mobutu faced continued scheming by Moise Tshombe. The former Katangese leader lived in exile, but he remained an ever-present threat. Tshombe still maintained ties to white mercenaries who had previously supported his Katanga secession. Many of the mercenaries were in the Congo, and the Congolese National Army comprised several all-white units of mercenaries. The continued presence of the pro-Tshombe forces, estimated at 650 in 1966,[19] constituted another destabilizing force. Mobutu proceeded to break up the white units and to disperse their members.

Mobutu's efforts to reduce the mercenary threat provoked new disorder.[20] In 1966, a combined force of mercenaries and former Katangese gendarmes seized the city of Stanleyville. Apparently the mercenaries sought to overthrow Mobutu and to return Tshombe to power. The *Economist* reported shortly after the revolt: "Recent events in the Congo . . . may be interpreted as a duel between President Mobutu and Mr. Tshombe."[21] Mobutu's troops quickly quelled the revolt.

In late 1966, evidence began to surface that Tshombe was once again plotting against Mobutu. Both the South African press and the *New York Times* reported that Tshombe was recruiting mercenaries in Europe and South Africa.[22] In October 1966, French police arrested a group of pro-Tshombe mercenaries. Tshombe reportedly was assembling a small air force, and he boasted publicly of his invasion plans. In September 1966, he stated: "Despite the foreign support he still enjoys, Mobutu cannot last by force alone," and added: "I am optimistic that I will return."[23]

Mobutu clearly feared the continuing intrigues, and in retaliation he proceeded to purge many of Tshombe's political supporters. In December, Tshombe's close ally and former interior minister, Godefried Munongo, was removed as governor of South Katanga province, while additional mercenary units were disbanded.[24] In March 1967, the Congolese government tried Tshombe for treason in absentia and sentenced him to death.[25]

The trial initiated a complex series of events that led to Tshombe's kidnapping and imprisonment. In June 1967, Tshombe's private plane was hijacked and flown to Algeria, where the Algerian government imprisoned him. No satisfactory account has been written on the hijacking affair, and it is still not clear who arranged it. Various reports have attributed the kidnapping to French intelligence, the KGB, or the CIA.[26] None of the explanations are conclusive, and many questions remain unanswered. It is unclear, for example, why Tshombe's plane was brought to Algeria, and why the Algerian government imprisoned him. The full story of the kidnapping may never be known.

In any case, the kidnapping provoked a major international dispute. The Congolese government demanded that Algeria extradite Tshombe to the Congo, where he was to be executed. The Algerians, while resisting the extradition demands, continued to imprison Tshombe. Supporters of Tshombe mobilized throughout the world. In the USA, conservative activists formed the Tshombe Emergency Committee. Many of the committee's supporters—including William F. Buckley, Michel Struelens, William Rusher, Max Yergan, and Marvin Leibman—had previously supported Tshombe during



MAP 4. Rebellions, 1966–67

the Katanga controversy.[27] In the Senate, Thomas Dodd also defended Tshombe.[28]

The kidnapping also caused a new revolt in the Congo. This revolt once again was led by mercenaries and white settlers based in the Congo. A mercenary force led by a Belgian plantation owner seized Stanleyville on July 5, 1967, while another force captured Bukavu (see map 4). According to the *New York Times*, "The presumption was that the uprising was in reaction to the kidnapping" of Tshombe.[29] Young and Turner state, "there can be no doubt that the 1967 mutiny . . . was part of a broader conspiracy to return Tshombe to power."[30] According to a U.S. government document, the mercenary revolt was "apparently prompted in part by the kidnapping of Tshombe to Algeria a few days previous."[31]

The 1967 mercenary revolt had widespread ramifications. It caused generalized panic and chaos in several regions of the Congo. Many Congolese evidently resented the mercenary intervention, and popular hatred toward Belgium grew steadily. A U.S. foreign service report noted a "grave deterioration [of the] racial situation" in Katanga province, where most of the copper mining took place.[32] The racial tension threatened to drive out the remaining white technicians, who were still to a large extent managing the copper industry. The pro-Tshombe revolt was a serious threat to Mobutu.

Ultimately, Mobutu remained in power. Tshombe was never released from prison, despite the international agitation. In 1969 Tshombe died, officially because of a heart attack.[33] Mobutu succeeded in defeating the mercenaries in November 1967, with substantial aid from the United States.

The American role will be discussed shortly. Now we will consider the question: Did UMHK finance the mercenary revolts? There is no definitive proof that the Belgian mining companies supported the mercenaries;[34] such support nevertheless seems probable. It should be recalled that most participants in the revolt had long-standing ties to Union Minière. Tshombe himself had led the Katanga secession, which was largely financed by Union Minière. We have seen that UMHK continued to back Tshombe long after the secession ended. Moreover, UMHK had historical connections to mercenary groups, many of which had been recruited by the company. Finally, the Tshombe Emergency Committee in the United States was largely a rehabilitation of organizations that had lobbied for Katanga or the UMHK during the early 1960s.[35] So virtually all elements of the revolts of 1966–67 had previously worked with UMHK.

There are a number of other factors suggesting Union Minière involvement. European residents in the Congo—many of whom worked for UMHK—favored Tshombe.[36] UMHK had an obvious motive to overthrow Mobutu. Mobutu, as we have seen, was threatening the UMHK interests during 1966 and 1967. The mercenary revolts occurred at almost exactly the same time as the nationalization controversy. Overall the case for UMHK involvement in the 1966–67 revolts, though inconclusive, seems strong.

Union Minière involvement was widely suspected. A U.S. government study from January 1967 claimed that the UMHK had ignored

> Mobutu and his desire to find Congolese unity through a more nationalistic posture . . . It [UMHK] thought that stiff resistance would force Mobutu to buckle down. And, perhaps most important, it seems to have [had] . . . the expectation that Mobutu would fall and be replaced by a more amenable leader—perhaps Tshombe . . . Union Minière reacted in early 1966 by refusing to make gestures even of a cosmetic nature which probably would have avoided the present difficulty.[37]

C.L. Sulzberger, in an article on the mercenary revolt in the *New York Times*, wrote that "Portugal, Rhodesia and Belgian big business prefer to stimulate chaos."[38] A former American official commented: "Circumstantial evidence is that . . . [UMHK] financed" the mercenary rebellion.[39] It should be recalled that Union Minière was encouraging technicians to leave the Congo and was blocking Congolese efforts to market their copper. UMHK was thus destabilizing Mobutu, certainly through financial means and probably also through military means, during 1966 and 1967.

The Role of the USA

General Mobutu was thus seriously threatened with overthrow in the year 1967. His nationalistic policies, especially his feuds with Union Minière, had largely alienated the Belgian interests, and those interests were actively seeking to overthrow him. During the controversies, the United States favored General Mobutu. The CIA after all had helped the general seize power in 1965. Many American officials sympathized with Mobutu and were critical of UMHK. One former diplomat believed that Union Minière was "ripping off" the Congo.[40] The U.S. support proved crucial in propping up the Mobutu regime.

The U.S. Air Force sent three C-130 transport planes to the Congo shortly after the mercenary uprising began. The planes airlifted Congolese army personnel and equipment to the disturbed areas. A U.S. government document reported "the C-130's arrival also had tremendous effect on lower level leadership and all Congolese who knew of it."[41] Meanwhile, Ethiopia and Ghana, presumably with American encouragement, supplied additional military aid.[42] President Johnson's intervention evoked some dissent within the USA.

Critics of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, including Senators Clifford Case and J. William Fulbright, opposed new American intervention in the Third World.[43] The protests were ineffectual, and the U.S. support was probably decisive in defeating the rebellion.

The nationalization of Union Minière very briefly generated friction between the USA and Mobutu. American officials feared that Mobutu's action was overly rash and precipitous.[44] It was also feared that the nationalization might provoke a generalized campaign against Western business interests. However, the Congolese government quickly moderated its position and indicated that it would consider compensating UMHK. The American chargé d'affaires stated that Mobutu had proven so conciliatory that "there [is] not much more we can ask him to do."[45] The chargé also noted concessions made by Mobutu and opined that "UM[HK] is now major obstacle to reaching modus vivendi."[46] Thus by the end of January, the frictions between Mobutu and the U.S. government essentially ended.

The Belgian-Congolese copper dispute continued for many months, but the USA strongly favored the Congolese. American officials claimed to have "refrained from involving ourselves in the dispute between the Congo and the UMHK."[47] In fact, the United States was deeply involved. We shall see that American officials pressured UMHK to make concessions to the Congolese. The Americans also sought to reduce UMHK's influence in the Congo; many documents from the period emphasized the need to internationalize Congolese copper mining. Such internationalization would presumably have opened new opportunities for American investors.

One such American investor was Maurice Tempelsman, the New York diamond trader (discussed in chapter 4). Tempelsman had excellent ties to the Mobutu regime. A heavily censored document observed: "Tempelsman is playing increasingly central role as GDRC [Congolese government] technical adviser and mediator."[48] Another report cited evidence that Tempelsman was "very influential with Mobutu."[49] Mobutu was never a complete puppet—at one point Tempelsman reportedly was "becoming annoyed . . . [about] having his advice ignored"[50]—but Mobutu often relied on Tempelsman's counsel.

Tempelsman was directly involved in the copper dispute from the outset. In fact, he seems to have encouraged the Congolese to challenge Union Minière (although he probably disfavored nationalization).[51] In 1966, Tempelsman agreed to draw up a plan, at no cost to the Congolese government, for the establishment of a copper stockpile. The purpose of the stockpile was to increase Congolese control over the marketing of copper and to reduce its dependence on Union Minière. Tempelsman himself sought to have "his firm participate [in the] marketing of minerals" from the stockpile.[52] Tempelsman's report ultimately recommended, on technical grounds, against a stockpile,[53] but it suggested other ways through which the Congolese could increase their independence from the Belgian mining companies. The report recommended the formation of a new parastatal company, under international management, to market Congolese copper. Tempelsman perceived a role for himself in the proposed parastatal. The U.S. embassy stated that "Tempelsman would be willing candidate for job" of organizing the international management.[54] The plan was not immediately implemented, but it shows that Tempelsman was actively seeking access to the Congolese copper industry.

Throughout the 1967 copper dispute, Tempelsman worked very closely with the U.S. government. American officials, throughout the copper controversy, frequently consulted with Tempelsman or one of his representatives. Tempelsman served as an unofficial American diplomat, and he was mentioned in numerous embassy cables. U.S. chargé d'affaires Robert Blake established a working relationship with the Tempelsman interests. Tempelsman was "full of praise for Blake."[55] In a cable to the State Department, Blake returned the compliment: "Wish to reiterate how useful Tempelsman's presence proved to be . . . He is to be complimented for extremely skillful job."[56] During an interview, Blake commented that Tempelsman was never "anything but helpful."[57] None of the cables from 1967 show any differences between Tempelsman and the U.S. embassy.[58] Thus the U.S. government worked through American investors in the Congo.

