

Notes

Introduction

1. Hans Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3, 1967, p. 430.
2. Quoted in Alfred Vagts, Introduction to Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), p. xxiv.
3. This was noted by Morgenthau (see n. 1), p. 425.
4. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 4.
5. Cited in Morgenthau (see n. 1), p. 425.
6. The Congo is a good place to study the question of business interests and their role in foreign interventionism, particularly by the USA. U.S. investment in the Congo has historically been quite low. Thus the Congo would constitute a "least likely" case. On the methodological point, regarding least likely cases, see Harry A. Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 7 (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
7. For this perspective, see, for example, Madeleine Kalb, *The Congo Cables* (New York: Macmillan, 1982).
8. On the Realist school, see E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); and Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). See also the literature review in R. D. McKinley and R. Little, *Global Problems and World Order* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988). For a classic Realist perspective on foreign intervention, see Morgenthau (n. 1).
9. Regarding the Dependency approach in general, see the excellent literature review in Thomas Biersteker, *Distortion or Development?* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), especially chap. 1. Major studies include: Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957); Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 2, 1971; Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 4, 1974; and Peter Evans, *Dependent Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). For a critique of Dependency, from a Marxist perspective, see Bill Warren, "Imperial-

ism and Capitalist Industrialization," *New Left Review* no. 81, 1973. The author has argued that the concept of Dependency, despite its deficiencies, still provides an accurate analysis for many of the least developed countries. See David Gibbs, "The Politics of Economic Development: The Case of the Mauritanian Fishing Industry," *African Studies Review* 27, no. 4, 1984. In general, the Dependency approach comes closest to the Instrumental Marxist approach, which will be outlined in chapter 1, although some studies would fall into the Structural Marxist camp.

10. For the use of such concepts, see Claude Ake, *Revolutionary Pressures in Africa* (London: Zed Press, 1978), pp. 11-25. The concept of international class conflict, between core and periphery, is also present in Wallerstein (see n. 9).

11. Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). Young states, in his introduction, that he focuses primarily on internal, Congolese politics and eschews international influences; Young does not consider the possibility that the two realms, internal and international, are intertwined.

Note that in more recent work Young partially corrects this bias and does consider foreign intervention, although, in this author's opinion, he still greatly understates the importance of intervention. See Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

12. Baran (see n. 9), p. 22.

13. Quoted in Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), unnumbered page preceding title page. Emphasis in the original has been deleted.

14. Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's secretary of the interior, provides one example of such falsification. According to Robert Keohane: "Ickes managed to confound a generation of historians . . . by not only lying to Congressional committees but by altering the minutes of relevant government-industry meetings and even including an incorrect account in his 'secret diary,' later published" (Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], p. 153).

15. This methodology is suggested in Carl G. Hempel, *Philosophy of Natural Science* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966), chap. 4. Three other criteria for evaluating various theories should also be mentioned. First, the theory should be potentially falsifiable. If any theory cannot be falsified by evidence, then it must be rejected as a tautology. Second, the theory must be internally consistent. Third, a simple theory is preferable to a complex theory.

Chapter One

1. James Madison, "The Federalist no. 10," pp. 58-59 in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., *The Federalist* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1961).

2. It is also important to establish what does *not* constitute foreign intervention. Intervention is not the same as conventional aggression. A military campaign aimed at seizing territory from another country, or in terminating another country's existence and annexing it altogether, does not constitute intervention. The distinguishing feature of intervention is that it does not affect the formal sovereignty of the country that is the object of intervention. The object country will still retain its own flag and will have its

territory intact, although its government and politics will to a significant extent reflect foreign manipulation.

3. Copious examples of such interventionist tactics may be found in Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell Books, 1980), especially part 2.

4. This point is emphasized in Hans Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene," *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3, 1967.

5. Chester Bowles, *The Conscience of a Liberal* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 66-67. Further discussion and analysis of this perspective can be found in Abraham Lowenthal, "United States Policy Toward Latin America: 'Liberal,' 'Radical,' and 'Bureaucratic' Perspectives," *Latin American Research Review* 8, no. 3, 1973. For a good critique of this perspective, see Robert Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

It should be noted that the National Character approach to foreign policy is one variant of the "civic culture" paradigm. See the classic study: Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); as well as critiques in Brian Barry, *Sociologists, Economists, and Democracy* (London: Collier Macmillan, 1970), chap. 3; and Carole Pateman, "The Civic Culture: A Philosophical Critique," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980). In the author's opinion, these critiques definitively demolish the civic culture paradigm.

6. The National Character perspective is expressed in the following confidential document from a Council on Foreign Relations study group: Report no. E-B71, June 24, 1944, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace series, Council on Foreign Relations Archives. U.S. government documents from this period also express anticolonial views.

7. For example, see Tony Smith, *The Pattern of Imperialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 4.

8. Smith (see n. 7), pp. 157-158, acknowledges incidents when the United States engaged in imperialism, but he claims that these incidents were aberrations.

It should be noted that there is a second variant of the National Character model of intervention (although this variant will not be analyzed in detail, since it is rarely employed in discussions of African cases). This perspective emphasizes that the USA, because of its liberal traditions, seeks to export democracy to the Third World. This approach is often explicitly interventionist; its adherents encourage intervention, allegedly to spread democracy. Samuel Huntington, for example, emphasizes democratic sentiments and their role in U.S. intervention. Huntington strongly implies that ensuring free elections was the principal motivation behind U.S. intervention. See Samuel Huntington, "American Ideals Versus American Institutions," *Political Science Quarterly* 97, no. 1, 1982, p. 27.

In the opinion of the present author, these claims are very much at variance with reality, and it is difficult to believe that Huntington intended to be taken seriously. For another view of the same issue, contending that American policy has often helped undermine democratic governments, see Edward N. Muller, "Dependent Economic De-

velopment, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World," *International Studies Quarterly* 29, no. 4, 1985.

9. Robert A. Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

10. F. Chidozie Ogene, *Interest Groups and the Shaping of Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

11. James MacGregor Burns and Jack Walter Peltason, cited in Randall Bartlett, *Economic Foundations of Political Power* (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 150. The classic works of Pluralism include Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).

12. Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963). This study, generally regarded as one of the seminal works of the paradigm, analyzes U.S. foreign trade policy and the role of business groups. See also Ithiel de Sola Pool, "How Powerful is Business?" in Robert Hessen, ed., *Does Big Business Rule America?* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1981). Pool (p. 33) summarizes his earlier work this way: "Businessmen were often extremely maladroitness and uncomfortable in the unfamiliar world of the public sector."

The present author believes that the Bauer, Pool, and Dexter study is critically flawed, since it focuses on congressional lobbying, while it ignores lobbying of the executive branch. The study probably overstates protectionist business interests, since these customarily rely on congressional support. The problem is that the protectionists have generally been less powerful than the free traders, at least since the New Deal. It would therefore seem that Bauer, Pool, and Dexter focus their attention on relatively weak business interests; their conclusion, that business is a "maladroitness" interest group, is predetermined by the biases of the study. A forthcoming study corrects this bias and emphasizes the free trade lobby. See Jerri-Lynn Scofield, "Foreign Policy as Domestic Politics: The Political Economy of U.S. Trade Policy, 1960-1975," D.Phil. diss., Oxford University, forthcoming.

13. David Vogel, "The New Political Science of Corporate Power," *Public Interest* no. 87, 1987, pp. 63-64.

14. Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom quoted in Vogel (see n. 13), p. 64. Note that the quote is from a 1976 essay in which Dahl and Lindblom acknowledge that their previous approach was flawed and that they underestimated the power of business.

The author has found only one instance where a Pluralist discusses the question of economic inequality and its influence on the political system. In an early study, while he still favored the Pluralist perspective, Dahl stated:

By their propensity for political passivity the poor and uneducated disfranchise themselves. Since they also have less access than the wealthy to the organizational, financial, and propaganda resources that weigh so heavily in campaigns, elections, legislative, and executive decisions, anything like equal control over government policy is triply barred to the members of [James] Madison's unpropertied masses. They are barred by their relatively greater

inactivity, by their relatively limited access to resources, and by Madison's nicely contrived system of constitutional checks.

See Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 81.

15. Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 67. For another example of the Instrumentalist perspective, see G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967); and G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles* (New York: Vintage, 1970).

16. Richard Barnett, *Roots of War* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 48-49. Note that in some other respects, Barnett's views reflect the Structuralist view of the state, which we will discuss shortly.

17. See, for example, Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon, 1969).

18. Lawrence H. Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), chap. 3.

19. Edward H. Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations in American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983). For a similar analysis of a variety of other elite organizations, see also G. William Domhoff, *The Powers That Be* (New York: Vintage, 1979), chap. 3.

20. Alexander Cockburn, letter to the editor, *The Nation*, December 19, 1988.

21. Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest* (Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1966).

22. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Dell, 1972).

23. Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), chap. 7.

24. Noam Chomsky, *Turning the Tide* (Boston: South End Press, 1985).

25. Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *New Left Review* no. 58, 1969, p. 73. A good overview of Structural Marxist literature is provided in David Gold, Clarence Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, "Recent Developments in the Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State," *Monthly Review* 27, no. 5, 1975. See also Ralph Miliband, "The Capitalist State: Reply to Nicos Poulantzas," *New Left Review* no. 59, 1970; and Goran Therborn, *What Does the Ruling Class Do When it Rules?* (London: Verso, 1980). More recently, Miliband has adopted a Structuralist perspective. See Ralph Miliband, *Marxism and Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977).

26. Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Some readers will probably object to this categorization. Some will claim that Lindblom belongs to a dissenting school of thought within Pluralism. They will note further that Lindblom himself has not adopted the Marxist label. The present author nevertheless believes that it is appropriate to place Lindblom in the Structural Marxist category, for the following reasons: First, Lindblom cannot reasonably be placed within the Pluralist category, since his views on the "privileged" position of business diverge sharply from those of the Pluralists. Second, it does not seem appropriate to

create an additional category for Lindblom. Third, Lindblom's views on the political role of business do correspond to those of the Structural Marxists.

27. The political role of the balance of payments has been discussed with regard to British politics:

The importance of the British overseas oil investments has generally been openly acknowledged . . . Great Britain's overseas oil investments have been the difference between a shaky solvency [with regard to the balance of payments] and bankruptcy . . . It is hardly surprising that Western governments have always been vitally concerned with oil and their international oil companies. The British government has a long history of relatively open involvement in the international oil industry.

Michael Tanzer, *The Political Economy of International Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries* (Boston: Beacon, 1969), pp. 47-49.

28. Lindblom (see n. 26), p. 175.

29. Perhaps the best elaboration of the capital strike concept is in Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State," *Socialist Revolution* 7, no. 3, 1971. See also James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973). O'Connor emphasizes the importance of state revenues and the constraints that the fiscal system poses for reformist governments.

30. Quoted in E. A. Brett, *The World Economy since the War* (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. 152. Note that Harold Wilson refused to abandon his program in 1964, when the noted conversation actually took place. By 1967, however, he was forced to devalue sterling.

31. Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), pp. 13-14.

32. Quoted in Paul Joseph, *Cracks in the Empire* (Boston: South End Press, 1981), p. 64.

33. Joseph (see n. 32), p. 66.

34. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

35. Defenders of Pluralism claim, correctly, that the Statists overstate their case and ignore Pluralist studies which do suggest some independent role for the state. See Gabriel Almond, "The Return to the State," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3, 1988. Despite these objections, it is clear that, in general, Pluralism deemphasizes state autonomy and focuses instead on societal interest groups and how these groups influence the state.

36. Skocpol has written extensively on the New Deal. See, for example, Theda Skocpol, "Political Response to Capitalist Crisis: Neo-Marxist Theories of the State and the Case of the New Deal," *Politics and Society* 10, no. 2, 1980. The present author has applied the concept of state autonomy to his study of Afghanistan. See David Gibbs, "The Peasant as Counterrevolutionary: The Rural Origins of the Afghan Insurgency," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 21, no. 1, 1986.

37. Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1978), pp. 5-6. For very similar analyses of U.S. intervention, see Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); and Kenneth Rodman, *Sanctity Versus Sovereignty* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). For a critique of Krasner, see the review by David J. Sylvan, "The Newest Mercantilism," *International Organization* 35, no. 2, 1981.

38. Krasner (see n. 37), p. 347.

39. Krasner (see n. 37), p. 86.

40. On the Congo case, see for example, Madeleine Kalb, *The Congo Cables* (New York: Macmillan, 1982).

41. The author has discussed and critiqued recent versions of the anticommunist literature: David Gibbs, "Does the USSR Have a 'Grand Strategy'? Reinterpreting the Invasion of Afghanistan," *Journal of Peace Research* 24, no. 4, 1987.

42. For example, Krasner (see n. 37) p. 338, states, "The American reaction to the Bolshevik revolution was peculiarly hysterical . . . When Castro visited the United States in 1959, his entourage was irked by the obsessive concern with communism." On radical critiques of U.S. foreign policy which also accept the Cold War assumptions of Statism, see Stephen Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). Note that other radicals do not accept the Statist approach and take a more explicitly economic view of the Cold War. See Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

43. The Bureaucratic Politics paradigm was originally developed in Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). A particularly lucid discussion of this paradigm can be found in Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), chap. 7. Note the difference between the Bureaucratic Politics perspective and the Weberian conception of bureaucracy as the epitome of a rationalized society. See Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). The Bureaucratic paradigm has generated a considerable body of literature pertaining especially to American foreign policy. For an application of the Bureaucratic perspective to the question of U.S. intervention in Latin America, see Lowenthal (n. 5). For an application to policy-making in North Vietnam, see Herman M. Weil, "Can Bureaucracies Be Rational Actors?" *International Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 4, 1975.

44. This description is from Joseph (see n. 32), p. 25.

45. Bureaucratic politics within the CIA is discussed in John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978). Stockwell is a former CIA officer, and the book is a description of his activities during the CIA intervention in Angola.

46. This is particularly true of memoirs and popularized accounts of foreign policy-making. See, for example, David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett-Crest, 1972).

47. We will discuss this at length in chapters 2 and 3.

48. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1975), p. 30.

49. For example, see P. H. Burch, Jr., *Elites in American History*, 3 vols. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980). The relative weakness of labor and the power of business is demonstrated in Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy*

(New York: Vintage, 1966), chap. 9. McConnell's study is particularly significant since it focuses on the World War II period—when labor's political power was at an all-time high.

50. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). For an elaboration of this theme, see Thomas Ferguson, "Party Realignment and American Industrial Structure: The Investment Theory of Political Parties in Historical Perspective," in Paul Zarembka, ed., *Research in Political Economy*, vol. 6 (London: JAI Press, 1983); and Bartlett (n. 11).

51. Bartlett (see n. 11), p. 154.

52. This is true, for example, of Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (see n. 12). It is also generally true of Graham Wilson, one of the more sophisticated Pluralists. In passing, Wilson mentions the phenomenon of capital strikes and the informal ties between government officials and business; however, most of his analysis focuses on public lobbying organizations, including corporate political action committees, trade organizations, and the like. See Graham Wilson, *Business and Politics* (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House 1985), especially chaps. 2 and 9.

53. Cited in Lindblom (see n. 26), p. 195.

54. This will be discussed in chapter 4.

55. Both quotes from Jonathan Kwitny, *Endless Enemies* (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984), pp. 162, 168. The former *New York Times* reporter was Kenneth Love. Also, see Krasner's account (n. 37), pp. 119-27.

56. Krasner notes that John McCone, a former CIA director, advised government officials who helped plot the intervention in Chile. Krasner points out that McCone was also a director of International Telephone and Telegraph, a major investor in Chile. Krasner nevertheless discounts the business connection and implies that McCone's ITT affiliation had no influence on policy: "In all of this intrigue McCone's actions are more easily explained by his former government position than by his corporate one. Despite the comforts of a corporate directorship, it would be surprising if being head of the CIA had not left a deeper mark . . . American behavior in Chile cannot be explained in terms of economic interests." Krasner's conclusions do not at all follow from the evidence. One could just as logically argue that McCone's corporate directorship—his economic self-interest—had left a deeper mark than his former government service. Quotes from Krasner (see n. 37), pp. 310, 312.

57. Robert Engler quoted in Tanzer (see n. 27), p. 55.

58. *Wall Street Journal* reporter Jonathan Kwitny discusses the CIA covert action in Guatemala in 1954 and suggests that U.S. policy was influenced by the United Fruit Company. Kwitny points out that the CIA director, the secretary of state, the assistant secretary for Latin American affairs, the UN ambassador, the under secretary of state, and President Eisenhower's personal secretary all had business or family ties to United Fruit, or they established such ties after government service. Krasner's discussion of Guatemala mentions none of these connections and simply notes that the company had "previous business ties with a number of State Department officials." Krasner concludes, as always, that business interests had no influence on government policy. Kwitny (see n. 55), pp. 219-29; Krasner (see n. 37), pp. 279-86.

59. It should be noted that the concept of state autonomy has been seriously

challenged by recent studies of Japan and France, which show that the governments of these countries are heavily influenced by business pressures. These studies are particularly significant since Japan and France are often regarded as the most autonomous states. See Richard Samuels, *The Business of the Japanese State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Harvey B. Feigenbaum, *The Politics of Public Enterprise* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Gregory Nowell, "Realpolitik vs. Transnational Rent-Seeking: French Mercantilism and the Development of the World Oil Cartel," Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988.

60. See, among many other examples, George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982).

61. This is shown in McConnell (see n. 49). See also Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1979).

62. This occurred on a large scale after the American Civil War. Robert P. Sharkey, *Money, Class, and Party: An Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstruction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).

63. This cleavage is explored in Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," *International Organization* 38, no. 1, 1984. Another case study emphasizing business cleavages is David Abraham, *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). This methodology has also been employed in studies of Third World countries. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979). A good methodology for analyzing business conflict is provided by James Kurth, "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes," *International Organization* 33, no. 1, 1979.

64. Pierre Jalée, *The Third World in World Economy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 131. Emphasis in original was deleted from the quote.

65. During much of the post-World War II period, the core countries invested predominantly in other core countries, rather than in the Third World. In 1966, for example, over 80 percent of American foreign direct investment was in Western Europe, Japan, Canada, or Australia—not in the Third World. It is therefore unlikely that the core really depends on markets or investment opportunities in the periphery. Some studies, such as Jalée (see n. 64), claim that the core is dependent on scarce mineral resources. This argument is also specious, since it ignores the possibility of mineral substitutes. Examples of such substitution are provided in Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., *The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). Statistics on foreign direct investment can be found in Magdoff (see n. 31), p. 59.

66. The concept of informal economic domination through spheres of influence is analyzed in John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *Economic History Review* 6, no. 1, 1953; and Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

67. One case in point is the Congo, now Zaire. See David Gould, *Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment: The Case of Zaire* (New York: Pergamon, 1980).

68. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," p. 109 in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

69. An interesting question, which we will not address here, is why bribery is more common in some polities than it is in others. See James Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

70. This analysis of the collective action problem is adapted from the discussion by Ferguson (see n. 50).

71. The concept of rational action is, of course, central to the "rational choice" literature. For some examples of the latter, see Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy* 65, no. 2, 1957; Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 98, no. 3, 1983; George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2, no. 1, 1971; and R. A. Posner, "Theories of Economic Regulation," *Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 5, no. 2, 1974.

72. On the diplomatic history literature, see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View," *Diplomatic History* 10, no. 4, 1986; and Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal," *Diplomatic History* 10, no. 4, 1986. For the political science counterparts, see Miles Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Jeffrey Frieden, "The Economics of Intervention: American Overseas Investments and Relations with Underdeveloped Areas, 1890–1950," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 1, 1989. Note that the last study is an exception in that it does include some theoretical discussion.

Chapter Two

1. Quoted in Neal Ascherson, *The King Incorporated* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 94.

2. Cited in John Gunther, *Inside Africa* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 653.

3. Joseph Conrad, "The Heart of Darkness," in *The Portable Conrad* (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 495.

4. See discussions in Curtis Keim, "Precolonial Mangbetu Rule: Political and Economic Factors in Nineteenth Century Mangbetu History (Northeast Zaire)," Ph.D. diss., Department of History, Indiana University, 1979; Jan Vansina, *The Children of Woot: A History of the Kuba Peoples* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Jan Vansina, *Kingsdoms of the Savanna* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), chaps. 3, 4, 7, 8; Jan Vansina, "The Peoples of the Forest," in David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin, eds., *History of Central Africa*, vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1983). Note that the latter study refers to the Mangbetu as a kingdom, although Vansina also states (p. 97) that this kingdom was in reality "never more than an overblown conglomerate." The author is grateful to Jan Vansina for clarifying certain points in this discussion and elsewhere in this chapter.

5. The literature on precolonial Kongo is considerable. See Anne Hilton, *The Kingdom of Kongo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); David Birmingham, "Society

and Economy Before A.D. 1400," in David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin, eds., *History of Central Africa* (London: Longman, 1983); John Thornton, "Demography and History in the Kingdom of Kongo, 1550–1750," *Journal of African History* 18, no. 4, 1977; Celestin Goma Foutou, *Histoire des civilisations du Congo* (Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1981); Sigbert Axelson, *Culture Confrontation in the Lower Congo* (Falköping, Sweden: Gunnessons, 1970); John Thornton, "The Development of an African Catholic Church in the Kingdom of Kongo, 1491–1750," *Journal of African History* 25, 1984; Georges Balandier, *Daily Life in the Kingdom of the Kongo* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968); and Louis Jadin, *L'Ancien Congo et l'Angola*, 3 vols. (Rome: Institut Historique Belge de Rome, 1975).

6. See especially Joseph Miller, *The Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730–1830* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).

7. Balandier (see n. 5), p. 81. By the 1890s, the European slave traders were gradually displaced by traders from East Africa, loosely referred to as "Arabs," who began raiding the Congo region. René Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 26–30.

8. Balandier (see n. 5), p. 9, cites the thirteen million estimate but calls it "excessive." The extensive study by Miller notes that for the period 1650–1830, slave exports ranged from five thousand to forty thousand persons annually for the whole region of western central Africa. See Miller (n. 6), p. 233.

It should also be noted that the indigenous practice of slavery was altogether different, and considerably milder, than the slavery which was practiced in the New World. This was pointed out to the author by Michael Schatzberg.

9. Balandier (see n. 5), pp. 189–90.

10. Officially the Association Internationale du Congo governed the Congo, but Leopold completely dominated this organization. Leopold's scheming is described by Ascherson (see n. 1). See also Ruth Slade, *King Leopold's Congo* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), chap. 3.

11. Slade (see n. 10), p. 38. Leopold's Congo organization was first formed in the 1870s; however, the AIC name was used only in 1882.

12. Harlan Dale Grinde, "Great Britain and the Congo Reform Movement, 1903–1912," Masters thesis, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1962, pp. 3–4.

13. It should be noted that Portugal itself can be regarded as a sphere of influence, or even a semicolon, of Great Britain. See Kathleen Schwartzman, "The Economic Origins of Political Instability: Why the Portuguese Bourgeoisie Abandoned its First Republic," p. 162 in William P. Avery and David P. Rapkin, eds., *Markets, Politics, and Change in the Global Political Economy* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

14. Grinde (see n. 12), p. 5.

15. This was the opinion, for example, of Otto von Bismarck. See Grinde (n. 12), p. 9.

16. Grinde (see n. 12), pp. 6–9. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce also objected, presumably because such an alliance would have impeded free trade.