In January 1967, Mobutu hired Theodore Sorensen to represent the Congo in the ensuing dispute with the Belgian companies. This measure increased the U.S. role considerably. Sorensen had been a speech writer for and a close advisor to John F. Kennedy. Sorensen also worked at the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison, whose partners had included such illustrious figures as Adlai Stevenson. Moreover, the appointment of Sorensen increased Tempelsman's influence. Sorensen was in fact Tempelsman's own attorney. It was Tempelsman who had originally urged the appointment of Sorensen.[59] It thus appears that Tempelsman helped, at least to some extent, to provoke the Congolese-Belgian copper dispute, and that he sought to profit from the resulting controversy. We shall see that in all of his intrigues, Tempelsman continued to make full use of his political connections.

Tempelsman's activities worried some U.S. officials; it was feared that

Tempelsman would antagonize the Belgians and interfere with U.S.-Belgian relations. The U.S. ambassador to Belgium, Ridgeway Knight, provided a particularly interesting analysis: "Conservative and business circles here [in Belgium] have long harbored suspicions that disguised air [aim?] U.S. policy in Congo is to obtain commercial advantage for American business at expense established Belgian concerns. If American business moves in behind departing UMHK, there is probability that these suspicions would revive and U.S. would be sharply criticized."[60] The ambassador urged the State Department to discourage American business interests, including Tempelsman, from investing in the Congo at UMHK's expense. The State Department, however, politely declined the ambassador's request. Secretary of State Dean Rusk cabled the ambassador "we [are] sympathetic your problems with Belgians but question how long we can expect foreign, including U.S., businessmen refrain from making bid [to] replace UMHK."[61] U.S. officials, despite some misgivings, worked closely with business interests in the Congo, especially Tempelsman.

The Press and the Copper Controversy

The copper dispute received considerable international attention. Mobutu had a growing reputation as a Third World radical and a major African statesman. A Western analyst predicted that General Mobutu would "make his country the leader of the African continent."[62] The general's defiance of Union Minière and Société Générale was a source of pride to many Africans. Radio Brazzaville "praised Mobutu's courage in face of 'UMHK blackmail' and predicted that [the] 'day will come when Congolese people will triumph over imperialism.'" The Togolese press celebrated Mobutu's "refusal to accept economic colonialism."[63] The Congolese encouraged such inflammatory interpretations of the UMHK nationalization. Mobutu was seen as a radical nationalist, challenging the multinational corporations. The reports neglected to mention that Mobutu's "radicalism" was often supported by American business interests and the U.S. government. The complex international rivalries which resulted from the nationalization were largely ignored.

There were a few exceptions. The *Economist* commented that Mobutu was "not the only opponent the company [UMHK] faces. Behind him lurk, as yet only dimly glimpsed, other foreign interests that could jump in to help him run the Union Minière mines. The name of an American company [probably Tempelsman] that has long shown an interest in that part of Africa has been mentioned."[64] An article in *Le Monde Diplomatique* offered a similar assessment.[65] A U.S. Commerce Department publication stated that the Congo was "reducing [its] dependence on Belgium . . . This will mean increased export opportunities as the Congo widens its markets and sources of capital and know-how."[66]

The Belgian press occasionally criticized the American role in the Congo. An article in *La Libre Belgique* accused "the American secret services of supporting General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu,"[67] while a second article claimed, "the CIA has been responsible for the continuing degradation in the Congo."[68] *L'Echo de la Bourse* noted that only "a single foreign government has given its support . . . [to Mobutu]: that of Washington."[69]

Such comments were unusual, however, and the Belgian press during this period made few references to the international rivalries. The U.S. embassy in Belgium stated: "Surprisingly little editorial comment in Belgian press last week on Congo-UMHK dispute."[70] The author has been unable to find any mention of Tempelsman, even though in private many Belgians continuously feuded with him.[71] The Belgian papers contained few anti-American polemics, which had been so common during the Katanga affair. The quiescence of the Belgian press is remarkable.

State Department documents attributed the quiescence to a Société Générale decision against publicizing the dispute: "Major Belgian papers have treated this issue with considerable restraint, doubtless reflecting advice editors have received from GOB [government of Belgium] and from Société Générale to play matter cooly in interest of ultimate settlement and security [of] Belgian nationals in Congo."[72] A Société Générale representative declared that he "would not be talking to the press about the problem in general [i.e., the UMHK-Congo dispute] or about Tempelsman in particular."[73] A Belgian foreign ministry official stated, "all steps possible will be taken to avoid crowing on part of Belgian press," with regard to the controversy.[74] The Union Minière dispute, copiously described in the classified documents, went largely unreported in the press. The 1967 crisis, unlike the earlier one over Katanga, involved little public controversy.

"Internationalizing" Congolese Copper

Despite the absence of press attention, the copper controversy generated significant international conflict. The dispute intensified immediately after President Mobutu nationalized the Union Minière mines in January 1967. At that time, as we have seen, the Congolese nominally owned the copper mines, but they were unable to exploit the copper or to market it internationally. They needed foreign support to do so. Union Minière, angered by the nationalization, refused to provide the support. Indeed, UMHK apparently sought Mobutu's overthrow. Union Minière's rivals sought to exploit the controversy and to establish themselves in the Congolese copper industry. The rivals, especially Maurice Tempelsman, employed various schemes to gain entry. We will discuss some of them in detail.

The first such scheme was an international consortium to manage the nationalized copper industry. This consortium began to take shape by the middle of January 1967. The proposed consortium was to provide technical expertise to the Congolese, to help them operate the mines and market the copper. The main sponsor appears to have been Banque Lambert, a Belgian firm and Société Générale's principal "business and financial rival,"[75] as well as Tempelsman. Working closely with the Lambert interests, Tempelsman sought international support for the consortium. Various American, South African, and European firms expressed interest in joining the consortium. One cable stated Tempelsman was offering his "good offices [to] secure eventual advantages for himself."[76]

The U.S. government favored the consortium plan. The USA sought to reduce Union Minière's role in the Congo and to establish "international" management of the copper mines—presumably including American firms, such as that of Tempelsman. These sentiments were expressed in government documents. One cable claimed "pure Société Générale solution does not offer stability."[77] According to another document: "There is no question in our minds that international association formula preferable" to continued UMHK dominance.[78] The American government and business interests thus sought to displace Union Minière and its parent Société Générale de Belgique (SG), or to dilute their influence. With these objectives in mind, U.S. officials directly supported the international consortium plan.

The SG/Union Minière interests, understandably enough, opposed the plan and particularly resented the participation of Banque Lambert, their old rival, in the proposed consortium. A Union Minière representative "strongly accused Lambert of wanting [to] use present difficulties to make breakthrough into Congolese copper business."[79] The Belgian government also opposed the consortium. A State Department document reported the consortium was "encountering strong UM[HK] and GOB [government of Belgium] opposition,"[80] while according to another cable, Belgian policy "seemed to be primarily based on defense of UMHK's interests."[81]

The Belgian government thus supported Union Minière. It is easy to explain this support. The conservative parties, which led the Belgian government at that time, had connections to the SG/Union Minière group. Viscount Etienne Davignon, a leading official in the Belgian foreign ministry, later became an SG executive.[82] Davignon staunchly opposed the consortium plan, and on January 28, 1967, he raised his objections with the American ambassador to Belgium, Ridgeway Knight. The ambassador described the conversation as follows: "Davignon has just called me under instructions re formation Congo consortium in more formal and ominous manner than he has ever used with me."[83] The next two paragraphs, regrettably, were censored prior to declassification. Clearly the copper controversy was a source of friction between the USA and Belgium.

Despite the official support, Union Minière was in a vulnerable position. Major elements of the international business community opposed Union Minière's activities in the Congo, especially its efforts to undermine Mobutu. A wide range of corporations, including the Anglo-American company of South Africa, Mobil Oil, and Tanganyika Concessions, were all critical of Union Minière.[84] An Anglo-American executive commented: "UMHK had no right to create chaos in the area [Congo] solely on political or prestige grounds."[85] A Mobil representative stated that UMHK's intransigence "endangers all other Western business interests" in the Congo.[86]

The denunciations had been orchestrated at least in part by the United States. State Department officials contacted companies and urged them to criticize Union Minière. A State Department cable reads: "Believe time has come quietly to mobilize whatever business support we can find to convince UM[HK] agree to modus vivendi with GDRC [Congolese government]. Believe Department should consider informing Tempelsman of latest developments and ask his views on next move."[87] The cable implied that Tempelsman also encouraged international criticism of UMHK. Why was Tempelsman acting against Union Minière? The most likely reason is that Union Minière was a major obstacle to the proposed copper consortium—which Tempelsman favored. Tempelsman was, in essence, trying to embarrass and isolate a potential rival.

Despite all this effort, the consortium was never established. UMHK threatened to sue any company that marketed the Congolese copper, and the threat was highly effective.[88] The U.S. embassy in Zambia noted that copper companies in that country were reluctant to participate in the Congo consortium because they "have no taste for complex and costly legal actions that could arise . . . [Moreover] UM[HK] has exclusive custody all the engineering plans without which new association would have to start literally from scratch, an intolerable handicap."[89] Some of the leading companies became skittish. Roan Selection Trust and Anglo-American executives began to express doubts about the feasibility of the consortium plan, while Newmont Mining refused to participate.[90] It became clear that the plan was unfeasible. For all practical purposes, the consortium was abandoned by early February 1967.

The failure of the consortium was also a setback for Mobutu. The Congolese had nationalized the copper mines, but they were unable to operate them without Belgian assistance, and they could not market the copper internationally because of the UMHK-organized boycott. It also became clear that the Congolese could not entice other companies to provide assistance. The Congo had virtually exhausted its foreign exchange reserves and was on the verge of collapse.

Facing economic disaster, in February 1967 Mobutu finally arranged a compromise with UMHK. Specifically, the Congo was permitted to own the copper mines through the GECOMIN parastatal company, but UMHK was to manage and operate the mines. Technically the resulting agreement did not involve UMHK but a newly established company called Société Générale des Minérais (SGM). However, SGM was, according to a U.S. government document, "a thinly disguised UMHK affiliate."[91] A State Department cable noted, "any pretense that UM[HK] and SGM are separate . . . is patently silly."[92] Thus, UMHK gained a major success and reestablished at least temporarily some of its former influence in the Congo. International management, by Tempelsman or any other firm, was precluded. Tempelsman's first bid to enter the Congolese copper industry failed.

The U.S. embassy was clearly disappointed by the arrangement, which excluded American companies. One American diplomat put the matter this way: "Question of duration SG-GECOMIN contract is very delicate matter. From political point of view shorter time period seems much preferable. Would imagine that any internationalization of Congolese copper operations will be frozen out for duration of SG contract . . . A brief Société Générale interlude to buy time for organizing some sort of international group would be more advisable."[93] Tempelsman was also dissatisfied and sought eventual "internationalization of SGM management contract."[94] All parties, in fact, were dissatisfied. Certainly the Congolese resented the SGM contract; they had after all signed under duress.[95] Even Union Minière interests disliked the arrangement. They still distrusted Mobutu, and as we have seen there is evidence that they sought his overthrow.

Gradually both sides began to tire of the feud. By the summer of 1967, UMHK executives realized that they could not overthrow Mobutu (especially after the failure of the mercenary revolt in July) and that they would have to reach a permanent modus vivendi. Belgian-Congolese tensions began to ease. In July 1967, UMHK encouraged the Belgian government to continue its technical aid to the Congo.[96] In early 1968, the director of the Belgian trade organization, the Fédération des Industries Belges, met with Mobutu; he returned to Belgium "very satisfied" and did not "believe that the memory of the old relations between Belgium and the Congo would be a handicap in the future."[97] During the summer of 1968, the Belgian government negotiated a treaty of friendship with the Congo, along with a series of new commercial accords.[98] Union Minière began to diversify its operations, opening new mines in Australia and Canada. The company changed its name to Union Minière, S.A., dropping the "du Haut Katanga."[99] The Union Minière continued to have an interest in the Congo, but it was not as great as previously. All of these factors contributed to a much less hostile environment.

A de facto settlement thus emerged. Union Minière, through its SGM subsidiary, managed the copper mines, while the Congolese owned the mines. All parties began to accept the arrangement as permanent. Mobutu gave up the idea of internationalizing the management of the copper industry. In March 1968, a State Department report observed with respect to the SGM management contract, "Both sides . . . have apparently decided to leave well enough alone . . . Both Mobutu and UM[HK] might decide to continue the present makeshift arrangements indefinitely." Even the issue of compensation for Union Minière's frozen assets was "swept under the rug with the understanding that they would be the subject of a future arbitration."[100]

The improved relations constituted a further setback for Tempelsman. Union Minière continued to dominate the copper industry and exclude all other interests. The internationalization of the SGM contract, which Tempelsman had advocated, was never undertaken. Yet Tempelsman remained determined to invest in the copper industry, and he soon found a new opportunity. GECOMIN, the Congolese parastatal which owned the mines, planned to sell 40 percent of its stock to private investors. Tempelsman hoped to market the 40 percent, presumably earning a substantial commission for himself. Mobutu wrote to Tempelsman: "Confident of your loyalty and your attachment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I am giving you the mission of finding foreign financial groups to take a 40 percent participation that I have reserved for the private sector at the time of GECOMIN's creation."[101] Theodore Sorensen, who was Mobutu's (and Tempelsman's) lawyer, strongly advocated this stock sale.[102] U.S. government officials also favored the sale.[103]

Union Minière opposed the stock deal and resented Tempelsman's participation. One document stated that the Belgians "would rather keep Mr. Tempelsman out of the picture."[104] According to another cable, some elements "in the UM [Union Minière] group have been deeply suspicious of Tempelsman's motives and are not at all happy that Mobutu has seen fit to give him a mandate to peddle the 40 percent of GECOMIN shares . . . We have the impression that the [Belgian] Foreign Office is also somewhat suspicious of Tempelsman and would not be unhappy to see him by-passed."[105] The Belgians offered to purchase the 40 percent themselves, but Mobutu, determined to bring in American capital, failed to accept the offer.[106] The stock plan thus provoked a new round of business conflict.

Tempelsman's plan once again failed. The reason for the failure is obscure, although it would seem likely that American companies, still fearing a lawsuit by Union Minière, were reluctant to purchase the shares. The 40 percent was never sold, and the Congolese copper industry remained firmly under Belgian control.[107] For a second time Tempelsman had sought to gain entry and had failed. It would also seem likely that the U.S. government, which had long supported Tempelsman's schemes, was disappointed as well.

Tempelsman did not lose interest in the Congo despite these setbacks, and he eventually gained access to Congolese copper. However, in January 1969 Tempelsman faced a new complication: the inauguration of Richard M. Nixon as president of the United States. For the first time in eight years, the USA had a Republican president. We will now turn our attention to the new administration and its role in the Congo.

Mobutu and the Nixon Administration

With the new administration, one might expect a change in American policy toward the Congo. The Mobutu dictatorship had been created and supported by liberal Democratic policymakers. Moreover, Mobutu's leading supporter in the business community, Tempelsman, had close ties to the Democratic party. During the 1968 election, Tempelsman favored the Democratic nominee, Hubert H. Humphrey, and "contributed generously" to his campaign.[108] Tempelsman accompanied Humphrey on a trip to Africa.[109]

Mobutu also curried favor with Humphrey and gave a diamond worth one hundred thousand dollars to Humphrey's wife.[110] One would therefore expect to find the Nixon administration less supportive of both Tempelsman and Mobutu.

In fact there was no such change in policy under Nixon. According to one study, "Nixon was delighted to work with the anti-Communist general," meaning Mobutu.[111] It is also worth noting that Gerald Ford, president in 1974–77, seemed no less attached to the Mobutu regime. During congressional hearings in 1975, a State Department spokesman commented: "We do have, as you well know Mr. Chairman, a warm spot in our hearts for President Mobutu."[112]

Concomitantly, Tempelsman established an excellent relationship with the Republican party, despite his Democratic affiliations. Tempelsman prudently shifted his political sympathies and contributed to Nixon's 1972 presidential campaign.[113] Tempelsman also established close business ties with Robert B. Anderson, who worked for Standard Oil of Indiana.[114] Mr. Anderson had been treasury secretary during the Eisenhower administration—in which Nixon had been vice president. We will see that Anderson worked closely with Tempelsman on various Congo projects; this partnership apparently augmented Tempelsman's influence in the Nixon administration. Tempelsman's association with the former cabinet member also impressed President Mobutu.[115]

This partnership probably increased Tempelsman's access to the important Rockefeller interests. Anderson's own company, Indiana-Standard, was Rockefeller controlled.[116] Moreover, Anderson was personally close to the Rockefeller family. There is evidence that the Rockefellers had bribed Anderson, during and shortly after his tenure as secretary of the treasury. *Wall Street Journal* correspondent Jonathan Kwitny provides this account:

> From 1955 to 1963, the Richardson, Murchison, and Rockefeller interests [Clint Murchison and Sid Richardson were business associates of the Rockefellers] . . . managed to give away a $900,000 slice of their Texas-Louisiana oil property to Robert B. Anderson . . . In the Eisenhower cabinet, Anderson led the team that devised a system under which quotas were mandated by law on how much oil each company could bring into the U.S. from cheap foreign sources. This [1958 arrangement proved a] bonanza for entrenched power.[117]

These Rockefeller affiliations were felicitous for Tempelsman. Rockefeller-controlled banks, as we shall see, helped finance Tempelsman's Congo ventures. Moreover, the Rockefellers were influential in American foreign policy during the Nixon era. Nixon's national security advisor and secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, had been a protégé of the Rockefellers. Kissinger himself notes that, "the single most influential person in my life had been . . . Nelson Rockefeller," and also adds: "It was Nelson Rockefeller who had introduced me to high level policy-making."[118] Kissinger thoughtfully dedicated his memoirs to Mr. Rockefeller. It thus seems likely that Tempelsman benefited from his association with Anderson.

During the Nixon years, Tempelsman retained influence in the U.S. government. Tempelsman's representatives worked closely with the U.S. embassy,[119] while Tempelsman himself enjoyed excellent access to the State Department. On visits to Washington, Tempelsman was received at a high level, typically by the under secretary of state.[120] Tempelsman was designated the "Nixon White House's unofficial greeter" during Mobutu's state visit to Washington in 1974.[121] Tempelsman also maintained close ties to the CIA during the Nixon-Ford era. Lawrence Devlin, the CIA's Africa Division chief, who reportedly had "helped put Mobutu in power," became a full-time employee of Tempelsman in 1974.[122]

All of these connections were to prove useful for Tempelsman and Anderson, since they were jointly investigating new investment possibilities in the Congo. Specifically, they sought to exploit the copper deposits in the Tenke Fungurume region. The Tenke Fungurume seams were believed to contain some of the richest untapped copper reserves in the world.

Before undertaking the new investment, however, Tempelsman had to resolve the dispute between Mobutu and the Belgians which resulted from the 1967 nationalization. It should be recalled that many outstanding issues pertaining to the nationalization, including that of compensation for the frozen Belgian assets, were never resolved. These legal differences and the threat of a Union Minière lawsuit had scuttled several of Tempelsman's previous investment schemes. If the new scheme was to succeed, Tempelsman would have to overcome the legal and political impediments.

The dispute was in fact resolved by the end of 1969, with the mediation of World Bank President Robert McNamara. The resulting settlement essentially formalized the de facto arrangements that had existed since 1967. Under the agreement, the Congolese parastatal GECOMIN continued to own the copper industry, while the Union Minière affiliate SGM provided management services. The agreement also provided generous compensation for Union Minière, which was to be paid from GECOMIN's profits.[123] In subsequent years Union Minière would often reap greater profits from Congolese copper than the Congolese themselves—despite their nominal ownership of the mines.[124] Clearly the arrangement was beneficial for the Belgians.

The settlement also provided major advantages for Tempelsman. It settled the legal issues that had complicated his previous schemes. The settlement effectively precluded any new foreign investment in the existing copper mines; however, Tempelsman had already acquiesced to the arrangement, and in any case, he was now interested in the new, untapped reserves in Tenke Fungurume.

There are also indications that World Bank President McNamara directly advanced Tempelsman's interests. It is interesting to note that Tempelsman had long favored World Bank involvement in the dispute. According to one cable, Tempelsman "clearly has financial interest in Bank" mediation, while another cable noted, "Tempelsman, of course, has vested interest in mediation," and a third reported "Tempelsman's excellent relations with McNamara."[125] A former Tempelsman representative, moreover, stated that McNamara "was certainly in our favor."[126] Overall, it would seem likely that the McNamara mission was an asset for Tempelsman.