17. Grinde (see n. 12), p. 8.
18. E. J. Dillon, "How the Greatest Modern Colony was Won under the Eyes of Greedy Nations," *Contemporary Review*, February 1910.
19. See, for example, Paul McStallworth, "The United States and the Congo Question, 1884–1914," Ph.D. diss., Department of History, Ohio State University, 1954, chaps. 1, 2, 3.
20. Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1928), pp. 419–20.
21. The military is discussed at length in L. H. Gann and P. Duigan, *The Rulers of Belgian Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), chap. 2.
22. Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), p. 79.
23. Slade (see n. 10), pp. 172. Stengers, however, indicates that the criminal court system was somewhat more effective, although the number of magistrates was "absurdly small in relation to the territory it had to control" (Jean Stengers, "The Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo Before 1914," p. 268 in L. H. Gann and P. Duigan, eds., *Colonialism in Africa*, vol. 1 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969]).
24. Buell (see n. 20), p. 419.
25. Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), pp. 56–57; Vansina (*Kingdoms of the Savanna*, see n. 4), pp. 239–41. Note that Leopold's arrangement with Tib broke down partly because Tib was unable to control competing Arab groups.
26. Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), pp. 111, 114–15.
27. Although this was revised in 1890, when Leopold obtained the right, according to an international agreement, to impose a 10 percent import duty. Buell (see n. 20), p. 425.
28. Leopold eventually obtained some financial support from the Belgian government, beginning in 1895. Ascherson (see n. 1), chap. 21.
29. Buell (see n. 20), pp. 426–30. The quote is from a state report. Note that private Belgian traders protested the state monopoly in 1892, leading to a compromise whereby private traders were allowed to operate in certain regions.
30. Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), p. 127; and Robert Harms, "The End of Red Rubber: A Reassessment," *Journal of African History* 16, no. 1, 1975, p. 81.
31. Buell (see n. 20), p. 421–23.
32. Slade (see n. 10), p. 177; and Gunther (see n. 2), p. 656.
33. The concession areas often operated in a monopolistic manner. This was not the case, however, in the Kasai region, where thirteen private companies produced and exported rubber. These thirteen companies had to compete with each other to attract local laborers. As a result, workers were actually paid, rather than simply forced to work, and standards of living were generally much higher in the Kasai region than they were in the concession areas. (And as we have seen, the concession areas employed slave labor and therefore often paid literally nothing.) Because of the high wage costs, the Kasai companies had relatively low profit margins. In 1901, Leopold proposed that the thirteen companies end their competition and participate in a state-regulated (and partly state-owned) Compagnie du Kasai. The small companies gratefully accepted

- this proposal, and the Compagnie du Kasai was thus formed. The Kasai laborers, however, endured harsher working conditions. Buell (see n. 20), p. 429.
34. Robert Harms, "The World ABIR Made: The Maringa-Lopari Basin, 1885–1903," *African Economic History* no. 12, 1983, p. 125.
35. Simon E. Katzenellenbogen, "Financial Links Between the Congo and its Southern Neighbors," *African Economic History* no. 12, 1983, p. 188. On the expedition, see n. 36.
36. Buell (see n. 20), pp. 423–24. Note that CSK was created in 1900, and it did not officially have jurisdiction in justice, taxation, or postal service. These matters were (at least on paper) left to the state.
37. Buell (see n. 20), pp. 422–24, 443.
38. Demand for rubber was increasing during this period, due to an international boom in the sales of bicycle tires. Edward H. McKinley, *The Lure of Africa* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p. 13.
39. Jean-Philippe Peemans, "Capital Accumulation in the Congo Under Colonialism: The Role of the State," p. 171 in P. Duigan and L. H. Gann, eds., *Colonialism in Africa*, vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
40. Ascherson (see n. 1), pp. 158, 274–76.
41. Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), pp. 66–67, 77.
42. Quoted in Roger Anstey, *King Leopold's Legacy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 7.
43. Buell (see n. 20), pp. 573–76, discusses the role of epidemic diseases in reducing the population.
44. Buell (see n. 20), p. 567.
45. Cited in Basil Davidson, *Africa in History* (New York: Collier Books, 1974), p. 249.
46. Anstey (see n. 42), p. 7.
47. Stengers (see n. 23), p. 270. Also, Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), p. 153, who generally downplay the atrocities, note (rather delicately) that a Belgian investigation was "in fact convinced—quite rightly—that the country's demographic situation was worsening rather than improving." In other words, the population was declining, presumably because Leopold was destroying the inhabitants in huge numbers.
48. Harms (see n. 30), p. 83.
49. E. D. Morel, *Red Rubber* (London: R. Fisher Unwin, 1906). See also E. D. Morel, *King Leopold's Rule in the Congo* (London: William Heinemann, 1904); and Buell (see n. 20), p. 438.
50. Grinde (see n. 12), p. 84.
51. See discussion in Brian Inglis, *Roger Casement* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), chaps. 3, 4, 5.
52. For a particularly disquieting account, see John Ellis, *The Social History of the Machine Gun* (New York: Pantheon, 1975), chap. 5.
53. Grinde (see n. 12), p. 76.
54. Ascherson (see n. 1), p. 255. The quote is directly from Ascherson, which paraphrases Leopold.

55. *Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1885, p. 192.

56. Traders particularly objected to state ownership of land and mineral resources in the Congo, which excluded many private companies. The Congo state trading monopolies were another source of resentment, since they further restricted trade. This was true, for example, with the New Africa Trading Company, a Dutch concern, which left the Congo in 1893. See Herman Obdeijn, "The New Africa Trading Company and the Struggle for Import Duties in the Congo Free State, 1886-1894," *African Economic History*, no. 12, 1983. On British companies, see Grinde (n. 12), p. 22.

57. Grinde (see n. 12), p. 32.

58. S. J. Cookey, *Britain and the Congo Question* (London: Longman, 1968), pp. 56-58, 62-63.

59. Grinde (see n. 12), p. 6; and Cookey (see n. 58), pp. 138, 292.

60. Cookey (see n. 58), p. 56.

61. Ascherson (see n. 1), pp. 255, 261.

62. Grinde (see n. 12), pp. 60, 64. Professor Jan Vansina has informed the author of the recent publication of the unexpurgated version of the commission report.

63. Grinde (see n. 12), p. 73.

64. Professor Jan Vansina pointed this out to the author.

65. McStallworth (see n. 19), pp. 258, 261, 265. The Ryan-Guggenheim interests, moreover, had close connections to a series of other politically powerful interests, including Senator Nelson Aldrich, one of the most important figures in Congress, and the Rockefeller family.

66. Buell (see n. 20), p. 443.

67. Katzenellenbogen (see n. 35), p. 186.

68. Pierre Joye and Rosine Lewin, *Les Trusts au Congo* (Brussels: Société Populaire d'Éditions, 1961), p. 264. Translated from the French. The total value of the Ryan-Guggenheim interest was estimated at seven million dollars in 1944, and by the early 1960s, their share constituted one-fourth of the total value of FORMINIERE. Department of State report, September 19, 1944, Decimal File no. 855A.50/9-1944, RG 59, National Archives; and Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 33. Note that McStallworth (see n. 19), p. 233, gives a similar interpretation of Leopold's motivation in courting U.S. business interests: "Leopold granted commercial concessions to American citizens to assuage American feelings."

69. Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York: Universal Library, 1966), p. 230. A similar interpretation, implying that the Belgian companies "bought off" the British, is provided in Michel Merlier, *Le Congo de la colonisation Belge à l'indépendance* (Paris: François Maspero, 1962), p. 121.

70. Buell (see n. 20), p. 424.

71. Leopold did not permit unlimited British investment and clearly restricted the amount of British capital. In the 1880s, for example, Leopold considered a plan for a major railway concession to be financed by British companies. Ultimately Leopold rejected the project out of fear that the Congo "might well have become a British possession in everything but name" (Roger Anstey, *Britain and the Congo in the Nineteenth Century* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962], p. 201). For further information on

Belgian economic control of the colony, see Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "Raison d'état ou raison du capital: L'Accumulation primitive au Congo Belge," *African Economic History* no. 12, 1983, p. 167.

72. Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), pp. 123, 142; Harms (see n. 34), p. 136.

73. Note that King Leopold had died in 1909.

74. E. D. Morel, "France and Her Congo," *Contemporary Review*, December 1911. The quotes refer to the Congo Independent State, not to the French Congo. Note also that many foreign governments long delayed their recognition of the Belgian Congo, because of lingering suspicions that atrocities were continuing. Britain did not recognize it until 1913. Grinde (see n. 12), p. 103. On American concerns about continued abuses, see McStallworth (n. 19), chap. 12.

75. McStallworth (see n. 19), p. 332.

76. Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), chap. 6.

77. Peemans (see n. 39), p. 203.

78. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., *The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), p. 28.

79. Edward Jay Epstein, *The Rise and Fall of Diamonds* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 86-87.

80. On Kilo-Moto, see Bokanzi Agayo, "The Gold Mines of Kilo-Moto in North-eastern Zaïre, 1905-1960," Ph.D. diss., Department of History, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1982.

81. This was true of the FORMINIERE and Unilever companies. Richard Derksen, "Forminière in the Kasai, 1906-1939," *African Economic History* no. 12, 1983, pp. 56-57; and D. K. Fieldhouse, *Unilever Overseas* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 507.

82. Buell (see n. 20), pp. 576-77; Anstey (see n. 42), p. 85.

83. This was especially true during the post-World War II period. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 38-39.

84. Belgian businessmen quoted in Peemans (see n. 39), p. 175. A similar point is made by Bruce Fetter, *The Creation of Elisabethville* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), p. 8.

85. Report attached to State Department document, July 23, 1945, Decimal File no. 855A.00/7-2345, RG 59, National Archives.

86. Buell (see n. 20), p. 495.

87. Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), p. 205; Buell (see n. 20), pp. 499, 500, 506.

88. This problem was partly, though not completely, alleviated in 1919, when Belgium gained a League of Nations mandate over Ruanda-Urundi. The new colonies bordered the Congo, were thickly populated, and provided a large supply of laborers. Buell (see n. 20), p. 537.

89. Buell (see n. 20), p. 543; see also pp. 537-542, 576. Similar methods are described in John Higginson, *A Working Class in the Making: Belgian Colonial Policy, Private Enterprise, and the African Mineworker, 1907-1951* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), p. 27.

90. Buell (see n. 20), p. 576; Derksen (see n. 81), pp. 55-56.

91. Derksen (see n. 81), p. 56.
92. In southern Katanga, white settlement began as early as 1910. Edgar M. W. Boyd, "Europeans in Katanga, 1877-1923: The Effects of Their Policies and Actions upon Katanga's People," Ph.D. diss., Department of History, Indiana University, 1982, p. 315.
93. Buell (see n. 20), p. 531.
94. Buell (see n. 20), p. 500.
95. Gann and Duigan (see n. 21), pp. 204-5.
96. Derksen (see n. 81), pp. 54-55.
97. On the depression era, see especially Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "The Great Depression and the Making of the Colonial Economic System in the Belgian Congo," *African Economic History* no. 4, 1977; also see Fieldhouse (n. 81), pp. 515-17. An exception to the general decline was in diamond exports, which actually rose during certain years. See Derksen (n. 81), p. 60.
98. Jewsiewicki (see n. 97), p. 162.
99. Eckes (see n. 78), p. 270.
100. John Edward Higginson, "The Making of an African Working Class: The Union Minière du Haut Katanga and the African Mine Workers, 1907-1945," Ph.D. diss., Department of History, University of Michigan, 1979, pp. 417-18.
101. Higginson (see n. 100), p. 412, 469, 471. Note that the figures on the wage/food price ratio cover the period May 1940-December 1943.
102. Eckes (see n. 78), p. 270.
103. Jean-Luc Vellut, "Mining in the Belgian Congo," pp. 140-41 in David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin, eds., *History of Central Africa*, vol. 2 (London: Longman, 1983); Eckes (see n. 78), p. 153.
104. J. Forbes Munro, *Africa and the International Economy* (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1976), p. 200.
105. Department of State report, October 26, 1950, Decimal File no. 855A.00/10-2650, RG 59, National Archives.
106. Anstey (see n. 42), pp. 177-78.
107. Gunther (see n. 2), p. 652.
108. Basil Davidson in *West Africa*, May 1, 1954.
109. *Economist*, June 6, 1959.
110. During the 1950s, the governor-general apparently gained some independence from the minister of colonies. Lemarchand (see n. 7), pp. 57-58.
111. Jean-Claude Willame, *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 13.
112. Quote from a 1910 Belgian ordinance cited in Boyd (see n. 92), pp. 279-80.
113. Boyd (see n. 92), p. 290; and Edouard Bustin, *Lunda Under Belgian Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 101-2. Fetter (see n. 84), p. 5, makes a similar point.
114. Bustin (see n. 113), p. 129.
115. During the 1930s, "councils of notables" were established in certain jurisdictions. Bustin (see n. 113), pp. 145, 147.

116. Georges Brausch, *Belgian Administration in the Congo* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 29.
117. Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 402.
118. Young (see n. 117), pp. 93-95. On the number of university graduates, thirty is the highest estimate that the author has seen. See Eyamba G. Bokamba, "Education and Development in Zaïre," p. 193 in Nzongola-Ntalaja, ed., *The Crisis in Zaïre* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1986). Another estimate, of seventeen graduates, is given by Brian Urquhart, a United Nations official. See Council on Foreign Relations, "The Situation in the Congo," November 14, 1960, Council on Foreign Relations Archives, Meetings Series.
119. Young (see n. 117), pp. 94-95. Also, some four hundred Congolese had had "technical" training, equivalent to university.
120. Rejashwar Dayal, *Mission for Hammarajöld* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 16.
121. Basil Davidson in *West Africa*, May 22, 1954.
122. *Fortune*, November 1952, "The Congo Is in Business," pp. 166-67. Reprinted with permission. Note that in 1954, Basil Davidson also described the existence of forced labor. *West Africa*, April 24, 1954.
123. Willame (see n. 111), p. 14.
124. Department of State report October 1, 1947, Decimal File no. 855A.01/10-147, RG 59, National Archives.
125. During a six-month period in 1905, one rubber concession area reported that 142 company agents had been killed by the populace. Harms (see n. 30), p. 85.
126. Jean-Luc Vellut, "Rural Poverty in Western Shaba, c1890-1930," p. 298 in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds., *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
127. Vellut (see n. 126), pp. 296-97.
128. Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "Political Consciousness Among African Peasants in the Belgian Congo," *Review of African Political Economy* no. 19, 1980, pp. 27-28.
129. Jewsiewicki (see n. 128), pp. 28-29.
130. Higginson (see n. 100), pp. 482, 495, 497.
131. Higginson (see n. 100), pp. 501-11.
132. Jewsiewicki (see n. 128), p. 31, notes that the opposition movements lacked clearly defined social programs, and this constituted an additional weakness.
133. Jewsiewicki (see n. 128), p. 29.
134. *Fortune*, November 1952, "The Congo Is in Business," p. 106. Reprinted with permission.
135. United States Council on Foreign Economic Policy, "Briefing for Mr. Clarence B. Randall on United States Foreign Economic Policy in Africa, by James F. Green," March 29, 1958, p. 3, Clarence Randall Collection, Special Studies Series, Box 1, Eisenhower Library.
136. See Michael Schatzberg, "Zaire," p. 287 in Timothy Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's

Press, 1984). See also Bogumil Jewsiewicki, "Zaire Enters the World System: Its Colonial Incorporation as the Belgian Congo, 1885–1960," p. 37 in Guy Gran, ed., *Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (New York: Praeger, 1979).

137. S. Herbert Frankel, *Capital Investment in Africa* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), pp. 292–94.

138. Department of State report, October 30, 1944, Decimal File no. 855A.00/10-3044, RG 59, National Archives.

139. Anstey (see n. 42), p. 88; Jean-Philippe Peemans, "Imperial Hangovers: Belgium: The Economics of Decolonization," *Journal of Contemporary History* 15, no. 2, 1980, p. 262.

140. Vellut (see n. 126), p. 133. Additional information on business-government ties is in Young (see n. 117), pp. 16–17.

141. Department of State report November 5, 1948, Decimal File no. 855A.00/11-448, RG 59, National Archives. Emphasis in original deleted.

142. Vellut (see n. 126), p. 130.

143. *Business Week*, May 26, 1962, "Belgian Giant Maps New Areas for Profit."

144. *Fortune*, November 1952, "The Congo is in Business."

145. Department of State report, March 30, 1950, Decimal File no. 855A.00/3-3050, RG 59, National Archives.

146. *Fortune*, November 1952, "The Congo is in Business." Reprinted with permission.

147. For a full discussion, see Fieldhouse (n. 81), pp. 379–386, 494–555.

148. Fetter (see n. 84), pp. 64, 77.

149. Henry Serrano Villard, *Affairs at State* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965), pp. 64–65.

150. Phelps-Stokes Fund, *The Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint* (New York, 1942), p. 19.

151. Higginson (see n. 89), pp. 176, 202.

152. The uranium diplomacy is described in J. E. Helmreich, "The Uranium Negotiations of 1944," in *Le Congo Belge durant la seconde guerre mondiale* (Brussels: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre Mer, 1983).

153. Department of State report, September 28, 1944, Decimal File no. 855A.00/9-2844, RG 59, National Archives, p. 4. Quote is directly from the cable, which summarizes the missionary. On international competition during this period, see also Jean-Claude Willame, "Le Congo dans la guerre: La coopération économique Belgo-alliée de 1940 à 1944," in *Le Congo Belge durant la seconde guerre mondiale* (Brussels: Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre Mer, 1983), especially pp. 213–38. Note that Willame claims it was British trading interests that felt threatened by the USA, and that the Belgians seemed quiescent regarding U.S. economic involvement. However, the author has found material (e.g., in the above document) suggesting that the Belgians resented the USA too.

154. Department of State, November 12, 1945, Decimal File no. 655A.116/11-1245; January 21, 1947, no. 655A.113/1-2147; June 3, 1946, no. 855A.50/6-346; December 7, 1945, no. 655A.113/12-745; April 13, 1948, no. 655A.11247/4-1348, RG 59, National Archives.

155. It should be noted that the Axis powers, specifically Nazi Germany, also participated in this competition. Officially the Belgian colonial authorities supported the Allies; however, it appears that the Belgians, prudently enough, supported both sides. There is evidence, for example, that the Belgian FORMINERE company sold industrial diamonds to the Nazis for use in producing V-2 rockets and other sophisticated equipment. See Epstein (n. 79), pp. 93–95.

156. Details are noted in Department of State Memorandum, November 25, 1939, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939* (hereafter *FRUS*), vol. 2, pp. 320–21; Aide Memoire from the American Embassy to the British Foreign Office, January 16, 1940, *FRUS, 1940*, vol. 3, pp. 119–20; Department of State Office Memorandum, January 6, 1947, Office of African Affairs collection, Box no. 7, RG 59, National Archives; Department of State Memorandum, December 30, 1942, Decimal File no. 880.6363/5; Department of State, September 2, 1946, Decimal File no. 862S.01/9-246, RG 59, National Archives.

157. W. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The United States and the Liquidation of the British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941–1951," p. 32 in Prosser Gifford and W. Roger Louis, eds., *The Transfer of Power in Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

158. Quotes from Department of State memoranda, March 8, 1943; and February 20, 1943. Both documents in Decimal File no. 851T.01/16-1/2, RG 59, National Archives.

159. John J. Sbrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal," *Political Science Quarterly* 101, no. 1, 1986, p. 74.

160. Louis and Robinson (see n. 157), p. 33.

161. Department of State, April 26, 1945, Decimal File no. 855A.00/4-2645; November 9, 1945, no. 855A.00/11-945, RG 59, National Archives.

162. Department of State, April 4, 1945, Decimal File no. 851T.00/4-445, RG 59, National Archives; Rupert Emerson, "The Character of American Interests in Africa," p. 33 in Walter Goldschmidt, ed., *The United States and Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1963); and Higginson (see n. 89), p. 176.

163. United States Government, December 11, 1941, Research and Analysis Report no. 826, pp. 2–3, RG 59, National Archives. This report appears to have emanated from the agency that was later called Office of Strategic Services.

164. Council on Foreign Relations reports no. E-B71, June 24, 1944; no. P-B45, August 3, 1942, Studies in the American Interests in the War and the Peace, Council on Foreign Relations Archives.

165. Louis and Robinson (see n. 157), p. 33.

166. An American military mission in West Africa reported that the French were "acutely sensitive with respect to their colonial empire." British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden later recalled in his memoirs that the U.S. government "hoped that former colonial territories, once free of their [European] masters, would become politically and economically dependent upon the United States." Winston Churchill regarded proposals for UN trusteeships "as merely a cloak for American expansion." Department of State Memorandum for the President, February 11, 1944, Decimal File no. 851T.01/70, RG 59, National Archives; Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning* (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 593; W. Roger Louis, *Imperialism At Bay* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 8. Note that the Churchill quote is from Louis, which summarizes the prime minister's views.

167. Department of State, March 23, 1945, Decimal File no. 855A.00/3-2345; May 2, 1945, no. 855A.01/5-245; May 19, 1945, no. 855A.00/3-2345; February 5, 1945, no. 855A.00/2-745; February 11, 1946, no. 855A.00/2-1140; April 11, 1945, no. FW 855A.00/3-2345; May 1, 1945, no. 855A.00/3-2245; April 6, 1945, no. FW 855A.00/2-2345; April 13, 1945, no. 855A.00/3-2345; March 22, 1945, no. 855A.00/3-2245; February 23, 1944, no. 855A.00/760, RG 59, National Archives.

168. Department of State, March 23, 1945, Decimal File no. 855A.00/3 2345, RG 59, National Archives.

169. Paraphrased in Department of State, October 9, 1944, Decimal File no. 855A.00/10-944, RG 59, National Archives.

170. Department of State, April 7, 1945, Decimal File no. 855A.00/3 2245, RG 59, National Archives.

171. Council on Foreign Relations report no. E-B71, June 24, 1944, p. 3, Studies in the American Interests in the War and the Peace, Council on Foreign Relations Archives.

172. Department of State Memorandum, September 13, 1943, p. 2, Decimal File no. 880.00/9-1343, RG 59, National Archives.

173. United States Government, December 11, 1941, Research and Analysis Report no. 826, RG 59, National Archives. The report appears to have emanated from the agency that was later called the Office of Strategic Services. Note that President Roosevelt himself was concerned about the economic implications of colonialism and especially its tendency to discriminate against American business. Roosevelt's views are noted in the commentary, p. 19 in Warren F. Kimball, ed., *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

174. Recent scholarship on the New Deal notes a considerable transformation in U.S. foreign economic policy during this period, one aimed at increasing U.S. foreign trade and investment throughout the world. On the New Deal, see Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," *International Organization* 38, no. 1, 1988.

Studies which discuss U.S. free trade efforts during and after World War II include: Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); Robert A. Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Robert E. Baldwin, *The Political Economy of Postwar U.S. Trade Policy* (New York: New York University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1976); Richard E. Feinberg, *Subsidizing Success: The Export-Import Bank in the U.S. Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Jeffry Frieden, "Sectoral Conflict and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940," *International Organization* 42, no. 1, 1988; Stephen Haggard, "The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934," *International Organization* 42, no. 1, 1988; Richard N. Gardner, *Sterling Dollar Diplomacy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956). Note that a recent study argues that there were important limitations to Ameri-

can "free trade" policy, and that protectionist measures were often advocated, by U.S. policymakers, for certain Third World countries. See Sylvia Maxfield and James Nolt, "Protectionism and the Internationalization of Capital: U.S. Sponsorship of Import Substitution Industrialization in the Philippines, Turkey, and Argentina," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 1, 1990.

175. The ideological factors are widely accepted and well known. See, for example, Tony Smith, *The Pattern of Imperialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chap. 4.

176. This is discussed in detail in David Gibbs, "Private Interests and International Conflict: A Case Study of U.S. Intervention in the Congo," Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989, chap. 2. However, the USA still criticized French colonialism in Africa. See George C. McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), p. 221.

177. The United States was also determined to protect the Congo mines. In 1951, the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was preparing contingency plans for the possible "seizure of critical areas of the Congo by force," if the uranium became threatened by the Soviet Union. The CIA was also authorized to engage in "covert surveillance" of the cobalt-processing facilities in the Congo. Department of Defense Memorandum, January 27, 1951, from the *FRUS*, 1951, vol. 1, p. 689. The CIA activities are discussed in Eckes (see n. 78), pp. 150-53.

178. *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, July 30, 1951; and October 22, 1951; Department of State, "The Belgian Congo as a Possible Recipient of ECA Loans," October 25, 1948, National Archives, RG 59, Research and Analysis Report series no. 4787; and *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, October 1, 1951. (Note that the *Bulletin* was alternately called the *Bulletin Mensuel* and the *Bulletin Bimensuel*. For simplicity, it is referred to here as the *Bulletin*.)

179. See Gibbs (n. 176), chap. 2.

180. The statement was made in 1947. Department of State report, February 24, 1948, no. 855A.032/2-2448; see also Department of State report, April 25, 1945, no. 855A.00/4-2545. Both documents from National Archives, RG 59, Decimal File.

181. "Briefing for Mr. Clarence B. Randall on United States Foreign Economic Policy in Africa, by James F. Green," March 29, 1958, p. 4, Eisenhower Library, Clarence Randall Collection, Special Studies Series, Box 1.

182. Regarding the general tendency to monitor U.S. public opinion, see various issues of the *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, especially during 1952-57.

183. *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, pp. 253-54, September 15, 1956. Translated from the French.

184. *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, May 15, 1953. Translated from the French.

185. *Marchés Coloniaux*, February 20, 1954; also *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, November 15, 1953.

186. *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, April 1, 1952; April 15, 1952; May 1, 1952. Also see Council on Foreign Relations, "Digest of a Meeting," April 14, 1952, Meetings series, Council on Foreign Relations Archives. Wigny was

ideally suited for this job since he spoke English, had studied at Harvard, and had been an executive with the Guaranty Trust company. See Pierre Wigny, *A Ten Year Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Belgian Congo* (New York: Belgian Information Center, 1951), p. 3.