With this new clout, and with the legal issues resolved, Tempelsman embarked on his Tenke Fungurume venture. In 1969, Tempelsman and Anderson formed an investment consortium, comprising Leon Tempelsman and Son, Standard Oil of Indiana (Anderson's firm), and three other companies. The latter included the Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières, a French government agency, which "presumably will eventually sell its share to one of the French mining companies."[127] A fourth partner was Charter Consolidated, which was nominally British but was probably "a 'front' for Anglo-American"—the South African company controlled by the Oppenheimer interests.[128] A fifth consortium member was the Mitsui financial group of Japan.[129]

Union Minière was, however, quite hostile toward the consortium, which was intruding on what the Belgians had always regarded as their sphere of influence. According to a State Department document, the "Belgians running [the copper parastatal] GECOMIN are highly suspicious of other groups seeking to invest in Katanga, especially Japanese and Americans."[130] A Union Minière affiliate protested against Anglo-American's participation as well, and accused Anglo of "undercutting Union Minière in the Congo."[131] By

1970, the competition intensified, as Union Minière established a rival consortium and competed directly with the Tempelsman group for access to the Tenke Fungurume deposits. This consortium included Union Minière, SGM (which Union Minière controlled), and GECOMIN (which SGM managed). Several other concerns, including an American steel company, were included, although the American share of the consortium was reportedly very small.[132] This Belgian consortium and the one led by Tempelsman both vied for Mobutu's favor, and "intense commercial competition" ensued.[133]

The U.S. government directly supported Tempelsman. Mark Garsin, Tempelsman's representative in the Congo, said "the U.S. [government] in general was favorable to our consortium."[134] The U.S. ambassador to the Congo, Sheldon Vance, lobbied the Congolese in favor of Tempelsman. A former foreign service officer stated that "Vance was pushing" the Tempelsman consortium.[135]

The Union Minière group attempted to press other advantages. Its consortium included GECOMIN—which was owned, at least nominally, by the Congolese government. Moreover, the Belgians informed Mobutu that he had "been fooled into believing he was giving the concession to an American group whereas it is in fact controlled by Oppenheimer from South Africa."[136] (The Oppenheimers did participate in the Tempelsman consortium, although they did not control it.) The Belgian government also lobbied in favor of the Union Minière consortium. In 1970 King Baudouin of Belgium paid a state visit to the Congo. Mobutu was so flattered by the visit that prior to the king's departure, he impulsively granted the Tenke Fungurume concession to the Union Minière group. Tempelsman, it appeared, had failed once again.[137]

The U.S. embassy, and especially Ambassador Vance, lobbied Mobutu to reverse his decision. One government official described Vance's activities this way: Vance "said 'well, they haven't signed the papers yet on Tenke Fungurume, let's try to get it,' and of course he was being pushed by Tempelsman."[138] U.S. officials at all levels proceeded to court Mobutu. The USA provided substantial military equipment to Mobutu, including C-130 transport aircraft, apparently in order to win the contract for Tempelsman. Ambassador Vance "got Mobutu in a room, and . . . [U.S. diplomats] just said to Mobutu 'you want C-130s[?] . . . Here it is,' and he was able to buy C-130s." Mobutu asked for even further military supplies including "patrol boats and all sorts of wild stuff." The U.S. embassy balked at these additional requests, but Henry Kissinger personally intervened and insisted that Mobutu be supplied with the requested equipment.[139]

The U.S. government also arranged for Mobutu to make a state visit to Washington. During the visit in August 1970, President Nixon, cabinet officials, and various business figures lavished attention on Mobutu. David Rockefeller even entertained Mobutu at his Pocantico Hills estate.[140] With all of this lobbying, Mobutu finally reversed his decision and in September 1970, he officially awarded the Tenke Fungurume contract to the Tempelsman consortium. The new consortium, called the Société Minière du Tenke Fungurume, also included some Congolese equity. American officials were delighted by the award, and according to one, "we were breaking out the champagne."[141]

The Belgians were not pleased. Tempelsman noted that "the Belgians were still acting a little childish over the fact that they were beaten in this Tenke Fungurume concession."[142] The Belgian government also protested. An American official recalled that Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre "Harmel was on our back immediately . . . [He] accused the Americans of engineering" the Tempelsman consortium deal.[143] The Belgians "were determined to get the decision on this concession reversed and were drumming up all kinds of ways to attack."[144] None of the efforts had any effect. Tempelsman finally gained access to the Congolese copper industry.

Discussion

The chapter has suggested that business interests determined U.S. foreign policy toward the Congo. The United States government, it is argued, sought to reduce the influence of Union Minière in the Congo in order to open investment opportunities for American businesses. The U.S. government was in essence an instrument of American business interests.

At this point we will consider an alternative hypothesis: that the government's objectives were largely political, not economic. This hypothesis would suggest that the United States sought political stability in the Congo and opposed Union Minière because it was a destabilizing element. It is true that the government collaborated closely with Maurice Tempelsman, since he was so influential with Mobutu, but Tempelsman failed to affect U.S. policy objectives. The U.S. government manipulated Tempelsman much more than Tempelsman manipulated the government.

This hypothesis is generally consistent with the Statist perspective, outlined in chapter 1. Statism, it should be recalled, argues that foreign policy is motivated by some conception of the national interest. The "national interest" may have material or ideological objectives, but it will serve the nation as a whole rather than a specific company, and it will be applied with consistency. Statists recognize that the government sometimes works with business interests. The Statists insist, however, that the government only does so when such collaboration furthers the national interest. In the Congo case, the national interest required political stability and the preemption of communist influence. The U.S. government worked with Tempelsman only to achieve this larger objective.

There is, in fact, considerable evidence in support of the Statist approach. There are indications that Tempelsman was at least to some extent dependent on the U.S. government. One 1967 cable stated, "Tempelsman obviously very interested in doing nothing that might damage USG [U.S. government] relations with GOB [government of Belgium] or GDRC [Congolese government]."[145] The cables also show that American officials were concerned about political stability in the Congo. Dean Rusk commented, in a 1967 cable, "most important element is that intransigent UMHK position could force Congo down the drain economically and politically, thus threatening overall western interest in Central Africa."[146] In other words, American officials supported Mobutu because he was a strong, anticommunist figure, and they opposed UMHK because it threatened to overthrow Mobutu and generate instability.

On further consideration, however, it becomes clear that the Statist approach does not explain American policy. It cannot explain, for example, the American government's continued support for Mobutu during the mercenary rebellion. In this instance the USA prevented a Tshombe takeover; however, there is no reason to assume that a Tshombe government would have been any less stable, or any less anticommunist, than a Mobutu government. We have already seen that Tshombe's Katanga regime was regarded as quite stable—at least from the perspective of Western interests. Stability considerations alone cannot explain American support for Mobutu.

Moreover, it should be noted that American policy with regard to the UMHK crisis in 1967 was highly atypical. In the Congo the USA supported a Third World regime in its dispute with a Western multinational corporation. In most cases the USA has sided with the multinational companies, even in cases where the multinationals were clearly destabilizing.

It is worth describing the case of Peru,[147] which was involved in another major nationalization controversy of the Johnson administration. In Peru, the government of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who was centrist and pro-American, attempted to place restrictions on the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a consortium of American-owned oil companies. Throughout the 1960s, the United States generally supported the IPC and opposed the Peruvian government. Peru received one of the lowest per capita levels of U.S. aid of any country in Latin America. These U.S. policies helped undermine the Belaúnde government and probably contributed to a coup d'état in 1968. The new regime, led by leftist officers, then nationalized the IPC. The U.S. government very strongly denounced the nationalization, which further radicalized the Peruvians. Peru eventually purchased arms from the Soviet Union.

The Peruvian case occurred at approximately the same time as the Congolese controversy; but the U.S. government behaved very differently in the two cases. In Peru the United States supported the IPC, while in the Congo the USA opposed Union Minière. How can one explain the difference in policy? Why did the U.S. government support the multinational corporations in Peru, while it opposed them in the Congo? The Statist approach provides no answers. Certainly political stability cannot explain both cases. In Peru, U.S. policy was a major *destabilizing* factor. If the concept of "national interest" has any meaning—if it is not a tautology—then it is difficult to see how it can account for U.S. policy during both the Peruvian and the Congolese nationalization disputes. Clearly, Statism can not explain these cases.

The Business Conflict approach does, however, provide an adequate explanation. The Business Conflict approach would regard U.S. policy toward Peru and the Congo as quite consistent, because in both cases the government defended American business interests. In Peru the United States government supported the IPC, despite the destabilizing consequences of that policy, while in the Congo it supported the Tempelsman company. It is true that Union Minière suffered as a result, but UMHK was not an American company. Several American companies, including Tempelsman, were quite eager to replace Union Minière in the Congo, and the U.S. government supported them. The USA opposed the mercenary rebellion because it was considered pro-Belgian and therefore a threat to American business interests. The Business Conflict approach seems much more consistent with the facts of the Congo case.[148]

The Copper Dispute in Perspective

The copper controversy took place in the context of a general improvement in internal conditions in the Congo. With the defeat of the 1967 rebellion, the white mercenaries were finally subjected to control by the central government. The last remaining pockets of rebel resistance in the hinterlands were gradually rooted out. The Mobutu regime itself consolidated its dictatorship, and it seemed to offer some modicum of stability. By 1974, the constitution read, "there exists a single institution, the MPR [Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution] incarnated by its President"—Mobutu.[149] Mobutu also promoted a cult of personality, extolling his own virtues as an example for the populace. Mobutu's ideas of "authenticity" became the official political philosophy.

At the same time, however, Mobutu achieved some popular support. He seemed to provide a sense of grandeur to the Congo. He traveled extensively, with triumphant state visits to foreign capitals, including Washington in 1970 and Beijing in 1973. Mobutu was increasingly viewed as a bona fide African nationalist. He changed the name of the country from the Congo to Zaire in 1971 (although this study, for simplicity, will continue to call the country "the Congo"), while all Congolese were required to Africanize their names. The president himself changed his name from Joseph-Désiré Mobutu to Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu gradually renamed the cities. The city of Leopoldville became Kinshasa, Stanleyville became Kisangani, and Elisabethville became Lubumbashi. Katanga province was renamed Shaba. Mobutu often employed antiimperialist rhetoric in his speeches.

Above all, the late 1960s marked a period of economic progress for the Congo. An IMF-sponsored stabilization program brought inflation under control by 1968, for the first time since independence.[150] The economy began to grow after years of stagnation. During the late 1960s, international demand for minerals, especially copper, increased, partly because of the Vietnam War. The mineral export boom fueled a general prosperity. In this context, substantial foreign investment moved into the Congo.

The influx of foreign investment clearly suited many of the Western powers. It also suited Mobutu's own objectives. Mobutu clearly had an interest in reducing his dependence on Belgium and diversifying his sources of funding and political support. Mobutu thus cultivated connections with multinational corporations from many countries. Schatzberg noted Mobutu's "skilful exploitation of divisions within the Western camp."[151] Close ties were also established with the People's Republic of China and even with North Korea.

The United States benefited from this diversification, and it probably gained more than any other country. American companies were clearly favored over all others. According to a State Department document, Mobutu was "looking increasingly to foreign aid and investment, particularly American."[152] Another document noted, "Mobutu's desire [to] have purely American firms" invest in his country.[153] General Mobutu's pro-American

sympathies are not surprising, since the USA had long-standing ties to the general. The CIA had advised Mobutu even before national independence and then aided his seizure of power in 1965. The agency's chief Congo specialist became a close confidant to Mobutu.[154] The U.S. embassy also had connections with him. In 1969 Mobutu promulgated an investment code which protected U.S. investments against expropriation; Ambassador Vance later boasted that the U.S. "Embassy helped them [the Congolese] to write the new . . . investment code."[155] It would seem likely that these connections facilitated American commercial expansion.