187. *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, May 15, 1952.
188. *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, February 8, 1954.
189. *The Belgian Congo Today*, July 1955.
190. *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, October 1, 1956.
191. Note that the holding company was Tanganyika Concessions, SG's British affiliate. Department of State report May 12, 1950, no. 750.00(w)/5-550; and December 14, 1950, no. 855A.254/12-1450. Both documents from National Archives, RG 59, Decimal File. Also see *New York Times*, November 3, 1950.
192. *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, December 3, 1951.
193. Weissman (see n. 68), pp. 34-35. Dillon, Read apparently hoped to make considerably larger investments in the Congo. In 1959, a Dillon, Read representative noted that "his Company could, over a period of a few years, float loans on behalf of the Congo in the total amount of some \$200 million" (Department of State, Foreign Service Despatch no. 271, February 20, 1959). Also see Leopoldville 151, February 19, 1959. Both documents released to the author under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
194. Department of State, Foreign Service Despatch no. 174, December 10, 1959. Released under FOIA.
195. Richard D. Mahoney, "The Kennedy Policy in the Congo, 1961-1963," Ph.D. diss., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1979, p. 255; also Department of State, Foreign Service Despatch no. 982, March 6, 1958. Released under FOIA.
196. Weissman (see n. 68), pp. 34-38.
197. Council on Foreign Relations, "Discussion Meeting Report," February 16, 1959, Council on Foreign Relations Archives, Groups Series, vol. 77, 1958-59, p. 12.
198. Jules Chomé, "La Politique Américaine au Congo," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, January 1965. Translated from the French.
199. Ministry of Colonies, Belgium, *Investments in the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi* (Brussels: Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi Information and Public Relations Office, 1956), p. 41. Note that these figures include the colonies of Ruanda-Urundi, as well as the Congo.
200. *Fortune*, November 1952, "Colonial Big Five," pp. 175, 182. Reprinted with permission.
201. *Marchés Coloniaux*, June 25, 1955; *Le Monde Diplomatique*, July 1959.
202. *Le Monde*, January 22, 1956. Translated from the French.
203. Jean-Claude Willame, *Zaire, l'épopée d'Inga* (Paris: Editions Harnattan, 1986), p. 32.
204. Young (see n. 117), pp. 206-7.
205. Anstey (see n. 42), pp. 202-3.
206. The *évolué* class, in theory at least, had some official status. During the post-World War II period, Congolese who had shed "uncivilized" social practices were

given a Certificate of Civic Merit, which was issued by the colonial authorities and testified to the holders' *évolué* status. In fact the certificates meant little and conferred few real advantages. Proposals to grant greater privileges to the *évolués* were generally blocked by the European settler community. For a discussion of these issues, see Young (n. 117), pp. 75-87.

207. Gunther (see n. 2), p. 663.
208. There were over one hundred thousand white settlers in the Congo by the late 1950s. Lemarchand (see n. 7), p. 75.
209. Anstey (see n. 42), pp. 206-208; Peemans (see n. 139), p. 261.
210. Willame (see n. 111), p. 26.
211. *Africa Special Report*, October 26, 1956; Anstey (see n. 42), p. 221.
212. Herbert Weiss, *Political Protest in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), chap. 1.
213. Lemarchand (see n. 7), pp. 153-158.
214. *Africa Special Report*, October 26, 1956.
215. Peemans (see n. 139), p. 267; Lemarchand (see n. 7), pp. 116-17.
216. Cited in Anstey (see n. 42), p. 161.
217. Lemarchand (see n. 7), p. 120.
218. Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p. 55.
219. Weiss (see n. 212), p. 13-14.
220. Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 28.
221. Eckes (see n. 78), p. 272.
222. *African World*, March 1959.
223. *Le Monde* cited in *West Africa*, January 24, 1959.
224. *Le Monde* cited in *West Africa*, January 24, 1959.
225. *West Africa*, January 10, 1959; *Le Monde* cited in *West Africa*, January 31, 1959.
226. Weiss (see n. 212), p. 17.
227. William Minter, "Limits of Liberal Africa Policy: Lessons from the Congo Crisis," *Transafrica Forum* 2, no. 3, 1984, p. 29.
228. *Africa Special Report*, February 1959. It was claimed that the reforms were being privately prepared even before the Leopoldville riots.
229. *Africa Special Report*, April 1959. Other sources stressed economic factors. A British publication cited "the rise in the number of unemployed workers" as a cause of the riots. *African World*, March 1959.
230. *Africa Special Report*, May 1959; *Economist*, June 6, 1959.
231. Weiss (see n. 212), pp. 20-21.
232. *Africa Special Report*, September 1959.
233. *Africa Special Report*, June 1959; *West Africa*, October 31, 1959.
234. *Africa Special Report*, December 1959.
235. *West Africa*, October 31, 1959; and *Economist*, November 7, 1959.
236. Young (see n. 117), p. 171.
237. Lemarchand (see n. 7), p. 191.

Chapter Three

1. I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), p. 352. This quote referred to Korea.

2. Regarding the Belgian decision to decolonize rapidly, two explanations have been advanced. The first view, probably the dominant one, is that the Belgian government agreed to grant independence because, with the growing disorder, it simply panicked. The Belgian Socialist party and the Catholic church both opposed massive repression in the Congo, and this opposition influenced the government.

A second explanation (which this author favors) is that the Belgians decolonized rapidly because they wished to foment disorder—which would, in turn, have enabled the Belgians to reassert control. This interpretation is suggested by Henry L. Bretton, a University of Michigan political scientist: “Premature granting of independence—before an alternative elite and machinery of effective government have been formed—has potential as a ‘divide and rule’ strategy. Acceptance of this principle may, in fact, have motivated the Belgian government to make this decision [to decolonize so rapidly].” I. F. Stone offers a similar view: “Belgium . . . figured that their best bet for continued influence and control was to grant independence so abruptly and with so little preparation that native ineptitude would be easily proven and Belgian control welcomed.” This explanation, though consistent with postindependence Belgian policy and the general circumstances of the Congo Crisis, is unproven.

The first view is expressed in, for example, William Minter, “The Limits of Liberal Africa Policy: Lessons from the Congo Crisis,” *Transafrica Forum* 2, no. 3, 1984, pp. 29–30. The quotes from Bretton and Stone are both from *I. F. Stone’s Weekly*, September 19, 1960. For a documentary history of Congolese independence, see Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, *La Crise Congolaise: Janvier 1959–Août 1960*, *Chronique de Politique Étrangère* series (Brussels, 1960).

3. Lefever, for example, notes how the Belgians had not prepared the Congolese for independence. Ernest Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965), pp. 8–9.

4. Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 83.

5. Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 314.

6. Lefever (see n. 3), p. 10.

7. Young (see n. 5), p. 313.

8. Richard Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 36.

9. Department of State, Intelligence Report no. 8350, September 22, 1960, pp. 1–2, National Archives, RG 59, Research and Analysis Report series no. 8350.

10. *Le Monde*, February 13, 1960.

11. Hoskyns (see n. 4), p. 63.

12. Ilunga Kabongo, “The Catastrophe of Belgian Decolonization,” p. 388 in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, eds., *Decolonization and African Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).

13. For a biography of Lumumba, see Thomas Kanza, *The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 1979).

14. Patrice Lumumba, *Lumumba Speaks* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 77.

15. René Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 220.

16. Young (see n. 5), pp. 305–6; Colin Legum, *Congo Disaster* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961), pp. 86–88. The Parti National du Progrès is a partial exception. This party also had national objectives, but it was not nearly as well organized as the MNC. Hoskyns (see n. 4), p. 66.

17. Young (see n. 5), p. 305.

18. Hoskyns (see n. 4), p. 66. Also, Lemarchand notes that in certain instances, Lumumba made opportunistic alliances with traditionalist forces. Lemarchand (see n. 15), pp. 220–21.

19. Clare Hayes Timberlake, “First Year of Independence in the Congo: Events and Issues,” Masters thesis, George Washington University, 1963, p. 41. Timberlake was the first U.S. ambassador to the independent Congo.

20. Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 20.

21. The MNC program is described in Weissman (see n. 20), pp. 263–65.

22. Smith Hempstone, *Rebels, Mercenaries, and Dividends* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 98.

23. The Parti National du Progrès is described by Hoskyns (see n. 4), pp. 66–67; and by Legum (see n. 16), p. 102. Hempstone suggests that Union Minière probably gave money to both the CONAKAT and BALUBAKAT parties in Katanga. Hempstone (see n. 22), pp. 98–99. Timberlake, the former U.S. ambassador, suggests that virtually all parties received Belgian financial support. Timberlake (see n. 19), p. 41.

24. Hoskyns (see n. 4), p. 83.

25. Lemarchand (see n. 15), p. 222.

26. Weissman (see n. 20), p. 19. The MNC’s forty seats included “some minor allied parties.” Note also that one faction of the MNC, headed by Albert Kalonji of the Kasai region, had previously separated and formed a new party, also under the name MNC. When the text mentions the MNC it refers exclusively to the party led by Lumumba.

27. According to one researcher, Kasavubu was “‘chosen’ by the Belgian African Affairs Minister, Ganshof van der Meersch.” See Nzongola-Ntalaja, “The Continuing Struggle for National Liberation in Zaïre,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17, no. 4, 1979, p. 596.

28. Hoskyns (see n. 4), p. 83.

29. The speech is printed, in English translation, in Alan P. Merriam, *Congo: Background to Conflict* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), pp. 352–54.

30. It was widely reported, for example, that Lumumba had said in his speech, “We are no longer your monkeys.” (The Belgians often used the racial epithet “monkey” when referring to Africans.) In all probability, Lumumba did not make this

remark during his Independence Day speech. Lumumba's speech reprinted verbatim in Meriam (see n. 29), makes no such reference. William Minter, moreover, notes, "the phrase ['We are no longer your monkeys'] . . . does not appear in either the written or taperecorded version of the speech, according to the respected Belgian *Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques (CRISP)* . . . Its placement at the independence speech seems to be someone's fabrication" (Minter [see n. 2], p. 46).

31. Minter (see n. 2), p. 31.
32. Young (see n. 5), p. 316.
33. Meriam (see n. 29), pp. 210–11; Young (see n. 5), p. 319.
34. Timberlake (see n. 19), p. 7; Young (see n. 5), p. 318.
35. Young (see n. 5), p. 317. The quote is Young's paraphrase of Lumumba.
36. Young (see n. 5), p. 317.
37. Department of State, "An Analytical Chronology of the Congo Crisis," January 27, 1961, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 86, p. 11.
38. Young (see n. 5), p. 318.
39. Legum (see n. 16), p. 117.
40. Young (see n. 5), pp. 317–18.
41. Lefever (see n. 3), p. 14.
42. Timberlake (see n. 19), pp. 76, 97.
43. Untitled document, October 18, 1960, pp. 1, 3, United Nations Archives, DAG-13/1.6.1.0:53. This document is untitled and is not explicitly identified as a UN document. However, the author is confident that it was written by UN staff since it was found in the UN archives, in a folder marked "Pol[itical] and Sec[urity] Matters." The report was written from a UN standpoint and in the style of an intelligence report.
44. However, there were some successes. A UN report noted how Belgium's Sabena Airlines managed to violate the Congo's exchange control laws through a front company. This front, called Air Congo, was "obviously an 'all Belgian affair' . . . being used as a screen (a very visible, one at that) to the sole protection of SABENA Airlines who remain the real operator of this one sided show." Untitled document addressed to "Mr. R. J. B. Rossborough, Chief of Civilian Operations [illegible] F. Frasca, Monetary Council," dated July 18 (1961?), United Nations Archives, DAG 13/1.6.1.0:83.
45. Hempstone (see n. 22), chap. 3.
46. Jules Gérard-Libois, *Katanga Secession* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 11, 17, 56–57.
47. Gérard-Libois (see n. 46), pp. 63–65; Lefever (see n. 3), p. 12; and Conor Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York: Universal Library, 1966), pp. 84–85.
48. Young (see n. 5), p. 503. Certain writers note tensions between Tshombe and his supporters, on the one hand, and the Belgians on the other hand. Some speculate that, toward the end of secession, Union Minière no longer favored Tshombe, and the company supported him with reluctance. Union Minière, according to this view, feared that the Katangese would nationalize company facilities, unless the company cooperated with the secession. This interpretation is presented, for example, by Hempstone (see n. 22), p. 46.

This interpretation seems doubtful. We shall see in chapter 5 that the Belgians supported Tshombe long after the end of the Katanga secession. The Belgian press, including the financial daily *L'Echo de la Bourse*, remained quite friendly toward Tshombe during the period 1963–65. Union Minière probably installed Tshombe as prime minister of the Congo in 1964. Why would the Belgians have returned Tshombe to power in 1964 if they feared him? All of this information suggests that Union Minière executives favored Tshombe, and that they did not support him reluctantly or in response to nationalization or sabotage threats.

Equally implausible is the view that the Belgians feared some of the "ultras" in Katanga, led by Interior Minister Godefried Munongo. This view is contradicted by evidence that UMHK favored Munongo. UMHK helped organize the Tshombe government of 1964—which included Munongo as interior minister. There were additional reports, as late as December 1966, of continued UMHK support for Munongo. It is unlikely that the Union Minière would have supported Munongo if he had seriously threatened to destroy company property. On Munongo's alleged threats, see O'Brien (n. 47), p. 175; on Union Minière support for Munongo, see the *Economist*, December 31, 1966; on Munongo's presence in the Tshombe government of 1964, see Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques, *Congo 1964* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 190; on the Belgian press and on UMHK involvement in the Tshombe government of 1964, see chapter 5.

49. There is no estimate of how many of the whites in Katanga worked for Union Minière, but almost certainly, this group comprised the majority. Hempstone writes, "It is probably fair to say that *Union Minière* and its subsidiaries are directly responsible for 75 percent of Katanga's industrial and commercial activity, and indirectly responsible for another 20 percent [for a total of 95 percent] . . . *Union Minière*, in an economic sense, is Katanga" (Hempstone [see n. 22], p. 61).

50. Cited in *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, September 19, 1960.

51. Quotations in O'Brien (see n. 47), pp. 84, 239. Reprinted with permission. For additional information on this point, see also G. Mennen Williams, *Africa for the Africans* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1969), p. 94. Williams was the assistant secretary of state for African affairs under Kennedy and Johnson.

52. Letter from Sture Linner to U Thant, April 18, 1962, United Nations Archives, DAG-1/2.2.1–63; Department of State telegram, Brussels 58, July 12, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 30A-32.

53. Estimated by Hempstone (see n. 22), p. 46. Hempstone was strongly pro-Katanga, and it is unlikely that he exaggerated the Union Minière role in the secession. For further details, see United States Government (agency name not indicated), "UMHK Dividend Payments," n.d. (probably middle or late 1962), JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 28A.

54. Department of State Airgram, A-701, June 9, 1966. Released to the author under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

55. Jean van den Bosch, *Pré-Zaire: Le Cordon mal coupé* (Brussels: Le CRI, 1986), p. 72.

56. The Liberal party had historical ties to the SG group. A 1945 report by an American missionary in the Congo commented, "The Liberal Party in Belgium is prin-

cipally a political party of financiers, and is closely allied with the . . . 'Société Générale de Belgique.' Report attached to Department of State cable, July 23, 1945, National Archives, RG 59, Decimal File no. 855A.00/7-2345.

57. Gérard-Libois (see n. 46), pp. 99, 104, 120, 178. On Wigny's views, see Paule Bouvier, *L'Accession du Congo Belge à l'indépendance* (Brussels: Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie, 1965), p. 322.

58. Gérard-Libois (see n. 46), pp. 102–3.

59. See UN report (n. 43).

60. UN report C. O. Circular no. 12, March 3, 1961, United Nations Archives, DAG-13/1.6.1.0-53.

61. Clemens's ties to UMHK were noted in United States Government Memorandum from G. Mennen Williams to Governor Harriman, "Subject: Biographical Data on Tshombe's European Advisors," July 31, 1964. Provided to the author by William Minter.

62. Department of State (see n. 37), p. 54.

63. Gérard-Libois (see n. 46), p. 161.

64. Gérard-Libois (see n. 46), p. 165. On the SS troops, see Madeleine Kalb, *The Congo Cables* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 193. The term "mercenaries" is a matter of some controversy, since the word has unsavory connotations. Some Katanga sympathizers, such as Robert Murphy, object to it. See Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 338. There is no doubt, however, that the white soldiers were for the most part mercenaries. O'Brien, who directed UN operations in Katanga for several months, states that the motivations for most of the white soldiers were entirely financial. O'Brien (see n. 47), p. 197.

65. United Nations document, entitled "Report on Mercenaries and Other Forms of Foreign Intervention in Katanga," pp. 8–9, October 23, 1961 (?), United Nations Archives, DAG-1/2.2.1:47. Note that this document is not explicitly identified as a UN report. However, its contents, its style, and its presence in the UN files strongly suggest that it was written by UN staff.

66. U Thant, cited in Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946–1967*, vol. 3. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 237–39. It should be noted for the record that the Belgians denied these allegations.

67. Letter from Monga Wa Ilunga Vincent and Kisonde Polycarpe to the "l'ONU Elisabethville," October 24, 1960, United Nations Archives, DAG-13/1.6.4.3.1:4. Translated from the French.

68. O'Brien (see n. 47), p. 162. Reprinted with permission.

69. Pierre Davistar, quoted in Gérard-Libois (see n. 46), pp. 125–26.

70. Tshombe himself was related by marriage to the Lunda paramount chief. Note that the CONAKAT party also had ties to the Bayekes. Tshombe's interior minister, Godefroid Munongo, was the grandson of M'Siri, a precolonial ruler of the Bayeke group. See O'Brien (n. 47), p. 104; and Weissman (n. 20), p. 66.

71. United Nations (see n. 65). In general, UN sources strongly emphasized the Belgian support for Katanga. The author has found an exception. One UN report noted, in passing, that "The relations of the Union Minière with the Katanga Government while not difficult did not appear to be particularly close." UN report, "Note of a

Conversation with the Directeur of General Union Minière," September 24, 1960, United Nations Archives, DAG 13/1.6.1.0:72. The author finds this view implausible since, at the time, Union Minière was supplying Katanga with 80 percent of its government revenues.

72. Department of State (see n. 37), p. 72.

73. Van den Bosch (see n. 55), p. 159.

74. United Nations (see n. 60).

75. *La Libre Belgique* quoted in O'Brien (see n. 47), pp. 81–82. Reprinted with permission. The article quoted a white resident of Katanga: "We are living exactly as we lived four years ago [i.e., under colonialism]. Nothing has changed." The article also implied a growing sense of interracial cooperation, but the only evidence cited—that an African woman embraced a Belgian woman—does not seem persuasive.

76. O'Brien (see n. 47), pp. 164, 226. Reprinted with permission.

77. Weissman (see n. 20), p. 71.

78. The Equateur secession attempt is mentioned in Weissman (see n. 20), p. 72; on Kivu see *New York Times*, July 13, 1960. Weissman mentions Belgian involvement in the Equateur case; there is no specific evidence of Belgian intrigues for the case of Kivu.

79. *Le Monde*, October 5, 1962; Weissman (see n. 20), p. 72. Specifically, the Société Minière du Bakwanga, a FORMINIERE affiliate, made the payments.

80. Weissman writes, "An extremely important figure, in the best position to know, has informed me that a gift of approximately 3 million dollars was made by Guggenheim to the secessionist state of South Kasai in 1960" (letter from Stephen Weissman to Albert Thiele, June 1, 1970). It should be noted for the record that the Guggenheim interests denied this allegation. See letter from Albert Thiele, of the Guggenheim Brothers, to Stephen Weissman, June 30, 1970; and letter from A. van de Maele, also of the Guggenheim Brothers, to Stephen Weissman, June 18, 1970. All three letters were provided to the author by Stephen Weissman.

81. United Nations (see n. 43), p. 5. Note that the document referred to "Colonel Crevecoeur," while some other sources give Crevecoeur's rank as Major.

82. Timberlake (see n. 19), p. 147.

83. O'Brien (see n. 47), p. 87.

84. Weissman (see n. 20), p. 44.

85. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 572.

86. Weissman (see n. 20), p. 56–57. France and Great Britain also requested Belgian intervention.

87. *New York Times*, July 14, 1960. The Afro-Asian hostility toward Katanga is described at length in Kwame Nkrumah, *Challenge of the Congo* (New York: International Publishers, 1967).

88. Weissman (see n. 20), p. 58–59.

89. *New York Times*, July 13, 1960.

90. Weissman (see n. 20), pp. 58–59.

91. The literature on the UN intervention in the Congo is substantial. See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (New York, 1985), part 5; O'Brien (n. 47); Lefever (n. 3);

Thomas M. Franck and John Carey, *The Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo* (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1963); P. H. Gendebien, *L'Intervention des Nations Unies au Congo, 1960-1964* (Paris: Mouton, 1967).

92. Department of State cable, State 313, August 1, 1960, Eisenhower Library, White House Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Box 3.

93. "To USUN NEW YORK Re SC Meeting on Congo," n.d. (Probably middle or late July 1960), p. 1, Eisenhower Library, Christian A. Herter Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 13. Quote is directly from the document, which paraphrased the official. The official in question was probably Secretary of State Christian A. Herter.

94. Weissman (see n. 20), p. 63.

95. Mahoney (see n. 8), p. 54. In addition, Robert Murphy, a retired foreign service officer who advised the Eisenhower administration on the Congo, also sympathized with Katanga. See Murphy (n. 64), p. 338.

96. Associated Press report quoted in *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, December 5, 1960.

97. Mahoney (see n. 8), pp. 80-81. One of Mahoney's sources was a "former CIA official." On the Fougua affair, see also Gérard-Libois (n. 46), pp. 166-67. The Fougua was actually designed as a trainer, although in Katanga it was used for combat missions.

In addition, a biography of CIA director Allen Dulles notes that the agency was aiding Katanga. See Leonard Mosley, *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network* (New York: Dial Press, 1978), p. 462. The aircraft were actually delivered during the first month of the Kennedy administration, although the preparations had probably been made several months earlier. It seems very doubtful that Kennedy had authorized this transaction. For more on this issue, see chapter 4.

98. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter was initially concerned about the public relations repercussions of the Katanga secession but, despite the concerns, he supported the established pro-Belgian policy. Satterthwaite's quote, in the text, and the information on the Bureau of International Organization Affairs are from Department of State (see n. 37), pp. 20, 29. Regarding the Africa bureau's anti-Katanga sentiments, see Memorandum from J. G. Satterthwaite to the secretary, July 14, 1960, Eisenhower Library, OSANSA Collection, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 1. Herter was mentioned in "Memorandum of Conversation with the President," July 21, 1960, Eisenhower Library, White House, Office of the Staff Secretary, Staff Series, State Department Subseries, Box 4.

99. Department of State (see n. 37), pp. 25-26. The document quotes from a "summary" of Lumumba's address, delivered in August 1960.

100. *New York Times*, July 26, 1960. Note also that the Belgians were suspicious of Lumumba's visit to the USA and accused the Eisenhower administration of collaborating with the Congolese premier. The Belgian daily *La Metropole* had a headline which (in translation) reads: "The Americans—Dupes of Lumumba?" Other Belgian papers echoed this concern. The American ambassador to Belgium, William Burden, described an "ostensible cooling off" in the relations between Belgium and the United States . . . partly because of the reception accorded Mr. Lumumba in the United States, which the Belgians considered friendly to the point of being an affront to

Belgium." As we shall see, these concerns were quite baseless. Despite the visit, the U.S. government remained intensely hostile toward Lumumba. On the Belgian press, see *Le Monde*, July 31, 1960. The Burden quote is from a Council on Foreign Relations document, December 29, 1960, Council on Foreign Relations Archives, Meetings Series.

101. Department of State (see n. 37), p. 16.

102. Murphy (see n. 64), p. 334.

103. Timberlake (see n. 19), p. 184. It is worth noting that prior to Lumumba's appointment, the U.S. government briefly indicated support for Lumumba. See Weissman (n. 20), pp. 53-54. It is clear that this support did not last long.

104. Quoted in United States Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* (New York: Norton, 1976), p. 53.

105. Eisenhower (see n. 85), p. 573.

106. Weissman (see n. 20), pp. 259-61. Much suspicion centered on several leftist advisors to Lumumba, although there is no evidence that any of these were communists.

107. The Belgian daily *La Libre Belgique* referred to Lumumba as a "crooked savage." Cited in *Le Monde*, July 31, 1960, and translated from the French.

108. "Telephone Calls, Monday, August 8, 1960," Eisenhower Library, Christian A. Herter Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 13. Regarding Hammarskjöld's hostility toward Lumumba, see Kalb (n. 64), p. 51.

109. Kalb (see n. 64), pp. 20; 22-23. Regarding Bunche's opinion of Lumumba, see Timberlake (n. 19), p. 96. Bunche's views are paraphrased by Timberlake.

110. Kalb (see n. 64), pp. 74-75. Cordier's former State Department affiliation is noted in *Who Was Who in America*, vol. 6.

111. O'Brien (see n. 47), pp. 56-57. Reprinted with permission.

112. Jonathan Dean, U.S. consul-general in Elisabethville, interview notes in Memorandum from Arthur M. Cox, August 30, 1963, Ernest W. Lefever Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 8. The quote is directly from the notes, which paraphrase Dean.

113. See his memoirs, Timberlake (n. 19), pp. 79-80. The Timberlake quote includes another quote from a UN press release.

114. Weissman (see n. 20), p. 104. One source claims that during its entire duration, the United Nations Congo force obtained almost 42 percent of its funds from the USA. From Ernest W. Lefever and Wynfred Ioshua, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo: 1960-1964* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 154-55.

115. Department of State (see n. 37), pp. 27-29.

116. Department of State (see n. 37), p. 34. Lumumba's speech is paraphrased in a cable by U.S. Ambassador Timberlake.

117. *Wall Street Journal*, September 6, 1960. Kabongo claims some two hundred civilians died in the offensive. See Kabongo (n. 12), p. 39.

118. U.S. Senate (see n. 104), p. 14.

119. Lumumba's support was indicated by his subsequent reconfirmation in the Chamber of Representatives, and also by the fact that the chamber had never voted a

motion of no confidence. Regarding the number of lawyers in the country, see Rejash-war Dayal, *Mission for Hammarskjöld* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 16.

120. Kalb (see n. 64), p. 52.

121. The U.S./UN role is generally accepted by the secondary literature on the subject. Weissman states, "Evidence of UN complicity in the Kasavubu coup appears overwhelming." According to Mahoney, "it is virtually certain that the U.S. played a central role in Lumumba's dismissal." Weissman (see n. 20), pp. 90–92; Mahoney (see n. 8), p. 47. Tully writes that prior to acting, Kasavubu "sat at the feet of the CIA men" (Andrew Tully, *CIA: The Inside Story* [New York: William Morrow, 1962], p. 221).

122. Dayal (see n. 119), p. 56.

123. Lefever (see n. 3), p. 46. Prior to the closure of the radio station, Lumumba was able to broadcast.

124. Department of State (see n. 37), p. 34.

125. Department of State (see n. 37), p. 33. The legislature also canceled an order by Lumumba which dismissed Kasavubu. However, Lumumba's own reinstatement was, on balance, a far more important action. The legislative activity constituted a victory for Lumumba.

126. U.S. Senate (see n. 104), p. 17.

127. Kalb (see n. 64), p. 87.

128. Department of State (see n. 37), p. 32.

129. *New York Times*, April 26, 1966, p. 1.

130. The main source on the assassination is still the United States Senate report (see n. 104), chap. 3. Additional information on the subject can be found in John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978). Stockwell is a former CIA officer with long experience in Africa.

131. Dayal (see n. 119), p. 66.

132. Kalb (see n. 64), p. 96.

133. Dayal (see n. 119), p. 66.

134. Young (see n. 5), p. 447. Young notes that Mobutu's power was "based on his firm control of a very small number of men. The bulk of the army was simply too disorganized to play a role."

135. *New York Times*, October 26, 1960.

136. Victor Marchetti, telephone interview with author, June 18, 1988. Andrew Tully writes, "It seems safe to say that Mobutu was 'discovered' by CIA" (Tully [see n. 121], p. 220).

137. Meriam (see n. 29), pp. 256–257, 260. According to Dayal, "Hammarskjöld had been alarmed by the effusive Western reactions to Lumumba's dismissal, but even more by their enthusiastic approval of ONUC's [the UN's] actions during the crisis and the supposed connection between the two" (Dayal [see n. 119], p. 42). We will also see in the next chapter that Hammarskjöld may have had a financial stake in ending the secession.

138. Dayal (see n. 119), p. 56.

139. Kalb (see n. 64), p. 135.

140. Kalb (see n. 64), pp. 100, 136. The UN troops that protected Lumumba were of Ghanaian nationality, and the action initially may have reflected the policy of Ghana

more than that of the UN. However, the Ghanaian troops were soon supported by Dayal. The protection of Lumumba thus became official UN policy.

141. The quote is a paraphrase in *New York Times*, November 5, 1960.

142. Quoted in Weissman (see n. 20), p. 102.

143. *New York Times*, November 5, 1960, p. 6.

144. Kalb (see n. 64), p. 183.

145. Kalb (see n. 64), pp. 180–83. See also "Memorandum of Conversation with SYG Hammarskjöld," September 26, 1960, Eisenhower Library, Christian A. Herter Papers, Chronological File, 1957–61, Box 9.

146. O'Brien notes that the USA at that time held sufficient power to force the resignation of a UN secretary-general. O'Brien (see n. 47), p. 56.

147. C. Douglas Dillon, quoted in United States Senate (see n. 104), p. 63.

148. Timberlake (see n. 19), p. 125. According to the ambassador, "Outside support of Gizenga proved to be of little practical use but did help to preserve him in office and give him hope and finances."

149. Hoskyns notes that Gizenga's regime "controlled virtually the whole of Orientale province and had considerable support in wide areas of Kivu, Kasai, North Katanga, and the western part of Leopoldville province" (Hoskyns [see n. 4], p. 292).

150. United States Senate (see n. 104), p. 49; and Kalb (see n. 64), p. 184.

151. See sources in footnote n. 130.

152. See, for example, the accounts of Eisenhower (n. 85), pp. 572–84; and Timberlake (n. 19).

153. Dulles's views were paraphrased in a National Security Council document, quoted in United States Senate (see n. 104), p. 57.

154. Mahoney makes the same point, although he uses slightly different figures. Different sources provide different estimates of the number of Soviets and Czechoslovaks in the country. The 380 figure, the highest estimate, is from Timberlake (see n. 19), p. 109. Timberlake also mentions unspecified "miscellaneous advisers" in addition to the Soviets, but he provides no details. An estimate of 100 Soviets and Czechoslovaks is provided by Mahoney (see n. 8), p. 41. A military study estimates 200 Soviets and makes no mention of Czechoslovaks. Fred E. Wagoner, *Dragon Rouge* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1980), p. 11. The number of UN personnel is from *United Nations Review*, September 1960.

155. Murphy (see n. 64), p. 335. Murphy believes that Lumumba's ideological naïveté made him susceptible to communist influence. This may be so, but Lumumba's actions showed a clear predilection for the West.

156. Lumumba's support from the Liberal party is noted in Georges Brausch, *Belgian Administration in the Congo* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 33. Regarding his support from the Communist party and from Belgian business interests, see Kalb (n. 64), p. xxiv; and Timberlake (n. 19), p. 41.

157. Timberlake (see n. 19), p. 88.

158. Weissman (see n. 20), p. 74, refers to the "NATO reflex" in U.S. policy.

159. Information regarding Morgan Guaranty's activity is from letter from Stephen Weissman to David T. Look, May 20, 1970. Letter provided to the author by Stephen Weissman. On Dillon-Read, see Centre de Recherche et d'Informations

Socio-Politiques, *Congo, 1959* (Brussels, n.d.), pp. 72-74. Quotes and other information are from Weissman (see n. 20), pp. 47-51; and Mahoney (see n. 8), pp. 54-55. CIA Director Dulles's ties to AMAX will be discussed at greater length in chapter 4.

160. Weissman (see n. 20), p. 46.

161. Mahoney (see n. 8), p. 54. See also Richard Mahoney, "The Kennedy Policy in the Congo, 1961-1963," Ph.D. diss., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1979, p. 256.

162. Minter (see n. 2), p. 33.

Chapter Four

1. Madeleine Kalb, *The Congo Cables* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 322.

2. *London Metal Bulletin*, December 12, 1961.

3. Advertisement by Franklin Smelting and Refining Company in *American Metal Markets*, January 26, 1961.

4. Memorandum from David Martin to Senator Thomas Dodd, "Conversation with Ambassador Timberlake," March 29, 1962, National Archives, RG 46, Senate Internal Security Committee, file on Michel Struelens.

5. Regarding Gullion's role, see David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett-Crest, 1972), pp. 118-19.

6. Letter from Donald T. Look of Morgan Guaranty Trust to Stephen Weissman, June 5, 1970, p. 2. Provided to the author by Stephen Weissman. Note that Morgan Guaranty apparently favored Katanga and was not part of the anticolonial bloc.

7. The entire role of the Swedish interests and their ties to the Kennedy administration was thoroughly investigated by the staff of the late Congressman Donald Bruce and presented in a speech before Congress. The author has checked many of Bruce's sources and is confident that, with minor exceptions, the Bruce accusations are factually accurate. Bruce's analysis can be found in the *Congressional Record*, September 12, 1962, pp. 19242-56. Much of Bruce's research material is to be found in the Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society. Two American companies and the Liberian government also participated in LAMCO, although the Swedes were clearly dominant. For a description of LAMCO in general, see *London Metal Bulletin*, November 14, 1961.

Regarding the Bolidens group, Sven Gustaf Schwartz, chairman of the Bolidens's board, was also director of Skanska Cement, which was a Swedish company and a member of the LAMCO syndicate. Schwartz also had an unspecified association with the Ifoverken company, also part of LAMCO. Schwartz's career included tenure as chairman of the Swedish Mining Association, as well as service with the UN force in the Congo. Regarding Schwartz, see biography in *Vem Är Det* (Swedish Who's Who), from the Bruce Papers, described above.

8. Bo Gustav Hammar skjöld's association with the LAMCO group and his relation to Dag Hammar skjöld are confirmed in a friendly biography, written by a former UN official. See Brian Urquhart, *Hammar skjöld* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 575. Regarding Bo Hammar skjöld's relationship to Grangesburg, see U.S. Department of Commerce fact sheet on Grangesburg, January 31, 1961, in the Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society.

9. Linner may have had other interests in the Congo, since he was part of a Swedish commercial mission to the Congo in 1953. See letter from P. Staner to Donald Bruce, September 12, 1962, Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society. For other information on Linner, see "UN Press Release, January 26, 1962," JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 28A; and biography in *Vem Är Det* (Swedish Who's Who) in the Donald Bruce Papers. Linner remained in the Congo as overall director of the UN force until January 1962, when he appears to have left the Congo. See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (New York, 1985), p. 344.

10. On both Hjortzberg-Nordlund and Schwartz, see Russell Warren Howe, "Union Minière: An Enigma of Congo Crisis," *Washington Post*, December 31, 1961; biography of Schwartz from *Vem Är Det* (Swedish Who's Who); *Liberia Trade, Industry, and Travel*, 1961, "This is the LAMCO Story"; and Liberian-American Swedish Minerals Company, SEC report, November 15, 1961. The latter three can be found in the Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society.

11. For examples of such accusations, see sources in speech by Congressman Donald Bruce in *Congressional Record*, September 12, 1962, pp. 19242-56.

12. *London Times*, August 9, 1960. Copper prices from 1957 to 1977 are provided in Raymond F. Mikesell, *The World Copper Industry* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 120; and Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., *The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), pp. 270-73.

13. *American Metal Markets*, July 25, 1960.

14. Börje Hjortzberg-Nordlund, "Mining Situation in the Republic of the Congo," September 30, 1960, pp. 68-69, United Nations Archives, DAG-13/1.6.1.0, Box 72.

15. Howe (see n. 10); and editorial from the *Richmond News Leader* cited in speech by Senator Strom Thurmond, *Congressional Record*, September 29, 1962, p. 21280.

16. Detwiler's original contract, formally establishing the Congo International Management Corporation, was widely reported at the time. See *Wall Street Journal*, July 25, 1960; and *Le Monde*, July 24-25, 1960. When the contract was reported in the press, Detwiler's ties to the Swedish mining interests virtually escaped notice, although the importance of the Swedish group was not known until much later. Dun and Bradstreet reported that Detwiler had been president of the International African American Corporation in 1954 and remained a "voting trustee" at the time the report was written in 1959. The report also noted that the latter company jointly controlled the Liberian ore fields with the Swedish LAMCO group. See the Dun and Bradstreet report, November 5, 1959, in the Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society.

The Detwiler contract was eventually repudiated by the Congolese government. The press accounts generally imply that the cancellation was due to Mr. Detwiler's apparently dubious business reputation; the author suspects that the cancellation was the result of pressure from the Belgians, although there is no documentary evidence of this. See Alan Merriam, *Congo: Background to Crisis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), p. 228.

17. In the opinion of former U.S. Ambassador Clare Timberlake, paraphrased by

an assistant to Ernest Lefever. "Staff Interview with Ambassador Clare Timberlake," May 14, 1965, interview notes, Ernest W. Lefever Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 9.

18. Information on AMAX is from John Payne, Jr., a former company executive, in a telephone interview with the author, January 23, 1988; information on LAMCO is from its SEC prospectus, November 15, 1961, Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society. The pro-Katanga orientation of AMAX will be discussed later in this chapter. On the connection between AMAX and the CIA, see Adam Hochschild, *Half the Way Home* (New York: Viking, 1986), pp. 93, 170. Adam Hochschild is the son of Harold Hochschild.

Dulles's pro-Katanga viewpoint is straightforward: Under Dulles's directorship, the CIA supplied Katanga with jet aircraft. See Richard Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 80–81.

19. The Canadian firm was Liberian Iron Ore Ltd., which had an interlocking directorate with both LAMCO and the LAMCO-affiliated International African American Corporation. On Mr. Steen's association, see "Liberian Iron Ore Limited," November 15, 1961, a Securities and Exchange Commission document, pp. 3, 45. On Hamilton's presence on the board of the IAAC, see "International African American Corporation: Annual Report, 1960," another SEC document. Both documents are from the Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society. On the law firm, see George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 101; and letter from Clarence B. Randall to C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., April 25, 1958, Eisenhower Library, Clarence Randall Collection, Randall Series, Trips Subseries, Box 3. Note that the name Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen, and Hamilton refers to the firm's New York office.

20. The Congo received a total of sixty-three million dollars in bilateral and multilateral U.S. aid in fiscal year 1962. Data from Department of State, Memorandum from John P. Walsh to Walt W. Rostow, July 30, 1967; provided to the author by William Minter.

21. Apparently, Hamilton "was nearly nominated" CIA director, but was then assigned at the last moment to foreign aid. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 630–31.

22. For general discussions of Tempelsman, see *Fortune* magazine, "Maurice Tempelsman's African Connection," November 15, 1982; *Washington Post*, "U.S. Businessman Plays a Key Role as Aide to Mobutu," December 31, 1979; Jonathan Kwitny, *Endless Enemies* (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984); and Katwala Ghifem, "Blockage Mechanisms, Disincentives, and Economic Crisis in Zaïre: The Role of the West," *Cahiers du CEDAFA*, no. 2, 1981, p. 51. Tempelsman is frequently covered in the social pages, although these articles reveal little of substance. Also note that in 1984, Maurice Tempelsman and his son acquired a controlling interest in Lazare Kaplan International. See 14A document for Lazare Kaplan International, Securities and Exchange Commission, public information room, file number 00107848. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is Tempelsman's only connection with an SEC-registered company.

23. These figures are from John Bartlow Martin, *Adlai Stevenson and the World*

(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1977), pp. 155, 243, 405, 406, 428. The name Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison, was the name adopted in 1957 for the firm's New York branch.

24. Martin (see n. 23), pp. 156, 428. Stevenson wrote to Kwame Nkrumah: "One of them [Stevenson's legal clients] is also applying for a license to purchase industrial diamonds in the government diamond market in Accra. . . . I plan to engage solicitors in Accra to assist me in this matter, and I very much hope that this application will merit the sympathetic consideration of the appropriate Government Departments. This company is one of the largest factors in the industrial diamond business in America." The letter does not specify the Tempelsman company, but the author is confident that Tempelsman was the client in question here. This quote is from a letter from Stevenson to Nkrumah, April 16, 1957, pp. 515–16 in Walter Johnson, ed., *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson*, vol. 6 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976).

25. Martin (see n. 23), pp. 156, 165. Martin cites a letter in which Stevenson described his travel plans.

26. The quote is from the letter cited in footnote n. 24.

27. *Fortune*, November 15, 1982.

28. Martin (see n. 23), p. 413.

29. Tempelsman's activities during this period will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.

30. Article in *Western World* reprinted in Johnson (see n. 24), vol. 6, pp. 536–38.

31. Commentary by Johnson (see n. 24), vol. 7, p. 3.

32. Letter from Adlai Stevenson to Sture Linner, September 15, 1960, United Nations Archives, DAG-13/1.6.1.0.15.

33. Letter from Sture Linner to Adlai Stevenson, September 30, 1960, United Nations Archives, DAG-13/1.6.1.0.15.

34. Martin (see n. 23), p. 536.

35. Letter from George H. Wittman, Jr. to William Blair, January 16, 1961, Adlai Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 837. Quoted with permission from Mudd Library, Princeton University.

36. Tempelsman reported that the Belgians did not oppose the barter project. In Richard Mahoney, "The Kennedy Policy in the Congo, 1961–1963," Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, 1979, pp. 261–263. In other instances we will see that the Belgians did indeed oppose Tempelsman's schemes.

37. Two-page letter from Maurice Tempelsman to Adlai Stevenson, November 9, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 837. Quoted with permission from Mudd Library, Princeton University.

38. The quote is from "Memorandum for Ambassador Stevenson," February 14, 1964; see also letter from Maurice Tempelsman to Adlai Stevenson, August 10, 1961. Both documents from Adlai Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Boxes 887 and 837, respectively. Quoted with permission from Mudd Library, Princeton University.

39. Letter from Maurice Tempelsman to Adlai Stevenson, August 10, 1961, Adlai Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 837. Quoted with permission from Mudd Library, Princeton University.

40. The quote is in a letter from Adlai Stevenson to Maurice Tempelsman, May 4, 1965, Adlai Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 905. On the other lobbying efforts during this period, see letter from Adlai Stevenson to George Ball, August 7, 1961, Box 837; letter from Adlai Stevenson to Maurice Tempelsman, August 26, 1961, Box 837; letter from Adlai Stevenson to George Ball, December 10, 1964, Box 887. Quoted with permission from Mudd Library, Princeton University.

41. Specifically, a "Memorandum for Governor Stevenson" begins with the following statement: "A day or two ago, the Washington Post called me about a report . . . that you had once been the president of Tempelsman and Sons [sic] . . . I informed the Post (and they so reported) that to the best of my knowledge there was nothing to this." The quote in the text was scribbled underneath the above statement. The scribbled statement was unsigned; nevertheless, its appearance under a "Memorandum for Governor Stevenson," its presence in the Stevenson papers, and its contents all leave little doubt that it was written by Stevenson. See Memorandum for Governor Stevenson, January 9, 1963, Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 867. Quoted with permission from Mudd Library, Princeton University.

42. The published collection of Stevenson's papers mentions Tempelsman among the persons who "generously provided funds to defray the editorial expenses of this volume." See Johnson (n. 24), vol. 6, p. 545.

43. Mahoney, (see n. 36), p. 264. Mahoney cites "a leading U.S. diplomat" as his source.

44. The Devlin involvement is noted, for example, in Kwitny (see n. 22), p. 58–59. Devlin retired as Tempelsman's representative in 1987. Information supplied by Helen Kitchen, Center for Strategic and International Studies, telephone interview with author, January 27, 1988.

Devlin had also been chief of station during the Eisenhower administration, in 1960. However, it is very doubtful that Devlin played a role in policy formulation during that period, since he was a relatively low ranking officer, continuously in danger of being replaced. By the time of the Kennedy administration, however, Devlin's situation was secure, and he was in a position to influence policy. Information regarding Devlin's career is from former CIA officer John Stockwell in a telephone interview with the author, February 27, 1990.

45. These ties will be discussed in chapter 6.

46. David Pallister, Sarah Stewart, and Ian Lepper, *South Africa Inc.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 158–59. Tempelsman's support for Kennedy during the election is mentioned by Kalb (see n. 1), p. 393.

47. Kwitny (see n. 22), p. 9.

48. Federal Election Commission, Public Information Office, Washington, D.C., "Selected List of Receipts and Expenditures (G) (79-80) Section 1: Individual Contributions," pp. 3085–88. It should be noted that according to George Ball, Tempelsman had previously been a supporter of Eisenhower and was a friend of Eisenhower aide Sherman Adams. The author believes this is a mistake, however, since it is contradicted by Tempelsman's long association with both Adlai Stevenson and the liberal wing of the New York Democratic party. Moreover, the author has looked through the Sherman Adams Papers at the Eisenhower Library. Although this

collection contains voluminous correspondence, the author did not find any letters to or from Tempelsman or any mention of him. On George Ball's statement, see Mahoney (n. 36), p. 266.

49. National Security Council, Memorandum, "Subject: Kasavubu Telegram to the President," December 5, 1964, LBJ Library, President's Papers, Confidential File, Box 7.

50. Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 127.

51. Robert Blake, former chargé d'affaires, U.S. embassy, Kinshasa, interview with author, January 20, 1988.

52. According to Russell Warren Howe, former *Washington Post* Africa correspondent, telephone interview with author, June 22, 1988; and Charles Derecskey, Sr., a freelance journalist, in a telephone interview with author, June 24, 1988. Although Tempelsman was typically at odds with the Belgian interests, he could in specific cases cooperate with them as well. It appears, for example, that Société Générale's diamond-mining affiliate participated in Tempelsman's aforementioned diamond barter deal. However, this was an exception, and in most cases, the Belgians were unrelentingly hostile to Tempelsman. (Note also that in the diamond sector, Tempelsman appears to have displaced SG by the middle 1960s.) On the cooperation with SG, see letter from A. Moeller de Ladderos to Maurice Tempelsman, March 14, 1961, Adlai Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 837. On the displacement of the Belgians, see chapter 6.

53. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, March 4, 1963. Released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

54. Mahoney (see n. 36), p. 265.

55. Stevenson's views on Katanga are noted in Ball (see n. 19), p. 256.

56. According to Edmund Gullion, former U.S. ambassador to the Congo, in a telephone interview with the author, August 26, 1988.

57. Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 144. Vance may have had a personal interest in the Congo, since in 1976 he reportedly "retired to open a consulting office in Washington, advising clients about Zairian investment opportunities" (John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* [New York: Norton, 1978], p. 241). For further information on Mr. Vance's consulting career, see Kwitny (n. 22), pp. 22–23.

58. Information on the attempted bribe was provided by former CIA officer John Stockwell in a telephone interview with the author, October 16, 1987. Information on the alleged assassination plot was provided by Wesley Cohen, who now teaches economics at Carnegie-Mellon University, in a telephone interview with author, August 26, 1988. Cohen interviewed Devlin in the early 1970s, and during this interview, Devlin described the Belgian assassination plot. On Devlin's initial enthusiasm for Tshombe in early 1961, see Weissman (n. 50), p. 145.

59. This was discussed at length in chapter 2.

60. On page 37, Weissman (see n. 50) states: "Much attention has been paid to the 1950 purchase [of stock by the Rockefeller interests in a Société Générale subsidiary] . . . However, Rockefeller sources insist that these holdings were sold in the market prior to June 1960, and the political behavior of certain directors during the Congo

crisis is broadly confirming." Continued Rockefeller participation in several Katanga-based companies is noted in Department of State cable, Brussels 2202, May 19, 1962. Document released under the FOIA. On Mobil's investments, see chapter 2; and also Weissman (n. 50), pp. 173-74.

61. Quote is directly from transcript, which paraphrased Rockefeller. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation with David Rockefeller, July 26, 1960, Eisenhower Library, Christian A. Herter Papers, Telephone Calls Series, Box 13.

62. Weissman (see n. 50), p. 176. Not all members of the Rockefeller family shared this view. A State Department cable suggested that Nelson Rockefeller (perhaps thinking of the family's continued holdings in Katanga) quietly sympathized with Tshombe. Nelson Rockefeller, however, "indicated general understanding of policy and gave no indication he will raise public issues," regarding Katanga. The author has not, in fact, seen any evidence that this particular Rockefeller played any role in the Congo Crisis. Department of State cable, Caracas 708, December 16, 1961, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 29/30.

63. Letter from William H. Beaty, Jr., to Stephen Weissman, June 10, 1970. Provided to the author by Stephen Weissman.

64. Weissman (see n. 50), p. 176.

65. The Rockefellers had ties to the Swedish interests. One of the directors of the Liberian Iron Ore Company, an affiliate of the LAMCO group, was also a vice president of the First National City Bank—which was Rockefeller controlled. On this link, see Liberian Iron Ore Ltd. Prospectus, November 15, 1961, p. 48, Donald Bruce Papers, Katanga Box, Indiana Historical Society. On Rockefeller control of First National City Bank, see Ferdinand Lundberg, *The Rich and the Superrich* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 740. On Tempelsman's later linkup with the Rockefellers, see chapter 6.