In any case, American investment was forthcoming. Much of the investment was in the form of mining consortia, the most important of which was the Tenke Fungurume concession. In addition, Union Carbide Company agreed, in 1969, to participate in a columbium-mining operation in Kivu province.[156] The Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals Corporation announced plans, in 1972, to exploit monazite, a type of phosphate.[157] Other American companies invested in manufacturing and import substitution projects. Continental Grain established a flour mill in 1973.[158] General Motors opened a plant for assembling trucks and specialized vehicles for tourism, while Ford announced plans to open a plant.[159] The Goodyear tire company inaugurated a factory in 1972.[160] Cyanamid International announced plans to manufacture pharmaceuticals in the Congo.[161] Other companies secured construction contracts. The Morrison-Knudson company participated in the huge Inga-Shaba hydroelectric project,[162] while Westinghouse furnished technical assistance for this project.[163] The Intercontinental Hotels Corporation began a large hotel project.[164] Both Bell Telephone and International Telephone and Telegraph secured contracts.[165]

The American businessman who appears to have benefited most was Maurice Tempelsman. We have already discussed his role in the copper sector. Tempelsman participated in numerous other ventures. Working closely with the De Beers cartel, Tempelsman helped reorganize the Congo's diamond industry during 1966 and 1967. Tempelsman reportedly "represented" De Beers in the Congo and obtained a sales contract for the Congo's diamonds, which he marketed through De Beers channels. This new arrangement was highly advantageous for Tempelsman.[166] Moreover, Tempelsman, in association with former treasury secretary Anderson, began to act as a broker for the numerous American investors in the Congo. Tempelsman and Anderson represented the following companies: Standard Oil of Indiana, Goodyear, Libby Pineapple, Aluminum Company of America, and Morrison-Knudson. Some of these companies made investments in the Congo which complemented Tempelsman's own activities.[167] Tempelsman appears to have continued his broker role into the 1980s.[168]

However, direct investment was not the main source of capital; bank loans were. The early 1970s was a major period of international expansion for American banks, and the banks helped finance many Third World development projects.[169] The Congo was one of several Third World countries that were regarded as good credit risks. In 1971, First National City Bank became the first American bank to open a branch in the Congo.[170] In 1973, First National City announced that it would lead an international consortium to provide a $250 million loan for the Inga-Shaba hydroelectric project.[171] In 1974, the Chase Manhattan Bank organized a consortium to finance the Tenke Fungurume mining project.[172] In addition, the following American banks participated in various Congo loan consortia: Morgan Guaranty Trust, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Bank of America, Equibank, and Continental Illinois Bank.[173] The commercial loans were supplemented by credits from public institutions such as the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank. All of the loans enabled the Congolese to import substantial equipment and technical expertise from the West (and especially from the United States).

The loans also expanded the Rockefeller interests in the Congo. Both First National City and Chase Manhattan, the leading U.S. banks in the Congo, were historically Rockefeller controlled.[174] David Rockefeller was, of course, president of Chase Manhattan. In 1971, Rockefeller, after a lengthy State Department briefing, personally toured the Congo.[175] The Rockefeller Foundation provided aid to the Congo in a variety of areas, including English language instruction.[176]

It was widely believed that the American interests were displacing the Belgians. As early as 1968, one observer offered the following assessment: "I have the impression that Belgium is becoming used to the idea of having the U.S. influencing things in the Congo and sometimes running them in a manner which is prejudicial to Belgian interests and which even courts the risk of eliminating the Belgian presence in the Congo . . . Belgian officials, too, are worried about doing anything which the United States might find offensive."[177] In 1970, Tempelsman's Tenke Fungurume deal constituted a major defeat for the Belgians. American officials reassured Belgian interests that they would not be totally displaced in Africa. In 1971, for example, the Belgian foreign minister was to be told, "the major investments planned by the Tempelsman/Anderson group, Kaiser, Goodyear, and others, do not signify an official U.S. Government policy to displace the Belgian presence in the Congo. On the contrary, the Congo has such a tremendous potential, and such a tremendous requirement for investment capital, we feel there is room for investors of many nationalities."[178] Commercial competition between the USA and Belgium was thus a politically sensitive issue.

Despite the reassurances, it appears that the Belgians were being displaced. In the area of loans—the largest source of foreign capital—American banks played the leading role. By the end of 1977, American banks had provided 35.5 percent of all loans to the Congo, while Belgian banks accounted for only 8.3 percent.[179] Belgian companies probably predominated in the category of equity investment, although no reliable figures are available.[180] Even in this area, however, the Belgian role was declining. A 1972 study noted a net decrease in the Belgian share of investments in the Congo.[181]

Clearly Americans were not the only investors. Numerous other countries participated in the investment boom. In 1967, the Italian ENI company completed a major oil refining plant in the Congo.[182] Italian and German firms helped build the Maluku steel mills.[183] Another German company agreed to construct a cement plant.[184] Japan's Nippon Mining Company received a major copper concession near the Zambian frontier.[185] Other investments came from Great Britain, Austria, Sweden, Canada, and the Netherlands.[186]

Probably the most important foreign investor in the Congo, after the United States, was France. France has traditionally maintained extensive economic and military interests throughout Africa and was eager to expand its influence still further. It should also be noted that the Congo was one of the largest French-speaking countries in the world. The French private sector gained new opportunities. Peugeot and Renault both announced plans for assembling vehicles in the Congo,[187] while French banks played a major role in the commercial banking consortia.[188] The Congolese government awarded a contract to Thomson, a French electronics firm, to build a highly sophisticated communications system. When it was completed in 1980, the Congo became "one of the first countries in the world [and certainly one of the very few in the Third World] to possess its own domestic satellite-communications network."[189]

The French investments were supplemented by increased French political influence. In 1969, the French-dominated Organisation Commune de l'Afrique et Malgache (OCAM) held its annual conference in the Congo. Mobutu established close personal ties to President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, one of the most pro-French leaders in Africa. In 1971 Mobutu considered a monetary association with France and sought to link the

Congo's national currency, the zaire, to the French franc.[190] The State Department interpreted these developments as follows: "Now through OCAM, with the help of the French, the convertability of the Zaire in terms of the CFA Franc and the French Franc, the umbilical cord, so long attached to Belgium, will be further snipped, demonstrating the Congo's diminishing dependence on the former metropole."[191] The French, along with the Americans, seemed intent on displacing Belgian influence in central Africa.

French interests in the Congo sustained a reversal in 1972. In that year Mobutu, irritated by a series of disputes with other French-speaking countries, withdrew from OCAM.[192] This setback proved to be only temporary, however, and with the election of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 1974, French influence achieved new heights. According to *Africa Confidential*, the Congo "falls within the Giscardian 'mercantilist' policy of cultivating the more important countries in the third world, and is part of a long-term effort by the French to extend their sphere of influence."[193] President Giscard had a personal interest in the matter, since several of his relatives participated in the Congo investments.[194]

The amount of foreign investment in the Congo remained relatively modest compared with that in many Third World countries in Asia or Latin America. However, it was widely believed that these investments were only the beginning. The Congo, after all, had some of the world's richest mineral reserves, apparent political stability, and a government that was generally receptive to foreign investors. The Congo, moreover, had been synonymous with profits since the era of King Leopold.[195] In 1970, one source stated that the "Congo [is] very attractive to overseas investors."[196] By 1971 the French business magazine *Marchés Tropicaux* called the Congo a "country of the future."[197]

The Congo's prosperity, however, came to an abrupt end during the mid-1970s. In 1973–75, Mobutu undertook a series of ill-advised and poorly planned nationalization measures, which basically extended political patronage and corruption. Numerous plantations, retail stores, and light manufacturing plants, mostly Belgian-owned, were confiscated and managed (or mismanaged) by Mobutu's political allies. In 1974, the world recession brought a major drop in the price of copper, the Congo's main export. Moreover, the oil shock caused an increase in the price of imported oil products. The Congo's balance of payments fell into deficit.[198] Mobutu was largely discredited by the decline in economic conditions, as well as by his collaboration, in 1975, with the CIA's covert operations in Angola. The popular discontent was especially serious in Katanga province, the source of the Congo's mineral exports. A series of strikes occurred in 1976. An armed insurrection in 1977 was repressed with French, Moroccan, and U.S. support.[199]

The Mobutu regime, with all of the economic upheavals and disorder, was politically and economically bankrupt. The Congo's foreign debt, estimated at three billion dollars in 1975,[200] was largely unrecoverable. The Congo became the first "problem country" of the Third World debt crisis. Since the middle 1970s, the International Monetary Fund has attempted, generally without much success, to restructure the economy and to ensure at least some debt repayment.[201]

Investors remained optimistic and hoped that the problems would prove temporary. Between 1974 and 1977, American direct investment in the Congo more than doubled, increasing from $64 million in 1974 to $151 million in 1977.[202] (No comparable figures are available with regard to bank loans, the greatest source of foreign capital.) In 1978, however, the situation deteriorated still further, with a new revolt in Katanga province. This revolt was far more dramatic than the one of the previous year. A massacre of whites in the town of Kolwezi ensured extensive press coverage. French and Belgian parachute units, dropped from American transport planes, helped to defeat the rebellion and saved the Mobutu regime from collapse.[203]

The Mobutu regime was preserved, but the Congo's image was thoroughly tarnished. Since 1978, American investment has stagnated.[204] Ironically, the Tenke Fungurume project, the focus of so much commercial competition, was finally closed in 1983, after years of construction and over $280 million in expenditures.[205] The Mobutu regime became mired in its endemic corruption, and according to one recent survey the "regime's only notable accomplishment from 1987–88 was its capacity to survive."[206] It is evident that the Congo did not prove as rich a prize as many had anticipated.

Conclusion

The reader may at this point raise a serious objection to the findings of this chapter: so what? All that has been demonstrated is that the U.S. government supported American business interests in the Congo. There is really nothing surprising here, since the government is supposed to promote American commercial interests all over the world.

The author would argue that his findings are significant, at least when seen in the context of the whole study. Chapter 4 argued that the anticolonial business interests sought new investments in the Congo. Specifically, the anticolonial interests sought to reduce Belgian influence in the Congo, both politically and economically, and to increase American influence. By late 1965, with the advent of the Mobutu regime, the political objectives were accomplished. At that time the USA became politically dominant in the Congo. By 1967, the *New York Times* reported, "No other nation, not even Belgium, is as deeply involved in the Congo as is the United States," while the *London Daily Telegraph* referred to the USA as the "caretaker power" in the Congo.[207]

The Business Conflict model suggests that American political dominance would lead to new U.S. investments and the gradual displacement of the Belgian interests. In fact, this is exactly what happened during the period 1966–70. In 1970 a Tempelsman-led consortium gained control of the largest copper seams in the Congo, at Tenke Fungurume. This contract was particularly important, since copper was the mainstay of the Congolese economy, and since the Belgians had traditionally dominated that sector. The Belgians were never completely displaced and continued to play an important role in the Congo, which has continued to the present day. However, Belgian preeminence had clearly ended. A former Tempelsman employee remarked that the Belgians "realized they had lost the Congo" when the Tenke Fungurume copper deal was concluded.[208] American investors, especially contractors and commercial lenders, gradually displaced the Belgians in other sectors as well.