66. Rusk's friendship with McGhee is emphasized by Halberstam (see n. 5), p. 128. Halberstam refers to McGhee as "Rusk's hand-picked man."

67. According to Edmund Gullion, former ambassador to the Congo in a telephone interview with the author, June 9, 1987.

68. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 576.

69. Chester Bowles, *Africa's Challenge to America* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956).

70. On Bowles's association with the Rockefeller Foundation, see Rockefeller Foundation *Annual Report* 1953. On his liberal views on Africa, see Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Delta Books, 1964), p. 246.

71. Mahoney refers to Fredericks as "the administration's preeminent Africanist," and notes that Fredericks believed that "the subverter of peace in the Congo was . . . Belgium" (Mahoney [see n. 18], p. 75). On his alleged CIA ties, see Weissman (n. 50), p. 130. Weissman cites two former government officials as sources.

72. See biography in *Who's Who in America*, 1982-1983. Frederick's involvement in Chase's loans to the Congo cannot be confirmed; nevertheless his involvement seems highly likely, since he was director of international relations for Chase in 1973-

74—when the bank was becoming involved in the Congo. On Chase's loans to the Congo, see chapter 6.

73. On Cleveland's Rockefeller ties, see Weissman (n. 50), p. 129. In his memoirs, George Ball notes that Cleveland was "definitely anti-Tshombe," although not as strongly as other figures, such as Stevenson. See Ball (n. 19), p. 230.

74. See biography in *Who's Who in the World*, 1971-72; also "Dr. Victor Umbricht, President, Congolese Monetary Council," April 19, 1961, Council on Foreign Relations Archives, Meetings Series.

75. Several other companies had political connections, although there is no evidence that they became directly involved in the Congo Crisis. One such firm was the Reynolds Metal Company, whose interests would seem to have been with the anti-colonial bloc. During the 1950s, the Belgians had blocked Reynolds, among other American companies, from participating in the Inga hydroelectric project. Reynolds was also a legal client of Stevenson, who helped promote the company's Africa activities. The company was one of the largest contributors to Stevenson's presidential campaigns. Nevertheless, Reynolds does not appear to have been active during the crisis.

The Ford interests also had political connections that were relevant to the Congo Crisis. Deputy Assistant Secretary Fredericks had long worked for the Ford Foundation, and after government service, he became director of international governmental affairs at the Ford Motor Company. Ford also attempted to invest in the Congo during the 1970s; it eventually announced plans to construct a factory there (but this was never successfully completed). There is no evidence that Ford took any interest one way or the other in the Congo Crisis.

On Stevenson's ties to Reynolds, see Martin (n. 23), pp. 156, 243, 339, 412, 413, 415, 425, 428, 439, 463, 464, 548. On the ultimate outcome of the Inga project see discussion in chapter 2. On Fredericks's Ford ties, see his biography in *Who's Who in America*, 1982-1983. On Ford's later interest in the Congo, see chapter 6 of this study. Also see footnote n. 234 for (circumstantial) evidence that the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies were part of the anticolonial bloc.

76. Jules Gérard-Libois, *Katanga Secession* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), p. 158.

77. London *Metal Bulletin*, March 12, 1965.

78. A former U.S. ambassador to Belgium stated that Leon Lambert, of the Lambert group, "was a very great admirer of Paul-Henri Spaak" (Douglas MacArthur II, interview with author, April 30, 1987). Another source suggests that the Socialists tended to be friendly toward the more modern, internationally oriented business interests—and Lambert easily fit into this category. See Kees van der Pijl, *The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class* (London: Verso Books, 1984), pp. 228, 268.

79. The Lambert group is described at length in Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques, *Morphologie des groupes financiers* (Brussels, 1966), chap. 10. On the overwhelming nature of SG's interests in the Congo, see chapter 1.

80. Department of State cable, Brussels 5642, April 26, 1967. Released under FOIA.

81. This is suggested by van der Pijl (see n. 78), p. 268, who contrasts the nationalistic oriented SG group and the "cosmopolitan" interests, which included Lambert. Any internationalist oriented European company would almost certainly have had dealings with the USA.

82. See Spaak's biography in *The International Who's Who*, 1972-73.

83. Ball (see n. 19), p. 258.

84. Gérard-Libois (see n. 76), p. 175; and Weissman (see n. 50), p. 73.

85. Conon Cruise O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York: Universal Library, 1966), p. 306. Quoted with permission.

86. Department of State cable, London 4223, May 16, 1962, p. 2, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 28A.

87. For a general description of the British financial stake, see Howe (n. 10); Mahoney (n. 36), p. 247; and annual reports by Tanganyika Concessions.

88. Tanganyika Concessions, *Annual Report*, 1960; and Charles Waterhouse's biography in *Who's Who*, 1960.

89. Howe (see n. 10).

90. *London Times*, July 27, 1962. For a similar view, see Ball (n. 19), p. 231.

91. Harold Macmillan, *Pointing the Way* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 263.

92. John Biggs-Davison, February 7, 1963, in *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Ser., vol. 671, p. 680.

93. Trinquier's Indochina activities are described in Alfred McCoy, Jr., *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), chap. 4. Jean Ziegler and Jules Gérard-Libois both report some Belgian-French feuding during February 1961, associated with Colonel Trinquier's presence. Ziegler implies that Trinquier's mission was encouraged by French corporate interests, which sought to displace the Belgians in Katanga (although Ziegler provides no details). By the end of February 1961, Belgian hostility blocked Trinquier's activities and prevented him from commanding the Katangese military. See Gérard-Libois (n. 76), pp. 165-168; and Jean Ziegler, *La Contre-révolution en Afrique* (Paris: Payot, 1963), pp. 87-92. French-Belgian rivalries were short-lived and relatively minor during this period; in chapter 5 we shall see that the rivalries would later intensify.

94. Weissman (see n. 50), p. 72; and Gérard-Libois (see n. 76), pp. 166-67.

95. The French played an important role in the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70 and in the Angolan Civil War of 1974-76. On Nigeria, see John de St. Joré, *The Brothers' War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). On Angola, see Stockwell (n. 57).

96. Paraphrased views of Francis Monheim, a Belgian journalist with long experience in the Congo. "Interview with Francis Monheim," interview notes, June 17, 1965, p. 7, Ernest W. Lefever Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 1.

97. *New York Times*, July 29, 1962.

98. Gérard-Libois (see n. 76), pp. 175, 282; O'Brien (see n. 85), p. 87. South African material aid, specifically planes and pilots, was noted in United Nations Memorandum, "SCCR Kotwezi," July 2, 1962, United Nations Archives, DAG--

13/1.6.1.0: 52; and Memorandum from R. K. A. Gardner to A. J. Jacobs, April 22, 1963 (?), United Nations Archives, DAG-1/2.2.1.49.

99. Quoted in Weissman (see n. 50), p. 168.

100. Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1971), p. 424.

101. On Dillon, Read's activities in general, see chapter 2. On the default, see *L'Echo de la Bourse*, March 25, 1965; Department of State cable, Leopoldville 1028, October 23, 1961; Leopoldville 1890, March 11, 1961. Documents released under FOIA. Note also that Dillon, Read had employed, as its agent, Ganshof van der Meersch, the son of the former Belgian minister of colonies. See Department of State, Foreign Service Despatch no. 347, March 15, 1962; and Foreign Service Despatch no. 622, January 11, 1962. Released under FOIA.

102. Quote from United States Government Memorandum from James O'Sullivan to Governor Williams, December 7, 1964. See also Department of State cable, Leopoldville 1165, November 10, 1961. Documents released under FOIA.

103. Mahoney (see n. 36), p. 256. "After a State Department meeting in which Dillon had taken exception to Congo policy, [George] Ball felt obligated to have 'an unhappy little talk with Doug,'" presumably referring to Douglas Dillon.

104. On Hoffacker's ties to Shell, see *Who's Who in America*, 1982-83. On Shell's role in the Congo, see *Petroleum Press Service*, "The New Congo," June 1960. For his views on Katanga, see Mahoney (n. 18), pp. 145-46.

105. Department of State cable, Brussels 1200, January 4, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 29/30.

106. See "Interview with Ambassador MacArthur," November 7, 1963, Ernest W. Lefever papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 1. Also Spaak, in his memoirs, states: "U.S. ambassador Douglas MacArthur . . . helped me tremendously during that period. Our relations, which had at first been purely professional, soon turned into solid, trusting, and lasting friendship. I felt free to reveal my thoughts to him, and MacArthur not only accurately conveyed my ideas to the State Department but, I am sure, pleaded my case on many occasions" (Paul-Henri Spaak, *The Continuing Battle* [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971], p. 371).

107. See MacArthur's biography in *International Who's Who*, 1977-78.

108. This will be discussed later in the chapter.

109. Noted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 40. See also Kirk's biography in *Who Was Who in America*, vol. 4.

110. From Department of State cable, Leopoldville 82, July 12, 1961. Released under FOIA.

111. Department of State cable, New York 2070, December 12, 1961. From *Declassified Documents microfiche series* (1975, no. 290A).

112. Hilsman (see n. 70), p. 44.

113. Information on Bundy's anti-Katanga position was supplied by Edmund Gullion in a telephone interview with the author, February 27, 1990.

114. See discussion later in this chapter.

115. Little information is available on Engelhard. However, see Weissman (n. 50), p. 172; *Forbes*, August 1, 1965, "The Engelhard Touch;" Paul Jacobs, "Charles Engelhard: Our Man in Africa," *Ramparts*, November 1966. It is not clear how close Engelhard was to the Kennedy administration. A letter from the Statler Hilton of New York reported, "Mr. Charles Engelhard, multi-millionaire, worked hard to elect John Kennedy President of the United States . . . Some people have told Charles Engelhard that President John Kennedy blames Charles, for holding back the New Jersey delegation, at the Democratic Convention. Charles, claims to be innocent of these charges" (letter to Kenneth O'Donnell [sender not indicated], October 22, 1961, JFK Library, White House Name File, Box 798). Despite the problem, Engelhard was designated U.S. representative to the Algerian independence ceremonies. See "Draft White House Press Release," July 3, 1963, JFK Library, White House Name File, Box 798.

116. Specifically, AMAX was a large shareholder in Rhodesian Selection Trust (RST), a copper company whose facilities were in Rhodesia, directly across the border from Katanga. AMAX was concerned that the disorder prevailing in the rest of the Congo might spread to Katanga and eventually, to Rhodesia itself. Also, the RST group obtained much of its energy supply through hydroelectric sources in the Belgian Congo. The latter connection was established in close cooperation with the Belgian colonial interests. For all of these reasons, AMAX had a strong and essentially pro-Belgian interest in the Congo Crisis. On the role of AMAX and Hochschild in general, see Weissman (n. 50), pp. 33, 126, 174-75; and Sir Ronald Prain, *Reflections on an Era* (London: Metal Bulletin Books, 1981), especially pp. 92-93.

117. Hochschild wrote, "As I said to . . . Adlai Stevenson when we happened to meet the other night, I do have misgivings about UN policy toward Katanga" (Letter from Harold Hochschild to Francis T. P. Plimpton, November 16, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 832). Quoted with permission from Mudd Library, Princeton University. Note that Société Générale and Lazard Frères (an investment bank and a stockholder in a Société Générale affiliate) also contacted Stevenson. However, there is no evidence that either firm had direct ties to Stevenson or that they had any special influence with him. See letter from André Meyer to Adlai Stevenson, April 23, 1962, Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 854; and E. van der Streaten to Adlai Stevenson, August 21, 1961, Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 838.

118. Hochschild (see n. 18), p. 170. John Payne, Jr., former AMAX vice president, confirmed that AMAX never used Stevenson's law firm. Telephone interview, January 23, 1988.

119. The only financial tie between Hochschild and Stevenson was a twenty-six-thousand-dollar contribution to the 1956 Democratic campaign. In that year alone, Tempelsman's legal payments totaled forty thousand dollars—and this figure does not include Tempelsman's payments during the other years of the 1955-60 period when he retained Stevenson as counsel. Hochschild also contributed fifteen thousand dollars to Kennedy's campaign in 1960, although there is no evidence that Hochschild attempted to lobby the president directly. On Hochschild's campaign contributions, see Herbert E. Alexander, *Financing the 1964 Election* (Princeton: Citizens' Research Foundation, 1966), p. 129; and letter from Adlai Stevenson to Richard Maguire, May 25, 1962,

Adlai Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 850. Tempelsman's legal fees were discussed earlier in this chapter.

120. To propitiate those interests, Stevenson wrote, "I have tried continuously to protect the good name and probity of the Union Minière against the rising chorus of accusations" (Mahoney [see n. 36], p. 257). Beyond these gestures, Stevenson took no apparent action to protect Union Minière's investments, and he consistently advocated policies that were highly disadvantageous for the company.

121. McGhee's ties to Mobil are noted in his biography in *Who's Who in America*, 1986-87. Weissman (see n. 50), pp. 173-174, writes that Mobil Oil "probably" lobbied for the Katanga cause. Note, however, that in other regions of Africa, especially French Equatorial Africa, Mobil appears to have had a more anticolonial orientation. On the feuds between Mobil (Socony-Vacuum) and the French colonial interests, see David Gibbs, "Private Interests and International Conflict: A Case Study of U.S. Intervention in the Congo," Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989, chap. 2.

122. According to Edmund Gullion, former U.S. ambassador to the Congo, in a telephone interview with the author, June 9, 1987.

123. Quoted in Russell Warren Howe, *Along the African Shore* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975), p. 138.

124. *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, January 15, 1956. Translated from the French.

125. Howe (see n. 123), p. 137.

126. Letter from David H. Swanson to Stephen Weissman, July 17, 1970. Provided to the author by Weissman.

127. Regarding Struelens's colonial ties, see the inside jacket of Michel Struelens, *The United Nations in the Congo—or ONUC—and International Politics* (Brussels: Max Arnold, 1976). Also see his biography in *Who's Who in America*, 1984-85. Note that KIS was actually established in 1960, before Kennedy's inauguration, although it did not become a significant factor until 1961.

128. Ball (see n. 19), p. 234.

129. *Group Research Reports*, December 18, 1962; and Russell Warren Howe and Sarah Hays Trott, *The Power Peddlers* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1977), p. 177.

130. Ball (see n. 19), p. 234, refers to the committee as "the Katangan lobby's principal instrument."

131. Yergan's career is described in Henry F. Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto* (New York: William Morrow, 1982), pp. 142-44. On his early pro-Belgian views of the Congo, see *Association des Intérêts Coloniaux Belges Bulletin*, May 15, 1953. Yergan stated that "the Belgians have focused in the Congo, on economic development and seek to satisfy the basic needs of the indigenous workers." However, Yergan cautiously noted that by refusing to grant any political rights, the Belgians "might have committed an error." Translated from the French.

132. See "American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters," January 13, 1964, by Group Research Inc., Washington, D.C., vertical files. In early 1962, the

committee attempted to distance itself from the John Birch Society in order to broaden its support. See letter from Max Yergan to Dean Manion, January 11, 1962. Marvin Leibman Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 56.

133. The lobbying effort is described in Weissman (see n. 50), pp. 168–72.

134. O'Brien (see n. 85), p. 159. Reprinted with permission.

135. Weissman (see n. 50), p. 171; and Ball (see n. 19), p. 234. Ball attributes the southern affection for Tshombe to "his secessionist ambitions [which] evoked atavistic memories of the old South."

136. The anti-UN factor is emphasized by Marvin Leibman, a consultant to the American Committee. Telephone interview with author, May 6, 1987.

137. Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 179. The quote is directly from Urquhart, who paraphrases Tshombe. On Tshombe's statement, Urquhart comments, "I do not know whether this was true." The present author believes that Tshombe's statement was true. Tshombe had no reason to slander Senator Dodd, since Dodd was one of Tshombe's principal defenders. Indeed, Tshombe's statement constitutes a declaration against interest and would thus seem plausible. On Dirksen, see Weissman (n. 50), pp. 159, 169.

138. Frederick G. Dutton, telephone interview with author, May 20, 1987.

139. Thomas Hughes, telephone interview with author, July 2, 1987.

140. Hughes (see n. 139) reported the investigation. On the NSA statement, see letter from the National Security Agency to David Gibbs, April 30, 1987. The agency did not specifically acknowledge the possession of documents pertaining to Senator Dodd.

141. Hughes (see n. 139). See also Drew Pearson, "Dodd Opposes Kennedy on Katanga," *Washington Post*, December 27, 1961; "Katanga Radio Tells of Dodd Trip," *Washington Post*, January 4, 1962. Also, in 1961 Thomas Corcoran, a former aide to Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Democratic National Committee Chairman Phil Butler lobbied for the South Kasai secession. A threatened investigation apparently quieted this effort. Mahoney (see n. 36), p. 266.

142. The State Department disputes and the Africa task force are described in Kalb (see n. 1), pp. 199–205; and Mahoney (see n. 18), pp. 65–66, 74–77.

143. The politics of the February resolution are described in O'Brien (see n. 85), pp. 60–63; Mahoney (see n. 18), pp. 74–77; and Catherine Hoskyns, *The Congo Since Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 328–39. The Belgian government at this time had not yet changed, and the foreign minister, Pierre Wigny, was conservative and strongly pro-Katanga. The Socialist foreign minister, Spaak, did not take office until April.

144. The resolution is reprinted verbatim in Hoskyns (see n. 143), p. 329.

145. Rejashwar Dayal, *Mission for Hammarskjöld* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 238. See also Kalb (n. 1), p. 236.

146. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 224. The quote is from Kalb, paraphrasing the opinions of Mobutu. See also Hoskyns (n. 143), pp. 330–31.

147. Hoskyns (see n. 143), p. 338.

148. These events are described in Hoskyns (see n. 143), pp. 343–46.

149. Hoskyns (see n. 143), p. 338. Former UN official Dayal mentions an instance

of a British diplomat disseminating anti-UN information. See Dayal (n. 145), p. 221. Dayal notes, however, that he does not believe that these actions reflected official British policy.

150. See Hoskyns (n. 143), pp. 346–47.

151. On Madagascar, see Hoskyns (n. 143), p. 343. On Hammarskjöld's views, see P. H. Gendebien, *L'Intervention des Nations Unies au Congo, 1960–1964* (Paris: Mouton, 1967), p. 100. On the U.S. role, see Hoskyns (n. 143), p. 347. Note that Ambassador Timberlake supported the accords, although he was in disfavor by this time, and his views probably did not represent those of the State Department. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 246.

152. Hoskyns (see n. 143), pp. 355–56.

153. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 271; and Hoskyns (see n. 143), pp. 359–66. The quote is from President Kasavubu.

154. Hoskyns (see n. 143), pp. 364–66.

155. Gendebien (see n. 151), pp. 112–14. Translated from the French.

156. Quoted in Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 86. Mahoney's source was de Gaulle's memoirs.

157. Quote on Ileo is from Rejashwar Dayal, a former UN official. See Dayal (n. 145), p. 314.

158. Adoula's connection to the AFL-CIO is noted in Weissman (see n. 50), pp. 105–6. On the CIA's extensive ties to the AFL-CIO, see Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell, 1980), pp. 28, 46, 352–53.

159. Weissman (see n. 50), p. 109.

160. Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 85.

161. Mahoney (see n. 18), pp. 86–87.

162. *New York Times*, April 26, 1966.

163. *New York Times*, April 26, 1966. The same article also alleged that Eastern bloc agents were playing a major role in the Congo during this period. The present author doubts this. According to a CIA document: "[Since the fall of Lumumba in 1960] the USSR has been extremely cautious in committing its prestige or resources in the Congo" (Central Intelligence Agency, SC no. 10626/64, August 27, 1964; released under FOIA).

164. Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 132. The CIA provided Cuban pilots to fly the planes.

165. George Ball, quoted in Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 87.

166. O'Brien (see n. 85), pp. 123, 168, 221. Reprinted with permission.

167. These events are described in O'Brien (see n. 85), pp. 206–88; Dayal (see n. 145), chap. 16; and Gérard-Libois (see n. 76), p. 165.

168. Apparently the CIA had helped deliver French-built Fougas aircraft to Katanga through a contract company in February 1961. The delivery thus occurred shortly after Kennedy's inauguration as president. Although it cannot be firmly established, it is very doubtful that Kennedy knew about this action or that he had authorized it, since it was completely contrary to his otherwise anti-Katanga policies. More likely, it was undertaken by CIA officers without presidential authorization. It is worth noting that

the delivery occurred during Kennedy's first month as president, at a time when his CIA director, Allen Dulles, was an Eisenhower holdover. John Stockwell, a former CIA officer with long experience in Africa, stated he could "not imagine that Kennedy was involved" in the Fougla delivery. Telephone interview with author, October 16, 1987. On the delivery itself, see *Le Monde*, February 8, 1961; February 18, 1961; and Mahoney (n. 18), pp. 80–81.

169. Dayal (see n. 145), p. 276.
170. Quoted in Dayal (see n. 145), p. 269.
171. Quoted in *New York Times*, "Opinions of the Week: At Home and Abroad," September 17, 1961. Note that Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 116, provides evidence that UN forces had, in fact, committed some atrocities.
172. Geoffrey Wheatcroft, "The Center Holds I," *New Republic*, September 12/19, 1988.
173. Dayal (see n. 145), p. 269.
174. Weissman (see n. 50), p. 159.
175. See Senator Dodd's remarks in *Congressional Record*, September 16, 1961, pp. 19875, 19877.
176. O'Brien (see n. 85), p. 109. Reprinted with permission.
177. *New York Times*, September 17, 1961.
178. Dayal (see n. 145), p. 270.
179. On the reprimand, see Dayal (n. 145), p. 271. There was some controversy as to whether O'Brien was acting on his own or if the operations had been approved by Hammarskjöld. O'Brien claims that his actions had been approved, although others, including Dayal, dispute this. See Dayal (n. 145), pp. 268–69.
180. O'Brien (see n. 85), pp. 286–87. Reprinted with permission. O'Brien does, however, leave open the possibility that Katangese Interior Minister Godefroid Munongo might have ordered the shutdown.

181. The shutdown is also described in Dayal (see n. 145), pp. 278–82; and U Thant, *View from the UN* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 130–34. See also United Nations, *Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances Resulting in the Tragic Death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld and of Members of the Party Accompanying Him*, Report A/5059, April 24, 1962.
- It is also worth mentioning that Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko claims that the KGB helped kill Hammarskjöld. However, very serious doubts have been raised about the reliability of this account. See Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 102–3; and Edward Jay Epstein, "The Spy Who Came in to Be Sold," *New Republic*, July 15/22, 1985.
182. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 330; see also Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 390. Young notes Gizenga's "drab public image."
183. Hoskyns (see n. 143), pp. 458–60; Kalb (see n. 1), pp. 303–5.
184. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 307. The threat was not made directly by Adoula but by Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko.
185. Quote from "Memorandum for the President," from George Ball, September 23, 1961, p. 3, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 27/28. The

importance of Ball in the policy-making process is noted by Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 106.

186. Ball (see n. 19), p. 256. The quote is from Ball, who paraphrases Stevenson's views.
187. G. Mennen Williams, "Memorandum for the President," September 25, 1961, in *Declassified Documents* microfiche collection (Retrospective series, no. 381E).
188. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 313.
189. See "Memorandum for the President," from Walt Whitman Rostow ("WWR"), October 10, 1961, JFK Library, White House Central File, Countries Series, Box 114; and Kalb (n. 1), p. 314.
190. Quoted in Hoskyns (see n. 143), pp. 444–45.
191. *New York Times*, November 25, 1961.
192. Hoskyns (see n. 143), pp. 447–55. The U Thant quote is a paraphrase from *New York Times*, December 4, 1961. Rhodesian support was noted in *New York Times*, December 27, 1961.
193. Department of State cable, New York, December 7, 1961, from *Declassified Documents* microfiche collection (1975, no. 287A). Stevenson's views were paraphrased in the cable. On UN air activity, see Kalb (n. 1), p. 314.
194. Hoskyns (see n. 143), p. 455.
195. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 307.
196. Ball (see n. 19), p. 234.
197. See the *New York Times*, December 14, 1961; December 17, 1961. On December 15, 1961, Eisenhower endorsed Kennedy's efforts in "developing peaceful conditions under which [the Congolese leaders] can themselves resolve their differences through negotiations." Eisenhower did not endorse the UN offensive, although he did not criticize it either. Thus Eisenhower failed to associate himself with the critics of the Kennedy administration. Apparently Eisenhower was uncomfortable with the extreme right elements, including the John Birch Society, that formed the core of the Katanga support groups. See Department of State cable, State 708, December 16, 1961, in *Declassified Documents* microfiche collection (Retrospective series, no. 389B).
198. *National Review*, December 23, 1961; and December 16, 1961.
199. On Dodd, see *New York Times*, December 15, 1961.
200. *New York Times*, December 14, 1961; December 15, 1961; also Thant (see n. 181), p. 138.
201. See U Thant (n. 181), pp. 138–39.
202. These events are described in *New York Times*, March 7, 1962; April 18, 1962; May 18, 1962; May 31, 1962; June 27, 1962; July 18, 1962.
203. On Kirk, see Department of State cable, from State, December 27, 1961, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries series, Box 29/30; and Department of State cable, Brussels 1179, December 29, 1961, *Declassified Documents* microfiche collection (Retrospective series, no. 402C).
204. On MacArthur, see Department of State cable, Brussels 1378, January 31, 1962, *Declassified Documents* microfiche collection (Retrospective series, no. 412G).

205. Pressure on the Tanganyika company was implied in Department of State cable, London 4223, May 16, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 28A.
206. Department of State cable, from State, May 21, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 30A-32.
207. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, March 14, 1962; September 2/3, 1962; October 12/13, 1962; October 16, 1962.
208. Department of State cable, Brussels 58, July 12, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 30A-32.
209. Department of State cable, Brussels 58, July 12, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 30A-32. Ambassador MacArthur assumed that the company's actions were motivated by a fear that Tshombe would sabotage the mining installations, not because the company actively favored him. Other cables make similar points. See for example, Elisabethville 373, September 2, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 30A-32.
- Subsequent events, however, show that this view was incorrect. Union Minière actively continued to support Tshombe long after the end of the Katanga secession, and it is doubtful that the company would have continued to trust Tshombe if he had threatened to destroy company property. For more on this, see chapter 5. MacArthur's view is also contradicted by the very strong support given Tshombe by the Belgian press, including the business press, during this period.
210. Letter from Sture Linner to U Thant, April 18, 1962, United Nations Archives, DAG-1/2.2.1:63.
211. The federalist option was discussed extensively in the Belgian press throughout 1962. On the possibility of a Swiss-style confederation, see *L'Echo de la Bourse*, December 28-31, 1962.
212. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, January 18, 1962. Translated from the French.
213. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, August 3/4, 1962. Translated from the French.
214. There were numerous examples of this in *L'Echo de la Bourse* throughout 1962. On the views of *Le Soir* and *La Libre Belgique*, two other Belgian papers, see summaries in *L'Echo de la Bourse*, January 18, 1962; and March 28, 1962.
215. Department of State cable, London 4223, May 16, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 28A. UMHK's payments probably decreased somewhat in 1962; the company was withholding copper from the international market because of low prices. See Department of State cable, Elisabethville 373, September 2, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 30A-32. Note that Mobil Oil did eventually cut off revenue payments, although they were clearly not the mainstay of the Katangese secession. George C. McGhee, "Memorandum for the President," October 31, 1962, in *Declassified Documents microfiche collection* (Retrospective Series no. 437C).
216. Department of State cable, March 24, 1962, in *Declassified Documents microfiche collection* (Retrospective Series, no. 426F). The cable was written by Ball.
217. For MacArthur's criticisms of official policy in the Congo, see Department of State cable, Brussels 1153, December 28, 1961, in *Declassified Documents microfiche collection* (Retrospective series, no. 400D); and Mahoney (n. 18), p. 292.

218. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 347.
219. The European policies were discussed in Department of State "Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, the White House," August 11, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 28A.
220. O'Brien (see n. 85), p. 130. Reprinted with permission.
221. "Great Britain and the Katanga Question," August 9, 1962, UN Archives, DAG-13/1.6.1.0-2. The specific occasion for the protest was that the government had refused to issue Tshombe a visa to tour Belgium.
222. Kalb (see n. 1), pp. 347-49; Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 141.
223. Thant (see n. 181), p. 139.
224. *New York Times*, October 17, 1962; October 19, 1962.
225. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 354; Department of State, Memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes to Governor Williams, January 2, 1963, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 29/30.
226. *New York Times*, November 3, 1962; Thant (see n. 181), p. 142.
227. Melvin Gurtov, *The United States Against the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 58.
228. *La Libre Belgique*, quoted in *L'Echo de la Bourse*, January 8, 1963. Translated from the French.
229. *La Libre Belgique*, quoted in *L'Echo de la Bourse*, January 1/2, 1963. Translated from the French.
230. *Pourquoi Pas*, quoted in *L'Echo de la Bourse*, January 11/12, 1963. Translated from the French.
231. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, August 1, 1962. *Het Volk* is summarized in *L'Echo*. Translated from the French.
232. Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, "Subject: Reynolds Proposal re Investment in Congo," November 2, 1962, pp. 1-2. Released under FOIA.
233. Cited in *Le Monde*, January 9, 1962.
234. An interesting question is why Anaconda and Kennecott failed to play active roles in the Congo Crisis. One possible explanation might be some indirect links between these companies and the Société Générale group. Specifically, the Guggenheim family, which held a bloc of stock in FORMINIERE, Société Générale's diamond affiliate, also held controlling interests in Anaconda and Kennecott. On FORMINIERE, see chapter 2. On the Guggenheim interest in the copper companies, see Lundberg (n. 65), pp. 940-42. These connections may explain the apparent absence of these copper companies in the anticolonial bloc. On the other hand, it may be that the copper companies were involved, but the author has been unable to find the evidence.
235. On this incident, see letter from Maurice Tempelsman to Adlai Stevenson, January 2, 1962; letter from Adlai Stevenson to Maurice Tempelsman, January 4, 1962; letter from Maurice Tempelsman to Adlai Stevenson, January 29, 1962. All from Adlai Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 854.
236. Letter from Edgar van der Streten to Adlai E. Stevenson, September 27, 1961, p. 1, Adlai Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 838. Quoted with permission from Mudd Library, Princeton University. Note that van der Streten, an SG executive, stated that he did not believe these allegations.

237. See, for example, *Gazette de Lausanne*, July 22/23, 1961. Reprinted, in English translation, in speech by Congressman Bruce (see n. 7).

238. Adenauer summarized in Central Intelligence Agency "Current Intelligence Memorandum," February 4, 1963, JFK Library, President's Office File, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 72.

239. London *Metal Bulletin*, December 15, 1961.

240. Sir W. Teeling, in House of Commons, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, 5th ser., vol. 671, February 7, 1963, pp. 706, 707.

241. Sir Harold Wilson, in House of Commons, *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, 5th ser., vol. 671, February 7, 1963, pp. 692, 693, 706.

242. Bruce (see n. 7).

243. Strom Thurmond, in *Congressional Record*, September 29, 1962, pp. 21279–80.

244. *Cincinnati Enquirer*, October 7, 1962, clipping in Donald Bruce Papers, Kattanga Box, Indiana Historical Society.

245. Mahoney (see n. 18), pp. 144–46, 292. Actually, Ball appears to have begun rethinking his position beginning in August, shortly before the Bruce speech. However, by August the European press had already begun running stories on the LAMCO group, while Bruce's staff was busily (and not very discreetly) researching the matter. For examples of press coverage on the issue during the period prior to September 1962, see numerous citations in the Bruce speech (see n. 7).

Note also that during the month of August, the liberals did gain one victory: Senator Dodd urged Tshombe to cooperate with the Kennedy administration. Mahoney describes how Dodd's cooperation was procured: "The president . . . invited the senator over to the Oval Office. At the meeting, Kennedy gently alluded to 'some people spending a lot of money.' That was encouragement enough for Dodd" (Mahoney [see n. 18], p. 146).

246. Mahoney (see n. 18), pp. 147–48. On Kaysen and Dungan, see Kalb (n. 1), p. 359.

247. Mahoney (see n. 18), pp. 144, 292.

248. Kalb (see n. 1), pp. 358, 363; and Mahoney (see n. 18), pp. 144–45. Bowles's anti-Katanga views were expressed in "Memorandum for the President," December 12, 1962, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 28A. On Williams's views, see his Memorandum to George McGhee, November 1, 1962, G. Mennen Williams Papers, National Archives, RG 59, Box 28.

249. Kalb (see n. 1), p. 358.

250. Hoskyns (see n. 143), pp. 458–60; and Young (see n. 182), pp. 454–55.

251. *New York Times*, November 29, 1962; December 8, 1962.

252. Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 152.

253. Mahoney (see n. 18), p. 152.

254. *New York Times*, December 19, 1962; December 20, 1962.

255. Ernest W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 163.

256. *New York Times*, December 13, 1962.

257. Lefever (see n. 255), p. 104; and Kalb (see n. 1), pp. 366–68.

258. United Nations (see n. 9), pp. 248–51; and Lefever (see n. 255), pp. 107–11.

259. *New York Times*, January 8, 1963.

260. Thant (see n. 181), p. 144.

261. The "scare reports" did apparently cause skittishness in both U.S. and UN circles. Thant claims that at one point he ordered a temporary suspension in Grand Slam, "until UN headquarters had firm evidence that [Union Minière] installations would not be blown up." Some U.S. officials also urged a suspension. Thant claims that a "breakdown of communications" caused the UN force to disregard the order and to continue the offensive. (It is also possible that the secretary-general wished to distance himself somewhat from the operation, since UN "peacekeeping" forces are not supposed to undertake offensives.) In any case, Thant was delighted with the resulting defeat of the secession and, in his memoirs, he effusively praises the operation. Thant (see n. 181), pp. 141–44; Schlesinger (see n. 68), p. 578; Weissman (see n. 50), pp. 189–90.

262. *National Review*, January 15, 1963.

263. United Nations (see n. 9), pp. 249–50.

264. Department of State, Research Memorandum RAF-25, April 28, 1964. Released under FOIA.

265. The only exception was CIA Director Allen Dulles, whose former law firm represented the LAMCO group. However, as we have seen, Dulles seems to have had much closer ties to the procolonial AMAX company. LAMCO does not appear to have had any influence over him.

Chapter Five

1. William Colby, quoted in the panel discussion "Should the U.S. Fight Secret Wars?" *Harper's*, September 1984, p. 36.

2. *Marchés Tropicaux*, July 6, 1963. Translated from the French.

3. From *L'Echo de la Bourse*, cited in Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques, *Congo 1963* (Brussels, n.d.), p. 101.

4. "Belgians versus U.S. Influence in the Congo Armed Forces," October 25, 1963, Ernest W. Lefever Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 2.

5. "U.S. and Belgian Tension in Leopoldville over Training ANC: October 1963," January 28, 1964, Ernest W. Lefever Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 1.

6. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, March 6, 1963. Released to the author under the Freedom of Information Act [hereafter FOIA].

7. "Text of Speech by Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Paul-Henri Spaak before the Belgo-American Association," March 24, 1963, Adlai E. Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Box 868.

8. "Memorandum for the Record," August 23, 1963, Ernest W. Lefever Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 8. Note that this quote is a paraphrase of Gullion's opinions, written by Ernest Lefever, a Brookings Institution researcher who had interviewed the ambassador.

9. Ernest Lefever paraphrased the views of two CIA officers: "Mobutu . . . is

pro-West and pro-U.S. . . . He is as solid as any man we have in the Congo and he might conceivably lead a military government . . . He might even direct a coup." These remarks are highly significant, since in late 1965, Mobutu actually did seize power in a coup, and Devlin almost certainly played a role in the coup. "Conversation with Messrs. Larry Devlin and [name deleted by the author] of the CIA," October 28, 1963, p. 2, Ernest W. Lefever Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 8. The author has deleted the second name because U.S. law now prohibits the publication of the names of CIA officers. Devlin's name is included since his CIA affiliation is already on the public record.

10. For various perspectives, see: interview notes by Ernest W. Lefever, "Hoffacker on Congo Stability," October 29, 1963, Ernest W. Lefever Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 8; Thomas Hughes, Research Memorandum, RAF-14, April 19, 1963, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 29/30; Harlan Cleveland, "Proposals for U.S. Policy in the Congo," February 20, 1963, p. 1, JFK Library, Boston, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 29/30.

11. *Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo Kinshasa)* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 294.

12. *Africa Report*, January 1964.

13. *London Financial Times*, October 22, 1963.

14. *London Financial Times*, November 1, 1963.

15. Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 349.

16. The quote is from commentary in *Congo 1963* (see n. 3), p. 236. Translated from the French. For other information on the unions, see Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 203–4; Young (n. 15), p. 349; *London Financial Times*, October 22, 1963; United Nations Memorandum "Mil Infor, HQ Sector Kolwezi," April 27, 1964, United Nations Archives, DAG-13/1.6.5.7.2.1:1.

17. *London Financial Times*, October 22, 1963.

18. It should be recalled that the Congo operation was the largest single action ever undertaken unilaterally by the UN. For an account of UN termination, see Ernest W. Lefever, *Crisis in the Congo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965), pp. 132–33; also United Nations, *The Blue Helmets* (New York, 1985), pp. 255–57.

19. United Nations (see n. 18), pp. 255–57; and Lefever (see n. 18), p. 133.

20. *Marchés Tropicaux*, December 30, 1967.

21. Weissman (see n. 16), p. 203.

22. See the *New York Times*, March 30, 1963; May 4, 1963; and *Keatings Contemporary Archives*, June 15–22, 1963.

23. Department of State Memorandum for the President, "Subject: U.S. Action re Congo in Next Three to Four Months," April 6, 1963, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 29/30.

24. United Nations Memorandum, January 23, 1964, DAG-13/1.6.1.0.9, United Nations Archives.

25. In August 1963, a UN official wrote, "I have the very strong impression that

Union Minière is continuing to protect the Katangese gendarmes." Translated from the French. United Nations Organization in the Congo, ML 76-63, May 9, 1963, United Nations Archives, DAG-13/1.6.1.0:47.

26. *Keatings Contemporary Archives*, June 15–22, 1963.

27. Weissman (see n. 16), p. 208.

28. Weissman (see n. 16), p. 204.

29. The purges are discussed in Weissman (see n. 16), pp. 200–201.

30. Young (see n. 15), pp. 345–46; and Weissman (see n. 16), pp. 214–21. For extended discussions of the rebellion, see Nzongola-Ntalaja, *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Africa* (London: Zed Press, 1987), chap. 5; and Benoît Verhaegen, *Rébellions au Congo*, 2 vols. (Brussels: CRISP, 1966, 1969). Note that the CNL was sometimes called the Conseil National de Libération.

31. Young (see n. 15), pp. 586–97.

32. A synopsis of the Mulélé group can be found in Young (see n. 15), pp. 583–85. See also Herbert Weiss, "Pierre Mulélé: La Dernière victime des rébellions Zaïroises," in Charles André Julien et al., eds., *Les Africains*, vol. 6 (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1977); Renée C. Fox, Willy de Craemer, and Jean-Marie Ribaucourt, "The Second Independence": A Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 8, no. 1, 1965.

33. Fred E. Wagoner, *Dragon Rouge* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1980), pp. 74–75. Wagoner writes that according to intelligence reports, Chinese aid was "marginal."

34. Central Intelligence Agency, SC no. 10626/64, August 27, 1964, p. 4. Released under FOIA.

35. On later Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese involvement, see Wagoner (n. 33), p. 109; Department of State cable, Brussels 185, August 7, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81; Department of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, Research Memorandum RAF-39, August 7, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81; Department of State cable, Leopoldville 3258, March 13, 1965, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 85; Central Intelligence Agency, Congo Weekly Report, SC00780/65, March 10, 1965, released under FOIA. On Cuban involvement, see Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell, 1980), p. 116.

36. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 283, July 31, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81.

37. Young (see n. 15), pp. 584–85.

38. Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Assessment, OCI no. 1387/64, June 12, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81.

39. Young (see n. 15), p. 595.

40. Young (see n. 15), p. 583.

41. Young (see n. 15), p. 582.

42. Weissman (see n. 16), pp. 218–19.

43. Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques, *Congo 1964* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 38–39. Translated from the French.

44. Lefever (see n. 18), pp. 127-30; and Weissman (see n. 16), pp. 212-13.
45. It is true that the Adoula government had been discredited by its association with foreign (specifically American) control; Tshombe, however, was even more closely associated with foreign interests and was hardly a plausible nationalist.
46. Ernest W. Lefever, "The Return of Tshombe and America's Congo Policy: 1964," speech presented at the Program of East African Studies, Syracuse University, August 16, 1964, pp. 5-6. Copy from the Ernest W. Lefever Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 8.
47. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 117, July 15, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81.
48. Department of State Airgram A-12, July 9, 1964. Released under FOIA.
49. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 40, July 18, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81. Note that the cable paraphrased Tshombe's advisor.
50. O'Brien quoted in Department of State Airgram A-35, July 20, 1964. Released under FOIA.
51. Interview with Montague Stearns, October 7, 1987, former foreign service officer in the U.S. embassy in Leopoldville.
52. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, June 24, 1964; June 26/27, 1964; July 10/11, 1964; July 12/13, 1964.
53. Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Memorandum, June 12, 1964, OCL no. 1387/64, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81.
54. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 68, July 10, 1964, p. 2. Released under FOIA. Emphasis added.
55. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, July 15, 1964, "Luncheon with His Excellency Baron Louis Scheyven Ambassador of Belgium." Released under FOIA.
56. Department of State cable, Leopoldville, July 25, 1964, paragraph no. 7. Provided by William Minter.
57. United States Government, Memorandum from G. Mennen Williams to Governor Harriman, "Subject: Biographical Data on Tshombe's European Advisors," July 31, 1964. Provided to the author by William Minter.
58. Department of State Airgram, A-335, "Belgian Presence and Belgian Policies in the Congo," December 2, 1965, p. 4. Released under FOIA.
59. Struelens's ties to the Katanga Information Services and to "Belgian financial interests" are reported by George Ball. These financial interests almost certainly included Société Générale, which was by far the most important investor in the Congo. See George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 234.
60. See letter from M. Tshombe to McGeorge Bundy, July 31, 1964; also Department of State cable, Leopoldville, August 1, 1964. Both documents from LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 86/87.
61. Department of State cable, Leopoldville, August 1, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 86/87.
62. Dodd sent numerous letters to President Johnson urging closer cooperation

- with Tshombe. Dodd suspected that "elements in the Department of State [presumably including G. Mennen Williams] . . . are still doing their utmost to undermine Tshombe." There is no evidence of such scheming. By all indications, the State Department, even its most liberal figures, accepted the policy of supporting Tshombe. See Dodd's letter of July 7, 1964, LBJ Library, President's Papers, Confidential File, CO 29, Box 7. Later Dodd directly attacked Deputy Assistant Secretary of State J. Wayne Fredericks and the U.S. ambassador to the Congo, McMurtrie Godley. See Dodd's letter to Johnson, January 6, 1965, LBJ Library, White House Central File, Box 24. The State Department also used Dodd as an emissary to Tshombe in January 1965. See Memorandum of Conversation, January 31, 1965, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 85.
63. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 1771, November 5, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 83. Note that the quote is directly from the cable, which summarized the opinions of the UN official.
 64. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 2580, June 13, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81. Specifically, the Belgians wanted Tshombe appointed as UN ambassador; Godley suggested, as a compromise, that perhaps Tshombe could be appointed ambassador to Belgium.
 65. Ambassador Godley was paraphrased in Department of State cable, State 103, July 14, 1964. Released under FOIA.
 66. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 68, July 10, 1964. Released under FOIA.
 67. Department of State cable, Leopoldville, July 25, 1964, p. 3. Released under FOIA.
 68. Department of State Airgram A-37, July 28, 1964. Released under FOIA.
 69. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 14, July 2, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81.
 70. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 451, August 11, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81.
 71. Department of State (see n. 58), p. 40.
 72. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 2147, February 19, 1963, National Archives, RG 59, G. Mennen Williams Papers, Box 24.
 73. Quote from United States Government, Memorandum, "From G. Mennen Williams to the Special Group," July 30, 1964, p. 1. Provided by William Minter.
 74. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 431, August 10, 1964, paragraph no. 1, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 81.
 75. United States Government, "Congo Contingency: Possible Alternatives Ahead," n.d. (probably August 1964), LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 82.
 76. Wagoner (see n. 33), pp. 27-43; Weissman (see n. 16), pp. 228-30; *New York Times*, April 26, 1966.
 77. See his memoirs, Michael Hoare, *Congo Mercenary* (London: Robert Hale, 1967).
 78. Central Intelligence Agency, "Memorandum: The Congo Situation," SC no. 10630/64, September 2, 1964, LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series,

Box 86/87. Note that in South Africa a brigadier general is actually called a "brigadier."

79. The 450 figure is from Department of State (see n. 58), p. 4; see also Wagoner (n. 33), p. 123.
80. Wagoner (see n. 33), pp. 40, 44.
81. For a complete discussion of the parachute drop, see Wagoner (n. 33); and also Major Thomas P. Odom, *Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964–1965* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1988). Note that a second drop, on the town of Paulis, occurred shortly after the assault on Stanleyville. One of the transport planes was piloted by the now famous Richard V. Secord, then an Air Force captain. See Wagoner (n. 33), p. 179.
82. Weissman (see n. 16), p. 240.
83. Wagoner (see n. 33), pp. 57–60.
84. Wagoner (see n. 33), pp. 205–6.
85. Jonathan Kwitny, *Endless Enemies* (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984), pp. 83–84.
86. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 250.
87. Weissman (see n. 16), pp. 240–41.
88. Department of State cable, September 6, 1964. Reprinted verbatim in William Minter, "Candid Cables: Some Reflections on U.S. Response to the Congo Rebellions, 1964," p. 284 in Nzongola-Ntalaja, ed., *The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities* (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1986). See also Wagoner (n. 33), pp. 34–35, 71.
89. Quoted in Kwitny (see n. 85), p. 82.
90. Weissman (see n. 16), pp. 222–23.
91. Wagoner (see n. 33), pp. 71–72, 77–79. Ambassador McMurtie Godley generally sided with the military on these issues.
92. Weissman (see n. 16), p. 222. The quote is from Weissman, who paraphrases the views.
93. Nzongola-Ntalaja, telephone interview with the author, April 25, 1988. Dr. Nzongola, now associate professor of African studies at Howard University, was a college student in the United States in 1964. G. Mennen Williams expressed pro-Tshombe views shortly before Tshombe's return to the Congo, during an informal conversation with Nzongola.
94. *Wall Street Journal*, December 1, 1964.
95. Wagoner (see n. 33), p. 42.
96. Department of State (see n. 58), p. 11.
97. United States Government Memorandum, "What Should Be U.S. Policy vis-à-vis Tshombe in Future Contingencies?" 1964, p. 16. Released by the Department of State under FOIA.
98. Department of State (see n. 58), p. 50.
99. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, August 20, 1964. Translated from the French.
100. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, June 30, 1964.

101. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, August 13, 1964; August 14–15, 1964; August 30–31, 1964.
102. Weissman (see n. 16), p. 219.
103. Department of State, Memorandum from G. Mennen Williams to the Secretary, "Subject: A New and Longer Term Approach to the Congo," August 7, 1964. Obtained from William Minter.
104. Wagoner (see n. 33), p. 24.
105. Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques (see n. 43), pp. 355–56.
106. Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques (see n. 43), pp. 387–88.
107. Weissman (see n. 16), p. 240.
108. Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques (see n. 43), pp. 530–32.
109. Department of State (see n. 58), p. 46.
110. *Le Monde*, May 27, 1965.
111. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, December 10, 1964.
112. Department of State (see n. 58), p. 46.
113. *Le Monde*, August 7, 1965. At about the same time, Tshombe appeared to be having a direct dispute with the Belgian business interests. During November–December 1964, Tshombe canceled Belgian mining concessions in the Congo. Tshombe was widely condemned by both Belgian government and business sources. This dispute, though dramatic, was of little practical significance. Tshombe never seriously challenged the Belgian interests; it seems that he engineered the controversy in order to appear as a genuine African nationalist and to mask his neocolonial ties. A U.S. embassy cable reported: "Informed [Belgian] financial circles are taking decree more calmly than press." Another cable stated that UMHK executives "have indicated . . . certain confidence that Tshombe at least is perhaps one man in Congo who understands and will support role of private enterprise."
- The controversy was finally resolved on February 6, 1965. The agreement provided a new formula for dividing the mineral revenues. The weekly news magazine *Jeune Afrique* commented that "Tshombe had gained nothing from the agreement that the Congo had not already been entitled to before and that he [Tshombe] had made even more concessions than conceded to earlier." Overall, this controversy improved Tshombe's international image, but it did not cause a great deal of friction with the Belgians.
- On Tshombe's initial declaration and the Belgian reaction, see *Le Monde*, December 6–7, 1964. The first quotes are from Department of State cable, Brussels 1164, December 7, 1964; and Elisabethville 1055, June 12, 1965. Both released under FOIA. The *Jeune Afrique* quote is a paraphrase in Wolf Radmann, "The Nationalization of Zaire's Copper: From Union Minière to GECAMINES," *Africa Today* 25, no. 4, 1978, p. 33. The settlement, between Tshombe and the Belgians is described in Wayne Alford Culp, "An Analysis of Congolese Foreign Policy during the Tshombe Prime Ministry, July 1964–October 1965," Ph.D. diss., School of International Service, American University, 1974, p. 237.