It is true that many of the investments turned out to be disastrous failures. American investors nevertheless had perceived the Congo to be profitable, and this perception influenced their conduct. The anticolonial interests gained increased access. The Congo thus became essentially an American sphere of influence.

7 Conclusion: Rethinking the "Autonomy" of the State

> The government is not now and never has been an independent engine . . . Moreover, private citizens entering the service of the Government do not pass through a personal metamorphosis. A banker, called to serve the Treasury Department . . . cannot be expected to divest himself of the customs and policies, the conception of interests and the tactics of the banking fraternity in which he has been trained. Nor can he be expected to shake off the personal associations he has made there, or turn a deaf ear to the importunities of friends when the occasion arises . . . It is a natural phenomenon and easy to understand.
>
> Charles Beard[1]

The political role of business has long been a contentious issue in the fields of international relations and comparative politics. In recent years the perspective of "state autonomy," which argues that state bureaucrats are not decisively influenced by business pressures, has gained popularity. It has profoundly influenced the study of domestic politics as well as foreign policy and international relations. The state autonomy perspective, also termed Statism, has been a source of controversy. In one recent debate, Theda Skocpol, a leading Statist, presented a history of the Social Security Act and claimed that it had been formulated without significant business influence. G. William Domhoff wrote a critique of this history from an Instrumental Marxist perspective, pointing out that specific businessmen had participated in writing the Social Security legislation.[2] In a response, Skocpol did not deny that business figures had participated. She argued, however, that the figures had not *decisively* influenced the policy process or the resulting legislation. Business interests may have wished to influence the legislation, but their efforts failed.[3]

The present author has disagreements with both parties in this debate, but we will discuss those questions later. At present, we will note that Skocpol raised a serious methodological problem. This study has argued at length that business played a decisive role in U.S. foreign policy during the Congo Crisis, and that the state was not insulated from business pressures. In order to substantiate this argument, it will be necessary to do two things. First, it must be demonstrated that companies actually were interested in the Congo turmoil, and that these companies attempted to influence the government. Second, the study must answer Skocpol's objection. It must be demonstrated that business decisively influenced state policy. This study must show that without these business interests, the Congo Crisis would have had a significantly different outcome.

The first step is easy. We have seen that numerous companies were interested in the Congo, before and after independence. In chapter 2, we saw that Belgian investors had played a key role in the colonization of the Congo. These colonial interests gradually established connections to American business. In chapter 3, we saw that these "procolonial" interests had very close ties to the Eisenhower administration, and that several of their representatives actually worked in the administration. Chapter 4 discussed a second set of business interests, termed the anticolonial bloc, which sought to end Belgian domination of the Congo and establish their own investments. The chapter also described diverse business connections to the Kennedy administration. Chapter 6 showed how American companies gained major investments in the Congo during the late 1960s and the 1970s. The chapter documented continued collaboration between business interests and government officials. In short, there was business interest in the Congo, and certain companies established ties to policymakers and politicians.

The second step, to prove that these interests actually influenced policy, is more difficult. The introduction discussed the difficulties involved in proving causality. Consistent with the proposed methodology, this conclusion will attempt the following: This chapter will recount the major empirical findings of the study on the Congo; it will then compare these findings with the six theories discussed in chapter 1, and also with the author's Business Conflict model. Then we will try to determine which theory best explains the data.

Policy Outcomes

Perhaps the most surprising finding was the relatively low salience of Cold War factors during the 1960–63 Congo Crisis. The Soviet-Chinese role during this period was secondary, and it was largely restricted to the first year of the crisis. Even in that year, the scale of Soviet intervention never approached that of the Western powers. After the death of Patrice Lumumba in early 1961, the communist powers played only a minor role.

The most important issue in the Congo Crisis—the Katanga secession—was not primarily a Cold War issue. In the Katanga affair all sides were anticommunist. Certainly Moise Tshombe, with his extreme right-wing connections, could not be accused of communist sympathies. The central government, largely sponsored by the CIA, was no less anticommunist. The Soviets played no major role one way or the other in the Katanga controversy.

During the Kennedy period, the Congo Crisis was primarily a U.S.-European conflict rather than a U.S.-Soviet conflict. European politicians and newspapers, as we saw, continually criticized the Kennedy administration and sometimes engaged in strident anti-American polemics. Intercapitalist conflicts played a central role in the crisis. The conflicts subsided during the 1963–65 period, when the Congo was racked by anti-Western rebellions. By 1965 the rebellions were contained; the U.S.-European rivalry resumed and continued into the 1970s. Thus, the Congo Crisis was partly an intercapitalist rivalry.

The Statist perspective ignores intercapitalist rivalries and emphasizes instead the importance of Cold War factors. Indeed, Stephen Krasner attributes all armed U.S. interventions (since World War II) to anticommunist sentiments. The Statist perspective cannot fully account for the facts of the Congo case. In the Katanga conflict, *both* sides were anticommunist. The USA could have supported either side and still have justified the policy in anticommunist terms. It is ironic that Soviet leaders opposed the Katanga secession. They thus had much in common with the policies of the Kennedy administration. It was primarily the European powers, especially France, Great Britain, and (more ambiguously) Belgium that opposed American policy in the Congo. The Statist argument exaggerates the role of anticommunism and is unable to account for the U.S.-European conflict. Anticommunism influenced U.S. policy to some extent, but as a complete explanation it will not suffice.

The Business Conflict model accords quite well with the facts of the Congo case. This model predicts that international crises divide the international business community, and that the resulting business rivalries cause rivalries among states. This is exactly what took place in the Congo. The business community was indeed divided between the anticolonial business interests, which opposed the Katanga secession, and the procolonial interests, which favored Katanga. We have also seen that the anticolonial bloc had close ties to the Kennedy administration, while the procolonial interests were more influential with the European governments. The Congo Crisis may be viewed as a struggle between the USA and Europe, and among American and European business interests, over control of the Congo and its commercial resources. The Business Conflict model, in short, can account for the U.S.-European rivalry in the Congo. The relative absence of Cold War factors is easily comprehensible.

Another finding was that U.S. policy changed over time. Policy changes were particularly obvious on the Katanga issue. The Eisenhower administration favored the Katanga secession and even supplied it with arms. The Kennedy administration, in contrast, opposed Katanga, and despite much hesitation, it helped crush the secession. An adequate theory must explain this change in policy.

Statists cannot explain such changes, since they view American foreign policy as consistent and relatively stable over time. Indeed, stability is regarded as one the defining features of the Statist, or national interest, perspective. Krasner, for example, makes the following point: "Here the national interest is defined inductively as the preferences of American central decision makers. Such a set of objectives must be related to general societal goals, *persist over time* [emphasis added], and have a consistent ranking of importance in order to justify using the term 'national interest.'"[4] The National Character approach also assumes stability and suggests that American foreign policy will be consistently anticolonial. The National Character and Statist perspectives cannot explain the policy change during the Kennedy administration.

The Business Conflict perspective does, however, explain this policy change, by analyzing the dynamics of business activity. Eisenhower and Kennedy followed different policies because they were supported by different types of business interests. Pro-Belgian interests supported the Eisenhower administration, causing Eisenhower to favor the Belgian position in the Congo. Anti-Belgian interests—which sought to supplant the Belgian companies—supported Kennedy; Kennedy's policies were, accordingly, anti-Belgian. The Business Conflict model explains the facts of the Congo Crisis better than alternative approaches.

The Policy Process

The study has also made important findings with regard to the foreign policy process. Just as the substance of policy changed over time, the policy-making process also changed. During the Eisenhower administration, Congo policy entailed no significant bureaucratic conflict. No agency seriously challenged the official, pro-Katanga policy. The Kennedy policy, in contrast, involved protracted bureaucratic feuding, especially with regard to the Katanga issue. The Kennedy period was also marked by extended periods of indecision. During the 1963–65 rebellions, the foreign policy process changed a second time. Once again, bureaucratic feuds largely disappeared. Virtually all officials supported the official policy, including the collaboration with Belgium, the appointment of Tshombe as prime minister, and the counterinsurgency campaign. In short, the Kennedy period included bureaucratic disagreement, while the Eisenhower and Johnson periods included little or no disagreement.

The foreign policy process is usually explained by the Bureaucratic Politics approach. This approach, which assumes bureaucratic conflict, works well for the Kennedy period, when such disputes were very much in evidence. Bureaucratic Politics will not, however, explain the Eisenhower or Johnson periods, when bureaucratic conflict subsided. The Bureaucratic Politics approach is basically a static theory, and it cannot account for changes in the decision-making process.

The Business Conflict model can, however, explain these changes. This model predicts that when one faction of business gains influence in a single presidential administration, then there will be little or no bureaucratic feuding; when two or more business factions gain influence in the same administration, then there will be bureaucratic feuding. These predictions worked well in our analysis of the Congo. We saw that the Eisenhower administration had ties to only one faction of business—the pro-Katanga group of companies—and Congo policy accordingly generated no significant bureaucratic conflict. The Kennedy administration was supported by both pro-Katanga and anti-Katanga companies, and it experienced a great deal of bureaucratic conflict.

The Business Conflict approach recognizes that the capitalists can sometimes set aside their petty differences and act as a bloc. Specifically, we can expect such unity when anticapitalist movements emerge and threaten to seize power in Third World countries. In such cases, both business conflict and bureaucratic conflict will cease. The capitalists inside and outside the government will act in concert to defeat the radicals.

Such events occurred in the Congo case during the period 1963–65, when anti-Western rebels threatened to overthrow the pro-American Adoula government. The investors and bureaucrats temporarily ended their feuding and focused on the counterinsurgency. In general the Business Conflict model predicts that bureaucratic politics will parallel business politics; when business is divided, the state will be divided, and when business is united, the state will also be united. These predictions are consistent with the facts of the Congo case.

Business Interests and Politics

We have found that business, as a social group, almost completely dominated policy-making. We examined at length the numerous investors and their complicated lobbying activities. Business groups were deeply involved in the Congo Crisis, while nonbusiness groups played only a negligible role.

There were only three examples of nonbusiness interest groups in the Congo Crisis. Many African-Americans apparently had an interest in the Congo. Black activists, led by the United African Nationalist Movement, protested the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and demonstrated at the United Nations headquarters.[5] However, those protesters lacked organization, money, and political connections. There is no evidence from any source that the protesters influenced U.S. policy. Also, several Protestant ministers spoke in favor of Katanga, since Moise Tshombe had been educated at Methodist mission schools.[6] Those ministers also played a very minor role.