114. Quoted in *L'Echo de la Bourse*, December 6-7, 1964. Translated from the French.
115. United States Government, "What Should be U.S. Policy vis-à-vis Tshombe in Future Contingencies?" 1964, pp. 10, 19. Released by the Department of State under FOIA.
116. Department of State, Memorandum from L. Dean Brown to Governor Williams, "Subject: Contingency Planning for the Congo," October 28, 1965. Released under FOIA.
117. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, October 13, 1965.
118. Cited in Department of State cable, Brussels 429, October 15, 1965. Released under FOIA.
119. Department of State cable, Leopoldville 727, October 20, 1965. Released under FOIA. Weissman reports that Kimba was beginning to show some independence in his foreign policy, and that the State Department was becoming concerned about the development. See Stephen R. Weissman, "CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns and Consequences," *Political Science Quarterly* 94, no. 2, 1979, p. 273.
120. Weissman (see n. 119), p. 273.
121. Quoted in *Harper's* (see n. 1), p. 36.
122. Victor Marchetti, telephone interview with author, August 15, 1986.
123. *La Libre Belgique*, July 26, 1966. Translated from the French. For further evidence of CIA involvement, see Elise Pachter, "Our Man in Kinshasa: U.S. Relations with Mobutu, 1970-1983, Patron-Client Relations in the International Sphere," Ph.D. diss., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1987, p. 107; and the *New York Times*, April 26, 1966.

Chapter Six

1. Quoted in Ghislain C. Kabwit, "Zaire: The Roots of the Continuing Crisis," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 17, no. 3, 1979, p. 397.
2. *Fortune*, October 12, 1987.
3. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 180, July 8, 1966. Released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
4. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 54-55, 189.
5. Michael Schatzberg, "Zaire," p. 290 in Timothy Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds., *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).
6. Department of State Airgram, CA-2659, "Congolese Government's Minerals Stockpiling," October 4, 1966. Released under FOIA. Note that in response to Congolese demands UMHK agreed to construct "a large building" in Leopoldville. The UMHK management also "hinted" that it would consider incorporating a subsidiary in the Congo. *New York Times*, May 27, 1966. These offers appear to have been cosmetic and were not taken very seriously.
7. *Le Monde*, May 19, 1966.
8. *Africa Research Bulletin*, August 1966. The quote is directly from the publication, which paraphrased Mobutu.

9. *New York Times*, July 1, 1966.
10. *Economist*, August 6, 1966.
11. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, July 17/18, 1966. Translated from the French. See also reports from December 6, 1966.
12. Department of State Memorandum from Robert H. Neuman to Mr. Schaufele, January 6, 1967. Released under FOIA. The quote is directly from the document. See also Ghislain Claude Kabwit, "The Evolution of the Congo Foreign Policy from 1960-1970: A Case Study in the Determinants Influencing the Making of Foreign Policy," Ph.D. diss., School of International Service, American University, 1975, p. 385.
13. Kabwit (see n. 12), p. 390. General discussions of the nationalization can be found in Wolf Radmann, "The Nationalization of Zaire's Copper: From Union Minière to GECAMINES," *Africa Today* 25, no. 4, 1978; and Ghifem Karwala, "Export-Led Growth: The Copper Sector," in Guy Gran, ed., *Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (New York: Praeger, 1979).
14. Department of State, Memorandum from Robert H. Neuman to Mr. Schaufele, January 6, 1967. Released under FOIA. Note that GECOMIN was later renamed GECAMINES (La Société Générale des Carrières et Mines du Zaire).
15. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4569, January 19, 1967. Released under FOIA.
16. Department of State cable, Lusaka 1290, February 6, 1967. Released under FOIA.
17. Department of State, Memorandum from Joseph Palmer to the Secretary, "Congolese Seizure of UMHK Assets," January 3, 1967. Released under FOIA.
18. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, Memorandum for the Director, January 27, 1967. Released under FOIA.
19. Young and Turner (see n. 4), pp. 250-53.
20. Young and Turner (see n. 4), pp. 250-51.
21. *Economist*, October 1, 1966.
22. See the *Johannesburg Sunday Express*, October 30, 1966; and *New York Times*, November 16, 1966.
23. *New York Times*, September 11, 1966.
24. National Security Council, "Selected Chronology of Presidential Involvement in Congo C-130 Crisis, July 1967," pp. 1-2, LBJ Library, National Security File, NSC History, Box 15. On Munongo, see *Economist*, December 31, 1966.
25. *New York Times*, March 14, 1967.
26. For various theories of Tshombe's kidnapping, see Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques, *Congo 1967* (Brussels, n.d.), pp. 340-45; *Le Monde*, July 16/17, 1967; Jules Chomé, "Pour consolider la situation de 'l'Homme Fort' du Congo: L'Enlèvement de Moïse Tshombe, a-t-il été organisé par le CIA?" *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 1967; René Lemarchand, "The CIA in Africa: How Central? How Intelligent?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14, no. 3, 1976, p. 413; and Ian Colvin, *The Rise and Fall of Moïse Tshombe* (London: Leslie Frewin, 1968), pp. 252-53. In this author's opinion, it seems most likely that the CIA was responsible for the kidnapping. The reasons are the following: The U.S. government had long op-

posed Tshombe and supported Mobutu—against whom Tshombe was plotting at the time. The USA thus had a clear incentive to arrange the kidnapping. The CIA seems the government agency most likely to have organized the action, especially in light of the agency's long history of involvement in the Congo.

27. One committee member wrote, with regard to Michel Struelens, that "although this offer [to help Tshombe] was presented in terms of a 'public service' on Struelens's [sic] part, there was every indication that he [Struelens] was rather desperately in need of money" ("Personal and Confidential Memorandum," from Marvin Leibman to William F. Buckley and William A. Rusher, January 4, 1968, Box 105). See also "Confidential Report," August 4, 1967, Box 106; and "Urgent Memorandum," October 31, 1967, Box 35. Both documents from Marvin Leibman Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.

28. Letter from Thomas Dodd to Lyndon Johnson, and from Thomas Dodd to Dean Rusk. Both documents are dated September 15, 1967, and are in the LBJ Library, White House, Confidential File, Box 8.

29. *New York Times*, July 7, 1967.

30. Young and Turner (see n. 4), p. 251.

31. National Security Council (see n. 24), p. 2.

32. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 333, July 8, 1967, LBJ Library, National Security File, NSC History, Box 15.

33. The Algerian government claimed that Tshombe had died of a heart attack. However, some suspect that Tshombe had been murdered. Young and Turner (see n. 4), p. 58.

34. Regrettably, the stock market reports from *L'Echo de la Bourse* (July 5, 1967) do not elucidate UMHK's interest in the affair. The paper noted rumors of a possible parachute drop in the Congo, presumably by Belgium. However, "the relevant markets remain calm, in any case . . . except for the gold and copper mining sectors." Translated from the French.

35. George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 234. Ball writes that "Belgian financial interests" (almost certainly meaning UMHK/SG) had supported the Katanga lobby.

36. *Economist*, May 28, 1966.

37. Department of State Memorandum, from Dean Brown to Mr. Palmer, "Subject: The Union Minière Controversy as Seen by Each Side," January 16, 1967, p. 1. Released under FOIA.

38. *New York Times*, November 10, 1967. Chapter 4 of the present study discussed Portuguese and Rhodesian motives for supporting Tshombe. For the record, it should be noted that UMHK denied charges that it was involved in the rebellion. See UMHK management's letter to the editor in *New York Times*, November 11, 1967.

39. Herman J. Cohen, former State Department official, who at the time of the interview served on the National Security Council staff. Interview with author January 12, 1988. Cohen is presently the assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

40. Herman J. Cohen (see n. 39).

41. "Sitrep Congo Kinshasa, 1500 Hours Edt, July 14, 1967," LBJ Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 86/87.

42. National Security Council (see n. 24), pp. 6-7.

43. Also, fifteen senators sent a letter to President Johnson asserting their opposition to the delivery of aircraft to Mobutu. See Letter to the President, July 27, 1967, LBJ Library, National Security File, NSC History, Box 15. For other congressional opposition, see *Congressional Record*, July 10, 1967; July 11, 1967; July 12, 1967.

44. Department of State cable, Lubumbashi 382, January 1, 1967. For evidence of U.S.-Congoese friction during this period see also Brussels 3094, January 3, 1967. Both documents released under FOIA.

45. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4656, January 23, 1967. Released under FOIA.

46. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4656, January 23, 1967; see also Brussels 3493, January 21, 1967. Released under FOIA.

47. Department of State, Memorandum from Joseph Palmer to the Secretary, "Subject: Congolese Seizure of UMHK Assets," January 3, 1967. Released under FOIA.

48. Department of State cable, Lubumbashi 425, January 15, 1967. Released under FOIA.

49. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 6255, April 4, 1967. Released under FOIA.

50. Department of State cable, State 131152, February 8, 1967. Released under FOIA. The cable paraphrased the views of a Tempelsman employee.

51. U.S. Government, "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Charles Mayer, Washington Representative of Société Générale de Belgique," January 15, 1967. Released by Department of State under FOIA. The Congolese even suspected Tempelsman was "a UMHK agent"—which was clearly not the case.

52. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 180, July 8, 1966. Released under FOIA.

53. Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, "Congo's Ten Percent Mineral Stockpiling Order," August 30, 1966. Released under FOIA.

54. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 2954, November 2, 1966. Released under FOIA.

55. Department of State, "Memorandum for the Files: Union Minière Crisis," January 6, 1966. Released under FOIA. Note that the document is dated 1966, but this is clearly a mistake. The document was almost certainly written in 1967.

56. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4317, January 9, 1967. Released under FOIA.

57. Robert Blake, interview with author, January 20, 1988.

58. During the post-1967 period, the author has found only two instances where the U.S. government did not act positively toward Tempelsman. In July 1968, the State Department refused to provide a Tempelsman representative with information on negotiations regarding the Union Minière dispute. In 1971, the Export-Import Bank declined to finance a scheme favored by Tempelsman. Such instances, where the government acted unfavorably toward Tempelsman, appear to have been rare. On the 1968 case, see Department of State cable, from State, July 15, 1968. On the 1971 case,

see letter from Herman J. Cohen to Donald L. Woolf, August 23, 1971. Both documents released under FOIA.

59. Note that the name Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison refers to the firm's New York office. Department of State, "Memorandum for the Files: Union Minière Crisis," January 6, 1966 (an error; the document was almost certainly written in 1967). Released under FOIA.

It is interesting to note that the U.S. government was considering the idea of an American lawyer to represent the Congolese as early as 1963. One report from 1963 stated, "We continue to believe that it would reward the [Congolese] Central Government handsomely to hire an outstanding international law firm" to represent its interests in the dispute with UMHK. It may be assumed that the contracted law firm also would have been rewarded handsomely. See Department of State, "Proposals for U.S. Policy in the Congo," February 20, 1963, p. 66, JFK Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Box 29/30.

60. Department of State cable, Brussels 3088, January 2, 1967. Released under FOIA.

61. Department of State cable, State 112268, January 4, 1967. Released under FOIA.

62. Jeannick Odier, quoted in Schatzberg (see n. 5), p. 284.

63. Analysis of African press from Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4231, January 5, 1967. Released under FOIA. Quotes are directly from the cable, which paraphrased the African sources.

64. *Economist*, January 7, 1967.

65. Jules Chomé, "Nouvel épisode au Congo-Kinshasa: La dictature du Général Mobutu pourrait favoriser l'implantation des intérêts Américains," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 1966.

66. Noted in *American Metal Markets*, June 22, 1966.

67. This quote is a paraphrase of *La Libre Belgique*, provided in Philippe Decraene, "Six ans après la mort de Patrice Lumumba: Le Congo-Kinshasa semble avoir recouvré sa stabilité interne et un certain prestige international," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 1967. Translated from the French.

68. Cited in Chomé (see n. 26). Translated from the French.

69. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, July 14-15, 1967. Translated from the French.

70. Department of State cable, Brussels 3725, February 2, 1967. Released under FOIA.

71. A State Department cable reported that Tempelsman sought to "allay suspicions" among UMHK officials. See State 7698, July 14, 1966. Released under FOIA. In another instance, an American official attempted to reassure SG that the United States was not attempting to undermine Belgian interests in the Congo, and that "Tempelsman was acting solely as a private individual." It is worth pointing out that Tempelsman's connections to the U.S. government suggest that he was more than a "private individual." Quote from "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Charles Mayer, Washington Representative of Société Générale de Belgique," January 15, 1967. Released by the Department of State under FOIA.

72. Department of State cable, Brussels 3809, February 6, 1967. The Belgian

press was also analyzed in the following cables: Brussels 3109, January 3, 1967; and Brussels 3087, January 2, 1967. All documents released under FOIA.

73. Quote from "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Charles Mayer, Washington Representative of Société Générale de Belgique," January 15, 1967. Released under FOIA. The quote is directly from the memorandum, which paraphrased Meyer.

74. Department of State cable, Brussels 3738, February 2, 1967. Released under FOIA. The Belgian official is paraphrased in the cable.

75. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4998, February 6, 1967. See also Brussels 3789, February 5, 1967. Both released under FOIA.

76. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4482, January 16, 1967. On Tempelsman's role in helping to organize the consortium, see Brussels 3737, February 2, 1967; Kinshasa 4609, January 20, 1967; Kinshasa 4626, January 30, 1967; Kinshasa 4454, January 15, 1967; State 131059, February 3, 1967. All documents released under FOIA.

77. Department of State cable, Lubumbashi 507, February 10, 1967. Released under FOIA.

78. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 5074, February 8, 1967. Released under FOIA.

79. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4998, February 6, 1967. It should be noted that the international group did ask UMHK to participate in its Congo venture, but Union Minière apparently refused. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4784, January 28, 1967. Both documents released under FOIA.

80. U.S. Government, Memorandum to Acting Chairman—Interdepartmental Regional Group for Africa, from AF/IRG—Staff Director, Subject: "The Present Situation in the Congo," January 31, 1967. Released by the Department of State under FOIA.

81. Department of State cable, Brussels 3646, January 28, 1967. Released under FOIA.

82. Etienne Davignon's Société Générale affiliation is noted in *The International Who's Who*, 1987-88.

83. Department of State cable, Brussels 3646, January 28, 1967. Released under FOIA.

84. United States Government Memorandum, from Armistead Lee to Mr. Brown, January 4, 1967; Department of State cable, State 117193, January 12, 1967; Kinshasa 4267, January 6, 1967; London 5407, January 10, 1967; Kinshasa 4825, January 30, 1967. All documents released under FOIA.

85. Department of State cable, Brussels 3493, January 21, 1967. Released under FOIA. Note that this quote is directly from the cable, which summarized the executive's views. Harry Oppenheimer personally criticized the Belgians, and according to one report, he considered offering technical assistance to the Congolese in order to assuage the effects of UMHK's actions. See Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4267, January 6, 1967; and State 117193, January 12, 1967. Both released under FOIA.

86. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4825, January 30, 1967. Released under FOIA. Quote is from the cable, which paraphrased the executive.

87. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4345, January 10, 1967. Released under FOIA. U.S. diplomats apparently lobbied certain Belgian interests against UMHK. A cable from the U.S. embassy stated, "Hope efforts have been made to mobilize support elements Belgian business community having interests in Congo." On the lobbying suggestion, see Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4345, January 10, 1967. On other instances of lobbying, by U.S. diplomats or Tempelsman representatives, see sources in footnote n. 84.

In fact, some elements in Belgium were hostile toward Union Minière. We have already discussed the role of Banque Lambert in Tempelsman's consortium plan. Also, Martin Theves, of the COMINIÈRE financial group and one of the richest men in Belgium, was "furious with the Société Générale crowd" in May 1967. On Theves, see U.S. Government, Memorandum from Armistead Lee to the Files, Subject: "Comments and Impressions after Luncheon with Belgian Businessmen," May 30, 1967. Released by the State Department under FOIA.

88. Department of State cable, State 127410, January 30, 1967. Released under FOIA.

89. Department of State cable, Lusaka 1290, February 6, 1967, pp. 1-2. Released under FOIA.

90. Department of State cables, Kinshasa 4857, January 30, 1967; and State 128622, received January 31, 1967. Both released under FOIA.

91. Department of State, Memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes to the acting secretary, Subject: "Modern Alchemy in the Congo—Copper into Cash," n.d. (probably 1968). Both released under FOIA.

92. Department of State cable, Lubumbashi 766, May 1, 1967. Released under FOIA.

93. Department of State cable, Lubumbashi 507, February 10, 1967, paragraph no. 1. Released under FOIA.

94. Department of State cable, Brussels 4073, January 16, 1968. Released under FOIA. Banque Lambert, which had also favored the consortium plan, was "a little peeved that Congolese did not pursue idea of international association . . . rather than signing with SGM alone." Quote is directly from the cable, which paraphrased Tempelsman's views. Lambert executives viewed the management contract as a temporary expedient, to be "amended as soon as practicable in order to provide in effect for international association." Department of State cable, Kinshasa 5126, February 10, 1967. Released under FOIA.

95. For evidence of Congolese dissatisfaction, see Department of State cable, Kinshasa 5126, February 10, 1967. Released under FOIA.

96. Department of State cable, Brussels 470, July 21, 1967. Released under FOIA.

97. *L'Echo de la Bourse*, April 3, 1968. Quote is translated from the French directly from the newspaper, which paraphrased the official.

98. *Economist*, August 31, 1968.

99. *Economist*, August 31, 1968.

100. Department of State Intelligence Note, March 12, 1968, pp. 1, 3. Released under FOIA. At this point the U.S. ambassador downplayed the influence of Tempelsman and predicted that when the Congolese and Belgians "see a deal to be in their interest they won't need Tempelsman." This prediction was incorrect; as we shall see, Tempelsman maintained close ties to the Congolese government for many years. On the ambassador's views, see Department of State cable, Kinshasa 8019, March 8, 1968. Released under FOIA.

101. Letter from Mobutu to Tempelsman, 1967 (probably October). Released by the Department of State under FOIA. Translated from the French.

102. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4869, February 1, 1967. Apparently UMHK briefly considered drawing some U.S. capital into its copper operations, presumably to co-opt it and to reduce the international friction, but the company lost interest by February. On UMHK's original interest in U.S. capital, see Department of State cable, Lubumbashi 463, January 27, 1967. Both documents released under FOIA.

103. At this point, one U.S. government official reiterated that he was beginning to feel that "internationalization of GECOMIN is a desirable United States objective" (Agency for International Development, letter from Charles A. Mann to Richard C. Matheron, October 25, 1967; released by Department of State under FOIA).

104. Department of State, Memorandum from John A. McKesson to Mr. Palmer, "Subject: Tempelsman Call on You—Settlement of GDRC/Union Minière Dispute," May 8, 1968. Released under FOIA.

105. Department of State cable, Brussels 5048, March 7, 1968, paragraph no. 2. Released under FOIA.

106. Department of State Intelligence Note, March 12, 1968. Released under FOIA. Specifically, the Belgians offered to waive their claims for compensation in exchange for the 40 percent.

107. The author has seen no mention in any document that Tempelsman or any other American company managed to purchase stock in GECOMIN.

108. See Richard D. Mahoney, "The Kennedy Policy in the Congo, 1961-1963," Ph.D. diss., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1979, p. 268. Tempelsman's support for Humphrey was also noted by Mark Garsin, then Tempelsman's representative in the Congo. Telephone interview with author, January 15, 1988.

109. According to Bruce Oudes, a former *Time* reporter in a telephone interview with the author, January 13, 1988.

110. Mahoney (see n. 108), p. 268. Mahoney cites an article in the European edition of *Time* magazine. Note that in 1974, Humphrey turned the ring over to the U.S. government.

111. Madeleine Kalb, *The Congo Cables* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 379.

112. United States Senate, *Security Supporting Assistance for Zaïre* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 32.

113. *Washington Post*, December 31, 1979.

114. Department of State, letter from Herman J. Cohen to Richard C. Matheron, December 4, 1968. Released under FOIA. Anderson's exact affiliation with Indiana-

Standard is not clear. The letter referred to "Robert Anderson of Standard Oil of Indiana."

115. Garsin (see n. 108) and Cohen (see n. 39). Both agreed that the Tempelsman-Anderson connection was at least partly political in nature.
116. Ferdinand Lundberg, *The Rich and the Superrich* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 938. Lundberg relies on *Fortune* magazine data from 1964.
117. Jonathan Kwitny, *Endless Enemies* (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984), p. 178.
118. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 4.
119. U.S. Ambassador Sheldon Vance's activities on behalf of Tempelsman will be discussed shortly.
120. Cohen (see n. 39).
121. Mahoney (see n. 108), p. 268.
122. *Fortune*, November 15, 1982, "Maurice Tempelsman's African Connections."
123. Department of State Ainsgram A-671, November 22, 1969; and Ainsgram A-386 October 30, 1969. Both released by the Central Intelligence Agency under FOIA.
124. Schatzberg (see n. 5), p. 291.
125. Department of State cables, Kinshasa 695, February 3, 1969; Kinshasa 933, February 13, 1969; Kinshasa 12387, October 28, 1968. Documents released under FOIA.
126. Garsin (see n. 108). It is also interesting to note that McNamara was, despite his World Bank status, acting as an agent for the U.S. government. The final settlement, which McNamara advocated, had actually been drawn up by the U.S. embassy. Former embassy officer Herman J. Cohen stated that the embassy "presented it [the plan] to McNamara, and McNamara presented it as his idea rather than our idea." McNamara thus worked closely with embassy officials. This arrangement probably increased Tempelsman's influence with McNamara even further, since Tempelsman enjoyed excellent ties to the U.S. embassy. See Cohen (n. 39).

Why would McNamara favor Tempelsman? One possible answer concerns the role of Theodore Sorensen, who served as counsel to Tempelsman and was deeply involved in the investment dispute. Sorensen, who had been McNamara's colleague during the Kennedy administration, communicated with McNamara regarding the investment dispute, and apparently tried to influence McNamara against UMHK. In a letter to McNamara, Sorensen noted Union Minière's record of "economic exploitation, political manipulation and participation in the Katanga rebellion—and a host of other suspected activities" (letter from Theodore Sorensen to Robert McNamara, December 3, 1968, World Bank Archives, "Congo [Kinshasa], Negotiations [Claims], 1969, Part II").

127. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4874, September 22, 1970. Released under FOIA.

128. "Background Notes," undated, three-page document on the subject of Charter Consolidated's role in the Congo. Released by the Department of State under FOIA.

129. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4874, September 22, 1970. Released under FOIA.

130. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 3319, June 14, 1969. Released under FOIA.

131. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 3718, July 3, 1969. Released under FOIA. The quote is from the cable, which paraphrased the original statement. Also, a Union Minière executive initially expressed "no objection" to the plan; it is evident that the company quickly changed its position and became quite hostile.

132. Young and Turner (see n. 4), p. 303; Department of State cable, State 177973, October 28, 1970. Tempelsman had originally offered—unsuccessfully—to include Union Minière in his consortium in order to tap the Belgian company's expertise and also, presumably, to avoid further conflict. See Department of State cable, State 16187, October 1, 1970. Both documents released under FOIA.

133. Department of State cable, State 16187, October 1, 1970. Released under FOIA. The quote is directly from the cable, which paraphrased McNamara's views.

134. Garsin (see n. 108).

135. Cohen (see n. 39).

136. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 5563, October 30, 1970. Released under FOIA.

137. Elise Pachter, "Our Man in Kinshasa: U.S. Relations with Mobutu, 1970-1983, Patron-Client Relations in the International Sphere," Ph.D. diss., School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1987, p. 124.

138. Quoted in Pachter (see n. 137), p. 124.

139. Pachter (see n. 137), p. 124.

140. Pachter (see n. 137), pp. 138-39. Several other factors probably also weakened the Belgian consortium at this time. These setbacks were: "first, the dismissal of [Congolese Central Bank director] Albert N'Dele . . . noted for his advocacy of closer links with Belgium; and second, the exposure of alleged currency smuggling by a Belgian bank in the Congo . . . The result of these actions was to worsen relations with Belgium" (*Africa Contemporary Record*, 1970-71, p. B296).

141. Pachter (see n. 137), p. 124.

142. Department of State, letter from Donald L. Woolf to Herman J. Cohen, December 11, 1970. Released under FOIA. Quote is from the cable, which summarized Tempelsman's views.

143. Cohen (see n. 39).

144. Department of State, letter from Donald L. Woolf to Herman J. Cohen, December 11, 1970. Released under FOIA.

145. Department of State cable, Kinshasa 4018, December 23, 1966. Released under FOIA.

146. Department of State cable, State 116940, January 11, 1967. The general concern with potential communist penetration in the Congo was cited fairly frequently in the embassy cable traffic during this period. See, for example, Kinshasa 4242, January 6, 1967. Both documents released under FOIA.

147. For the Peruvian case see Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis, *The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress* (Chicago: Quadrangle

Press, 1970), pp. 148-56; Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, *Peruvian Democracy under Economic Stress* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 108-25; Richard N. Goodwin, "Letter from Peru," *New Yorker*, May 19, 1969.

148. The business factors also interacted with bureaucratic factors. The CIA clearly had an interest in favoring General Mobutu, since the agency had long promoted him and had helped him seize power in 1965. At the same time, the agency had close and long-standing connections to business concerns, especially to Tempelsman, which had a nearly identical interest in supporting Mobutu. The CIA officer most closely associated with Congo policy, Lawrence Devlin, eventually worked full-time for Tempelsman. Thus, business interests tended to reinforce bureaucratic interests.

149. Young and Turner (see n. 4), p. 70. For other discussions of the Mobutu regime, see Nzongola-Ntalaja, ed., *The Crisis in Zaïre* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1986); Thomas Callaghy, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaïre in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Guy Gran, ed., *Zaïre: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (New York: Praeger, 1979); Comité Zaïre, *Zaïre: Le Dossier de la décolonisation* (Paris: Harmattan, 1978); and Michael Schatzberg, *The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaïre* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

150. Young and Turner (see n. 4), pp. 278-81.

151. Schatzberg (see n. 5), p. 307.

152. Department of State, "Rockefeller Briefing," 1971 (probably September 29). Released under FOIA.

153. Department of State cable, State 099422, January 16, 1968. Released under FOIA.

154. See John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 136-37. The agency specialist was Lawrence Devlin, discussed earlier. Devlin officially retired from the CIA in 1974, although he continued to assist the agency in its relations with Mobutu even after retirement.

155. Sheldon Vance, "American Foreign Policy: The Glory Years and Now What? An Insider Looks at the Foreign Service," unpublished manuscript, n.d. p. 206. Vance was a former U.S. ambassador to the Congo. See also Pachter (n. 137), pp. 137-38.

156. Department of Commerce, "Memo for the Files" July 15, 1971. Released under FOIA. This was actually a joint venture which included Union Carbide, the Congolese government, and also unspecified Belgian interests.

157. *Marchés Tropicaux*, June 16, 1972.

158. The Continental Grain episode is discussed at length in Dan Morgan, *Merchants of Grain* (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), chap. 10.

159. *Marchés Tropicaux*, March 10, 1972; Pachter (see n. 137), p. 141. Pachter notes that the Ford plant "never materialized."

160. *Marchés Tropicaux*, June 30, 1972.

161. *Marchés Tropicaux*, December 22, 1972.

162. The literature on the Inga-Shaba disaster is substantial. See Jean-Claude Willame, *Zaïre, l'épopée d'Inga* (Paris: Harmattan, 1986); Katherine Dixon, "The Inga-Shaba Project: Disaster for Development Banks in Zaïre," *Country Notes* monograph series (Washington, D.C.: Center for Development Policy, 1982); Kwitny (n. 117), pp. 21-24.

163. On Westinghouse and Inga-Shaba, see Department of State cable, Kinshasa 5659, July 11, 1973. Released under FOIA to Jonathan Kwitny, who made it available to the author.

164. République du Zaïre, *Les Investissements des Etats-Unis en République du Zaïre*, (Kinshasa: Fédération Nationale des Chambres de Commerce, d'Industrie, et d'Agriculture de la République du Zaïre, 1972), p. 15-16.

165. *Marchés Tropicaux*, September 11, 1971.

166. Quoted from Vance (see n. 155), p. 214. Traditionally, the Congo's diamonds had been mined by the SG-controlled FORMINIERE company and its subsidiary Société Minière du Bakwanga (MIBA), which exploited the industrial diamonds in the Kasai region. Beginning in 1966, Mobutu reduced the role of the Belgians, while he expanded the role of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. Anglo purchased shares in MIBA. This purchase is significant since Anglo is controlled by the Oppenheimer family, which also controls the De Beers diamond cartel.

Tempelsman played an important role in establishing this new diamond arrangement. He reportedly counseled Mobutu, and as noted, he represented De Beers in the Congo. Moreover, the new arrangement improved Tempelsman's relationship with the De Beers cartel. According to *Fortune* magazine: "In helping Mobutu [with regard to the diamonds], of course, Tempelsman got something too. As he tells it, 'In our relationship with the CSO [the De Beers-controlled Central Selling Organization] we were obviously then able to negotiate favorable conditions on some of our [diamond purchases]'" (*Fortune*, November 15, 1982). And as mentioned in the text, Tempelsman played a direct role in marketing Congolese diamonds.

Additional information on these developments was obtained from an interview with former Tempelsman agent Mark Garsin (see n. 108). Also, see Edward Jay Epstein, *The Rise and Fall of Diamonds* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 87. For recent developments in the Congolese diamond industry, see articles in *Jewelers' Circular Keystone* and *Diamond World Review*.

167. See letter from Herman J. Cohen to Donald L. Woolf, August 23, 1971; Memorandum from Herman J. Cohen to Mr. Newsom, August 30, 1971. Both documents released by the Department of State under FOIA. On Morrison-Knudson, see *Fortune*, November 15, 1982, "Maurice Tempelsman's African Connections."

168. See *Fortune* magazine, November 15, 1982, "Maurice Tempelsman's African Connections."

169. The general literature on debt is by now very extensive. See, for example, E. A. Brett, *The World Economy since the War* (New York: Praeger, 1985), chap. 9; Barbara Stallings, *Banker to the Third World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); and Jeffrey Frieden, "Third World Indebted Industrialization: International Finance and State Capitalism in Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, and South Korea," *International Organization* 39, no. 3, 1981.

170. *Marchés Tropicaux*, November 20, 1971.

171. *Marchés Tropicaux*, April 13, 1973. The Inga-Shaba project probably involved Tempelsman, at least indirectly, since Tempelsman was performing consulting services for Morrison-Knudson, the principal contractor in Inga-Shaba. See *Fortune*, November 15, 1982.

172. Department of State cable, State 119246, June 6, 1974. Released under FOIA.

173. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 23, 1977. These loans, in turn, increased official U.S. interest in the Congo. The article also commented that "Another factor on the minds of U.S. officials . . . and one they do not emphasize publicly, involves U.S. financial interests [in the Congo] . . . 'Look into the bank loans' one State Department official advised. 'That's important to us. [']'"

174. Lundberg (see n. 116), p. 740.

175. Department of State, "Rockefeller briefing," n.d., (probably September 29, 1971). Released under FOIA.

176. *Marchés Tropicaux*, May 3, 1974; February 8, 1974; August 23, 1974.

177. Michel Struelens, "Confidential Memorandum—Not for Publication," February 1968, pp. 3-4, Marvin Leibman Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 105. Note that Struelens, a longtime Tshombe lobbyist, made the observation after extensive discussions with Belgian officials, including the foreign minister.

178. Department of State, Memorandum from Herman J. Cohen to Mr. Newsom, "Subject: Meeting with Belgian Foreign Minister—Briefing Memorandum," January 18, 1971. Released under FOIA.

179. A. Huybrechts, V. Y. Mudimbe, L. Peeters, J. Vanderlinden, D. van der Steen, B. Verhaegen, *Du Congo au Zaïre* (Brussels: Centre de Recherche et d'Informations Socio-Politiques, n.d.), p. 219. Note that the discussion of loans does not specify whether the figures include only commercial banks or if the figures also include loans by public institutions, such as the Export-Import Bank.

180. Huybrechts et al (see n. 179) provides comparative statistics on direct investment, but these are of little value since they did "not count several large investments." The quote was translated from the French. Figures for American investment in the Congo are available, but they are not consistent. The U.S. Department of Commerce, for example, estimates U.S. investment in the Congo in 1972 at forty-six million dollars, while a French business magazine gives a (much more plausible) figure of two hundred million dollars. See United States Department of Commerce, *Selected Data on U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 1950-76* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 202; and *Marchés Tropicaux*, July 20, 1973.

181. Jean-Claude Willame, "Les relations Belgo-Zaïroises: Réflexions sur une pratique de la politique étrangère," *Res Publica* (Belgium) 22, no. 3, 1980, p. 437. The article refers to a 1972 study undertaken by Congolese researchers.

182. The plant was the culmination of a longstanding controversy between the Italian ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) oil company and a group of four opposing companies. The latter, which included Texaco, Mobil, Shell, and (Belgian-owned) Petrofina, had dominated Congolese oil since colonial times. ENI was regarded as the interloper. In 1968 the feud was settled with an agreement that ENI would operate the new refinery in cooperation with the other four companies. For details see *Pétroleum Intelligence Weekly*, September 30, 1963; October 7, 1963; October 21, 1963; May 9, 1966; June 20, 1966; November 20, 1967; and August 12, 1968.

It should be noted that U.S. officials strongly disapproved of the Italian associa-

tions. An American official who had been in the Congo during the Kennedy era, recalled reprimanding Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula for working with ENI, instead of American oil companies: "I got angry with Adoula. I thought he should protect American interests . . . They got to him, the Italians" (quoted in Pachter [see n. 137], p. 158). The official's name is not identified.

183. *Africa Confidential*, May 3, 1974.

184. Young and Turner (see n. 4), p. 305.

185. Young and Turner (see n. 4), pp. 301-2.

186. Details can be found in *Marchés Tropicaux*, especially during the period 1968-74.

187. *Marchés Tropicaux*, February 11, 1972.

188. Huybrechts et al. (see n. 179), p. 219.

189. *Wall Street Journal*, April 23, 1981. The quote is from a company executive cited in the article.

190. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1972-73, pp. A61-A62.

191. Department of State, letter from Donald L. Woolf to Herman J. Cohen, March 31, 1971. Released under FOIA.

192. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1972-73, pp. A61-A62.

193. *Africa Confidential*, August 29, 1975.

194. *Wall Street Journal*, April 23, 1981. For a full study of this relationship, see

Theodore Trefon, "French Policy toward Zaïre during the Giscard d'Estaing Presidency," *Les Cahiers du CEDAF*, no. 1, 1989.

195. The author thanks Elise Pachter for making this point.

196. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1969-70, p. B411.

197. *Marchés Tropicaux*, September 25, 1971.

198. Young and Turner (see n. 4), chap. 10.

199. The 1977 revolt became known as "Shaba I." In this case foreign intervention involved Moroccan troops, French logistical support, and U.S. "nonlethal" aid.

200. Young and Turner (see n. 4), p. 71.

201. See Thomas Callaghy, "The International Community and Zaïre's Debt Crisis," in Nzongola-Ntalaja, ed., *The Crisis in Zaïre* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1986).

202. Figures on U.S. direct investment from United States Department of Commerce (see n. 180), p. 202; and United States Department of Commerce, *U.S. Direct Investment Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 37.

203. This incident became known as "Shaba II."

204. United States Department of Commerce (see n. 202), p. 37.

205. Young and Turner (see n. 4), p. 301. For the \$280 million figure, see *Fortune*, November 15, 1982.

206. *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1987-88, p. B230.

207. Both of these papers are cited in Michel Struelens, *The United Nations in the Congo—or ONUC—and International Politics* (Brussels: Max Arnold, 1976), p. 178.

208. Garsin (see n. 108).

Chapter Seven

1. Charles A. Beard, *The Idea of National Interest* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), pp. 116–17.
2. G. William Domhoff, "Corporate-Liberal Theory and the Social Security Act: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge," *Politics and Society* 15, no. 3, 1986–87.
3. Theda Skocpol, "A Brief Response," *Politics and Society* 15, no. 3, 1986–87. She acknowledges the existence of business supporters of the Social Security Act; however, Skocpol calls these supporters "maverick" businessmen and implies that they were only aberrations.
4. Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 13.
5. See *The New York Times*, February 16, 1961; and William Minter, "The Limits of Liberal Africa Policy: Lessons from the Congo Crisis," *Transafrica Forum* 2, no. 3, 1984, pp. 28–29.
6. George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 234.
7. Similarly, radical critics of U.S. policy in Africa assume that the United States invariably supports European colonialism and neocolonialism. Gabriel Kolko writes, "American policy toward Africa after World War Two had deferred to European interests, and the Eisenhower administration's desire for NATO unity and its fear of Communist infiltration . . . reinforced this commitment . . . The Kennedy administration was to continue the policy of deferring to its European allies and working through them in Africa as much as possible" (Gabriel Kolko, *Confronting the Third World* [New York: Pantheon, 1988], p. 191). The present author has provided evidence that the Kennedy administration did not generally defer to European interests in Africa.
8. Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of the Capitalist State," *New Left Review* no. 58, 1969, p. 73.
9. Poulantzas (see n. 8), p. 72. Emphasis in original deleted.
10. Krasner (see n. 4), p. 276.
11. See, for example, Krasner (n. 4), p. 221.
12. For an excellent analysis of foreign aid programs in general, see Robert E. Wood, "Foreign Aid and the Capitalist State in Underdeveloped Countries," *Politics and Society* 10, no. 1, 1980.
13. Richard D. Mahoney, *JFK: Ordeal in Africa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1983); chap. 1; Thomas J. Noer, *Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948–1968* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1985), chap. 4. Note also that the administration announced a new program of government subsidies to companies willing to invest in "poorer nations around the world" which presumably included those in Africa. See *Business Week*, June 3, 1961.
14. This view is expressed, for example, in Immanuel Wallerstein, "Africa, the United States, and the World Economy: The Historical Bases of American Policy," in Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed., *U.S. Policy toward Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1975).
15. Charles F. Darlington and Alice Darlington, *African Betrayal* (New York: David McKay, 1968), quotes from pp. 66, 67, 112. It is interesting that Assistant Secretary Williams also sought to reduce European influence in Africa. One of his memo-

randia stated, "Exclusive ties [between European and African countries], whether political or economic, weaken a government in the long run . . . Cultural domination [in Africa] by a single European country is likewise questionable" (Department of State Memorandum, June 26, 1964, G. Mennen Williams Papers, Box 29, RG 59, National Archives).

16. See Charles Darlington's biography in *Who's Who in America*, 1968–69. Mobil Oil (previously Socony-Vacuum) apparently had a more harmonious relationship with the Belgian administration in the Congo. See chapter 2. On details of Socony-Vacuum's anticolonial role in French Equatorial Africa and elsewhere, see David Gibbs, "Private Interests and International Conflict: A Case Study of U.S. Intervention in the Congo," Ph.D. diss., Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989, chap. 2.

17. Russell Warren Howe, *Along the African Shore* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1975), p. 143.

18. Howe (see n. 17), p. 152.

19. Howe (see n. 17), p. 151.

20. Howe (see n. 17), p. 132. Additional information on U.S.-French rivalries can be found in Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, *La Piscine: The French Secret Service since 1944* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), chaps. 9, 10, 14.

21. Henry Kerby, letter to the editor, *London Daily Telegraph*, August 2, 1962.

22. Also, the NATO alliance certainly tempered Kennedy's anticolonialism. Even Assistant Secretary Williams, a leading anticolonial figure, conceded that "the United States should supplement rather than supplant the former metropole[s]" in Africa (Department of State, Memorandum, November 6, 1962, G. Mennen Williams Papers, Box 29, RG 59, National Archives).

23. The author is aware that some revisionist historians claim that security interests were themselves derived from economic factors. According to the revisionists, the Cold War provided an excellent political rationale for U.S. overseas expansion. The goal of the Cold War was not anticommunism but economic expansion. On the other hand, this view remains controversial. Other researchers criticize the revisionists for a variety of empirical and theoretical reasons. It would go beyond this study to analyze these issues in detail. For purposes of argument, the traditional view—that anticommunism derives from security interests, and not from economic interests—is accepted in the present study. On the revisionist perspective, see Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), especially chap. 1. For a critique, see Robert James Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

24. However, South Africa, Ethiopia, and (possibly) Sudan have had communist parties of some importance. This was pointed out to the author by Michael Schatzberg.

25. MPLA stands for Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola. The Angolan case is discussed in *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1982–83, pp. B607–8. On Guinea, see William Attwood, *The Reds and the Blacks* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 14, 38–39, 124–125. On Ghana, see Mahoney (n. 13), chap. 6.

26. See, for example, Issa Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976); Crawford Young, "Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Class in

Africa: A Retrospective," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 26, no. 3, 1986; Crawford Young, "Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity," *Daedalus* 111, no. 2, 1982; Richard L. Sklar, "The Nature of Class Domination in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 17, no. 4, 1979; Nzongola-Ntalaja, "The State and Class Struggle in Zaïre," *Journal of African Marxists* 5, 1984.

27. For a synopsis of Nigeria, see John de St. Joré, *The Brothers' War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

28. Information on foreign involvement in Angola is from John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies* (New York: Norton, 1978), especially pp. 139, 191–92, 203–12; also Edward J. Epstein, *The Rise and Fall of Diamonds* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1982), pp. 215–16. Epstein writes that one Angolan political group, called the Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, "was backed by French oil interests."

29. Quoted in Gabriel Palma, "Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?" *World Development* 6, 1978, p. 914. See also Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 4, 1974, p. 412; and C. K. Webster, ed., *Britain and Latin American Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938).

30. David S. Painter, *Oil and the American Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 196.

31. Quote from Frank Snepp, *Decent Interval* (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 321. Snepp provides details of French diplomacy in Vietnam during the last months of the war. Additional information on U.S.-French conflict in Vietnam is provided by Alfred McCoy, Jr., *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 118–19. McCoy describes a little-known incident: "Between April 28 and May 3, 1955, the Binh Xuyen [a criminal gang] and the Vietnamese army (ARVN) fought a savage house-to-house battle for control of Saigon-Cholon. More troops were involved in this battle than in the Tet offensive of 1968, and the fighting was almost as destructive. . . . This battle had been a war by proxy; the Binh Xuyen and [Prime Minister Ngo Dinh] Diem's ARVN were stand-ins, mere pawns, in a power struggle between the French 2nd Bureau and the American CIA." McCoy further describes how the (CIA-supported) ARVN prevailed in this conflict, while the French and their Binh Xuyen bandits were defeated. It was this incident, rather than the more famous battle of Dien Bien Phu, that led to the French military departure from Indochina.

32. On continuing French involvement in Cambodia during the 1970s, see William Shawcross, *Sideshow* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1979).

33. Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986). See also Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); and Peter Peterson, "The Morning After," *Atlantic*, October 1987.

34. Rosecrance also assumes that free trade promotes peace. For reasons of brevity, the present study will accept this point. Other studies, however, have ques-

tioned the "pacific" nature of capitalism. See for example, Albert Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

35. At one point, Rosecrance writes: "The domestic society will be a less secure place. . . . Important segments of the American, Western European, and Japanese populations will have to consider spending long periods of time in other countries, much as Greek, Turkish, Mexican, Haitian, East Asian, Indian, and Pakistani populations do now. For those with international expertise and enterprise, the results could be much more satisfactory than mundane domestic life." Some may lack Rosecrance's sense of adventure. Those lacking "international expertise and experience" (or adequate savings and health insurance), might regard such travels with a sense of dread. See Rosecrance (n. 33), p. 225.

36. John Maynard Keynes, "National Self-Sufficiency," *Yale Review* 22, no. 4, 1933. For further discussion of these issues, see the introduction to Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

37. On recent economic trends, the best discussion is in Joyce Kolko, *Restructuring the World Economy* (New York: Pantheon, 1988).

38. Historically, high levels of protection have been associated with economic blocs. In the Great Depression of the 1930s, multilateral trade virtually ceased, and the world economy was broken up into a series of regional blocs. During the 1930s each bloc comprised several countries. Within blocs, trade proceeded more or less freely and was priced in regionally dominant currencies. Each bloc was relatively self-sufficient, however, and interbloc trade was limited or nonexistent. Throughout the depression, such blocs greatly reduced the level of international trade. On the 1930s, see Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

Note that in some respects, the world economy also functioned this way during the end of the nineteenth century. See Peter Gourevitch, "International Trade, Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873–96," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 8, no. 2, 1977.

39. Charles Meissner of Chemical Bank, quoted in Jeffrey Frieden, *Banking on the World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 178.

40. Meissner, quoted in Frieden (see n. 39), pp. 178–79.

41. Under such conditions, it is also likely that core countries would emerge within each bloc. The newly industrialized countries, such as Korea and Brazil, could function as secondary core countries within their respective blocs; alternatively, they could be "deindustrialized" by more powerful countries and assume a subordinate function. There are historical precedents for this kind of forced deindustrialization. Germany pursued policies which, during the 1930s, helped preclude industrialization in the Balkan region. During this period, the Balkans constituted a German sphere of influence. See Albert Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

42. On recent French intervention, see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, October 18, 1986, "The Long Arm of the French Navy"; and Theodore Trefon, "French Policy toward Zaïre during the Giscard d'Estaing Presidency," *Cahiers du CEDAFA*, no. 1, 1989.

43. Admiral C. A. H. Trost, letter to the editor, *New York Times*, January 1, 1990.
 44. See editorial in the *New York Times*, December 18, 1989. It is also worth noting that throughout the 1980s, military procurements have focused very heavily on Third World interventionism. Similarly, military doctrine has gradually shifted from an emphasis on conventional warfare with the USSR to unconventional "low intensity conflict" in the Third World. See Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties* (New York: Pantheon, 1988).

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Freedom of Information Act

Some two thousand pages of State Department documents were declassified at the author's request under the Freedom of Information Act. Most of these can now be obtained on microfiche cards (at low cost) from the State Department. Readers who wish to order the materials should write to the Office of Information and Privacy, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. Note that the microfiche series numbers are as follows: 8503216, 8503217, 8503218 Section I, and 8503218 Section II. Additional materials (of considerably less value) were released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Commerce. The author does not know whether these are available on microfiche.

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| | <i>West Africa</i> |

Interviews

- GEORGE BALL, former undersecretary of state
 ROBERT BIELSKAS, executive with Farrell Lines shipping company
 ROBERT BLAKE, former U.S. foreign service officer in Leopoldville
 MONSIGNOR ROLAND BONDOLON, former employee with Catholic Relief Services
 ARNAUD DE BOURCHGRAVE, former correspondent, *Newsweek*
 JAMES BOYD, former aide to Senator Thomas Dodd
 MARYANNE CALLAHAN, assistant to Torgay Astrom, president of U.S. affiliate of the Bolidens Gruv copper company
 HERMAN J. COHEN, former U.S. foreign service officer, Leopoldville
 WESLEY COHEN, assistant professor of economics, Carnegie-Mellon University
 CHARLES DERECKEY, Sr., former freelance journalist in the Congo
 FREDERICK G. DUTTON, former assistant secretary of state for congressional affairs
 MARK GARSIN, former employee, Leon Tempelsman and Son
 EDMUND GULLION, former U.S. ambassador to the Congo
 DAVID HEAPS, former official with the Ford Foundation in the Congo
 ADAM HOCHSCHILD, son of the late Harold Hochschild, president of American Metal Climax copper company
 RUSSELL WARREN HOWE, former Africa correspondent, *Washington Post*
 THOMAS HUGHES, former director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
 MARGARET JONES, desk officer for Zaire, Department of State
 HELEN KITCHEN, director of African studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies
 MARVIN LEIBMAN, former activist with the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters
 DOUGLAS MACARTHUR II, former U.S. ambassador to Belgium
 ROBERT MCNAMARA, former president of the World Bank and former secretary of defense
 VICTOR MARCHETTI, former CIA officer
 GEORGE C. MCGHEE, former assistant secretary of state for political affairs
 NZONGOLA-NIALAJA, associate professor of African studies, Howard University
 CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, former director of UN operations in Katanga
 BRUCE OUBES, former correspondent for *Time* magazine
 JOHN PAYNE, Jr., former vice president of American Metal Climax
 WALT WHITMAN ROSTOW, former White House advisor
 MONTEAGLE STEARNS, former foreign service officer, Leopoldville
 JOHN STOCKWELL, former CIA officer, Elisabethville
 SHELDON VANCE, former director of the Office of Central African Affairs, in the Department of State, and former ambassador to Congo/Zaire
 JEAN VUILLEQUEZ, former executive with American Metal Climax
 G. MENNEN WILLIAMS, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs

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
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