A third example of a nonbusiness interest group was the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters, a right-wing organization. This group did influence policy. It constrained the Kennedy administration and the UN. The members of the American Committee, mostly conservative activists, did not have any direct financial interest in Katanga. Yet the American Committee was not completely independent of business interests, since it was organized, and probably funded, by the Katanga Information Services, which in turn represented Belgian companies. Therefore the committee at least indirectly represented business interests. All other interest groups spoke for either the procolonial bloc or the anticolonial bloc of companies. The interest group system was thus biased in favor of business.

Pluralism fails to explain this bias. As discussed in chapter 1, the Pluralist perspective generally deemphasizes the role of business interests and implies that business is just one more interest group. Pluralism, as its name suggests, emphasizes a *plurality* of politically potent social groups. The Pluralist literature suggests that business does not dominate policy-making; but business groups did dominate during the Congo Crisis. Pluralism cannot account for this dominance. The Business Conflict approach, in contrast, easily accounts

for the preeminence of business interest groups. Indeed, business dominance is a key assumption of the Business Conflict model.

In this study we have also analyzed the nature of business-government interaction in the Congo case. We have seen that business interests established direct connections to the government. The Eisenhower administration had close ties to the pro-Katanga interests, while the Kennedy administration was connected to the anticolonial bloc. The anticolonial bloc, especially Maurice Tempelsman, also had connections to the Johnson and Nixon administrations. We found, moreover, that the investors competed with each other for political influence. Investors used their political connections to gain advantages over their competitors.

The Instrumental Marxist paradigm correctly anticipates such direct connections between business and government, but it fails to account for the divisions within the business community. The Instrumentalists tend to view the capitalist class as a monolith, while the Congo case suggests that the capitalists were seriously divided. The Instrumentalists cannot account for such intercapitalist conflicts.[7]

Structural Marxists, in contrast, minimize the importance of direct business ties. They often fail to discuss such ties, or they argue that these do not significantly influence politics. Nicos Poulantzas, for example, states that even where business does participate directly in government, the participation "*in no way changes things* [emphasis in original]."[8] Structuralists emphasize indirect channels of business influence. Charles Lindblom, for example, claims that business is a "privileged" group, because it can refuse to invest and can thus sabotage the economy. The threat of such a capital strike compels governments to favor business.

The Congo Crisis provides little support for the Structuralist view of politics. There is no indication that business interests ever considered a capital strike. The Structuralist view of politics may be sophisticated and nuanced, but it bears little relation to the facts of the Congo Crisis. Direct business-government ties, so often dismissed by the Structuralists, were much in evidence.

Structuralism does, however, have one advantage: it anticipates the phenomenon of business conflict. Poulantzas, for example, notes "the differences and relations between fractions of capital." He asks rhetorically: "Can a Marxist pass over in silence the existent differences and relations, under imperialism, between comprador monopoly capital, national monopoly capital, nonmonopoly capital, industrial capital, or financial capital?"[9] Structuralists suggest that a relatively autonomous state will mediate these differences among capital. An autonomous state is in fact essential to resolve the differences and serve the general interests of the capitalist class.

However, the concept of "the general interests of the capitalist class" often holds little meaning. What were the general interests in the Congo case? Did these interests favor or oppose the Katanga secession? No obvious answer presents itself. For the sake of analysis, let us assume that the general interests of capitalism favored an end to the Katanga secession. In that case, the Structuralist perspective might explain the Kennedy policy toward the Congo, since it was generally anti-Katanga. It cannot explain, however, the pro-Katanga policies of the Eisenhower administration. This paradigm provides no analysis of policy changes. The Structuralists argue that policymakers favor capitalism. They tend to ignore, however, the fact that policymakers can favor capitalism and still have a very wide range of options. The Structuralist model provides no way of predicting *which* procapitalist policies the government will favor, and it does not specify the conditions that cause different governments to favor different policies. The predictive power of Structural Marxism is, accordingly, quite low.

The Business Conflict model does account for these factors. It correctly predicts the political dominance of business interests, the existence of interbusiness conflicts, and the direct ties between business and government. And as discussed, this model can account for changes in policy. It can explain, for example, the differences between the Eisenhower and Kennedy policies toward the Congo. The Congo case is thus better explained by the Business Conflict than by any of the other approaches.

The Business Conflict Model in Perspective

We have seen evidence that the Business Conflict model explains the events of the Congo Crisis, and that this model is more convincing than alternative explanations. However, the Congo is only a single case. The Business Conflict model, if it is really valid, must be generalizable and must apply to a range of cases.

Can the model be generalized? It is, of course, difficult to determine this from a single case study, but there is reason to believe that it can be generalized. The U.S. commercial stake in the Congo has always been small in comparison with that in other parts of the world. U.S. investments were never expected to equal those in Europe, Latin American, Asia, or the Middle East.

The Congo at independence had less than twenty million dollars in direct American investment.[10] Indeed, several studies discount the possibility of business influence in the Congo Crisis precisely because of the low level of U.S. commercial interest in the country.[11] The Congo is thus one of the last countries where one would expect investments to influence U.S. policy. If business influence was important even in this case, then our conclusions should also apply with even more force to cases where the U.S. commercial interest was higher.

The Business Conflict model probably could be applied to the study of other regional conflicts. The present study has shown that anticolonialism was a decisive factor in U.S. policy during the Congo Crisis, and that this anticolonial policy, moreover, was supported by a significant segment of the business community. This analysis of the Congo case could be extended to the whole of Africa. Anticolonialism was a major factor in U.S. policy during the Kennedy administration, and it was manifested throughout the African continent. Just as the USA opposed neocolonialism in the Congo, it opposed neocolonialism all over Africa.

These anticolonial manifestations warrant some discussion. First, Kennedy urged rapid decolonization of all areas still under colonial rule. The Kennedy administration pressured Portugal to grant independence to its colonies, and established contact with guerrillas in the Portuguese colony of Angola. The administration also sought friendly relations with Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who were both regarded as radical, nationalist leaders. Kennedy greatly augmented the American presence in Africa. Foreign aid was increased, and Peace Corps programs were established throughout the continent.[12] President Kennedy denounced apartheid and refused to sell arms to South Africa. Africa policy for the first time was given considerable attention, and the president often mentioned Africa in his speeches.[13]

Some researchers assert that Kennedy's interest in Africa was only a cosmetic change and that as with previous administrations, the USA was only interested in precluding communist influence in the continent and in supporting the European position.[14] This view is incorrect; it ignores a distinct anti-European component in Kennedy's policy. This component is illustrated in the memoirs of Charles Darlington, who was Kennedy's ambassador to Gabon:

> The Gabonese knew few goods but French . . . French administrators and technicians encouraged and fostered the use of French products . . . [Several central African countries]

> surrounded themselves with a customs tariff, known as the Common External Tariff . . . The beneficiary for practical purposes was France. The supplier that was hit was the United States . . . It was plain that the step had been engineered by French technical advisors . . . [In Africa] France takes part of their exchange earnings for the benefit of the metropole. This is an old colonial practice which is now quite rightly termed "neocolonialism" . . . [This practice] bears particularly harshly on the dollar earnings of these states and limits their commercial relations with the United States.[15]

Darlington's memoirs note intense French hostility toward American interests. This hostility is easy to understand. Ambassador Darlington had for fifteen years been an executive with the Mobil Oil Company[16]—which had a history of feuding with French interests in Central Africa.

During the 1960s, France opposed the USA throughout the continent. In Guinea, French officials harassed Americans. According to one account: "A French Foreign Ministry spokesman said . . . that Paris would prefer a 'Soviet Guinea' to an 'Americanized Guinea.'"[17] Charles de Gaulle's chief aide on African affairs, Jacques Foccart, was stridently anti-American and became "virtually the main enemy of United States diplomacy in Africa." Foccart's staff "saw the United States, not China or Russia, as the main enemy."[18] An American journalist offers this assessment: "By 1963, it was abundantly clear that the U.S. faced open hostility in Africa from France: de Gaulle was convinced that Washington coveted his black satellites; French Africans who showed pro-American sentiments were sandbagged by French agents in African administrations; almost all American attempts to invest in French Africa were sabotaged, usually successfully."[19] France thus became a "hostile ally" of the United States.[20]

These conflicts were not confined to the former French colonies. In Great Britain, a Conservative member of parliament made these remarks about U.S. diplomacy in Africa:

> The whole business has a sinister ring reminiscent of Abadan [in the Persian Gulf] . . . It is almost inescapable that the State Department seeks to dominate the Central African copper industry for American commercial ends, not for the benefit of the inhabitants. This sinister picture is still further blackened by the common knowledge that until recently the American Consul-General's office in Salisbury [Southern

> Rhodesia] was staffed almost on a "Russian" scale, and that its employees were deliberately currying favor with African agitators . . . If these suggestions are well founded they make nonsense of President Kennedy's plea for an "Atlantic Community."[21]

One need not accept at face value all of these allegations.[22] Nevertheless, it does appear that the Americans and Europeans were competing for influence, and that Kennedy genuinely opposed European policy. Future studies could use the Business Conflict methodology to analyze the role of private interests in this diplomacy and how these events influenced the politics of African decolonization. The analysis of the Congo could be generalized.

It is possible, therefore, that the Business Conflict model could help us to understand other conflicts in addition to the Congo Crisis. However, the model does not apply in all cases. It would be less valuable in cases where popular, "nonbusiness" interest groups are active. Such interest groups, on occasions, can compete effectively with business lobbies. Antiapartheid organizations, for example, have apparently influenced U.S. policy toward South Africa. The Business Conflict model cannot account for nonbusiness actors. A traditional Pluralist model might be appropriate for such cases.

The Business Conflict model, moreover, would tell us little about Soviet or Chinese intervention. The model emphasizes the role of private companies; in the communist countries, the private sector is very small, and all large companies are state owned. The Business Conflict approach would apply only to countries with market economies. A Statist approach would better explain intervention by the communist countries.

The Business Conflict model would also be less useful when both superpowers become substantially involved in a Third World conflict.[23] Business interests are generally hostile toward communism, and Cold War conflicts tend to unite the international business community. Business conflict also declines whenever large anticapitalist political movements emerge in Third World countries. Investors unite in support of the counterrevolutionary forces, and intercapitalist rivalries subside. For such cases, Statist or Marxist approaches are more appropriate than the Business Conflict model.

The model would nevertheless prove useful in analyzing a wide range of cases. It is particularly well suited for studying political conflict in Africa. African countries meet a key condition for the Business Conflict model—the absence of Marxist political movements—to a greater extent than other regions of the world. Few African countries have had powerful communist parties, and outside of intellectual circles, Marxist ideas have not fared well.[24]

Africa has certainly had its share of "radical nationalist" regimes, such as Nkrumah's Ghana and Touré's Guinea, but these maintained good relations with Western business interests. Even the nominally Marxist MPLA government in Angola has long courted Western oil companies.[25] The wholesale expulsion of foreign interests which accompanied the communist victories in Cuba and China did not occur in Angola. In Africa, radical regimes may use anticapitalist rhetoric, but their policies toward Western interests are usually quite moderate.

The sociology of African states further contributes to this moderation. Recent research emphasizes the importance of class conflict in African politics.[26] However, class conflicts are generally intertwined with highly complicated regional, ethnic, or racial feuds. Such conditions generally preclude the emergence of nationally organized, anticapitalist political movements. Social conflicts in Africa therefore do not usually threaten Western business interests, but they do provide ideal conditions for intercapitalist rivalries. Competing companies support various political groups in specific African conflicts.

The Nigerian Civil War of 1967–70 provides a potential case study.[27] France and Israel supported the secessionist state of Biafra, while Great Britain aided the central government in Lagos. Nigeria, with large reserves of petroleum, certainly interested international business. Similar rivalries may have occurred during the Angolan civil war of 1975–76. In this case, U.S., French, Brazilian, South African, and Southern Rhodesian companies and intelligence services all supported various Angolan factions.[28] The Sudanese, Chadian, Algerian, and Southern Rhodesian civil wars would provide other potential case studies for the Business Conflict model.

The Business Conflict model could also be applied elsewhere. The international relations of Latin American independence in the nineteenth century would be a promising case. It is well established that Great Britain played a major role in supporting the Latin American independence movements against Spain, and that the British government was partly motivated by a desire to end Spanish commercial dominance and to open the region for British trade. In 1824 one official commented: "Spanish America is free, and if we do not badly mismanage our affairs, she is English."[29] The Business Conflict model could elucidate how private interests interacted with the diplomacy of

Great Britain, Spain, and other powers during the independence struggle, and how these issues affected postindependence politics.

There is no reason to confine such studies to Third World conflicts. The model might explain the foreign policies of the European powers during the American Civil War. The model could also be applied to domestic conflicts that do not involve civil war. The Iranian nationalization crisis of 1953, for example, enabled American companies to obtain a 40 percent share of the Iranian oil production. This American windfall came at the expense of the established British interests.[30] Research might explore how the Anglo-American rivalry affected Iranian domestic politics, and how the oil companies influenced U.S. and British foreign policies. The Business Conflict model could also be used in studies of interstate conflicts. The Iran-Iraq war, for example, attracted considerable interest among oil companies and arms merchants throughout the world. The recent occupation of Kuwait, and the resulting crisis, would present further opportunities for study. Future research might examine how private interests interacted with the complex Persian Gulf diplomacy, as well as with the foreign policies of specific Western powers.

The Business Conflict model may even prove useful to a limited degree in analyzing countries with large-scale Marxist political movements. Business interests usually shun Marxists, but they may compete with each other for influence among the counterrevolutionary forces. The Business Conflict model could explain the interaction between international business interests and anti-Marxist political groups.

The Vietnam War provides one example. Throughout the war, the Americans and the French competed for influence in the South Vietnamese government. This competition continued until the fall of Saigon in 1975. According to a former CIA officer, the French retained investments in South Vietnam, and these investments "no doubt contributed to their abiding political interest in the country."[31] The French played a similar role in Cambodia.[32] The Russian Civil War of 1918–20 may provide another example, since it entailed extensive foreign intervention by several Western countries. It would be interesting in future studies to examine the role of private interests in these cases, and to see how international competition interacts with the internal politics of counterrevolutionary movements.

In summary, the Business Conflict model does not generally provide an adequate explanation for conflicts with anticapitalist political movements when the peripheral country in question has little investment potential or when

TABLE 3. Factors Affecting the Utility of the Business Conflict Model

Variables	Increased Utility	Decreased Utility
High level of Soviet-Chinese involvement in periphery[a]		x
Existence of large, anticapitalist movement in periphery		x
Activity by powerful, nonbusiness lobby groups in core		x
Socialist-nonmarket economy in core		x
Large, differentiated private sector in core	x	
Substantial investment by core in periphery	x	
Substantial investment potential in periphery	x	

[a] "Core" refers to the country engaging in foreign intervention, and "periphery" refers to the country that is the object of intervention. It is recognized that the core countries can also be the objects of foreign intervention.

nonbusiness lobbies are influential in the core country. The Business Conflict model does, however, apply where the core country has a large, differentiated private sector, where the periphery contains major investments or has investment potential, and where Cold War considerations are relatively unimportant (see table 3). We have seen that the model is particularly useful for studying political conflict in Africa.

The Future of Business Conflict

Will foreign intervention and business conflict continue to influence future international relations? According to one interpretation, the answer is negative. This perspective, of which Richard Rosecrance is the leading exponent, argues that military adventures have become far too expensive.[33] In an era of commercial decline, the USA can no longer afford the massive military expenditures that are essential for intervention. Other countries also will realize the folly of foreign intervention and will be dissuaded from replacing the USA as world policeman. The recent reductions in Cold War tension presumably should accelerate this trend.

Rosecrance and others oppose foreign interventionism because it detracts from the goal of economic efficiency, which is deemed essential in the competitive international trading environment. Military aggression will gradually become an anachronism. If this view proves correct—if interventionism does

decline—then the Business Conflict model would be only of historical significance. Third World intervention could become a thing of the past.

Let us consider further this argument. Rosecrance clearly affirms the desirability of free trade, and indeed his writings celebrate the concept. It is the institution of free trade, and the rigorous economic environment that it fosters, that will compel countries to be efficient. This compulsion, in turn, forces countries to reduce their military expenditures and hence their capacity for Third World intervention. It is free trade that will end interventionism.[34]

The present author is skeptical of the above analysis, and he will raise some objections. Rosecrance's optimism may be questioned. Surely free trade has some negative effects, but Rosecrance ignores these, or he discusses the negative effects in unrealistic terms.[35] Rosecrance, moreover, assumes the permanence of free trade, yet this permanence cannot be assured. No condition can be permanent. We will, therefore, consider criticisms of free trade doctrine—and how such criticisms may affect the issue of intervention.

One critic was John Maynard Keynes. Keynes opposed free trade on the grounds that it undermines national governments and precludes economic planning.[36] In recent years, free trade is once again being questioned. Present-day protectionists usually represent declining economic sectors, especially in manufacturing, which seek relief from foreign competition. Their arguments, less elegant than those of Keynes, are based on straight self-interest. With relatively stagnant economic growth, unemployment, and (in the USA) trade deficits, economic nationalism may gain increasing political support.[37] The present study will make no judgment with regard to the desirability of free trade or protection. It will note only that the existing system of relatively free trade is being challenged.

This discussion now can be summed up. International economic conditions may affect the nature of interventionism. Free trade may compel countries to minimize their wasteful foreign adventures and to focus instead on economic efficiency. Free trade could constrain core countries from intervening in the Third World. Foreign intervention would decline. However, there is nothing sacrosanct about the institution of free trade, and it could be replaced by a more protectionist system. If free trade were to end, the situation would be altogether different. The goal of efficiency would then be less important, and the economic restraints to militarism would be removed. Interventionism, accordingly, could continue.

Moreover, protection could generate new international arrangements, and these might also influence interventionism. Certain observers foresee a breakdown of multilateral trading patterns and, in their place, the rise of regional trading and currency blocs.[38] Some regard recent European integration as the beginning of a continental trading bloc, dominated by the Deutsche mark. Charles Meissner of Chemical Bank provides this assessment:

> The EMS [European Monetary System] in essence is becoming a Deutsche mark currency bloc, and eventually the Brits are going to join . . . You have the European Community as a Deutsche mark driven system, then the dollar system—including especially Canada, Mexico, and Brazil—and probably the development of a yen system in the Far East . . . All the seeds are there. Rather than a unified market-oriented international system, there would be in essence a trilateral economic system based on three economic and currency groupings.[39]

Meissner, in essence, foresees the emergence of protectionist, "mercantilist" arrangements on a global scale. The world would divide into three blocs. Such a system would differ fundamentally from the current system of multilateral trade, in which exporters face a truly global market. Rather than trading worldwide, as they do today, exporters will produce primarily for countries within specified regions. Trading blocs would certainly reduce microeconomic efficiency. Yet it is possible that the present system of multilateral trade will be replaced by three mercantilist trading blocs.

None of these predictions is assured. Perhaps multilateral trade will be preserved in some form despite the strains. However, if multilateralism fails, the Third World will surely be affected. Meissner predicts that future blocs will establish preferential ties with selected Third World spheres of influence. According to Meissner: "The Europeans build special bilateral relationships with Africa, primarily for raw materials and energy access. The [European] community in essence turns inward and forms a self-sufficient common market tied to resource and energy bases abroad. They force the United States to do the same in the Western Hemisphere, and the Japanese to do their own bit."[40] Within blocs, underdeveloped regions would also prove useful as markets for hard pressed export sectors. Such protected markets would be especially important in the type of low growth environment that would prevail under mercantilism.[41] The Third World could thus play an important role in a future mercantilist system.

Such a system would not necessarily be conducive to international peace. It

is possible that future trading blocs, or core countries within those blocs would compete for spheres of influence in the Third World. Numerous international rivalries would result, possibly entailing foreign intervention and war. A neomercantilist system, if it does develop, would provide new and increased incentives for intervention in the Third World.

In addition, other factors could contribute further to future interventionism. Foreign intervention already has a well-established bureaucracy within the USA, comprising the Central Intelligence Agency and a large segment of the military. These agencies have a vested interest in intervention. Moreover, a range of private concerns, including weapons manufacturers, producers of basic components for weapons fabrication, and certain types of foreign investors, might also favor Third World intervention. In other countries, such as France,[42] similar factors could promote interventionist policies.

A formidable array of interests will continue to favor foreign intervention, despite the decline of communism. Indeed the U.S. military is beginning to downplay the importance of anticommunism as a justification for policy. Admiral C. A. H. Trost, the chief of naval operations, recently conceded: "Since 1980 alone, the President has employed naval forces in crises and contingency operations almost 50 times. Virtually none of these had anything to do with East-West confrontation."[43] With the demise of the Cold War, the military will focus to an even greater extent than before upon intervention in the Third World as its principal raison d'être.[44]

Thus, it seems unlikely that foreign interventionism will disappear. The development of regional trading blocs, if they emerge, would provide an additional impetus for such actions. And as we have seen, international rivalries could accompany future interventions. The Business Conflict model may prove valuable in analyzing these events.

There is reason to believe that the Business Conflict approach can explain a range of cases in addition to the Congo Crisis. Also, the model might be useful in explaining future world politics. The existing literature fails to deal adequately with the role of private actors in international conflict and especially with the importance of cleavages among the private actors. The Business Conflict model may thus contribute significantly to the study of international relations.